Sweden’s seventh national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management

Sweden’s seventh national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention

SOU och Ds kan köpas från Norstedts Juridiks kundservice. Beställningsadress: Norstedts Juridik, Kundservice, 106 47 Stockholm Ordertelefon: 08-598 191 90 E-post: kundservice@nj.se Webbadress: www.nj.se/offentligapublikationer För remissutsändningar av SOU och Ds svarar Norstedts Juridik AB på uppdrag av Regeringskansliets förvaltningsavdelning. Svara på remiss – hur och varför Statsrådsberedningen, SB PM 2003:2 (reviderad 2009-05-02). En kort handledning för dem som ska svara på remiss. Häftet är gratis och kan laddas ner som pdf från eller beställas på regeringen.se/ remisser Cover: SSM Upper left: Disassembly of Co-60 source holder at Cyclife Sweden AB, Non-Nuclear Department. Upper right: Sweden’s spent fuel will be disposed of in a geological repository at approximately 470 metres depth, and the licensing process is ongoing. Lower left: Spent fuel is stored in underground pools in the central interim storage facility, Clab, for at least 30 years before encapsulation and eventual disposal. Lower right: Responsibility of the licence holder.

Graphic design: Granath Printed by Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm 2020 Stockholm 2020

ISBN 978-91-38-25099-0 ISSN 0284-6012

Sweden’s seventh national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention

F.4 Article 24: Operational radiation protection 85 L.3 National Report Preparation Team 166 F.5 Article 25: Emergency preparedness 89

Kronologisk förteckning 168 Systematisk förteckning 169 G.1 Article 4: General safety requirements 103 G.2 Article 5: Existing facilities 108

List of Figures

Figure A1 Nuclear facilities in Sweden. 16 Figure D2 The Clab facility. 44 Figure A2 The system for managing spent nuclear fuel Figure D3 Standardised types of packages used for and radioactive waste. 17 radioactive waste. 46 Figure A3 Basic requirements and general obligations of licensees. 19 Figure D4 The melting facility (SMA) at Cyclife Sweden AB. 47 Figure A4 Storage pool in Clab. The top edge of the spent Figure D6 The shallow land burial at OKG. 50 fuel is eight metres below the water surface. 24 Figure D5 Radionuclide-specific activity content in SFR. The Figure A5 The KBS-3-method for disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 25 data reflects the situation as at 31 December 2018. 50 Figure A6 Estimated general timetable for establishment Figure D7 Schematic overview of the nuclear power of the spent fuel repository and Clink based on the companies’ and SKB’s timetables for decommissioning current status of the licensing process for KBS-3. 26 (F0 and O0 are shared facilities on the sites). 53 Figure A7 The facilities at Studsvik. 27 Figure E1 Process for licensing of nuclear facilities that is Figure A8 Decommissioning of the R2 research and materials applicable to the spent nuclear fuel repository and testing reactor at Studsvik. 28 encapsulation plant. 65 Figure A9 Photo from the top of the silo in SFR and an Figure E2 The stepwise process of regulatory authorisation illustration of the design. Waste packages are and supervision following a Swedish Government placed in shafts in the silo. 28 decision on licensing of a nuclear facility. 66 Figure A11 The existing facility in Forsmark for short-lived low Figure E3 The present organisation of SSM (1 April 2020). 69 and intermediate level operational radioactive waste, Figure E4 SSM’s management system process scheme. 70 SFR (the silo and vaults in the upper right-hand part Figure E5 Supervisory programme structure. 71 of the figure) and the planned extension (lower left). Figure E6 Fundamental aspects of baseline supervision. 72 The extended SFR will consist of four additional Figure F1 SKB’s ‘House’, the entrance to the management system. 83 waste vaults for low-level waste (2–5 BLA), one additional waste vault for intermediate level waste Figure F2 Description in principle of how the Waste Management (2BMA) and one waste vault for segmented reactor Process works, but not the exact description in the pressure vessels (1BRT). 29 main process in SKB’s management system. 84 Figure F3 Estimated effective dose (µSv) to the representative Figure A10 Timetable for low and intermediate level waste person in the critical group from releases of radioactive and decommissioning of the nuclear power plants. 29 substances from sites with operating NPPs. 89 Figure A12 Illustration of the current concept for SFL as a Figure F4 Effective dose (µSv) to the representative person geological repository with two different sections. in the critical group. Releases from Barsebäck NPP, Metallic waste from the nuclear power plants is Studsvik site, Ranstad site and Westinghouse fuel placed in a waste vault (BHK) designed with a concrete fabrication plant. 89 barrier, and legacy waste is placed in a waste vault (BHA) designed with a bentonite barrier. An evaluation Figure F5 The Swedish national structure for emergency of the post-closure safety for this design was preparedness and response for nuclear emergencies. 91 presented in 2019. 30 Figure F6 Alarm sequence for an emergency event at a Figure A13 The Äspö HRL with ongoing (bold) and concluded Swedish nuclear facility. 92 (italics) experiments. 31 Figure F7 Sweden’s national expert response organisation Figure A14 Friction stir welding of copper lids. The image to for nuclear and radiological emergencies. 93 the left shows Canister Laboratory equipment for Figure F8 New monitoring stations around the Forsmark development, and the image to the right shows NPP (the insert shows a monitoring station). 93 the rotating tool that is pressed into the joint Figure L1 This report has been produced by a working group between the parts that are to be combined. 33 of representatives from the Swedish Radiation Figure A15 The Multi-purpose Test Facilities at Äspö. The photo Safety Authority (SSM) and with the support of the shows the testing of a self-positioning robot for Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management backfilling a deposition tunnel with bentonite blocks. 33 Company (SKB). The team collaborates while Figure D1 Reactor top and pools at one of the Swedish reactors. 44 keeping distance to avoid the spread of covid-19. 167

List of Tables

Table A1 Joint Convention Reporting Provisions. 11 Table A2 Revised overview of the Swedish programme for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. 12 Table B1 Waste classification scheme used by the Swedish nuclear industry. 39 Table D1 Inventory of spent fuel in NPP pools. 44 Table D2 Inventory of spent fuel stored in Clab as at 31 Dec. 2019. 45 Table D3 Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 temporarily stored at Studsvik. 45 Table D4 Waste treatment methods at Swedish NPPs. 46 Table D5 Inventory of stored radioactive waste in AM as at 31 Dec. 2019. 48 Table D6 Inventories of radioactive waste dispwosed of in SFR as at 31 Dec. 2018. 49 Table D7 Inventories of waste disposed of in shallow land burials. The burial facilities at Studsvik (AB Svafo) are closed permanently. 51 Table D8 Nuclear facilities under decommissioning. 51 Table E1 SSM’s competence supply model. 73 Table E2 Budget of SSM in million SEK (1 SEK is about 0.1 euro). 74 Table F1 Radiation dose data for staff at Clab during the period 2012–2018. 88 Table F2 Swedish nuclear facilities by emergency preparedness category. 96

Foreword

The requirements of the Joint Convention on the Safety of has been secured through the nuclear waste fund for the

Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive continued monitoring of a legacy mine tailings deposit.

Waste Management have for a long time been incorporated A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) was decided by in the Swedish system for spent fuel and radioactive waste the Swedish Parliament on 26 April 2018 and entered into management. The Swedish Government judged at the time force on 1 June 2018. The new Act transposes several key of signing the Joint Convention in 1997 that national provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/ Euratom laying policy and legislation as well as the safety work conducted down basic safety standards for protection against the by the licensees and the authorities in Sweden were in dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation. compliance with the obligations of the Convention.

Sweden has completed a first round of international peer The Swedish nuclear programme is in a phase of change reviews, with a full scope IAEA IRRS in 2012 and a with regard to new requirements on safety improvements follow- up mission in 2016. The Swedish Government has for the continued operation of nuclear reactors and the officially requested the IAEA to carry out a new IRRS to shutdown and immediate decommissioning of other Sweden in autumn 2022, followed by an ARTEMIS mission reactors. Of Sweden’s thirteen nuclear reactors, six reactors on Sweden’s waste management programme in spring 2023. at the Forsmark, Ringhals and Oskarshamn sites have plans

for long-term operation beyond 2020. The Ågesta reactor This report has been produced by a working group of

has been shut down since 1974, the two reactors in representatives from the Swedish Radiation Safety

Barsebäck since 1999/2005, while in 2015 the utilities Authority (SSM) and with the support of the Swedish

decided also to permanently shut down the four oldest Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), see

electricity-producing reactors at Oskarshamn and Ringhals section L3. Other fuel cycle facilities and waste management

before the end of 2020. Following the development of organisations have also been consulted with and have

new regulatory conditions for decommissioning, the review provided information.

and approval of licensees’ safety reporting and issued The report is designed for good screen readability. This environmental permits, actual large-scale dismantling increases its accessibility, while also reducing the need to make activities will commence at the Ågesta, Barsebäck and a printout. This is beneficial from an environmental aspect. Oskarshamn sites in 2020.

Pursuant to the requirements of the Joint Convention, Since Sweden’s sixth national report under the Joint Sweden submits its Seventh National Report on the Convention, progress has also been made in the licensing fulfilment of obligations under the Convention and of final disposal facilities. The applications for an encapsulaaccounts for developments since the Sixth Review Meeting. tion plant and a deep geological repository for spent nuclear Sweden reaffirms its commitment and continues to comply fuel from Swedish reactors, as well as for an extension of with the Joint Convention. the existing repository for low- and intermediate level waste

(SFR) to receive reactor decommissioning waste, have been Stockholm, 10 September 2020

reviewed and statements and recommendations have been

forwarded to the Swedish Government for licensing decisions.

Remediation activities at the former Ranstad uranium mine and treatment facility were completed in 2019 with a decision Isabella Lövin

to release the site from regulatory requirements. Financing Minister for Environment and Climate

Foreword 9

Section A – Introduction

A.1 Purpose and structure of this report

of Sweden. It constitutes an updated document with the

same basic structure as the previous national reports under Sweden signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of the terms of the Joint Convention, and reflects develop- Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive ments in Sweden up to 31 December 2019 unless stated Waste Management (hereinafter ‘Joint Convention’) on 29 otherwise. The report will be subject to review in May September 1997. Sweden ratified the Joint Convention 2021 at the Seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting approximately two years later and has been a Contracting Parties in Vienna. Party to the Joint Convention since 29 July 1999. The Joint

Convention entered into force on 18 June 2001. The report’s format and content follow the guidelines for

structure and content of national reports, as agreed at the Each member state that has ratified the Joint Convention Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Joint (Contracting Party) is obligated to prepare a national report Convention, held in May 2005 (taking into account covering the scope of the Joint Convention and to subject subsequent revisions). The sections in this report have the the report to review by other Contracting Parties at review same titles as in these guidelines, thus facilitating review by meetings held in Vienna, Austria. Sweden has participated other Contracting Parties. Table A1 provides cross in all review meetings since the First Review Meeting was reference between the sections in this report and the held in November 2003. The present report is the seventh specific reporting provisions of the Joint Convention. Swedish National Report under the Joint Convention.

Section A provides a broad overview of the Swedish waste This report meets the requirements of the Joint Convention management system, including a brief account of for reporting on the status of safety at spent fuel and important developments since the last national report. radioactive waste management facilities within the borders

Table A1 Joint Convention Reporting Provisions.

National Report Section Joint Convention Section

A. Introduction –

B. Policies and Practices Article 32, Paragraph 1

C. Scope of Application Article 3

D. Inventories and Lists Article 32, Paragraph 2

E. Legislative and Regulatory Systems Articles 18–20

F. General Safety Provisions Articles 4–9, 11–16 and 21–26

G. Safety of Spent Fuel Management Articles 4–10

H. Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Articles 11–17

I. Transboundary Movement Article 27

J. Disused Sealed Sources Article 28

K. General Measures to Improve Safety Multiple Articles

L. Annexes Multiple Articles

Section A – Introduction 11

Section A also includes a summary of highlights and issues – Safety implications of long-term management of spent raised with regard to the Swedish report and presentation fuel, see section K.2.4. during the Sixth Review Meeting, held 21 May to 1 June – Linking long-term management and disposal of disused 2018, and a list of issues Sweden was asked to report on in sealed radioactive sources, see sections A.4, A.5.3, D.1.4, its seventh national report. B.1.2.2, J and K.3.2.1. At the Sixth Review Meeting it was agreed to address four – Remediation of legacy sites and facilities, see sections topics in the National Reports for the next Review A.4, D.1.5.6, E.2.1.4, F.4.2.2, F.6 and K.3.1.6. Meeting. These topics are discussed as follows in the current report:

– Implementation of national strategies for spent fuel and A.2 Overview matrix

radioactive waste management, see sections A.8, B.1.2, In order to provide continuity from the second review D.1.1, G.1.2, G.5.2, G.5.3.2 and K.1.1 (spent fuel) and meeting, the rapporteur’s overview matrix has been revised A.9.3.2, A.9.4, B.1.2, D.1.3, H, K.1.2 and K.3.2.1 and supplemented with references to explanatory sections (nuclear fuel cycle wastes). of the report in Table A2 below.

Table A2 Revised overview of the Swedish programme for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

Long-term Type of liability Funding of liabilities Current practice/ facilities Planned facilities management policy

Stored on site initially, then NPP licensees responsible. Funded by fees on nuclear transferred to the central Licence application for an Shared obligations for cost energy production, accumu- interim storage facility (Clab) encapsulation plant and a Spent fuel calculations and development lated in segregated funds (the pending disposal. Reviews of spent nuclear fuel repository of disposal solutions. Strategy Nuclear Waste Fund). the adequacy of funding every pending Government decision. in place for disposal. three years.

See section A.5, A.8.2, B.1.1, E, K.3.1.3 A.6.4, E.2.1.4 A.8.2.1, B.1.2, D.1.1, G.1.2 A.8.2.2, G.5.2, G.5.3.2, K.1.1

Licence application for

Mainly funded by fees on extension of the existing Short-lived LILW disposal NPP licensees responsible. nuclear energy production, repository for short-lived LILW at existing repository (SFR); Shared obligations for cost accumulated in the Nuclear (SFR) pending Government Nuclear fuel shallow land burial for shortcalculations and development Waste Fund. Disposal of short- decision. Long-lived LILW to cycle wastes lived VLLW are present at NPP of disposal solutions. Strategy lived operational LILW (SFR) be disposed of in the planned sites. Reviews of the adequacy in place for disposal. from NPPs, paid for directly by repository for long-lived LILW of funding every three years. owners. (SFL). Licence application

expected in 2031.

A.8.3.1, B.1.2, D.1.3, D.1.4, See section A.5, A.8.3, B.1.1, E.2.7 A.6.4, E.2.1.4, F.2.1.2 A.8.3.2, H, K.1.2 H.1, H.2

Licence application for

extension of the existing Disposal at fuel cycle waste repository for short-lived LILW Financed by producers/ repository (SFR) or interim (SFR) pending Government Non-power Disposal at fuel cycle waste owners of waste. Government storage pending disposal in decision. Long-lived LILW to wastes facilities when appropriate. funding available for legacy the planned repository for be disposed of in the planned wastes. long-lived LILW and nuclear repository for long-lived LILW fuel cycle waste (SFL). (SFL). Licence application

expected in 2031.

See section A.5, B.1.2.2, E.2.1.2, K.3.2.1 A.6.4, E.2.1.4, K.3.2.1 A.8.3.1, D.1.4.1, K.3.2.1 A.5.3, H, K.3.2.1

Licence application for

extension of the existing

repository for short-lived Preliminary plans for decom- LILW (SFR) to accommodate Mainly funded by fees on missioning exist for all nuclear radioactive waste from nuclear energy production facilities, with more detailed decommissioning of nuclear Decommissioning Licensee is responsible. (NPPs) or other fees (FCF), plans for those approaching or facilities pending Government accumulated in the Nuclear undergoing decommissioning. decision. Long-lived LILW to Waste Fund. Reviews of the adequacy of be disposed of in the planned funding every three years. repository for long-lived LILW

(SFL). Licence application

expected in 2031.

A.4, D.1.5, D.1.6, F.6, G.6.1.7, See section A.4, A.6., E.2.1.1, F.6, G.4 A.6.4, E.2.1.4, F.2.1.2, F.6 A.8.3.2, H, K.1.2 G.6.2.7, K.2.1

Returned to manufacturer Financed by producers/ To be disposed of in reposor disposed of in SFR or in Disused sealed owners of waste. Government itories for nuclear fuel cycle Returned to manufacturer. interim storage pending sources funding available for orphan wastes, SFR or SFL (if not disposal in the planned reposisources. returned to the manufacturer). tory for long-lived LILW (SFL).

See section J.1 J.1 J.1 J.1

12 Section A – Introduction

A.3 Summary of results from the A.4 Summary of developments since the previous review previous report

In the period prior to the sixth review meeting, Sweden This section briefly summarises key developments in received 114 questions on the report from 21 countries. Sweden’s waste management programme since the Sixth The questions touched upon several articles of the Joint Review Meeting under the Joint Convention. Convention. Key areas addressed included the conse-

Reactor decommissioning

quences of decommissioning for storage and disposal, In October 2015, the nuclear power plant licensees decided ongoing licensing processes for disposal facilities, plans for to permanently shut down the four oldest reactors at disposal of long-lived waste and operational experiences Oskarshamn (BWR units 1 and 2) and Ringhals (BWR unit related to the repository for low- and intermediate level 1 and PWR unit 2) before the end of 2020. The Oskarswaste (SFR) at Forsmark. All the questions were answered hamn units were permanently shut down in 2017, Ringhals on the Joint Convention website and commented on at the unit 2 in 2019 and unit 1 is in preparation for shutdown review meeting. before the end of 2020. Preparatory decommissioning During the discussion at the review meeting, it was agreed activities have been carried out at the two shut down that Sweden seems to comply well with the obligations of Oskarshamn units, the two BWR units at Barsebäck that the Joint Convention. The Good Practice on Sweden’s were shut down in 1999 and 2005 and at the Ågesta progress towards a fully-operational deep geological PHWR shut down in 1974. These include the segmentarepository for spent fuel, first identified at the fifth review tion of reactor internals and radiological characterisation meeting, was reiterated. work. An interim storage facility for reactor internals was

established on the Barsebäck site in 2015. The review further acknowledged several Areas of Good Performance including: In late 2019, the Oskarshamn, Barsebäck and Ågesta

– provisions for stakeholder involvement, reactors had all received environmental licences for decommissioning and the regulatory approval of safety – the funding system for radioactive waste and spent fuel reports and radiological monitoring programmes. The large management, scale dismantling work that will commence in 2020 has to – the development of an upgraded safety culture and follow a work breakdown structure with required notificafacility ageing management programme, and tions to the regulatory authority before the start of each – development of a national strategy for management in work package. the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The dismantling of Studsvik’s R2 materials testing reactors started in February 2015 and is, after some delay, planned A number of Challenges were discussed for future to be finalised in 2020, aiming for the free release of the development as regards management of spent fuel and facility. See also sections D.1.1, D.1.5.5 and F.6. radioactive waste, including:

– completing the licensing for construction and operation Ranstad legacy site remediation

of the encapsulation plant and the spent fuel disposal The decommissioning and site remediation of the Ranstad facility and for the extension of the SFR repository for uranium mining and milling facility that started in 2010 has low- and intermediate level waste, been completed after the dismantling of the processing plant in 2017 and the subsequent radiological controls and – addressing issues related to decommissioning of nuclear preparations for site release. The regulator, the Swedish reactors, Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), decided in 2019 on the – management of regulatory competences, and free release of the industrial site from regulatory require-

– handling of non-conformities at the SFR facility. ments. See sections A.5.1 and D.1.5.6.

The rapporteur’s report also included a specific Suggestion Licence applications for spent fuel disposal facilities

to complete the implementation of actions arisen from the In 2011, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management IRRS follow-up mission in 2016, specifically: Company (SKB) submitted its licence applications for an encapsulation plant in Oskarshamn and a deep geological – provision to maintain competence for nuclear safety and repository for spent fuel in Forsmark. The Land and radiation protection on a national level, and Environment Court has examined SKB’s application under – the systematic evaluation of operational experience the Environmental Code, with a systems approach that from non-nuclear facilities and radiation protection cover both facilities. The regulatory authority, SSM, has events and activities, including dissemination of all reviewed SKB’s applications under the Act on Nuclear significant experience. Activities. In June 2016, SSM submitted a statement to the Court based on the outcome of the Authority’s review, These challenges and suggestions are discussed in section stating the conclusion that the proposed sites and facilities K.1 in this report. have the potential to comply with radiation safety requirements and regulations. SSM also participated in the Court’s

Section A – Introduction 13

consultation process which included giving independent review of SKB’s revised cost estimates (Plan 2016), the

testimony in a five-week public court hearing in October Government in December 2017 decided on the financial

2017. guarantees and nuclear waste fees (that are set per delivered

kilowatt-hour of electricity generated) to be provided by In January 2018, both SSM and the Court submitted final the nuclear power plant licensees to the Nuclear Waste review statements to the Government for licensing Fund for the years 2018 through 2020. decisions. SSM recommended the approval of SKB’s

application for a licence to possess, construct and operate On 1 September 2018, the regulatory responsibility for

an encapsulation plant and a final repository under the the review of cost estimates changed from SSM to the

nuclear activities act. The Court on the other hand stated National Debt Office. The Debt Office is currently

that SKB should present further documentation clarifying reviewing SKB’s latest cost estimates (Plan 2019), that will

the long-term integrity of the copper canisters, for the serve as a basis for the Government’s decision on financial

repository to be considered permissible according to the guarantees and nuclear waste fees for the nuclear power

environmental legislation. plants for the period 2021 through 2023. In December

2019, the Debt Office decided on the nuclear waste fees In April 2019, SKB submitted supplementary information and financial guarantees for other nuclear licensees, such as requested by the Government, including results from further nuclear fuel cycle and waste management facilities, for the experimental and theoretical studies. In a public consultaperiod 2020 through 2022. See also sections A.8.3 and tion, stakeholders were given the possibility to state their E.2.1.4. opinions. SSM, after a thorough technical review of the new

material, reiterated its earlier statement to the Government Orphan sources control

that SKB’s preferred site is suitable, the disposal concept is During the years 2016 through 2018, SSM was allocated

feasible and the safety case fulfils strict regulatory require- SEK 11 million to conduct a campaign relating to the

ments. See also sections A.9.4.1, A.10.2 and K.1.1. treatment and storage of radiation sources from disused

smoke detectors for industrial use that have been incor-

Licence application for an extension of the SFR disposal facility

rectly delivered to recycling centres. In total, more than a In 2014, SSM received a licence application for an hundred thousand sources were taken care of by SSM’s extension of the final repository for short-lived low and contracted waste treatment company, Cyclife. SSM’s intermediate level waste at Forsmark (SFR) so that it can funding for enabling control and safe management of also accommodate decommissioning waste. SSM in 2019 orphan sources and certain legacy waste from non-nuclear finalised its review and participated in the Land and activities continues from 2019 with an annual budget of Environment Court’s public hearing and consultation SEK 3.0 million. See also sections E.2.1.4 and J. process. In October of the same year, SSM submitted its

final statement to the Government recommending the Legislative changes

approval of SKB’s proposed extension and continued On 1 June 2018, a new Radiation Protection Act with

operation of the facility. In November also the Land and Ordinance and eleven new SSM regulations came into

Environment Court recommended the Government to force. These implement the European Council Directive

approve the license applications. See sections A.9.4.2, H.5.2 2013/59/Euratom (BSS) on radiation protection. See

and K.1.2. section E.2.3.

Review of SKB’s twelfth RD&D programme Amendments to the Act on Nuclear Activities entered into

In September 2019, SKB, on behalf of the nuclear power force on 1 August 2017. These changes, implementing the

plant licence holders, submitted its twelfth tri-annual EU’s revised nuclear safety directive, 2009/71/Euratom,

research, development and demonstration (RD&D) clarify the licensee’s responsibility for safety and that safety

programme for the management of spent nuclear fuel and must be continuously evaluated and verified. New provi-

nuclear waste to SSM for evaluation. Based on its review, sions are also introduced to give the regulatory authority

including a public consultation process, SSM concluded insight into how the licensee ensures that contractors and

that the 2019 programme fulfils the statutory requirements. suppliers meet the safety requirements.

In its statement of March 2020, the Authority recom- In March 2019, a Government-appointed inquiry reported mended the Government’s approval, with certain proposed on a review of the national nuclear legislation. The inquiry conditions that SKB take into account SSM’s review proposes that the current Act on Nuclear Activities be comments in the continued development of the repealed and replaced by a new act based upon the programme. See sections A.8.2, G.1.2.1, G.1.3.1, H.1.2.1, structure of the new Radiation Protection Act. Certain H.1.3.1, and K.2.2. new provisions are proposed on clarifying the responsibili-

Changes in the financing system for decommissioning, nuclear ties of nuclear licence holders and operators with regard to waste management and disposal waste management, decommissioning and the stepwise

A revision of the Act (2006:647) and Ordinance licensing process for new facilities. A specific proposal is to

(2017:1179) on Financing of Management of Residual formalise the state’s subsidiary responsibility for nuclear

Products from Nuclear Activities came into force on 1 activities and ultimate responsibility for a closed geological

December 2017 in order to further reduce the state’s repository. This proposal was taken into a special consider-

financial risk. Based on the changed legislation and SSM’s ation by the Government and sent to the Parliament. The

14 Section A – Introduction

A.5 Overall context of Sweden’s

Government bill was adopted on 10 June 2020 and will

enter into force 1 November 2020. The rest of the

programme for nuclear and radioactive

proposals from the inquiry will be taken into consideration

in the coming years. See section E.2.7. waste management

A.5.1 Generation of spent nuclear fuel and

Major revision of SSM regulations

radioactive waste

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority in 2013 initiated a Spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste emanates mainly from major multi-objective revision of its regulations promulthe twelve electricity-producing nuclear power reactors gated in the SSM Regulatory Code, SSMFS. The revision located at four sites in southern Sweden: Barsebäck, addresses recommendations from the 2012 IRRS review Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals. Nine of these regarding consistency of the Swedish regulatory reactors are of BWR type (ASEA-ATOM design), three framework with IAEA Safety Standards. It also takes into are of PWR type (Westinghouse design). All of these account the implementation of the European Union reactors were taken into commercial operation between nuclear safety, waste management and BSS directives, as 1972 and 1985. The two BWR units B1 and B2 at the well as WENRA’s applicable safety reference levels. An Barsebäck site were shut down permanently in 1999 and important goal of the revision is to clarify and broaden the 2005, respectively. The two oldest BWR units O1 and O2 regulations in order to create more predictability for the at the Oskarshamn site were permanently shut down in licensees and to improve the regulatory support. 2015 and 2016. Of the two oldest units at the Ringhals site,

The first of the new regulations in the established structure R1 (BWR) was permanently shut down in 2019 and a

entered into force in June 2018. Key regulations governing decision has been taken to permanently shut down R2

nuclear power reactors are expected to come into force in (PWR) in 2020.

2021, followed by corresponding regulations on fuel cycle Other fuel cycle facilities include the Westinghouse fuel and waste management facilities, while applying a graded fabrication plant in Västerås and the former uranium approach. New regulations on nuclear waste management, mining and milling facility in Ranstad. The Ranstad facility currently subject to consultations, are expected to come was constructed and operated in the 1960s. The uranium into force in 2021. See section K.2.5. open-cast mine and the mill tailings deposits were restored

Euratom directives’ reporting and covered in the 1990s. The industrial facility has been

In December 2017, Sweden submitted its third report to free-released from regulatory requirements since 2019.

the European Commission under Council Directive Spent fuel from the nuclear power reactors is shipped to 2006/117/Euratom on the supervision and control of the centralised storage facility, Clab, close to the Oskarshipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. shamn nuclear power plant, which has been in operation

In August 2018, Sweden submitted its second report to the since 1985.

European Commission on the implementation of Council Short-lived low- and intermediate level operational waste is Directive 2011/70/Euratom establishing a Community disposed of in the repository for low and intermediate framework for the responsible and safe management of level short-lived waste, SFR, in Forsmark, Östhammar spent fuel and radioactive waste. A revision of the Swedish municipality. SFR was commissioned in 1988 and is National Programme under the Directive, first notified to situated close to the Forsmark nuclear power plant. the Commission in 2015 and kept up-to-date by SSM, is planned for 2020. See also section A.7. Long-lived low- and intermediate level waste is stored at

the nuclear power plants, in Clab or at the Studsvik site.

Peer review missions

Spent fuel and nuclear waste emanates also from three Sweden has completed a first round of international peer research reactors and the first prototype nuclear power reviews, with a full scope IAEA IRRS (Integrated Regulareactor (PHWR) in Ågesta, which was in operation tory Review Service) review in 2012 and a follow-up between 1963 and 1974 and mainly used for district mission in 2016. The follow-up mission concluded that the heating in a suburb of Stockholm. The oldest research Swedish system for nuclear safety and radiation protection reactor R1, situated in Stockholm, was in operation is solid and continues to show good progress. The Swedish between 1954 and 1970. Two additional research reactors Government has officially requested the IAEA to carry out R2 and R2-0, situated in Studsvik, were in operation a new IRRS to Sweden in autumn 2022, followed by an between 1960 and 2005. Studsvik is the centre for nuclear ARTEMIS mission in spring 2023 on Sweden’s waste research activities and hosts facilities for nuclear fuel and management programme. See sections A.11.4 and K.4. materials testing as well as facilities for waste treatment and

European Spallation Source storage.

The European Spallation Source ERIC (ESS) has during Radioactive waste originates also from medical use, the period 30 June 2017 to 15 July 2019 prepared an industry, research and consumer products. There are application for trial operation of the normal conducting thousands of activities outside the nuclear fuel cycle where linear accelerator part of the ESS facility. For the moment ionising radiation is used for different purposes; at there is an ongoing review at the Swedish Radiation Safety hospitals, educational and research facilities, non-nuclear Authority (SSM) of this application, see section A.8.1.8. industries and so forth. These activities generate relatively

Section A – Introduction 15

Nuclear Facilities in Sweden

Boiling Water Reactor (ASEA-Atom)

Pressurized Water Reactor (Westinghouse) Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Other facilities Forsmark 3

Permanently Shut down SFR Final repository for radioactive operational waste

Westinghouse Stockholm Electric Sweden AB Ågesta Fuel fabrication facility Vattenfall AB Ågesta PHWR Ranstad AB Studsvik Nuclear AB, Uranium recovery facility AB Svafo, Radiologically cleared Cyclife Sweden AB Facilities for fuel and materials testing, waste management and storage Gothenburg Ringhals 1 Ringhals 2 Ringhals 3 Ringhals 4

Oskarshamn 1 Oskarshamn 2 Barsebäck 1 Oskarshamn 3 Clab Barsebäck 2 Central interim storage Malmo facility for spent fuel

Figure A1 Nuclear facilities in Sweden.

small volumes of radioactive waste compared to the A.5.2 National policy and fundamental principles volumes generated within the nuclear fuel cycle. Arrange- Fundamental principles for the management of spent fuel ments are in place, based on commercial contracts, to allow and radioactive waste have evolved in stages since the for radioactive waste from medical use, industry, research 1970s through public debate and a number of policy and consumer products to be managed within the manage- decisions taken by both the Government and Parliament. ment solutions developed for nuclear fuel cycle wastes. See These principles are reflected in the Swedish legislation, also section K.3.2.1. which is further described in sections B.1.1 and E.2.1.

Radioactive waste will also arise from the European The most important fundamental principles of the national Spallation Source (ESS) accelerator facility in southern policy are: Sweden. Current plans envisage the facility to become – Costs for the management and disposal of spent fuel operational in 2025 and that the facility will be in operation and radioactive waste from nuclear activities shall be for about 40 years. The ESS facility is not a nuclear facility, covered by fees that licensees are required to pay. but it will house considerable quantities of radioactive material and significant volumes of radioactive waste will – The licensees are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel be generated at the facility. A letter of intent has been and radioactive waste from nuclear activities. signed by the ESS consortium and SKB with the under- – The state has the ultimate responsibility for final standing that SKB will provides services as regards the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste future management of the radioactive waste from the from nuclear activities. facility. – Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear Figure A1 shows the location of the nuclear facilities in fuel and radioactive waste generated by nuclear activities Sweden. in that country.

16 Section A – Introduction

Shallow land burial for very low-level Shallow land burial for very operational waste 2 low-level decommissioning waste 3

Clearance

Nuclear power plant Industry, research and medical care

Operation Decommissioning

Fuel

Short-lived Short-lived m/s Sigrid

Short-lived Long-lived Long-lived Long-lived Storage 4

1

Clab Storage 4 (future Clink)

Operation Decommissioning

1

Repository for short-lived radioactive waste – SFR

1 If SFR closes before SFL, short-lived waste Repository for long-lived follows the dashed line to SFL. waste – SFL 2 Shallow land burial are located at the nuclear power plants sites in Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals. At the Studsvik site, similar shallow land burial for Spent fuel repository waste from industry, research and medical care are located. 3 A possible alternative for very low-level decommissioning waste. The final decision of the management of very low-level decommissioning waste has not yet been taken. 4 Interim storage at nuclear power plants or other site. Today long-lived waste is stored at the nuclear power plants, in Clab and at the Studsvik site.

Figure A2 The system for managing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

Section A – Introduction 17

The implementation of these principles in Swedish operator as being primarily responsible for the safety of legislation in practice constitutes the implementation of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The state, the producer pays principle. however, has the ultimate responsibility for safety aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

A.5.3 Basic preconditions

The legal framework corresponds well to the objectives of A.5.3.1 Management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear the Joint Convention. An overview is given in sections A.7

waste

and E. The responsibility for managing spent fuel and nuclear or The following main legislative instruments regulate the radioactive operational and decommissioning waste that management of spent fuel and nuclear waste: arises in an activity rests with the licence holder for the activity in question (see sections A.6.2 and E.2.1.1). The – The Act on Nuclear Activities four utilities operating nuclear power reactors in Sweden – The Radiation Protection Act have formed a special company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB), to assist them in – The Environmental Code executing their responsibilities regarding all handling, – The Act on Financing of Management of Residual transportation and storage of spent fuel and radioactive Products from Nuclear Activities waste outside the nuclear power plants. SKB is also responsible for the planning and construction of facilities Under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the holder of a licence required for the management of spent nuclear fuel and for nuclear activities is primarily responsible for the safe radioactive wastes, and for the research and development handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste work required in order to provide such facilities (R&D produced. In addition, under the Radiation Protection Act, programmes). Thus, management solutions for spent fuel the licensee must take all the measures and precautions and nuclear fuel cycle wastes are developed and imple- necessary to prevent or counteract harmful effects to mented by the nuclear reactor utilities in cooperation, human health and the environment due to radiation. through SKB. The Environmental Code specifies basic environmental Figure A2 provides an overview of the existing and principles such as the precautionary principle, the principle planned facilities associated with the relevant waste streams of best available technology, the polluter pays principle, the in the overall system to manage spent nuclear fuel and principle of conservation of natural resources, and the nuclear waste. A more detailed description of the figure is principle of selecting the most appropriate location where given in section A.8.1. the purpose of the activity can be achieved with a minimum of damage and detriment to human health and A.5.3.2 Management of non-nuclear fuel cycle wastes the environment. The Code also contains provisions As accounted for above, arrangements have been set up relating to the conduct of environmental impact assessto allow for radioactive waste from non-nuclear fuel cycle ments. applications, i.e. medical use, industry, research activities The Act on Financing of Management of Residual and consumer products, to be managed within the Products from Nuclear Activities lays down the principles management solutions developed for nuclear fuel cycle for the financing of expenses for decommissioning and the wastes, as appropriate. It should however be emphasised management and disposal of spent fuel and decommisthat there is no legal requirement on the utilities operating sioning waste. nuclear reactors to accept radioactive waste from non-nuclear activities to be disposed of in facilities developed for Sweden has implemented the European Union’s radioactive nuclear waste. More information in this regard is provided waste and spent fuel management directive (2011/70/ in section K.3.2.1. Euratom) in its legislative framework. The directive requires that EU countries:

A.6 The legislative and regulatory

– have a national policy for spent fuel and radioactive waste management;

framework

– draw up and implement national programmes for the A.6.1 Implementation of national policy in management and disposal of all spent nuclear fuel and legislation radioactive waste generated on their territory; The legal framework provides a consistent system – have in place a comprehensive and robust framework involving clear allocations of responsibilities, licensing, and competent and independent regulatory body, as well prohibitions, institutional control, regulatory inspections, as financing mechanisms to ensure that adequate funds documentation and reporting. The framework also enables are available; and the enforcement of applicable regulations and terms of the licences. The competent regulatory body (SSM) has the – provide public information on radioactive waste and mandate, qualified staff and financial resources necessary spent fuel and ensure that opportunities for public for its activities. The legislation clearly points out the participation are available.

18 Section A – Introduction

Nuclear power plant

Licensees are responsible for fulfilling operational safety requirements M/S Sigrid

NPP Transport Treatment, Transport Disposal Facility Storage Facility

Licensees are responsible for the safe management NPP Licensees In Cooperation and disposal of SF & RW

Licensees are responsible for funding of costs for NPP Licensees In Cooperation management and disposal of SF & RW

Figure A3 Basic requirements and general obligations of licensees.

A.6.2 Licence holder responsibilities and radioactive waste, as well as for future decommissioning of the nuclear power plants and SKB’s own

A.6.2.1 General obligations on licensees for nuclear

facilities.

activities

The holder of a licence for nuclear activities and other Adequate financial resources for ensuring the fulfilment of activities involving radiation has the primary responsibility these responsibilities and for maintaining qualified staff is for maintaining safety, ensuring the safe handling and provided through disbursements from the Nuclear Waste disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and the safe Fund and, in the case of operational radioactive waste, decommissioning and dismantling of facilities in which the directly by the nuclear power plant utilities. activities will cease.

A.6.2.2 General obligations for licensees for non-nuclear

As illustrated in Figure A3, the utilities operating nuclear

activities

power reactors cooperate as regards implementation of the For non-nuclear activities, the Radiation Protection Act general obligations. The most important elements in this requires all parties that have produced radioactive waste to cooperation are: ensure the safe management and disposal of this waste, – to establish and carry out a research and development including securing of financial resources. This applies to all (RD&D) programme for the safe handling and disposal non-nuclear activities where radioactive material is used of spent fuel and nuclear waste, see also sections A.8.2 such as medicine, industry and research, see sections and E.2.1.1; and A.8.3.4, E.2.1.4, J and K.3.2.1.

– to estimate costs for management and disposal of spent

A.6.3 RD&D programme for spent fuel and nuclear

fuel and nuclear waste as a basis for payments to be

waste

made to the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund, see also The Act on Nuclear Activities requires the utilities that sections A.4 and E.2.1.4. operate nuclear power reactors, in cooperation, to develop The utilities operating nuclear power reactors have joint and implement the R&D programme (since 1992 denoted ownership of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste as the programme for Research, Development and Management Company, SKB, which fulfils the utilities’ Demonstration, the ‘RD&D programme’) needed for the aforementioned shared obligations and assists them in safe management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and executing their responsibilities. nuclear waste, as well as safe decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear power plants. SKB is tasked with the planning and construction of facilities required for the management of spent nuclear fuel Every three years, on the behalf of the operators, SKB and radioactive wastes, and the research and development submits a report on this programme to the regulatory work associated with these facilities. SKB also calculates authority for review. SSM invites a large number of the costs associated with the management of spent fuel interested parties to comment on the report. The report is

Section A – Introduction 19

to include an overview of all measures that may be necessary expenses include construction and operation of the

and must specify the actions to be taken within a period of encapsulation plant and repository for spent fuel, reposito-

at least six years. Based on SSM’s review recommendations, ries for low and intermediate level waste, the decommis-

the Government approves or rejects the general direction sioning of nuclear power plants and continued research

of the continued programme. In connection with the and development work.

decision, the Government may also issue conditions on the Since 2011, the nuclear waste fees paid by the power plants content of future research and development work. have increased from an average of SEK 0.01 per kWh of

An important goal of the programme was fulfilled when produced nuclear electricity (approx. EUR 1.0 per MWh)

an application for a licence to construct a disposal facility to an average of SEK 0.05 (approx. EUR 5.0 per MWh)

for spent nuclear fuel was submitted to SSM and the Land for the period 2018–2020. The increase is due to higher

and Environment Court on 16 March 2011. cost estimates as well as enhanced assessments of future

electricity production and real price drivers for the nuclear The most recent RD&D programme was published by waste programme. Falling interest rates and the lowering SKB and submitted to SSM in September 2019. Specific of discount rate curves used in the calculations have also attention was paid to the more detailed planning for a had a substantial effect. In addition, the reduced number future disposal facility for long-lived LILW waste (SFL), of units in production, following the utilities’ decision in and on management on waste from decommissioning of 2015 to permanently shut down four reactors ahead of nuclear facilities. From its review and evaluation, SSM their estimated operating time, have resulted in higher fees concluded that the programme fulfils statutory requirefor the remaining units at Oskarshamn and Ringhals and a ments and that the programme demonstrates progress in greater variation in the size of fees between the power developing and implementing necessary solutions for plant licensees. The revision of the Financing Act in 2017 management of spent fuel and nuclear waste in a manner has somewhat balanced the effect by enabling a broadening consistent with licence holders’ obligations under the Act of the investment opportunities for the Nuclear Waste on Nuclear Activities. SSM also concluded that the RD&D Fund and in basing the calculation of fees on 50 years of Programme 2019 complied with the conditions imposed by operation instead of the previous 40 years, for those the Swedish Government in the decision on the RD&D nuclear power reactors in continued operation. Programme 2016, as regards transparency of the

programme, competence development in the perspective In October 2020, at the latest, the National Debt Office is

50-100 years, plans for disposal of long-lived LILW and to submit a new proposal for nuclear waste fees and

the safe management and transport of decommissioning financial guarantees to the Government for the period

waste. 2021–2023, based on its review of SKB’s 2019 cost

estimates. The overall system for managing spent fuel and nuclear

waste including future plans for its implementation, as For nuclear facilities other than power reactors, the Debt

presented in SKB’s RD&D Programme 2019, is described Office decides on, based on cost estimates, the three-year

in section A.8 and schematically illustrated in figure A.2. fees and financial guarantees. For the period 2017–2019,

the licensees paid a total of SEK 50.9 million per year. In

A.6.4 Financing arrangements December 2019 the Debt Office decided on waste fees for

Since the beginning of the 1980s a system apply for the period 2020 through 2022, with a total SEK 219.5

financing costs for management and disposal of spent million per year to be paid to the fund.

nuclear fuel and radioactive waste by requiring licensees to There is also a funding mechanism for legacy waste from pay fees and provide financial guarantees. This arrangehistoric nuclear activities. Until the end of 2017, a fee was ment implements the ‘polluter pays’ principle and also aims levied on the nuclear power plant owners in order to cover to minimise the risk for the state and future generations to expenses for liabilities originating from the establishment bear these costs. The fees are deposited in a nuclear waste of a nuclear programme in Sweden. To date this funding fund. The funded assets are managed by a Government has primarily contributed to the decommissioning of authority, the Nuclear Waste Fund. The legislation on research reactors at Studsvik and the Ågesta reactor and financing is presented in more detail in section E.2.1.4. the clean-up activities at the uranium mine in Ranstad

The licensees’ cost estimates are reviewed by the National (which was completed in 2019).

Debt Office. Based on the review and statement of the The licensees for nuclear power reactors are required to Debt Office, the Government decides on the fees and pay the additional fees necessary, in accordance with the financial guarantees for the nuclear power plants for a provisions of the Financing Act, if the fund’s assets are period of three years. The financial guarantees constitute insufficient to cover the future liabilities. securities to cover fees that have not yet been paid and to

cover costs in connection with unexpected events. There is also a state financing scheme administered by SSM

for the recovery of orphan sources and clean-up of other To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has covered expenses for non-nuclear legacy waste (see section J.1.2.2). the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel

(Clab), for the transport system and for the research and According to the Radiation Protection Act, all parties that

development needed, including the siting and method have produced radioactive waste are required to ensure the

development for a spent fuel disposal system. Future safe management and disposal of the waste, including

20 Section A – Introduction

securing of financial resources. This applies to all non- – the annual incidence of skin cancer caused by ultraviolet nuclear activities where radioactive material is used such radiation is lower than in the year 2000; and as medicine, industry and research. Institutional waste – exposure to electromagnetic fields in occupational and accepted by Cyclife Sweden AB is, as appropriate, disposed other environments is so low that there is no negative of in SFR or stored on site until SFL is in operation. In impact on human health or on biodiversity. 1984, the Government agreed to a one-off compensation payment to the predecessor of Cyclife Sweden AB, The environmental quality objective A Safe Radiation Studsvik Energiteknik AB, to cover future costs for Environment play an important role in the Swedish radioacdisposal in SFR of all radioactive waste originating from tive waste management system in targeting and evaluating non-nuclear activities. Where radioactive waste is to be non-nuclear radioactive waste. The national policy and the disposed of in SFL, the fee paid by the producer to Cyclife provisions for nuclear waste management are more includes the cost for this disposal. comprehensively addressed in the nuclear legislation and the specific requirements on RD&D and cost estimates.

A.6.5 Environmental Objectives

The latest in-depth evaluation of the environmental quality In 1999, the Swedish Parliament laid down fifteen national objectives was published in 2019, and the overall assessment environmental quality objectives, and in 2005, a sixteenth is that the environmental quality objective A Safe Radiation objective was adopted concerning biological diversity. Environment is close to being achieved. Achieving these environmental quality objectives constitutes the basis for the Swedish national environmental

A.6.6 Regulatory control and supervision

policy and work. The environmental goals on a national level also incorporates the ecological dimension of the A.6.6.1 Licensing global sustainability goals in Agenda 2030. All nuclear facilities require a licence under both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code. The The environmental objectives are of three different types; Government grants the licence based on the recommenthe Generational goal that defines the overall direction of dations and reviews of the competent authority. environmental efforts, the 16 environmental quality objectives to facilitate these efforts and a number of A key element of the regulatory framework is the clearly milestone targets. defined stepwise licensing process, see sections E.2.3 and E.2.9. The Generational goal states that “The overall goal of Swedish environmental policy is to hand over to the next generation a society in

A.6.6.2 Roles and responsibilities

which the major environmental problems in Sweden have been solved, The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is the without increasing environmental and health problems outside competent authority that supervises licensees of nuclear Sweden’s borders.” activities in fulfilling their responsibilities for safe operation In practice, the generational goal means that the basic of facilities and transports as well as in planning for conditions for solving the environmental problems are decommissioning and disposal. SSM has the adequate to be achieved within one generation. This calls for an levels of authority, competence and financial and human ambitious environmental policy – in Sweden, within the resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities, see EU and in international contexts. sections E.3.

The 16 environmental quality objectives describe the A.6.6.3 Independence of the regulatory authority quality of the environment that Sweden wishes to achieve. The regulatory body’s independence is of fundamental They should be followed up on a regular basis, with annual importance in the Swedish constitution. As a central reports to the Government and an in-depth evaluation administrative authority, SSM receives its budget approponce every parliamentary term. A number of government riations and instructions on its general direction of agencies are engaged and the Swedish Environmental operations from the Swedish Government. SSM is at the Protection Agency, working with all the agencies, prepares same time independent in its decision making under an overall report to the Government. Swedish legislation.

SSM is responsible for the quality objective A Safe Although the independence of the regulator is stated in Radiation Environment, which states that: “Human health Swedish legislation, it is also a matter of public service and biological diversity must be protected against the harmful effects tradition and values. A strong, independent and fully of radiation.” accountable national authority is also confident and The environmental quality objective A Safe Radiation trustworthy in upholding high safety standards. As an Environment aims to ensure that: example, the integrity of SSM has become increasingly vital with the progression of the licensing review of SKB’s – human exposure to harmful radiation in occupational application for a spent fuel repository. Strict internal rules and other environments is limited as far as reasonably apply to interaction with an applicant or licensee to ensure possible; the regulator’s independence in relation to the nuclear – discharges of radioactive substances into the industry in all its supervisory activities, see sections E.3 environment are limited so as to protect human health and K.3.1.4. and biodiversity;

Section A – Introduction 21

A.6.6.4 Regulatory inspections To enable active participation in formal consultations In accordance with its legal authorisation and its mandate during the licensing process, host municipalities, regional defined by the Government, the regulatory authority authorities and certain environmental organisations receive conducts regular inspections and assessments of nuclear financial support through the Nuclear Waste Fund. and other facilities whose work involves radiation in order Preceding the Government’s licensing decision for a to ascertain compliance with regulations and licence nuclear facility, the host municipality has a right to veto and conditions, see section E.2.5 and E.3.2.6. is expected to formally declare its support or rejection of the decision.

A.6.6.5 Documentation and reporting

The implementing organisation for spent fuel disposal, Extensive reporting from licence holders is required. SKB, has involved stakeholders in its siting and develop- Annual reports are to be submitted to SSM on activities at ment of a repository. The regulator, SSM, has taken several the facility, including experience gained and conclusions measures to support the engagement of municipalities, drawn with regard to safety, and on the management of NGOs, the public and other stakeholders in both the nuclear waste and high activity sealed sources (HASS). A pre-licensing and the licensing review for a spent nuclear deficiency detected during the construction or operation fuel repository. See also sections E.2.8, E.3.2.9, K.3.1.5 of a nuclear facility, and that can lead to deterioration in and K.5. safety in addition to what is anticipated in the safety analysis report, must be reported to SSM without unneces-

A.7 Swedish National Plan

sary delay, see section E.2.5.3. The licensee of a nuclear facility must also report to SSM Sweden have implemented the European Union’s directive on the discharge of radioactive substances into air and on the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and water, shown as discharge of activity, and doses to radioactive waste in its legislative framework (2011/70/ individuals in a reference group. In addition, the results of Euratom). Under the Ordinance with instructions for the environmental monitoring must be reported, see section Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (2008:452), SSM must E.2.5.3. ensure that there is a current national plan in place which corresponds to the content required under Article 12 of At least once every ten years, licensees are required to the directive. perform a periodic safety review (PSR), i.e. an integrated analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility, see The Swedish National Plan, notified to the European sections E.3.2.6 and K.2.3. Commission in 2015 as the national programme, is an up-to-date plan that provides a comprehensive account A.6.6.6 Prohibition and enforcement of Swedish policies (fundamental principles), the legal, The Swedish authorities have extensive legal, regulatory regulatory and organisational system (national framework), and enforcement powers. As a supervisory authority, SSM in addition to the strategies (national programme) may issue any injunctions or prohibitions and revoke activi- governing the management of spent fuel and all radioties if so required in the specific case to ensure compliance, active waste in Sweden. See sections A.5 and A.6. see section E.2.4. The plan accounts for the origin, management, treatment, transport, interim storage and final disposal of spent

A.6.7 Provisions for public engagement and

transparency nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Sweden. It gives an Building public confidence and acceptance in the system account of the quantities of spent nuclear fuel and for managing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste radioactive waste produced, as well as estimates of future strongly benefits from a national system based on quantities. consistent and long-term strategies and planning. See also The Swedish National Plan is based on three strategic sections A.8 and K.3.1.1. planning components; the programme for research, The legal framework for licensing of nuclear activities development and demonstration (the RD&D Programme), contains provisions governing transparency, openness and the financing system and cost estimates (the Plan Cost public participation. According to the Environmental Estimates) and the national System of Environmental Code, a prospective licensee is required to submit a plan Objectives including the goal for a Safe Radiation Environment. for the formal process of consultation with stakeholders in See sections A.6, E.2.1.4, and K.3.1. order to develop an Environmental Impact Assessment. Through the mandatory review of RD&D programme reports, SSM supervises the development of management and disposal systems in the pre-licensing process. The review process includes opportunities for broad public participation in the development of the Swedish system for managing spent fuel and radioactive waste.

22 Section A – Introduction

A.8 Management of spent nuclear fuel

shallow land burials at the Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals nuclear power plants.

and radioactive waste

A.8.1.5 Transportation system

A.8.1 Overview of waste streams and

All transportation of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive

management solutions

waste from the four nuclear power plant sites to SKB’s The following section gives an overview of waste streams facilities is by sea, since all the nuclear facilities are situated and management solutions as illustrated in Figure A2. on the coast (however radioactive waste from Forsmark A.8.1.1 Management of spent nuclear fuel NPP for disposal in SFR is transported a short distance on The spent fuel, after cooling on the reactor site, is trans- land). The transportation system, which has been in ported by ship to the central interim storage facility, Clab, operation since 1982, consists of a purpose-built INF class located next to the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. 3 vessel, transport casks and containers, and terminal Current practices foresee interim storage of the spent fuel vehicles for loading and unloading. Figure A2 provides a for a period of about 30 years before being disposed of in schematic illustration of the management system for spent a deep geological disposal facility. nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

In addition to spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power

A.8.1.6 Planned facilities

reactors (including fuel from the Ågesta reactor), materials Facilities that remain to be realised are an encapsulation to be disposed of includes fuel residues from testing plant for spent fuel, repositories for spent fuel and programmes at Studsvik, as well as MOX fuel (mixed oxide long-lived low and intermediate level waste, and an fuel). Approximately 20 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel from extension of SFR to accommodate decommissioning Ågesta and approximately two tonnes of spent nuclear fuel waste. from Studsvik Nuclear AB’s research activities are currently in interim storage in Clab. Clab is also used to store 23 A.8.1.7 Research and demonstration facilities tonnes of MOX fuel obtained from Germany in exchange SKB operates several research and demonstration facilities for fuel that was sent to France (La Hague) for reprocessing to assist them in the development of remaining facilities. at an early stage of the Swedish programme. A small These include the underground Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory amount of spent nuclear fuel from the first reactor at for the investigation of engineered and geological repository Oskarshamn was sent for reprocessing in Sellafield, barriers, the Canister Laboratory for the development of England. No fuel or radioactive waste from that repro- sealing technology for copper canisters, and the Multicessing will be returned to Sweden. purpose Test Facilities for the testing of bentonite

properties and development of methods for backfilling

A.8.1.2 Management of long-lived low- and

and plugging of repository tunnels. All facilities are

intermediate level waste

situated in the Oskarshamn area. Long-lived waste from the NPPs consists of used core components, reactor pressure vessels from PWRs and A.8.1.8 Other important facilities in relation to control rods from boiling water reactors BWRs. The waste management of nuclear and radioactive waste is currently stored at the nuclear power plants, Clab and

Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in Västerås

the Studsvik site. The total quantity of long-lived low and Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB operates a nuclear fuel intermediate level waste is estimated to about 16,000 m 3 , fabrication plant in Västerås, approximately 100 km west about one third of which comes from the NPPs. The rest of Stockholm. The plant has been manufacturing fuel since comes from facilities operated by Studsvik Nuclear AB, the mid-1960s. Its annual production is approximately 500 Cyclife Sweden AB and AB Svafo. SKB plans to dispose to 600 tonnes of UO fuel for PWRs and BWRs, mainly of the long-lived waste in a geological facility for long-lived 2 for customers abroad. low- and intermediate level waste, SFL. The manufacturing process generates some slightly A.8.1.3 Management of short-lived low- and uranium-contaminated wastes in the form of CaF 2 , metal, intermediate level waste construction waste, electronics, combustible wastes, sludge, Short-lived low- and intermediate level waste is disposed filters, protective clothing, etc. Westinghouse disposes of of in SFR, operated by SKB. According to current wastes with very low uranium content, typically CaF , metal 2 projections, about 180,000 m 3 , including nine segmented and construction wastes at municipal landfills as permitted reactor pressure vessels from BWRs will be disposed of in by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Prior to SFR. Most of the short-lived waste originates from the disposal, however, most of the uranium in the waste is nuclear power plants. Other waste originates from Clab extracted through special recovery processes in the and from Cyclife AB, Studsvik Nuclear AB and AB Svafo. Västerås plant. In addition, a new facility for waste processing (pyrolysis) at Cyclife AB has been developed, A.8.1.4 Management of very low-level short-lived waste and currently processes combustible waste from Westing- Very low-level waste is disposed of in shallow land burials house. A minor proportion of the remaining waste may be operated by the nuclear power plants. Under the current considered for disposal in a future disposal facility for licences, a total of about 37,000 m of short-lived very 3 long-lived waste. low-level waste operational waste may be disposed of in

Section A – Introduction 23

Figure A4 Storage pool in Clab. The top edge of the spent fuel is eight metres below the water surface.

The European Spallation Source (ESS) accelerator The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority decided on 17 July On 31 August 2015, European Spallation Source ESS AB 2014 to grant ESS authorisation for the facility to be changed its structure to form a European Research established at the site in Lund, and on 30 June 2017, to Infrastructure Consortium, ‘European Spallation Source allow ESS to install equipment that can generate radiation. ERIC’ (ESS). The founding members of ESS are 13 Further permission will be required from the Authority European countries currently involved in constructing and before this facility may be commissioned. The general operating a new neutron source. This source is based on a licence that ESS has today allows the company to import, large accelerator that bombards a heavy target material acquire, install and own technical devices and other (tungsten) with protons. The neutron source makes it components for generation of ionising radiation. The possible to study materials in their smallest components. licence is linked to a number of special conditions for the According to the current plan, the ESS facility should be ESS facility in areas such as physical protection, emergency operational in 2025 and it is envisaged that the facility will preparedness work and management of radioactive waste. be in operation for about 40 years. For the moment there is an ongoing review of an ESS The ESS facility is not a nuclear facility, but it will house application for trial operation of the normal conducting considerable quantities of radioactive material. Significant linear accelerator part of the ESS facility. volumes of radioactive waste will be generated at the One of several challenges faced by ESS in the continuing facility. The highest level of radioactivity will be generated licensing process with the Authority is to clarify and verify in the tungsten target, but also to a lesser extent elsewhere, that the waste management can be conducted in a way that such as activation of the soil filling material surrounding is safe in terms of radiation safety and radiation protection, the accelerator. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and that it can be performed in compliance with applicable and the Land and Environment Court are licensing the regulatory requirements, see section K.3.2.1. ESS facility. On 12 June 2014 the Land and Environment Court approved the first ESS application submitted in

A.8.2 Spent nuclear fuel management

2012. This approval was, however, conditional and ESS was not allowed to produce any radioactive waste or start A.8.2.1 Existing spent nuclear fuel management

practices and facilities

the accelerator until the company had reported on further investigations concerning certain radiation protection Management practices at the NPP sites issues and the management of radioactive waste. The Spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power reactors is results of the investigations, including a proposal for final temporarily stored on site in water-filled fuel pools for at licensing conditions, was reported to the court by 31 least nine months before being transported to the central December 2017. interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, Clab.

24 Section A – Introduction

Fulfilment of the requirements of SSM’s general regula- Licensing processes for an encapsulation tions is accomplished and verified through regulatory plant and a spent fuel disposal facility review and inspection activities at the nuclear power plants, SKB’s submitted parallel licence applications in March as reported under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 2011, under the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code, for an encapsulation plant in combination

The central interim storage facility for spent fuel, Clab

with the existing interim storage facility at Oskarshamn Spent nuclear fuel from all Swedish nuclear power reactors and a geological repository for spent fuel at Forsmark. The is stored in Clab, situated adjacent to the Oskarshamn applications have been subject to a thorough regulatory nuclear power plant. The facility has been in operation review by SSM and examination by the Land and Environsince 1985. The facility has around 100 employees. ment Court. The review phase has been concluded and the The facility consists of two parts: one building above applications are currently pending Government decision. ground for unloading spent fuel assemblies from transport After an initial assessment of SKB’s primary licensing casks, and one underground section for storage in water documents, SSM reviewed the quality and completeness of filled pools with a rock cover of about 25 to 30 metres. the two separate applications for nuclear facilities, The spent fuel is stored for at least 30 years before being including supporting technical material and references that encapsulated and deposited in the repository. were submitted by SKB. Over a period of three years, SSM Clab is licensed for storage of 8,000 tonnes of spent fuel requested and obtained from SKB substantial supplemenand SKB has applied for increasing the storage capacity to tary information and clarification at various levels of detail 11,000 tonnes. One of the storage pools is shown in relating to both facilities, on topics ranging from the scope Figure A4. Principal data as well as information on of SKB’s assessment of alternative methods and locations inventories are contained in section D.1.2.2. to detailed scientific and technical analyses relating to specific aspects of the disposal system design and its A.8.2.2 Planned spent nuclear fuel management performance. This included a comprehensive revision of practices and facilities the preliminary safety analysis for the combined encapsula- The KBS-3-concept tion plant and interim storage facility, submitted by SKB at The concept for disposal of spent fuel, KBS-3, involves the end of 2014. By the end of 2015, SSM had completed emplacement of fuel elements in copper canisters the major part of its technical review of SKB’s rationale (corrosion resistance) with ductile iron inserts (mechanical for method and siting as well as SKB’s preliminary safety strength), see Figure A5. The canisters will be embedded analyses for the two facilities. In June 2016, SSM submitted in bentonite clay (protection against corrosion and rock a statement to the Land and Environment Court based on movements, preventing water penetration and leakage of its review and as part of the Court’s consultation process. radioactive substances) in individual vertical deposition The Land and Environment Court’s role is, in the first holes at a depth of about 500 metres in the bedrock instance, to prepare a recommendation to the Government (maintains the technical barriers for a long time and isolates relating to the permissibility of SKB’s plans for final the spent fuel from human beings and the environment). disposal in relation to general principles established in the Environmental Code. Following formal public notification of the licence applications in January 2016, the Court

Cladding tube Spent nuclear fuel Bentonite clay Surface part of final repository

500 m

Fuel pellet of Copper canister Crystalline bedrock Underground part of final repository uranium dioxide with cast iron insert Figure A5 The KBS-3-method for disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

Section A – Introduction 25

Main phases

Commis- Licensing Construction Operation sioning

Spent Fuel Repository

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 Application for Submitting Submitting construction updated SAR supplemented SAR

KTL MMD Legally binding judgment The conditions conditions the permit judgement municipality's Start of Start of Start Start statement Licenses and construction construction integrated Start trial regular of position permissibility nuclear facility central area testing operation operation

Safety analysis report Safety analysis report Rock investigation Detailed design Infrastructure, establishmant Land works, operations area Buildings constructed Ramp/Skip shaft Other shafts Central area System testing/Integrated testing Deposition area – continued expansion

Clink

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 Submitting PSAR Application for SAR Submitting Submitting Clab 11,000 tons construction Clab 11,000 tons updated SAR supplemented SAR Start of Start Start Licencing extended construction integrated Start trial regular interim storage nuclear facility testing operation operation

Clab 11 000/Clink Safety analysis report System design Detailed design Construction and construction, encapsulation System and integrated testing Clab 11,000 tons – Construction change

Technology development

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 Ongoing deliveries

Construction Implementation Management and improvement

Clab Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel MMD Land and Environment Court Clink Central Interim Storage Facility and Encapsulation of PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Spent Nuclear Fuel SAR Updated Safety Report for approval to start regular operation KTL Nuclear Activities Act Supplemented Safety Report submitted for approval to start regular operation Figure A6 Estimated general timetable for establishment of the spent fuel repository and Clink based on the current status of the licensing process for KBS-3.

received statements from a range of referral bodies in The role of SSM has been to review SKB’s licence Sweden and neighbouring countries. In September and applications for a Government decision under the Act on October 2017, the Court conducted a five-week public Nuclear Activities. This also included a formal national court hearing on SKB’s licence application under Sweden’s consultation process involving a wide range of referral environmental legislation. SSM participated in the Court’s bodies, including local, regional and national authorities, consultation process and gave independent testimony on higher education institutions and environmental organisamatters relating to radiation safety during the public tions. SSM’s review and assessment of the licence applicahearing. During the hearing, certain long-term safety issues tions has entailed judgment as to whether SKB has made a were debated in detail, in particular the potential extent of credible case for the feasibility of its plans for the facilities degradation of copper canisters by various corrosion and whether, when taken forward to detailed design and mechanisms in the repository post-closure environment. industrial implementation, they can be expected to comply

26 Section A – Introduction

Figure A7 The facilities at Studsvik.

with all relevant radiation safety requirements, including A.8.3 Radioactive waste management

those applying to the repository safety case after closure.

A.8.3.1 Existing radioactive waste management

In January 2018, both SSM and the Court submitted their practices and facilities

final review statements to the Government. SSM recom- Management practices at the nuclear power plant sites

mended the approval of SKB’s licence applications to Waste management at the NPP sites is fully integrated into

possess, construct and operate an encapsulation plant and the operations at each site. Fulfilment of the requirements

a final repository under the nuclear activities act. The of SSM’s general regulations is accomplished and verified

Court on the other hand stated that SKB would need to through regulatory review and inspection activities at the

present further documentation clarifying the long-term nuclear power plants, as reported under the Convention on

protective function of copper canisters, in order for the Nuclear Safety. Most of the low and intermediate level

repository to be considered permissible in accordance with radioactive wastes (LILW) are conditioned (solidified,

the provisions of the Environmental Code. In addition, the compacted, etc.) at the point of origin, i.e. at the reactor

Court highlighted the need for legal clarification regarding sites. Some wastes are sent to Studsvik’s waste treatment

responsibility for the repository after its final closure. facilities for incineration or melting. More details are found

in section D.1.4.1. In April 2019, SKB submitted supplementary information

requested by the Government, including results from

Management practices at the Studsvik site

further experimental and theoretical studies relating to Early nuclear research activities started in Stockholm in the potential corrosion mechanisms identified by the court. 1950s and some nuclear laboratories were also established In a public consultation, stakeholders were given the at the Studsvik site, located around 30 km from the town possibility to state their opinions on the additional material. of Nyköping (see Figure A7). Basically all nuclear research Some maintained their previously expressed view that activities were moved during the 1960s to Studsvik, where more time is needed for additional research and developalso research reactors were constructed and operated until ment of the repository concept. SSM, after a thorough 2005. As of today, three companies operate facilities at the technical review of the new material, reiterated its earlier site under a nuclear licence, i.e. Studsvik Nuclear AB statement that SKB’s preferred site is suitable, the disposal (SNAB), Cyclife Sweden AB and AB Svafo. concept is feasible and the safety case fulfils strict regulatory requirements. Studsvik Nuclear AB (SNAB) provides services in fuel and

materials technologies to the nuclear power industry. At the time of preparing this report, the licence applica- Facilities operated by SNAB include the hot cell laboratory tions remained with the Government for decision. See (HCL), the active metal laboratory (AKL) and the storage Figure A6 with SKB’s tentative time schedule below. facility (FA).

Section A – Introduction 27

Cyclife Sweden AB, owned by French EDF, manages Sea, covered by about 60 metres of rock. It is designed for Studsvik’s waste treatment facilities. These include the disposal of short-lived low and intermediate level radioincineration facility (HA), the melting facility (SMA) and active waste from Swedish nuclear power plants and Clab, treatment facilities for radioactive non-nuclear waste and for disposal of similar waste from other usage in (FR0-A and R0-A). industry, research and medicine. Svafo, which is owned by the companies operating nuclear SFR currently consists of four 160-metre-long waste power reactors, treats and stores radioactive legacy waste vaults, plus a 70-metre-high cavern in which a concrete silo from former research and development operations has been built. The facility was taken into operation in conducted in Sweden. Svafo also manages liquid radioac- 1988. Its total capacity is 63,000 m and about 40,000 m 3 3 tive waste from other Studsvik facilities. Svafo is in had been used by the end of 2019. The silo is shown in addition responsible for decommissioning the R2/R2-0 Figure A9. Principal data as well as information on research and materials testing reactor at Studsvik that was inventories are contained in section D.1.4.2. shut down in 2005, see Figure A8. Decommissioning of the reactor is ongoing and expected to be finished in 2020. Facilities operated by Svafo are the treatment facility for intermediate waste (HM) and the interim storage facility for low and intermediate level waste (AM). The radioactive waste treatment and management facilities at the Studsvik site are described in more detail in section D.1.4.1.

Repository for radioactive operational waste, SFR

SFR is located approximately 140 kilometres north of Stockholm, close to the Forsmark nuclear power plant. The Figure A9 Photo from the top of the silo in SFR and an illustration of the design. Waste packages are placed in shafts in the silo. facility is situated in crystalline bedrock beneath the Baltic

Shallow land burials

The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and Oskarshamn, as well as the Studsvik site, have shallow land burials for solid short-lived low-level operational waste (<300 kBq/kg). Each burial is licensed for a total activity of between 100 and 1100 GBq (the highest level permitted under the legislation is 10 TBq, of which a maximum of 10 GBq may consist of alpha-active substances).

Clearance

Material may be cleared for unrestricted use or for disposal as conventional non-radioactive waste (see also sections E.2.9.4 and F.6).

A.8.3.2 Planned radioactive waste management practices and facilities

The low and intermediate level waste programme comprises three main activities: the extension of the SFR facility to receive decommissioning waste; development of a repository for long-lived low and intermediate level waste, SFL; and interim storage of long-lived waste. The general timetable is illustrated in Figure A10 and described below.

Extension of the SFR facility

In December 2014, SKB applied for permission to extend the final repository for short-lived low and intermediate level waste at Forsmark (SFR) so that it can also accommodate decommissioning waste (see Figure A11). Licence applications have been filed with regard to both the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities. The two applications were reviewed in parallel by the Land and Environment Court and SSM, respectively. During the Figure A8 Decommissioning of the R2 research and review, SSM issued a statement to the Court regarding its materials testing reactor at Studsvik.

28 Section A – Introduction

Low- and Intermediate Level Waste

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080

SFR – Final Repository for Short-lived Radioactive Waste

Application for Submitting Submitting construction updated SAR supplemented SAR

Start of construction Trial operation Regular operation extended SFR extended SFR extended SFR

Authority approval and licensing process Operation of Modifications of the existing facility existing facility Trial operation Regular operation extended SFR Detailed design, Construction applications

Interim Storage of Short-lived Waste

Interim storage

SFL – Final Repository for Long-lived Waste

Applications Application for Submitting Submitting F-PSAR construction updated SAR supplemented SAR

Safety Siting Start of Operation evaluation SFL SFL construction SFL SFL

Feasibility studies, site investigations, Application documents, Construction Trial Regular operation technology development design, licensing op

Interim Storage of Long-lived Waste

At nuclear power plants, Clab, and the Studsvik site

Preparatory Actions, Dismantling and Decommissioning of Reactors, Clink, SFL and SFR

(B1, B2, O1, O2 och Ågesta shut down) F2 O3 R2 R1 F1 R3 R4 F3 SFL Clink SFR

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 Clab Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel SAR Updated safety report for approval to start regular operation B1 Barsebäck 1* F1 Forsmark 1 O1 Oskarshamn 1* R1 Ringhals 1 Clink Central Interim Storage Facility and Encapsulation of Supplemented safety report submitted for approval to start B2 Barsebäck 2* F2 Forsmark 2 O2 Oskarshamn 2* R2 Ringhals 2 Spent Nuclear Fuel regular operation Ågesta* F3 Forsmark 3 O3 Oskarshamn 3 R3 Ringhals 3 F-PSAR Preparatory Preliminary Safety Analysis Report SFL Final Repository for Long-lived Waste * Shut down R4 Ringhals 4 SFR Final Repository for Short-lived Radioactive Waste

Figure A10 Timetable for low and intermediate level waste and decommissioning of the nuclear power plants.

view on the completeness of the application on matters Nuclear Activities is then followed by a stepwise process relating to radiation safety and the permissibility of the whereby SSM’s approval of updated safety analysis reports, planned extension. plans and other related documentation is required prior to authorisation for the construction, start of trial operations The objective of SSM’s review was to assess whether the and start of routine operations (see also section E.2.9.1). proposed extension is sited, designed and can be expected Furthermore, SSM may stipulate additional licence to be operated and closed in such a way that nuclear safety, conditions. security, and radiation protection requirements, as well as the general ‘rules of consideration’ stipulated in the The Land and Environment Court will issue permits and Environmental Code, are met. SSM undertook an initial licence conditions under the Environmental Code after a review of the completeness of the application and issued a new hearing has been held. number of requests to SKB for clarification and supplementary information.

SSM participated in the Court’s consultation process and gave independent testimony during the two-week public 1BMA

1BLA

hearing that was held in September 2019. Shortly after- 2BTF

1BTF

wards, in its final review statement to the Government in Silo October, SSM recommended the approval of SKB’s licence application for the proposed extension and continued operation of the SFR facility. One month later,

1BRT

the Land and Environment Court also recommended in its 2BLA

3BLA

statement to Government that the extension be considered 4BLA

5BLA

a permissible activity according to the Environmental Code. 2BMA

At the time of preparing this report, the licence applica-

Figure A11 The existing facility in Forsmark for short-lived low and

tions remained with the Government for decision. If the intermediate level operational radioactive waste, SFR (the silo and Government decides to approve the licence applications, vaults in the upper right-hand part of the figure) and the planned

extension (lower left). The extended SFR will consist of four additional

however, the Municipality of Östhammar will first be

waste vaults for low-level waste (2–5 BLA), one additional waste vault

requested to issue a statement regarding its right to veto for intermediate level waste (2BMA) and one waste vault for the decision. A Government licence under the Act on segmented reactor pressure vessels (1BRT).

Section A – Introduction 29

Repository for long-lived low and intermediate level the design of the engineered barriers, waste acceptance waste (SFL) criteria and the site selection process for SFL. The According to the current plans, a licence application to evaluation was performed by analysing several cases that build a repository for long-lived low and intermediate level together indicate under what conditions the repository waste, SFL, will be submitted in 2030 and operations are concept has the potential to fulfil regulatory requirements. planned to commence in 2045. The origin of this waste is Furthermore, the results have been used to identify areas legacy waste (primarily research), industry, medical for further RD&D, including safety analysis methodology applications, used reactor core components, reactor and its implementation, efforts needed to address the full pressure vessels from PWRs, and control rods from BWRs. set of post-closure regulatory requirements, the siting The legacy waste is currently stored at Studsvik, core process, assessment model development, and technical components and control rods are stored at the nuclear design improvements. power plants and at Clab. The volume of SFL will be The stepwise siting process for SFL was initiated during relatively small compared to SKB’s other disposal facilities. the period. The first step constituted an account of The total volume is estimated to 16,000 m . According to 3 background data and fundamental conditions and points the current concept, SFL is designed as a deep geological of departure for the siting process for SFL and is repository with two different sections (see Figure A12): described in SKB’s RD&D Programme 2019. The results – one waste vault, designed with a concrete barrier, for of the evaluation of post-closure safety for SFL, as well as metallic waste (core components and control rods) from experience of safety assessments previously conducted by the nuclear power plants; SKB for repositories in crystalline bedrock, were taken into – one waste vault, designed with a bentonite barrier, account. The plan for the consecutive steps, include an mainly for legacy waste. initial feasibility study phase, a site investigation phase and site selection. Bentonite pellets Technological development of the repository concept for Concrete Bentonite blocks SFL will commence in the next few years and is planned to result in a choice of concepts for SFL by the mid-2020s.

Steel tanks Waste container

Acceptance criteria for the long-lived low and intermediate level waste will be established in conjunction with the submission of the SAR for SFL. However, today there is a

BHK BHA

need to clarify the planning prerequisites for management of the waste arising during operation and decommissioning of the nuclear facilities. The recently completed safety evaluation for SFL provides some guidance for future requirements on the waste. In addition to requirements related to the post-closure safety of the repository, requirements related to the construction, transportation and handling during operation will serve as a basis to further define acceptance criteria for the waste. As the details of the repository design are progressively finalised, it will be possible to further define the set of requirements and eventually establish acceptance criteria. The nuclear power plants should not commence final conditioning of waste until a verified repository concept exists.

Interim storage of long-lived waste

SFL is planned to be commissioned around 2045. Since several reactors according to the current plan will be Figure A12 Illustration of the current concept for SFL as a geological decommissioned before the repository is finished, capacity repository with two different sections. Metallic waste from the nuclear for interim storage of the long-lived waste from decompower plants is placed in a waste vault (BHK) designed with a concrete missioning is needed. The nuclear power plants will barrier, and legacy waste is placed in a waste vault (BHA) designed with a bentonite barrier. An evaluation of the post-closure safety for arrange for interim storage at their sites or elsewhere. One this design was presented in 2019. example is the establishment of an interim storage facility for long-live waste from segmentation of reactor internals During the period 2015–2019, an evaluation of post-clo- that was established on the Barsebäck site in 2015. Another sure safety for the proposed repository concept has been example is a planned new storage building in Studsvik for carried out with the purpose to provide input to the low- and intermediate level decommissioning waste from subsequent, consecutive steps in the development of SFL. the research reactor R2, which will be established and These consecutive steps include further development of taken into operation in 2021.

30 Section A – Introduction

Borehole sealing

KBS-3H MPT

RNR Experiment

True Block Scale Alternative System design of Backfilling Buffer Materials Deposition Tunnels, full scale test (Test package 1–3)

MiniCan

Tunnel Sealing

Deposition Machine Tests Backfill and

Tests

Plug Test

Alternative Prototype Repository

BRIE

Buffer Materials

(Test package 4–6) LOT

Canister Retrieval Test Microbe Projects

Buffer tests Dome Plug Project Lasgit

Sulphide Matrix Fluid Chemistry Experiment Experiments Caps - Counterforce Applied to Prevent Spalling POST

Tunnel

production SWIW Experiment

True-1 Concrete and Clay

Concrete

component tests Colloid project

Concrete and Clay Detum-1 investigations KBS-3H pilot Figure A13 The Äspö HRL with ongoing hole drilling (bold) and concluded (italics) experiments.

Larga scale casting of concrete caisson

The transportation system will be supplemented with a The Canister Laboratory new type of transport container for shipping long-lived The Canister Laboratory, situated in the harbour area at waste placed in steel tanks. The transport container is Oskarshamn, has been in operation since 1998. The called ATB 1T. It is, due to its activity content, designed in laboratory is used for developing sealing technology for accordance with the IAEA requirements type B(U), and the copper canisters, including welding and non-destructive delivery of the first container is expected at the earliest in testing techniques for the canister components. Figure A14 2021. illustrates equipment for friction stir welding of copper lids.

The Multi-purpose Test Facilities

A.8.4 Research and demonstration facilities

The Multi-purpose Test Facilities were taken into operation The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory in 2007. The facilities are situated adjacent to the Äspö The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL) is situated on the HRL and supplements the experiments being conducted island of Äspö, north of the Oskarshamn nuclear power there, see Figure A15. plant. The main tunnel descends in two spiral turns to a depth of 460 metres. Various experiments are conducted In the Multi-purpose Test Facilities, the properties of the in niches in the short tunnels that branch out from the bentonite are tested by (for example) simulating water main tunnel. An illustration of the HRL and concluded conditions in a controlled manner. Here, SKB is also and ongoing (2019) experiments are shown in Figure A13. developing methods for backfilling of repository tunnels and construction of plugs to seal deposition tunnels. The Äspö HRL is used to investigate the behaviour of the barriers in the repository for spent nuclear fuel (canister, buffer, backfill and rock). Also, research on LILW is performed here. Development and demonstration of equipment to be used in future facilities are also performed in the HRL.

Section A – Introduction 31

A.9 Swedish participation in inter-

SSM is a member of ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group), an independent, expert advisory group

national activities to enhance safety and

to the European Commission. It is composed of senior

radiation protection officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety authori-

Sweden is a member of the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear ties from all EU member states. SSM has been active in Energy Agency (NEA), with permanent delegations to developing implementation and reporting guidelines for both organisations. Sweden has been a member state of the directive on establishing a Community framework for the European Union (EU) since 1995. the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (2011/70/Euratom). Sweden is party to the relevant conventions applicable to a country with nuclear power plants in operation, encom- SSM has contributed significantly to WENRA’s work on passing nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and harmonising safety approaches between European member response, nuclear liability, spent nuclear fuel, radioactive countries with regard to the development of common waste and physical protection. Sweden has also formally safety reference levels for decommissioning, storage of committed to implement the Code of Conduct on the waste and spent fuel and geological disposal and waste Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the processing. Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of SSM also contributes to the work performed within the Radiation Sources. Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) as well as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment

A.9.1 The regulatory authority

of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR) and the Helsinki The regulatory authority’s missions and tasks are defined in Commission (HELCOM) conventions for reduction of the Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for the Swedish releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities. Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), see section E.3. The Ordinance declares that SSM (among other tasks) shall In addition to multilateral collaboration, SSM has bilateral carry out Swedish obligations in accordance with conven- agreements with twelve countries relating to liaison and tions, EU ordinances/directives and other binding exchange of information on agreed issues (e.g. nuclear agreements (e.g. to provide points of contact, reporting, safety, emergency preparedness, occupational exposure, and act as the national competent authority), undertake environmental radiological protection, and radioactive international cooperation work with national and multina- waste management). These countries are Australia, Finland, tional organisations, and monitor and contribute to the France, Georgia, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, progress of international standards and recommendations. Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. Additionally, Sweden has special agreements In addition, SSM is involved in international development concluded with the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, cooperation within the areas of reactor safety, radiation Iceland and Norway) regarding emergency preparedness protection, nuclear waste safety and non-proliferation, see and information exchange on the technical design of section A.9.2. nuclear facilities. A bilateral protocol on liaison and SSM’s international liaison activities encompass about 150 information exchange regarding emergency preparedness international groups, the majority of which are related to has been signed with the Russian Federation. A Memonuclear safety and radiation protection issues. Such randum of Understanding on liaison and information cooperation takes place within the frameworks of the exchange has also been signed between the Nordic IAEA, NEA and EU, in connection with international regulatory bodies (the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear conventions ratified by Sweden, and through networks Safety Authority, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety such as the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Authority and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) and Association (WENRA), the European Nuclear Security the Ministry for Emergency Situations of the Republic of Regulators’ Association (ENSRA), the Heads of European Belarus. Radiation Control Authorities (HERCA), and the Interna- A multinational liaison group (DGRRF) has been estabtional Nuclear Regulators’ Association (INRA). lished by the nuclear regulators of Sweden (SSM), Canada IAEA safety standards form the main basis of SSM’s (CNSC), Finland (STUK), France (ASN), Switzerland regulatory requirements and guides. SSM is represented in (ENSI) and the United States (NRC) with the objective of the IAEA safety standards committees (CSS, NUSSC, sharing regulatory experiences in the licensing, siting, safety WASSC, RASSC, EPReSC and TRANSSC) and nuclear assessment and construction of deep geological repositosecurity guidance committee (NSGC). ries (DGRs) through annual workshops. The latest workshop, held in France in January 2020, was hosted by As a member of the European Union, Sweden is obliged the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). to comply with the directives and legal requirements emanating from the Euratom Treaty. SSM has a key role in SSM also participates in international research, primarily in the transposition of Euratom directives into Swedish the frameworks of the EU research programmes, but also legislation. as part of the IAEA and OECD/NEA.

32 Section A – Introduction

Figure A14 Friction stir welding of copper lids. The image to the left shows Canister Laboratory equipment for development, and the image to the right shows the rotating tool that is pressed into the joint between the parts that are to be combined.

Figure A15 The Multi-purpose Test Facilities at Äspö. The photo shows the testing of a self-positioning robot for backfilling a deposition tunnel with bentonite blocks.

Section A – Introduction 33

SSM regularly provides experts to assist in international building of national authorities, waste management

peer review missions, mainly in the framework of the organisations and other key national institutions.

IAEA’s IRRS and ARTEMIS review services. Currently, Sweden’s cooperation partners are Russia,

SSM’s international involvement and work is continually Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus. As of 2020 there

reviewed with respect to available staff resources and as are also plans for establishing cooperation with Armenia.

part of upholding competent regulatory supervision of

licensees and activities in Sweden. In order to support A.9.3 Licence holders

priority decisions, a classification scheme and a policy for

A.9.3.1 General information

international work are part of SSM’s integrated and Utilities in Sweden have a tradition of being quite active in process-based management system. international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety by

sharing experiences, contributing to work on international

A.9.2 SSM’s international support programmes

regulations and guidelines, and participating in safety Since 1992, Swedish authorities have been engaged in assessments and peer reviews. providing assistance to states of Eastern and Central Europe in the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear security and Swedish fuel cycle facility licence holders, such as Studsvik

radiation protection. Today, the aims of the bilateral Nuclear AB, Cyclife Sweden AB and Westinghouse Electric

assistance that is carried out by the Swedish Radiation Sweden AB, are global companies offering a wide range of

Safety Authority, SSM are to: advanced technical services to the international nuclear

power industry in areas including waste treatment, consul- – improve reactor safety and minimise the risk of a tancy services and fuel and materials products and nuclear accident involving uncontrolled radioactive technology. Also, representatives from e.g. SKB, AB Svafo releases at the facilities in question; and Barsebäck Kraft AB participate actively in interna- – improve conditions so that radioactive waste, including tional working groups whose focus is on waste manage-

spent nuclear fuel, shall be handled and stored in a ment and decommissioning.

manner that is acceptable from the point of view of

safety and radiation protection, regarding personnel, the A.9.3.2 SKB

public and the environment; SKB gives international cooperation high priority and

works together with corresponding waste management – strengthen non-proliferation measures and institutions; organisations in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, – improve national preparedness and awareness as far as Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United concerns radiation protection of people and the States of America. environment; The aim of SKB’s international activities is to monitor – strengthen the legislation and regulatory framework research and development work conducted in other related to the operation of nuclear facilities and countries and to participate in international projects within handling of radioactive waste; the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste

– contribute to the development and strengthening of the management but also to share knowledge and developed

countries’ authorities and organisations within national methods with others. The international work provides

emergency preparedness systems and to establish perspectives to the domestic programme and contributes

cooperation in the event of an emergency situation in to maintaining state-of-the-art competence in relevant

the Baltic region; and scientific areas.

– support regional cooperation in the areas of nuclear and SKB participates actively in different IAEA, EU and

radioactive waste safety among the GUAM countries OECD/NEA committees and working groups. SKB is

(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). involved also in a large number of research projects within

these international organisations. SKB takes an active role Since 2018, SSM has also taken on a new role as implewithin the executive group of the ‘Implementing Geologmenting organisation for international support projects, ical Disposal of Radioactive Waste Technology Platform’ funded by the European Commission and by the Swedish (IGD-TP) in which twelve waste management organisa- International Development Cooperation Agency, tions collaborate. The IGD-TP identifies and prioritises addressing challenges related to management of legacy research and technological development initiatives that are radioactive waste and radioactive sources in Georgia and necessary and time-critical for ensuring that the first Moldova,. These projects aim at strengthening the national geological repositories in Europe will be in operation by radioactive waste management system, development of 2025. The IGD-TP has no financial resources at its siting and disposal programmes and supporting capacity disposal but has an indirect influence on how the EU’s

34 Section A – Introduction

research funding is allocated within the area. This influence A.9.4 International peer review missions has become more direct since IGD-TP acts as one of the In 2016, a follow-up IRRS mission was performed in colleges in the joint programming of EURAD, the new Sweden. Section K.1.6 gives an account of the completion initiative for radioactive waste research in EU. SKB is also of the actions arisen from that follow-up mission. With the directly engaged in the Bureau of the EURAD. 2012 full scope mission and the 2016 follow-up mission, Sweden completed the first round of international safety SKB’s rationale for continuous participation in the peer reviews. The Swedish Government has since officially platform is that it provides a shared arena for scientific requested the IAEA to carry out a new IRRS mission to cooperation and exchange throughout Europe. Sweden in autumn 2022, followed by an ARTEMIS SKB’s collaboration with Posiva in Finland is the most mission in spring 2023 on Sweden’s waste management extensive forum, comprising projects in the fields of implementation (see section K.4). repository and encapsulation technology. SKB has also extensive collaboration with the Nuclear Waste Management Organization, NWMO, in Canada comprising research projects related to rock mechanics and canister integrity. An important example of SKB’s international research cooperation is represented by the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory, where organisations from Finland, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan conduct joint studies. The research on bentonite conducted at Äspö also includes collaboration with Russian scientists. SKB International, a wholly owned subsidiary of SKB, provides services related to the laboratory work as well as providing knowledge transfer and safety case services to organisations in China, Taiwan, Japan, Denmark and the Czech Republic.

Section A – Introduction 35

Section B – Policies and Practices

B.1 Article 32.1: Reporting

covered by revenues from the production of energy

that has given rise to these expenses.

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each » The producer of radioactive waste outside of the

Contracting Party shall submit a national report to each nuclear fuel cycle shall provide financial security for

review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall the waste management costs and recovery measures

address the measures taken to implement each of the that the activity can incur.

obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party 3. The state has ultimate responsibility for spent nuclear the report shall also address its: fuel and radioactive waste. (i) spent fuel management policy; 4. Each country is responsible for the spent nuclear fuel (ii) spent fuel management practices; and radioactive waste generated in that country. (iii) radioactive waste management policy; Disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (iv) radioactive waste management practices; and from a foreign country is not allowed in Sweden other (v) criteria used to define and categorise radioactive waste. than in exceptional cases. It is also prohibited to dispose

of Swedish spent fuel or radioactive waste in another

country, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled in

B.1.1 Spent fuel and radioactive waste

line with the Euratom waste directive and international

management policy

conventions. Swedish policy for spent fuel and radioactive waste

management is based on the legal requirements contained Another basic presumption as regards spent fuel managein the Act on Nuclear Activities, Radiation Protection Act ment is the principle of direct disposal, i.e. that reproand Environmental Code. The national policy is also in cessing will not take place even though this is not prohibaccordance with the European Union’s Council Directive ited by law. In practice, spent nuclear fuel is both 2011/70/Euratom establishing a Community framework considered and treated as waste, although it is not legally for the responsible and safe management of spent nuclear defined as waste according to the Act on Nuclear Activities fuel and radioactive waste (the Euratom waste directive), until disposed of in a repository. which has been formally implemented in Swedish legisla-

tion since August 2013. The national policy is further based on the principles in

Article 4 of the European Union’s radioactive waste and The most important legal principles that constitute the spent fuel management directive 2011/70/Euratom, which national policy can be summarised as follows: in addition to the above requires that:

1. The licence holder of a nuclear activity as well as the – the generation of radioactive waste shall be kept to the operatsor of activities involving ionising radiation are to minimum that is reasonably practicable; safely manage and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and

radioactive waste arising from their activities. – the interdependencies between all steps in spent fuel

and radioactive waste generation and management shall 2. Funding liability be taken into account; » The expenses for management of spent nuclear fuel – spent fuel and radioactive waste shall be safely managed, and radioactive waste from nuclear activities shall be including in the long term with passive safety features;

Section B – Policies and Practices 37

– implementation of measures shall follow a graded Wastes are directed to different parts of the repository approach; and depending on factors such as activity content and chemical characteristics. – an evidence-based and documented decision-making process shall be applied with regard to all stages of the Long-lived low and intermediate level waste (LILW-LL) management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. will be disposed of in a deep geological repository situated

in rock caverns in crystalline bedrock. Until this repository Other principles constituting national policy are also has been constructed, the long-lived waste is stored at the included in the legal and regulatory framework. The reactor sites, at the Studsvik site, or in storage pools in the Radiation Protection Act is based on the International interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab). Radiation Protection Commission’s (ICRP) principles on justification, optimisation and dose limitation. The Spent nuclear fuel is stored in fuel pools at the nuclear objective of the Swedish Environmental Code is to power plants for at least nine months before it is transpromote sustainable development and ensure a healthy ported to the central interim storage facility for spent environment for current and future generations. The nuclear fuel (Clab). The safety and security measures taken general ‘rules of consideration’ established in the Code at the NPPs do not differentiate between spent or partially identify important principles that are applicable even to spent fuel. According to the current plans, following a nuclear activities and activities involving radiation, e.g. the storage period in Clab of about 30–40 years, fuel elements knowledge principle, the precautionary principle and use will be encapsulated in copper canisters and transported to of best available technology (BAT), the selection of the the spent nuclear fuel repository for disposal. The most suitable site and the remediation liability principle. proposed disposal method is based on the conceptual These are further described in section E.2.1. design of a deep geological repository in hard rock, with a system of engineered barriers ensuring post-closure safety B.1.2 Spent fuel and radioactive waste through containment over very long periods of time.

management practices

B.1.2.2 Radioactive waste from non-nuclear activities B.1.2.1 Spent fuel and radioactive waste

The practices developed through the nuclear waste

from nuclear activities

management programme also apply to radioactive waste Under the Act on Nuclear Activities, a party that holds a from non-nuclear activities. Waste arising outside of the licence to conduct nuclear activities in Sweden has an nuclear fuel cycle may therefore, when needed and if obligation to ensure that the nuclear material, spent nuclear appropriate, be disposed of in disposal facilities for nuclear fuel and nuclear waste generated by the operations are fuel cycle wastes. safely managed and disposed of. This obligation signifies an extensive commitment on the part of a licensee until a

B.1.3 Criteria for defining and categorising radio-

final disposal facility for this waste has ultimately been

active waste

closed. The utilities operating nuclear power reactors are also subject to a specific obligation collaboratively to B.1.3.1 Definitions establish and carry out a research and development The definition of nuclear waste according to the Act on (RD&D) programme for the safe handling and disposal of Nuclear Activities is:

spent fuel and nuclear waste. They are further obliged – spent nuclear fuel that has been placed in a repository; collaboratively to prepare cost estimates for management – radioactive material that has been generated in a nuclear and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste as a basis for facility and that has not been produced at or taken from payments to be made to the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund. the facility to be used for educational or research Very low level short-lived waste (VLLW-SL) is disposed of purposes or for medical, agricultural engineering or in shallow land burials that are licensed under the Act on commercial purposes; Nuclear Activities or subject to clearance in accordance – material or any item that has belonged to a nuclear with the regulatory authority’s requirements and decisions. facility and become contaminated by radioactivity and Waste subject to clearance may be released for unrestricted which shall no longer be used in such facility, and use, disposed of in municipal landfills or incinerated using specific furnaces (only applicable to contaminated oil). – radioactive parts of a nuclear facility that is being decommissioned. Short-lived low and intermediate level waste (LILW-SL) is treated and packaged according to a standardised system The definition of radioactive waste according to the with predefined waste type descriptions (WTD) and Radiation Protection Act is: disposed of in the repository for operational waste (SFR) – any substance or object that the holder disposes of or in rock caverns in crystalline bedrock beneath the Baltic intends or is obliged to dispose of. Sea, covered by about 60 metres of rock. The repository consists of five different caverns, including a 50 m deep silo.

38 Section B – Policies and Practices

Table B1 Waste classification scheme used by the Swedish nuclear industry.

Low and Very low level Low level Intermediate level High level Cleared intermediate waste short-lived waste short-lived waste short-lived waste material long-lived waste (VLLW-SL) (LLW-SL) (ILW-SL) (HLW) (LILW-LL)

Material with so Contains small Contains small Contains significant Contains significant (Nuclear fuel) Typical small amounts of amounts of short- amounts of short- amounts of short- amounts of long- decay heat >2 kW/ radioactive nuclides lived nuclides with lived nuclides with a lived nuclides with lived nuclides with a m and contains 3 that it has been a half-life less than half-life less than 31 a half-life less than half-life greater than significant amounts released from 31 years; dose rate years; dose rate on 31 years; dose rate 31 years, exceeding of long-lived regulatory control. on waste package is waste package (and on waste package is the restricted quan- nuclides with a less than 0.5 mSv/h. unshielded waste) is less than 500 mSv/h. tities for short-lived half-life greater than less than 2 mSv/h. waste. 31 years, exceeding Definition Long-lived nuclides Long-lived nuclides the restricted quanwith a half-life Long-lived nuclides with a half-life tities for short-lived greater than 31 with a half-life greater than 31 waste. years can be greater than 31 years can be present in restricted years can be present in restricted quantities. present in restricted quantities. quantities.

Requires cooling Specific Requires radiation Requires special and radiation conside- – – – shielding during containment during shielding during rations transport. transport. intermediate storage and transport.

Final repository for Final repository for Final repository for No final repository Final repository Destination Shallow land burial. short-lived radio- short-lived radio- long-lived radioneeded. for spent fuel. active waste (SFR). active waste (SFR). active waste (SFL).

B.1.3.2 Categorisation

There is no legally defined waste classification scheme in Sweden for nuclear or radioactive waste. There is, however, an established waste characterisation system that is used by the Swedish nuclear industry. The characterisation system is destination-driven and customised with regards to existing and planned repositories (end points) as shown in Table B1. Section F.3 describes the waste management process and application of waste acceptance criteria. See also section K.2.2.

Section B – Policies and Practices 39

Section C – Scope of Application

C.1 Article 3: Scope of application

C.1.1 Scope of application

Reprocessing of spent fuel is not included in the Swedish • This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel waste management programme and is therefore not subject management when the spent fuel results from the to reporting under this Article.

operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at

Sweden does not declare waste containing only naturally

reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing activity is

occurring radioactive material and which does not originate

not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the

Contracting Party declares reprocessing to be part of spent from the nuclear fuel cycle as radioactive waste for the fuel management. purpose of the Joint Convention pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2, second sentence.

• This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when the radioactive

C.1.2 Conclusion

waste results from civilian applications. However, this

Convention shall not apply to waste that contains only Sweden complies with the obligations under Article 3 naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not regarding spent fuel that results from the operation of originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a civilian nuclear reactors, radioactive waste that results from disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive waste civilian applications, and spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting within military or defence programmes.

Party. • This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.

Section C – Scope of Application 41

Section D – Inventories and Lists

D.1 Article 32.2: Reporting

amounts of spent nuclear fuel originate from the research reactor R2 at the Studsvik site. In addition, some spent 1. This report shall also include: nuclear fuel from the closed Ågesta reactor and from the decommissioned research reactor, R1, must be managed. (i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and The spent fuel from the closed research reactor R2 at the essential features; Studsvik site has been exported to the United States (ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this according to contractual agreements. Convention and that is being held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a About 3.3 kilograms of separated plutonium and approxidescription of the material and, if available, give information mately 9 kilograms of natural and depleted uranium, on its mass and its total activity; mainly from reprocessing of some spent fuel from the (iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities Ågesta reactor, was exported to US Department of Energy subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose in 2012 within the framework of the Global Threat and essential features; Reduction Initiative (GTRI). All remaining spent fuel from (iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to the operation of the Ågesta reactor is currently stored in this Convention that: Clab awaiting future disposal in Sweden. a. is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities; The fuel rods used in the R1 research reactor consist of rods of metallic uranium enclosed in an aluminium alloy b. has been disposed of; or casing. These have been interim stored at the Studsvik site c. has resulted from past practices. since the closure of the reactor. This type of metallic fuel This inventory shall contain a description of the material is not suitable for the anticipated method for disposal of and other appropriate information available, such as spent nuclear fuel. The intact part of the spent fuel was volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides; therefore separated from the corroded parts and in 2007 (i) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being sent for reprocessing in the United Kingdom. The decommissioned and the status of decommissioning separated 1.2 kilograms of plutonium remain in storage in activities at those facilities. United Kingdom. The remaining waste from the reprocessing activities was sent back to Sweden in 2009.

D.1.1 Management of spent nuclear fuel

Ownership of the separated plutonium was transferred to Spent nuclear fuel from Swedish NPPs is temporarily the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in stored in fuel pools before being transported to the central 2014 together with the transfer of ownership of 834 interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab), where kilograms of separated plutonium from reprocessing of it will be stored for at least 30 years before being encapsuspent fuel from OKG AB (see section A.8.1.1). The lated and deposited in a disposal facility. material, which is presently stored at the Sellafield site, Most spent nuclear fuel in Sweden emanates from is to be managed together with existing UK plutonium for commercial nuclear power plants at the Forsmark, Oskars- future use in UK reactors in line with UK policies. The hamn and Ringhals sites, but also from the Barsebäck site, corroded parts of the R1 fuel are still being temporarily which was permanently shut down on 31 May 2005. Small stored at the Studsvik site awaiting conditioning before

Section D – Inventories and Lists 43

Table D1 Inventory of spent fuel in NPP pools.

storage capacity for spent fuel. The pools also have space for the plundered reactor core, fresh fuel, scrap and boxes.

D.1.2.2 Clab, the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel

Spent fuel assemblies are to be stored at the Clab facility for at least 30 years. The main reason is to allow the thermal output to decay by about 90 per cent before encapsulation and disposal take place. Other highly radioactive components, such as control rods from reactors, are also stored in Clab awaiting disposal. A schematic illustration of Clab is shown in Figure D2. After being removed from the transport cask in an unloading pool, the spent fuel assemblies are transferred to storage canisters for subsequent transport and storage. A water-filled elevator cage takes the storage canister down to the storage section, where it is placed in a predetermined position in a storage pool. Thus, unloading and all subsequent handling of spent fuel assemblies are performed under water using hydraulic machines. The water, which circulates in a closed system, acts both as a coolant and as Figure D1 Reactor top and pools at one of the Swedish reactors. an effective radiation shield, and no additional radiation being disposed of in the planned disposal facility for Figure D2 The Clab facility. long-lived waste (SFL). No spent nuclear fuel is currently being disposed of in Sweden.

D.1.2 Spent nuclear fuel facilities and inventories

32 m

D.1.2.1 Interim storage at the nuclear power plants

Each NPP unit has a fuel pool close to the reactor vessel in which spent fuel is stored temporarily for at least nine months before Unloading of fuel being transported to Clab, see Figure D1. The fuel pools constitute integrated parts of the reactor facilities and are Storage canister Storage pool for the purpose of the Joint Convention not considered as separate spent fuel management facilities. The quantities of spent fuel stored in pools at the nuclear power reactors as at 31 December 2019 are 5 m presented in Table D1. The pool capacity listed corresponds to the

44 Section D – Inventories and Lists

Table D2 Inventory of spent fuel stored in Clab as at 31 Dec. 2019.

Specification Spent nuclear fuel stored as at 31 Dec. 2019

No. of assemblies Tonnes

BWR fuel 30,451 5,127 PWR fuel 3,783 1,632

Fuel from Ågesta district

222 20.2

heating nuclear power reactor

Fuel from Studsvik 26 3

German MOX fuel (exchanged for

217 22.5

Swedish fuel reprocessed in France)

Total 34,699 6,805

Storage capacity 8,000

Table D3 Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 temporarily stored at Studsvik.

Spent nuclear fuel in storage as at 31 December 2019

through filters to keep it clean before being returned to the steps involved in the process from when the waste is pools. The heat is removed in heat exchangers and cooled generated up until the finally conditioned waste package is by seawater in an intermediate cooling system. All safety delivered to the disposal facility, and thus ensure systems have backups. Vital parts of the monitoring and conformity with the WAC in question. Among other control systems can be powered by a battery backup things, the WTD need to consider the type of waste system. The storage pools are designed to withstand package to be used to ensure conformity with the handling seismic loads as well as extreme temperature loads in the equipment at the disposal facility. Another important event the cooling systems should fail. consideration is the potential restrictions imposed by e.g. transport regulations and radiation protection. The waste Approximately 100 people work at the facility; one-third of management process is further described in section F.3.2. them with day-to-day operation, and others with radiation protection, chemical sampling, maintenance and repairs.

D.1.3.2 Management of radioactive waste at the

The number of fuel assemblies of different types stored at

nuclear power plants

the Clab facility and corresponding tonnages are listed in Waste management at the NPP sites is fully integrated into Table D2 above. the operations at each site. Fulfilment of the requirements of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s general

D.1.2.3 Spent nuclear fuel facilities and inventories

regulations is verified through regulatory review and

at Studsvik

inspection activities at the nuclear power plants, as As described in section D.1.1, remaining waste from reported under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. reprocessing of the intact parts and corroded parts of the R1 fuel is temporarily stored on site at Studsvik prior to Waste with very low activity (VLLW) is disposed of in transport to a disposal facility, see Table D3. shallow land burials on site, with the exception of Barsebäck, which disposes of VLLW in SFR.

D.1.3 Management of radioactive waste

Short-lived low and intermediate level waste (LILW) from D.1.3.1 The Waste Management Process the nuclear power plants consists of ion exchange resins SKB and the utilities operating nuclear power reactors from filters, metal scrap, pipes, valves, pumps, tools and established early on a systematic approach by means of a protective clothing. The waste is classified and handled ‘waste management process’ for efficient management of initially on site in preparation for disposal. The purpose of nuclear waste from the reactors. There are two important the waste handling at the power plants is to reduce its basic elements in the waste management process; the volume, solidify wet waste in concrete or bitumen, and Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and the Waste Type suitably package the waste. The standardised types of Description (WTD) for different waste streams. WAC must packages used are shown in Figure D3. be developed by the licensee for the specific disposal facility in question, based on an appropriate facility-specific safety case and associated safety assessments. WTD must be developed by the licensee of the activity or facility where the waste is generated, e.g. the licensee of a nuclear

Section D – Inventories and Lists 45

Concrete tank

Concrete mould

ISO-container full height, 20 and 10 feet

ISO-container half height, 20 and 10 feet Steel mould

Steel mould Figure D3 Standardised types of packages used for radioactive waste. Drum tray Steel drum

Waste is treated differently at the different nuclear power D.1.4 Radioactive waste management plants. Table D4 below illustrates the methods used and facilities and inventories packages for operational waste produced at the nuclear

D.1.4.1 Management of radioactive waste

power plants.

and inventories at Studsvik

Waste packages are placed temporarily in storage on the Studsvik Nuclear AB (SNAB) materials research site before being transported to SFR, the repository for facilities operational waste. As waste packages from the NPP sites SNAB provides services in fuel and materials technologies are transported to SFR on a regular basis, it is not relevant to the nuclear power industry. Testing of materials and for the purpose of the Joint Convention to present a list reactor fuel is performed in its own laboratories on site. of the inventories for the interim storage at the sites. The pools are presently used for temporary storage of

spent fuel prior to examinations performed in HCL. At the Oskarshamn site, the interim storage facility for low and intermediate level waste is located in a rock cavern.

Hot cell laboratory, HCL

At the other nuclear power plants’ sites, there are special The Hot Cell Laboratory is primarily used to investigate buildings used for interim storage of conditioned operairradiated nuclear fuel, although it is also used for studying tional waste on the respective site. Operation of storage other types of irradiated materials. In addition, the buildings at the sites are fully integrated in the operation of laboratory is used for conditioning, treatment and encapsuthe NPP. The safety procedures and safety documentation lation of spent fuel fragments in packages suitable for for those activities constitutes integrated parts of the safety interim storage in other facilities. The laboratory has seven procedures and safety documentation for the NPP. The cells with thick concrete walls, and lead windows to protect safety documentation describes the facility and the waste personnel from ionising radiation. All waste is removed handling activities, the content of radioactive substances, from the laboratory after conditioning. supervisory activities, as well as safety analyses. See section D.1.6 as regards interim storage of decommissioning waste.

Table D4 Waste treatment methods at Swedish NPPs. (Note: operational waste is no longer generated at the Barsebäck site following the closure of this plant.)

Type of waste Ringhals Barsebäck Oskarshamn Forsmark

Ion exchange Solidified in concrete moulds Solidified in concrete and Solidified in concrete and Solidified in bitumen and resins and steel moulds packed in steel drums packed in concrete drums packed in steel moulds

Cast in concrete and packed Cast in concrete and packed Packed in concrete moulds Packed in steel moulds in concrete moulds Trash and in concrete moulds Packed in standard Packed in standard Packed in standard Metal scrap Packed in standard ISO containers ISO containers ISO containers ISO containers Packed in steel tanks Packed in steel tanks Packed in steel tanks

Solidified in concrete, packed Sludge N.A. N.A. N.A. in concrete moulds

46 Section D – Inventories and Lists

The active metal laboratory, AKL The work also comprises management, radiological

The Active Metal Laboratory is primarily used to investi- measurement and final conditioning of the waste. Up until gate irradiated metallic materials. The laboratory has 2006 ash has been stabilised in concrete for disposal (or if several cells with lead walls to protect personnel from the waste comes from overseas, returned to the country of ionising radiation. All waste is removed from the labora- origin for further management). However, as of 2016 SKB tory after conditioning. does not accept ash conditioned in concrete for disposal and work is ongoing to develop a new method for

The storage facility, FA

conditioning and packaging of ash. The current licence This facility, which contains three water pools, was built in conditions allow for treatment of 600 tonnes of combus- 1965 for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from the tible waste annually. Ågesta power reactor. As all fuel from Ågesta has since

been transferred to Clab, the facility can be used for other The melting facility, SMA

purposes, such as storing spent fuel from other reactors The melting facility at Studsvik is used for volume and storing other radioactive materials or for temporary reduction of contaminated metal, see Figure D4. After storage of spent fuel prior to examinations performed in having carried out melting and radiological measurement, HCL. Small quantities of spent nuclear fuel that have been the material may be exempted from regulatory control or examined at Studsvik are transported to Clab, the interim returned to the customer for further management. Most storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. often the metal ingots can be free-released while slag and dust is returned to the customer. The current licence allows

Cyclife AB’s radioactive waste management facilities

for treatment of 5,000 tonnes of metal annually. Cyclife provides services by means of treatment of waste

from national and international customers based on Treatment facilities for radioactive non-nuclear waste, commercial contracts. A principal precondition for such FR0-A and R0-A

contract agreements as regards international customers is Disused sealed sources and radioactive waste from medical that the radioactive material and radioactive waste is use, research and industry are mainly managed in the two returned to the customer. facilities FR0-A and R0-A. In R0-A, ionising smoke detectors are dismantled or sorted, whereas all other

The incineration facility, HA disused sealed sources and radioactive waste are treated in

The facility is used for incineration or pyrolysis of FR0-A. Depending on the activities, dose rate, material, low-level waste (LLW) from NPPs, fuel fabrication plants, etc., treatment comprises sorting, volume reduction, hospitals, research institutions and facilities at Studsvik. packing and conditioning. Some of the disused sealed

Figure D4 The melting facility (SMA) at Cyclife Sweden AB.

Section D – Inventories and Lists 47

sources and radioactive waste may also be treated in the Table D5 Inventory of stored radioactive waste in AM as at 31 Dec. 2019. facilities HA, SMA or AB Svafo’s facility HM (see below). Number of Volume (m 3 ) incl. Activity Some radioactive sources are sent abroad for recycling. packages packaging (Bq)

3,565 2,750 8E15

AB Svafo radioactive waste management facilities

The following are the most important facilities operated by

Storage facilities for radioactive waste, AU and AUA

AB Svafo at the Studsvik site. The AU facility is an interim storage facility for long-lived

Treatment facility for intermediate waste, HM low level waste that has been conditioned. It is a simple

This facility is used for the treatment of intermediate level unheated building made of concrete and steel. The AU solid and liquid waste from facilities at the Studsvik site. storage facility contains drums with historical waste Treatment of solid waste comprises sorting, volume embedded in concrete. The waste was reconditioned in the reduction (compaction), packing and conditioning by 1990s. About 7,000 drums were previously stored in the means of stabilisation using concrete. Treatment of liquid facility. The waste will ultimately be disposed of in the waste comprises evaporation and solidification by means planned disposal facility for long-lived waste.

of stabilisation using concrete. The AUA facility is an interim storage under construction, expected to be in operation 2021. It will store decommis-

Interim storage facility for low and intermediate level waste, AM

sioning waste from Ågesta and the R2 research reactor. The AM facility was constructed in the 1980s for interim storage of conditioned waste from facilities at the Studsvik

Monitoring of facilities at the Studsvik site

site. The storage facility is constructed in a cavern in Whenever there is a risk of airborne emissions, ventilation bedrock with a rock cover of at least 20 metres. The rock and/or exhaust systems are monitored for any radioactive mass is grouted with concrete, the walls are reinforced by substances. Likewise, to avoid contamination from waste means of rendering concrete, and special arrangements water, drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive have been made to drain the rock. The storage facility is substances before the water is discharged. dimensioned to receive waste until around the year 2045. The storage area is divided into two parts: one part is used D.1.4.2 Repository for short-lived low and intermediate for waste requiring shielding, and the other is used for level waste (SFR) waste not requiring shielding. The shielded part of the AM

General information

storage facility has a capacity of about 4,000 m , corre- 3 The repository is situated beneath the Baltic Sea, covered sponding to 1,632 moulds and 1,020 four-drum unit trays; by about 60 metres of rock. Two one-kilometre-long the unshielded part has a capacity of about 1,120 m , 3 access tunnels lead from the harbour in Forsmark to the corresponding to 660 moulds and 264 four-drum unit repository area. The facility currently consists of four trays. A further 1,000 drums can be deposited in other 160-metre-long waste vaults; the rock vault for intermeparts of the storage facility. The waste is conditioned and diate level waste (BMA), two rock vaults for concrete tanks packed in special containers before being positioned in the (1BTF, 2BTF) and a rock vault for low level waste (BLA), storage. The ventilation and drainage systems are plus a 70-metre-high cavern in which a concrete silo has monitored for any radioactive substances. been built. Wastes are directed to different parts of the The following types of waste originating from facilities on repository depending on factors such as activity content the Studsvik site are currently being stored at AM (see also and chemical characteristics.

Table D5): The total capacity of SFR is approximately 63,000 m . By 3 – operational waste from the R2 research reactor and 31 December 2018, roughly 40,000 m of waste had been 3 testing performed in the reactor; disposed of. In the safety assessment for the facility, the

– irradiated and contaminated material from the total radioactivity of the waste in the filled repository is assumed to be 10 Bq. 16 production of isotopes;

– irradiated and contaminated material from the fuel The repository is designed to isolate the waste from the testing laboratory; and biosphere in order to avoid harmful consequences for people and the environment both during operation and – start sources from an old research reactor and after closure. This is accomplished by emplacement in operational waste from the waste handling facilities. bedrock under the seabed and by the technical barriers In addition, the following externally-produced types of surrounding the waste, see Figure A11. waste currently being stored at AM:

The silo

– residual products from incinerated waste from nuclear The waste designated for SFR that has the highest radioacpower plants, hospitals and industry; tivity is intended for disposal in the silo. This waste comes – residual products from use of isotopes in industry and from many different waste streams, but the most important hospitals; one comprises ion exchange resins in a concrete or

– decommissioning waste from old nuclear facilities; and bitumen matrix from the nuclear power plants. Other waste, such as metal components of different origins, is – waste from treatment of steam generators from also disposed of in the silo. The amount of organic Ringhals.

48 Section D – Inventories and Lists

material is kept to a minimum. The maximum surface dose The waste is stacked on top of the concrete floor in such a rate permitted on a package is 500 mSv/h. All handling of way that the concrete moulds act as support for prefabriwaste packages is performed using remote control cated concrete slabs, put in position as soon as the equipment. The dominant nuclides are Co-60, Cs-137 and compartments are filled. It is also possible to backfill the Ni-63. void between the waste packages in a compartment. Lastly, a layer of concrete will be cast on top of the lid. Between The silo consists of a cylindrical concrete construction the concrete structure and the rock wall there is a 2 m wide with shafts of different sizes for waste packages. The space, which will be filled with sand before closure. The concrete cylinder is approximately 50 m deep with a space above the concrete structure may be left unfilled, but diameter of approximately 30 m. The largest shafts it could also be backfilled. Plugs will be placed in the two measure 2.5 m by 2.5 m. The waste packages are placed in entrances to the vault when the repository is closed. the shafts, normally in layers of four moulds or 16 drums. The spaces between the waste packages are gradually The rock vaults for concrete tanks (BTF) backfilled with porous concrete. The walls of the silo are There are two rock vaults in SFR for concrete tanks: 1BTF made of 0.8 m thick reinforced concrete. In between the and 2BTF. The waste in 1BTF mainly consists of drums walls and the surrounding rock, there is a bentonite backfill containing ash and concrete tanks containing ion exchange averaging 1.2 m thick. The 1 m thick concrete floor at the resins and filter parts, whereas the waste in 2BTF consists bottom of the silo is placed on a layer of 90/10 sand/ of only the latter. Moreover, some large components of bentonite mixture. metal, e.g. steam separators and reactor vessel lids, may be According to the present plans, a 1 m thick concrete lid disposed of in the caverns.

will cover the top of the silo. After closure, the lid will be The maximum surface dose rate permitted on packages is covered with a thin layer of sand, then a 1.5 m thick layer 10 mSv/h. The radionuclide content is fairly low, and the of sand/ bentonite mixture (90/10), and the remaining dominant nuclides are Co-60 and Cs-137. The rock vaults space will be filled with sand, gravel or sand stabilised are approximately 160 m long, 14.8 m wide with a height with cement. of 9.5 m. The concrete tanks, each 10 m 3 in volume, are

stacked in two levels with four tanks in each row. A

The rock vault for intermediate level waste (BMA)

concrete radiation protection lid is placed on top of the The radioactivity in the waste that is disposed of in BMA stacks. The space between the different tanks is backfilled is generally lower than in the waste contained in the silo. with concrete and the space between the tanks and the The waste in BMA comes from many different waste rock wall will be filled with, for example, sand stabilised streams. The most important one is ion exchange resins with cement. from the nuclear power plants. Other waste, such as metal components of various origins as well as contaminated The rock vault for low level waste (BLA) rubbish, is also disposed of in BMA. The waste disposed of in BLA, short-lived waste, is mainly

The maximum surface dose rate permitted on packages is low level scrap metal (iron/steel, aluminium), cellulose (e.g. 100 mSv/h, and the radionuclide content is fairly low. wood, textile, paper), other organic materials, non-organic BMA has been designed to accommodate approximately materials (e.g. plastics, cables) and other waste such as 6% of the total activity content in SFR. The dominant insulation (e.g. rock wool) packed in ISO-standard steel nuclides are Co-60, Cs-137 and Ni-63. The waste packages containers.

are of the same type as in the silo, i.e. moulds and drums. The maximum dose rate permitted on the surface of the

waste packages is 2 mSv/h. The radionuclide levels are low, The rock vault is approximately 160 m long, 19.5 m wide and the dominant nuclide is Co60. Some of the waste with a height of 16.5 m. Inside the cavern, a concrete inside the containers is placed in steel drums and other construction has been constructed so that the vault is types in bales. divided into 15 compartments. The moulds and drums are placed in the compartments using remote-controlled The rock vault cavern is approximately 160 m long, 15 m equipment. wide with a height of 12.5 m. The design is very simple: it

Table D6 Inventories of radioactive waste dispwosed of in SFR as at 31 Dec. 2018.

Repository section Volume (m 3 ) Activity (Bq) per 31 Dec. 2018

Silo 7,644 6.74E14

BMA 9,777 2.53E14

1 BTF 2,513 2.16E12

2 BTF 7,680 9.65E12

BLA 12,300 6.64E11

SFR total 39,914 9.39E14

Section D – Inventories and Lists 49

is basically only a concrete floor, on which the containers D.1.4.3 Shallow land burials are placed. During the operational phase, a ceiling is The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and suspended above the waste in order to minimise water Oskarshamn as well as the Studsvik site have shallow land dripping onto the waste. This suspended ceiling will be burials for very low-level waste. The total activity content dismantled before the repository is closed. is, according to the licence, limited to between 100 and 1100 GBq per burial. The containers are stacked three high in rows of two. Most of the containers are half-height, allowing six to a pile. No In addition to the total activity content, waste acceptance backfilling is planned. criteria specify the nuclide-specific activity concentration and surface dose rate of the individual packages. The

Inventory of nuclear waste disposed of in the SFR facility

(remaining) activity concentration is specified for the future The inventory of nuclear waste disposed of in the SFR point in time when the shallow land burial is planned to be facility is listed in Table D6 below. The nuclide-specific released from a radiation protection point of view, see activity content can be seen in Figure D5. Table D7.

1,00E+15 The waste is disposed of at the three nuclear power plants 1,00E+14 as part of campaigns undertaken at three to five year 1,00E+13 intervals, with the burial facilities closed in between these 1,00E+12 periods. The waste consists of low-level scrap and residues from the operations of the NPPs. These include piping,

1,00E+11

1,00E+10

tools, insulation material and protective clothing as well as

1,00E+09

1,00E+08 rubbish such as plastics, paper and cables, etc. The 1,00E+07 dominant nuclides are generally Co-60, Cs-137 and Ni-63. 1,00E+06 The shallow land burial at Studsvik contains waste from 1,00E+05 decommissioning of various old nuclear installations plus

25

operational waste from other Studsvik facilities.

org) H-3 Ni-63Co-60Cs-137Fe-55Ni-59Sr-90Sb-1 Cs-134 Nb-93m Tc-99Nb-94Mo-93Cs-135Ru-106Zr-93Se-79Cl-36I-129Pd-107Sn-126Be-10 C-14 (org) Ag-108m Cd-113m C-14 (in

The design and layout of the shallow land burials differ, Figure D5 Radionuclide-specific activity content in SFR. but all facilities have a top sealing layer to reduce infiltra- The data reflects the situation as at 31 December 2018. tion of water, see Figure D6. The design of the top sealing

Figure D6 The shallow land burial at OKG.

50 Section D – Inventories and Lists

Table D7 Inventories of waste disposed of in shallow land burials. The burial facilities at Studsvik (AB Svafo) are closed permanently.

Licence conditions Waste disposed of as at 31 Dec 2019

Max. activity Licence period

layer differs between the facilities: bentonite liners, plastic A decommissioning licence according to the Environmembranes and massive layers of glacial clay or mixes of mental Code was obtained from the Land and Environbentonite and sand have been used, as well as mixed ment Court in 2019. The final dismantling and demolition designs. The sealing layer of the facilities is covered with a work will start in 2020. Site release in accordance with drainage layer and, on top of that, a protective layer of e.g. regulatory requirements is planned for mid-2030s. soil, approximately 1 metre thick. At the newer installations at Ringhals and Oskarshamn, a geological barrier has been D.1.5.2 Oskarshamn NPP installed down-gradient of the burials. At the burials at In 2015 the owner decided to permanently shut down the Forsmark and Studsvik, a natural or semi-natural geological two oldest BWR units 1 and 2 at the Oskarshamn NPP barrier reduces leakages to the environment. There are before 2017. Oskarshamn 1 was permanently shut down in monitoring programmes in place for sampling leachate June 2017. In practice, Oskarshamn 2 was never restarted water, for example with respect to radionuclides. The following an extended period of shutdown. Dismantling licence period includes a 30-year surveillance period of the internal reactor parts from Oskarshamn unit 1 and (50 years for OKG) after final closure. 2 are planned to be completed in 2020.

The necessary licences for decommissioning units 1 and 2

D.1.5 Nuclear facilities under decommissioning

pursuant to the Environmental Code were obtained in 2019. This section presents an update and overview of the current status for nuclear facilities permanently shut down

D.1.5.3 Ringhals NPP

or being decommissioned. Table D8 lists all nuclear In 2015, the owner decided to permanently shut down facilities under decommissioning. More detailed informathe two oldest reactors at the Ringhals NPP, unit 1 (BWR) tion on regulation of decommissioning as well as decomand unit 2 (PWR). Unit 2 was permanently shut down in missioning practices is presented in section F.6. December 2019 and unit 1 is planned to shut down in December 2020. Dismantling of the internal reactor parts

D.1.5.1 Barsebäck NPP

from both units 1 and 2 is planned to start 2022. The twin BWR units Barsebäck 1 and 2 were shut down permanently in 1999 and 2005, respectively, as a result of

D.1.5.4 Ågesta PHWR

political decisions. All spent nuclear fuel was removed by The Ågesta reactor was shut down in 1974. A licence 2006, and reconditioning and removal of nuclear waste according to the Environmental Code for dismantling and from the operational phase is ongoing. Preparations for demolition of the reactor was obtained in 2019. Dismanand detailed planning of dismantling and demolition have tling activities are planned to commence in 2020. intensified since 2016. Segmentation of the reactor pressure vessel internal components has been completed.

Table D8 Nuclear facilities under decommissioning.

Anticipated Nuclear facility Current projects Start of project completion Status Details

Ranstad – uranium Decommissioning 2013 2019 Complete Section A.4 mining/milling & clearance

Studsvik R2 facility,

Dismantling Section materials testing 2015 2020 Ongoing & demolition A.8.3.1, F.6

reactors

Barsebäck nuclear Dismantling Section 2020 2027 Ongoing power plant – unit 1,2 & demolition A.4, F.6, K.3.1.6

Oskarshamn nuclear Dismantling Section 2020 2027 Ongoing power plant – unit 1,2 & demolition A.4, F.4.2.1, F.6, K.3.1.6

Dismantling Section Ågesta 2020 2022 Ongoing & demolition A.4, F.6.2.2

Section D – Inventories and Lists 51

D.1.5.5 Studsvik materials testing reactors decommissioning wastes and before the construction of The final dismantling of Studsvik’s R2 materials testing the SFL repository for long-lived decommissioning wastes. reactor, which began in 2015, is in its final stage. Applica- For this reason, the radioactive waste must be placed in tions for clearance of the remaining buildings and sub-sur- interim storage prior to disposal. The load on the transporface structures are expected during 2020. tation system will increase when the extended SFR and SFL repositories are commissioned, and the interim stored D.1.5.6 Installations in Ranstad wastes can be transferred for disposal. The uranium mining and milling facilities in Ranstad were As regards radioactive waste materials arising from the constructed and operated in the 1960s. The decommisdecommissioning of the Barsebäck reactors, this means sioning of the Ranstad uranium mining and milling facility planning for additional interim storage capacity for is completed and the site has been released from any low-level waste on site in addition to the recently further regulatory control. constructed interim storage facility for long-lived interme- The general timetable for the nuclear power companies’ diate level waste. Waste produced during decommissioning and SKB’s planned decommissioning of their facilities is of the reactors at Oskarshamn and Ringhals will need to presented in Figure D7. The current period is dominated be stored on site in existing facilities until these wastes can by activities at the nuclear power reactors Barsebäck 1 and be transferred to the extended SFR or SFL repository. 2, Oskarshamn 1 and 2, Ringhals 1 and 2, and the Ågesta Radioactive wastes produced during decommissioning of reactor. the Ågesta reactor are planned to be transferred to the new

storage building in Studsvik for storage pending disposal. D.1.6 Interim storage of decommissioning waste Some of these licensees are also investigating the possibili- The timing for final shutdown is an important planning ties for shallow land burial on site for very low level premise for a decommissioning project, and for the overall decommissioning wastes. system of radioactive waste management. Radioactive When it comes to management of long-lived decommiswaste management requires, for example, that waste type sioning wastes, approximately half of this waste is descriptions be revised and approved for decommissioning expected to arise before the planned commissioning of waste, that handling and techniques for management of SFL. Since the waste cannot be finally conditioned before large components be developed, and that waste containers acceptance criteria for SFL are determined, which presupthat are desirable from a decommissioning perspective be poses a defined site and concept, the long-lived waste developed and licensed. Furthermore, pathways need to be needs to be placed in waste containers pending final available for radioactive material that will not be disposed conditioning. According to the current timetable, final of by SKB, such as a licence for shallow land burial of very conditioning can commence at the earliest in conjunction low-level decommissioning waste at the nuclear with SKB obtaining a licence to build SFL, which is power plants. planned for the late 2030s. Waste from decommissioning of the first nuclear power reactors is being produced before the extended SFR repository will be available for the disposal of short-lived

52 Section D – Inventories and Lists

Decommissioning of reactors and SKB facilities

Decommisioning of reactors and SKB facilities

19 21 22 23 25 30 40 45 50 60 65 20 2020 20 20 20 2024 20 2026 2027 2028 2029 20 2035 20 20 20 2055 20 20 2070 2075 Start operation extended SFR Start operation SFL

Forsmark 1 Forsmark 2 Forsmark 3 Forsmark 0* Oskarshamn 1 Oskarshamn 2 Preparatory actions, dismantling and demolition Oskarshamn 3 Conventional demolition, restoration of land Oskarshamn 0* Ringhals 1 Ringhals 2 Ringhals 3 Ringhals 4 Barsebäck 1 and 2 Ågesta Clink SFL SFR Spent Fuel Repository 19 21 22 23 25 30 40 45 50 60 65 20 2020 20 20 20 2024 20 2026 2027 2028 2029 20 2035 20 20 20 2055 20 20 2070 2075 * Shared facilities Clink Central Interim Storage Facility and SFL Final Repository for Long-lived Waste Encapsulation of Spent Nuclear Fuel SFR Final Repository for Short-lived Radioactive Waste

Figure D7 Schematic overview of the nuclear power companies’ and SKB’s timetables for decommissioning (F0 and O0 are shared facilities on the sites).

Section D – Inventories and Lists 53

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

E.1 Article 18: Implementing measures

contains more detailed information about requested legal requirements for the licensing system, prohibition, Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administra- and reporting, enforcement of regulations and terms of a tive measures and other steps necessary for implementing licence, and a description of the allocation of responsibiliits obligations under this Convention. ties of the bodies involved. The third part (section E 2.3) describes the regulatory framework, which refers to the The legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfil the various authorities’ regulations. The fourth part (section E obligations of the Joint Convention are discussed in this 2.4) reports on regulatory review activities. The fifth part report. (section E 2.5) describes the relevant regulatory bodies relating to different aspects of spent fuel and radioactive

E.2 Article 19: Legislative and regulatory waste management. framework

E.2.1 National legislative framework

The framework of Sweden’s legislation in the fields of waste

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a

legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety management, nuclear safety and radiation protection is of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. mainly regulated in the following four Acts with associated Ordinances:

2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:

– Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and Ordinance (i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety; (1984:14) on Nuclear Activities; (ii) a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive – Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) and Radiation waste management activities; Protection Ordinance (2018:506); (iii) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel – Environmental Code; or radioactive waste management facility without a licence; (iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regula- – Act (2006:647) on Financing of Management of tory inspection and documentation and reporting; Residual Products from Nuclear Activities; (v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the The main features of these enactments are reported below, terms of the licences; as well as some additional relevant acts to be applied. (vi) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and of radio- As also reported below, the Swedish Radiation Safety active waste management. Authority (SSM) has a mandate to issue regulations 1. When considering whether to regulate radioactive concerning radiation safety under the Act on Nuclear materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties shall Activities and the Radiation Protection Act on the basis take due account of the objectives of this Convention. of Government Ordinances.

This section is divided into five parts. The first part E.2.1.1 The Act and Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (section E 2.1) presents basic prerequisites for the legal and The Act on Nuclear Activities is the basic law regulating regulatory framework. The second part (section E 2.2) nuclear safety (as well as nuclear security, physical protection,

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 55

information security and non-proliferation, but outside of Definitions

the scope addressed in this convention). It contains basic The handling or transport of nuclear waste or other

provisions concerning safety in connection with nuclear dealings with this waste are defined as a nuclear activity.

activities, and applies to management of nuclear material

General obligations of licensees and licence conditions

and nuclear waste as well as to the operation of nuclear The licence holder for a nuclear activity shall be responsible power plants. for ensuring that all the measures necessary are taken for: The Act does not contain provisions concerning radiation – maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the protection. This area is regulated in a separate act, the activities and the conditions under which they are Radiation Protection Act, see section E.2.1.2. As far as conducted; nuclear activities are concerned, the Radiation Protection

Act and Act on Nuclear Activities should be applied in – ensuring the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste

parallel and in close association with each other. arising from the activity or nuclear material arising

therein that is not reused; and The Ordinance on Nuclear Activities contains detailed provisions regulating areas such as definitions, applications – the safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in

for licences, reviews, evaluations, inspections and certain which the nuclear activity no longer will be conducted.

exemptions from the application of the Act on Nuclear In addition to the three bullet points above, the Act on Activities. The Ordinance also mandates SSM to decide on Nuclear Activities also requires the application of the exceptions in individual cases if there are special circumgeneral ‘rules of consideration’ contained in the Environstances and if the purpose of the law is not violated. mental Code, see section E.2.1.3. The Ordinance also specifies that SSM is authorised to The holder of a licence for a nuclear activity must ensure issue permits for e.g. shallow land burials for very-low level that all the necessary measures are taken for maintaining wastes and other facilities managing low levels of radioacsafety. These general requirements are supplemented by tive waste. SSM is also authorised to issue permits for more detailed regulations issued by SSM (see below) and, transports of nuclear materials and nuclear waste. if needed, licence conditions that the Authority may issue Furthermore the Authority is authorised to impose licence in individual cases. The licensing conditions are imposed

conditions and to issue general regulations concerning when a licence is issued. Licensing conditions can also be

measures to maintain the safety of nuclear activities. imposed during the period of validity of a licence.

Safety Requirements Disposal of nuclear waste – Safe management and Nuclear activities shall be conducted so as to meet safety RD&D programme

requirements and fulfil the obligations pursuant to The holder of a licence for nuclear activities is responsible

Sweden’s agreements for the purpose of preventing the for the management and disposal of the waste produced

proliferation of nuclear weapons and unauthorised dealing and for decommissioning. The holder of a licence for the

with nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel. operation of a nuclear power reactor shall – in liaison with

the other holders of a licence for the operation of nuclear A nuclear installation must be designed, located, power reactors – establish and carry out an RD&D constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned programme for the safe handling and disposal of spent to avoid radiological emergencies and, if a radiological fuel and nuclear waste. Every third year, a report describing emergency still occurs, so that the consequences of the the programme shall be submitted to SSM for review. An emergency can be managed. important step in the review process is that the programme Safety in nuclear activities shall be maintained by taking all is sent to a large number of stakeholders for consultation

the measures required to prevent errors in equipment, or and comment, such as other government organisations,

its defective function, to prevent incorrect handling or any municipalities, environmental organisations, research

other circumstances that could result in a radiological accident, institutions and universities.

and to prevent unlawful dealings with nuclear material or Following the review, SSM sends a review statement nuclear waste. The Government or the authority appointed regarding the RD&D programme to the Government. The by the Government may issue more detailed provisions Government determines whether or not the programme concerning these areas. As mentioned above, SSM has the can be approved. In connection with this decision, the mandate to impose detailed regulations. Government may issue conditions concerning the content At least once every ten years, a new integrated analysis and of the nuclear power operators’ (through SKB) future

assessment of the safety of a nuclear facility shall be research and development work.

performed by the licence holder (periodic safety review).

The analyses and assessments, as well as the measures E.2.1.2 The Radiation Protection Act and Ordinance

proposed on the basis of these, must be documented and Requirements for radiation protection are set out in the

submitted to the regulatory authority for review. Radiation Protection Act and in the Radiation Protection

Ordinance. Precautionary measures listed in the Act apply

56 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

not only to activities that require permits or notification Justification: No activity is to be introduced until it has but also to activities that does not require neither of this. been shown to provide greater advantages than disadvantages to society. The basic principle of justification with The purpose of the legislation is to protect human health regard to management of nuclear and non-nuclear and the environment against the harmful effects of radioactive waste cannot be questioned at this stage. The radiation. waste has been generated as a result of previous decisions. Persons engaged in activities involving radiation are

Optimisation: All radiation doses to individuals, the

obliged to take the requisite precautionary measures. number of exposed individuals, as well as the probability The persons conducting activities are also responsible for of receiving doses must be kept as low as reasonably proper handling and disposal of the radioactive waste achievable, while taking into account economic and societal produced in or brought to the activity, which includes factors. This is often called the ‘ALARA principle’ (As Low covering the costs associated with both the handling and As Reasonably Achievable). disposal of the waste.

Dose limitation: Individual exposure to radiation (dose)

The Radiation Protection Ordinance contains detailed must not exceed the established limits for the particular provisions on e.g. dose limits, licence and notification, circumstances. The dose limit or dose constraint can be documentation of sources, reporting on orphan sources viewed as a limit for optimisation; thus, individual doses and supervision. must not exceed the established limits, even if the collective dose would be reduced as a result. The Ordinance stipulates that the regulatory authority assigned by the Government may issue regulations The Government or the authority assigned by the Governregarding further provisions concerning general obliga- ment may also issue further regulations as required for tions, radioactive waste and prohibitions against activities protection against, or control of, radiation as specified in with certain materials, etc. The Ordinance also stipulates the Act. that certain provisions in the Act do not apply to very

low-level radioactive materials and technical equipment General obligations of licensees and licence conditions

emitting only low-level radiation (exemption). The In addition to the above mentioned principles the basic regulatory authority may also issue regulations concerning requirements as listed below apply for any person who the release of very low-level radioactive material. conducts activities involving radiation:

– measures to limit the production of radioactive waste;

Radiation Protection Requirements

– measures to limit discharge of radioactive substances

Definitions

and exposure of the environment to ionising radiation. The Act applies to all activities involving radiation. These are defined to include all activities involving radioactive Furthermore; any person who conducts activities involving substances and technical devices capable of generating ionising radiation shall, to the extent necessary from the radiation. radiation protection point of view and with regard to the Consequently, the Act applies to radiation from nuclear nature and conditions of the activity:

activities and to harmful radiation, ionising as well as – control and maintain the radiation protection in the non-ionising, from any other source (medical, industrial, places where radiation may occur; research, consumer products and NORM). As far as – maintain technical devices and measuring or radiation nuclear installations, such as management and disposal protection equipment used in the activity; facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste, the Radiation Protection Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities are – take any other measures and precautions necessary to applied in close association with each other. prevent or counteract damage to human health or the environment; The Government or the mandated authority may, to the – ensure that everyone who works in the activity and may extent it does not conflict with the purpose of the Act, be exposed to ionising radiation has the knowledge and prescribe exemptions in full or in part from the application competence needed for the radiation protection to of the Act. An exemption may also be combined with function satisfactorily. special conditions. Furthermore, specific conditions may be stipulated on radioactive substances or technical devices Anyone who conducts activities shall also comply with the capable of generating radiation which are not otherwise requirement that sufficient financial, administrative and covered by the Act. personnel resources are available to meet the obligations arising from the Act, regulations issued under the provi-

Basic requirements for radiation protection

sions of the Act and decisions issued in accordance with The Radiation Protection Act is based on the International the Act. Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP’s) internationally recognised principles. These principles are: The provision implies that all the necessary measures

should be taken to improve radiation protection; it is thus

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 57

insufficient to solely comply with the regulations or health and the environment against damage or conditions issued by the responsible authority. detriment. The Government or the authority assigned by the Govern- – The precautionary and BAT principles mean that the ment may also issue any further regulations required for implementer shall put into practice protective measures, protection against, or control of, radiation in the respects comply with restrictions, and take any other precautions specified in the Act. that are necessary in order to prevent, hinder or combat damage or detriment to human health or the When a licence is, or has been, issued under the provisions environment as a result of the activity. For the same of the Radiation Protection Act, the responsible authority reason, the best available technology shall be used in may impose the conditions needed for radiological connection with occupational activities. protection. Such radiation protection conditions can also be imposed on activities licensed within the legal – The most suitable site principle means that as regards framework of the Act on Nuclear Activities. activities for which land or water areas are used, a suitable site shall be selected while taking into account

Disposal of radioactive waste – Safe management the goals of the Environmental Code. Sites for activities

Anyone who conducts activities involving radiation is must always be chosen in such a way as to make it required to treat and, as necessary, dispose of the radioac- possible to achieve their purpose with a minimum of tive waste which may arise in or otherwise brought to the damage or detriment to human health and the activity. environment. Anyone who conducts or has conducted activities using a – The after-treatment liability principle means that technical device that can emit radiation shall, to the extent everyone who has pursued an activity that causes stipulated by the Government or the authority appointed damage or is detrimental to the environment shall be by the Government, ensure that the device is destroyed responsible for restoring it to the extent deemed when it is no longer being used in the activity. reasonable. An individual who is liable for aftertreatment shall carry out or pay for any after-treatment E.2.1.3 The Environmental Code measures necessary. The general rules of consideration The objective of the Swedish Environmental Code is to function as a preventive tool based on the polluter-pays promote sustainable development and thereby ensure a principle. healthy environment for current and future generations. The Code includes general provisions on environmental The requirements of the first three bullet points above protection. The Code is applicable to nuclear activities and apply to the extent that it cannot be considered onerous to activities involving radiation and must be applied in parallel comply with them. In making this assessment, particular with the Act on Nuclear Activities and Radiation Protec- consideration should be given to the benefits of protection tion Act. A number of ordinances supplement the Code. measures and other precautions as compared to the cost of These are laid down by the Swedish Government. such measures (by means of cost-benefit analysis).

Requirements for Protective Measures, etc. E.2.1.4 Legislation on financing

Definitions Nuclear power plants

In the Code, environmentally hazardous activities are The purpose of the financing arrangements, established in defined as: 1981, is to secure financing for the nuclear licensees’ future costs for the management and disposal of spent nuclear – the discharge of wastewater, solid matter or gas from fuel and nuclear waste. The objective is to minimise the land, buildings or structures onto land or into bodies of risk of the state and future generations being forced to water or groundwater; bear costs considered to be the liability of the licensees. – any use of land, buildings or structures that entails a risk The licensees pay a fee to the Nuclear Waste Fund. If there detrimental to human health or the environment due to is insufficient money in the Fund to pay for the costs, the discharges or emissions other than those referred to licensees will nevertheless still be liable. above, or to pollution of land, air, bodies of water or SKB coordinates the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates groundwater; or and submits these to the National Debt Office every three – any use of land, buildings or structures that may be years. The Debt Office reviews the cost estimates and detrimental to the surroundings due to noise, vibration, calculates the nuclear waste fees and financial guarantees light, ionising or non-ionising radiation or similar impact. individually for each utility. The fees are calculated on the assumption that each reactor will generate electricity for 50

General rules of consideration

years, though always with a minimum remaining operating The general rules of consideration define several important time of six years. Based on the Debt Office’s proposal, the principles that must be complied with by the implementer, e.g.: Government decides on the nuclear waste fees and – The knowledge principle means that the implementer financial guarantees for a period of three years. The must possess the knowledge that is necessary regarding nuclear waste funds’ assets are managed by a Government the nature and scope of the activity to protect human authority, the Nuclear Waste Fund.

58 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

The power plant utilities must also provide financial E.2.1.5 Other relevant Acts guarantees as securities to cover fees that have not yet been The Act on the Control of Dual-use Items and paid (the credit risk amount), and to cover costs in Technical Assistance connection with unexpected events (the risk margin). Export of nuclear material and equipment is governed by

To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has covered SKB’s the Act on the Control of Dual-use Items and Technical expenses for the central interim storage facility for spent Assistance, as well as by Council Regulation (EC) No nuclear fuel (Clab), for the transport system and for the 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime research and development needed, including for the siting for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit and method development for a spent fuel repository of dual-use items. See also information under Article 27, system. Future expenses should cover the encapsulation section I.1.1.

plant and repository for spent fuel, repositories for low

The Civil Protection Act

and intermediate level waste, the decommissioning of The Civil Protection Act contains provisions on how nuclear power plants and the continued research and community rescue services are to be organised and development work. operated. According to the Act, the County Administrative Other nuclear facilities Board is responsible for rescue operations in cases where the public needs protection from a radioactive release from Nuclear licensees other than power reactor operators must a nuclear installation and in cases where such release seems also pay fees to the Nuclear Waste Fund. This in practice imminent. The Act also stipulates that a rescue commander applies to certain nuclear fuel cycle, research and waste with a specified competence and having extensive authority management facilities. The build-up of adequate financial is to be engaged for all rescue operations. In addition, the resources is based on the facilities expected remaining Act requires the owner of hazardous installations to take period of operation. The licensees must also provide a the measures necessary to minimise any harm to the public financial guarantee to cover fees that have not yet been or environment if an accident were to occur in the paid (the credit risk amount). The National Debt Office installation. decides on the nuclear waste fees and financial guarantees for a period of three years. The Civil Protection Ordinance contains general provi-

sions concerning emergency planning. The County

Legacy waste

Administrative Board is obliged to draw up a radiological There is also a funding mechanism for legacy waste from emergency response plan. The Swedish Civil Contingencies historic nuclear activities. Until the end of 2017, a fee was Agency (MSB) is responsible at national level for coordinalevied on the nuclear power plant licensees under the tion and supervision of the preparedness for rescue provisions of the so-called ‘Studsvik Act’, in order to cover services response to a radioactive release. expenses for liabilities originating from the establishment of a nuclear programme in Sweden. This special funding SSM decides on necessary measures for nuclear installations. primarily contributes to the decommissioning of old

The Occupational Safety and Health Act

installations. The Occupational Safety and Health Act contains require- The licensees for nuclear power reactors are required to ments for the work environment and provisions regarding pay the additional fees necessary, in accordance with the protection from accidents caused by technical equipment, provisions of the Financing Act, if the fund’s assets are dangerous materials or other work conditions. The Act insufficient to cover the future liabilities. There is also a also contains detailed provisions concerning responsibility state financing scheme administered by SSM for the and authority with respect to occupational safety issues. clean-up of orphan sources and other non-nuclear legacy waste. See section J.1.2.2. The Transport of Dangerous Goods Act The Transport of Dangerous Goods Act and Transport of

Non-nuclear waste

Dangerous Goods Ordinance contain provisions for the A licence under the Radiation Protection Act, may for its purpose of preventing, hindering and limiting damage validity be made dependent on that the licence holder caused by transports of dangerous goods. intending to conduct the activity provides financial security for the waste management costs and recovery measures E.2.2 National regulatory framework that the activity can incur. The financial security can be set With reference to its legal mandate, SSM, in its Regulatory gradually according to a plan that at all times meets the Code (SSMFS), issues legally binding safety and radiation current need for financial security. If it can be assumed protection regulations for nuclear activities and other that financial security is no longer sufficient, the licensing activities involving radiation. authority may decide on additional collateral. This applies In addition, SSM may issue general advice on interpretato all non-nuclear activities in which radioactive materials tion of the safety regulations. The general advice is not are used: in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and legally binding per se. Measures should be taken according education. to the general advice or, alternatively, methods justified to The state, municipalities, county councils and municipal be equivalent from the point of view of safety should be associations need not to provide any financial collateral. implemented.

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 59

In connection with a major review and update of SSM’s and submits comments to the Government as a basis for entire Regulatory Code, SSMFS, a model was introduced the Government’s decision regarding the permissibility of with guidance to the regulatory requirements. The guidance the proposed activity. After the Government’s decision, the explains the purpose, background, application, considera- case is handed over to the Land and Environment Court to tions and references of each of the provisions. determine provisions concerning environmental supervision, inspections and checks, the safety and technical SSM’s regulations also implement binding EU legislation design of the activity, and conditions that are necessary to and international obligations. As part of preparing SSM’s prevent or limit any harmful or other detrimental impact. regulations, consideration is given to IAEA safety standards, international recommendations, industrial

E.2.3.4 Environmental impact assessments

standards and norms, and the rulemaking of other Swedish

General

authorities. SSM’s regulations are issued in accordance with The Act on Nuclear Activities, Radiation Protection Act an established management procedure that stipulates and Environmental Code, require submission of an technical and legal reviews of draft versions. Under Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as a basis for the governmental rules, a review is performed of the final licensing. draft by authorities, licensees, various stakeholders and industrial and environmental organisations. An EIA is required for e.g. nuclear activities, such as waste

management activities and facilities and decommissioning Section L.1 contains a brief summary of the most relevant of reactors. regulations relating to the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. In other cases, with activities involving radiation, the

Government or an authority appointed by the Government E.2.3 Licensing may, in licensing cases, prescribe that the applicant prepare

E.2.3.1 The Act on Nuclelar Activities an EIA before permission is given.

In principle, all activities involving nuclear material or nuclear Legislation regarding EIA is in accordance with Council waste constitute a nuclear activity for which a licence under Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985, amended by the Act on Nuclear Activities is required. However, nuclear Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 and by waste and nuclear material with a very low level of Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003, on the assessment radiation can be released from regulatory control. of the effects of certain public and private projects on the The Government is the licensing authority for nuclear environment. An EIA is to be submitted together with an facilities. SSM reviews the licence application and prepares application for a permit for environmentally hazardous a statement with recommendation for the Government’s activities.

decision. After a Government licence decision, SSM The purpose of an EIA is to identify, describe and assess authorises the continued construction, operation and environmental impacts when planning and deciding plans closure of the facility in a step-wise manner and may and programmes (strategic environmental assessments) and stipulate conditions under the Act under each phase. For activities and actions (specific environmental assessments). certain smaller facilities and activities, SSM has the Environmental impact means direct or indirect effects that mandate to issue a licence. are positive or negative, that are temporary or permanent, that are cumulative or non-cumulative and that occur in the

E.2.3.2 The Radiation Protection Act

short, medium or long term. Below are examples of some For activities outside the nuclear fuel cycle all handling of basic components that should be included in an EIA: radioactive substances requires a licence under the Radiation Protection Act and for which SSM issue licences. – possible alternative designs and the reasons for the In the case of export of radioactive substances, a licence chosen design with regard to environmental effects;

may instead be required under the Act (2000:1064) on the – possible alternative locations and the reasons for the Control of Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance. choice of site, taking into account differences in the

environmental effects between the chosen site and the A separate licence according to the Radiation Protection alternatives; Act is not required for activities licensed according to the Act on Nuclear Activities. – information on existing environmental conditions before the start of activity and how those conditions are E.2.3.3 The Environmental Code expected to develop if the activity is not started or According to the provisions of Environmental Code, a taken; licence is required for environmentally hazardous activities, – information on the measures envisaged to prevent, which include facilities for the treatment, storage or hinder, counteract or mitigate the adverse environmental disposal of spent fuel, nuclear waste or radioactive waste. effects, and A licence is also needed for the decommissioning of nuclear reactors. – a statement of the consultations that have taken place and what has emerged in the consultations. For certain activities, including any facility requiring a Government licence under the Act on Nuclear Activities, The information to be included in the environmental the Land and Environment Court examines the application impact assessment must have the extent and degree of

60 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

detail that is reasonable in the light of current knowledge E.2.4 Prohibition, revocation and sanction and assessment methods and is needed to make an overall It is prohibited to carry out nuclear activities or activities assessment of the significant environmental impacts that involving radiation without a permit or licence. Any person the activity may be expected to cause. who deliberately, or through negligence, operates an

activity without the necessary permission shall be fined or

The EIA-process

sentenced to not more than two years imprisonment. The The following steps apply in the process of preparing an same penalty (for unauthorised environmental activity) EIA. applies under the Environmental Code.

Scoping – public consultation The licensing authority may revoke a licence to conduct

In an initial scoping step the developer shall, before the nuclear activities under the Act on Nuclear Activities if: work on the actual environmental impact assessment starts, – conditions have not been complied with in some conduct consultations on the location, scope and design of essential respect; the activity and its environmental effects, and on the content and form of the environmental impact statement. – the licensee has not fulfilled its obligations concerning research and development work on waste management Prior to the scoping consultation, consultation documents and decommissioning, and there are very specific must be prepared and submitted to the parties concerned, reasons from the point of view of safety to revoke the which are the County Administrative Board, the supervilicence; or sory authority and the individuals who may be assumed to – there are any other very specific reasons for revocation be particularly affected by the activity, as well as with the from the point of view of safety. other state authorities, the municipalities, the general public and NGOs who may be assumed to be affected by the This means that revocation of a licence may be decided in activity. cases of severe misconduct by the operator or otherwise for exceptional safety reasons. If the licence to operate a

Consultation with other countries

nuclear power plant is revoked, the licence holder never- In case of activities assumed to have a significant environtheless remains responsible for waste management and mental impact in another country or if a country that may decommissioning. be considerably affected by the activity so requests, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency shall inform Under the Radiation Protection Act the licensing authority the other country and give a reasonable time to comment may decide to fully or partially revoke a licence if the on whether it wishes to participate in the environmental licensee in any material respect does not comply with assessment. These provisions incorporate the requirements regulations or conditions imposed pursuant to the Act, if contained in the Aarhus Convention and the Espoo there are particular reasons from a radiation protection Convention. point of view or if the licensee requests it. Furthermore,

the Government, or the authority appointed by the

Assessment of EIA in the licensing process

Government, may issue additional regulations on prohibi- When the developer has submitted the application and the tions and other precautions to protect human health environmental impact assessment to the authority, the against the risk of damage from ionising radiation. authority shall assess whether the impact assessment, to the extent and degree of detail that is reasonable in the Under the Environmental Code, a supervisory authority light of current knowledge and assessment methods and is may in individual cases impose the injunctions or prohibineeded, enables an overall assessment of the significant tions that are required on an operator for compliance with environmental impacts that the activity may be expected to the obligations of the Code.

cause. After this, the EIA shall be announced and made The Act on Nuclear Activities also contains provisions on available to the public for comments during at least 30 sanctions. Anyone who conducts nuclear activities without days. a licence, or disregards conditions or regulations, will be In a decision of its own or in connection with the final sentenced to pay a fine or imprisoned for a maximum of review of the application, the licensing authority shall two years. If the crime is intentional and aggravated, the decide whether the environmental impact assessment individual shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a meets the requirements. The authority shall also complete minimum of six months and a maximum of four years. the environmental assessment by identifying, describing Liability shall not be adjudged if responsibility for the and making a final and comprehensive assessment of the offence may be assigned under the Penal Code or the Act environmental impact, taking into account the content of on Penalties for Smuggling (2000:1225), or if the offence is the environmental impact assessment and what emerged trivial.

during the review process of the case. Under the Radiation Protection Act fines or imprisonment When the application with an EIA has been approved, the can be sentenced for violations of the law. Anyone who licensing authority shall announce this as soon as possible. intentionally or through gross negligence violates the law The announcement shall describe how the public can can be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for a access the content of the decision. maximum of two years. Anyone who intentionally or negligently violates certain provisions of the law can be

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 61

sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of six plans are also of importance by providing conditions months. Liability under the Act is not adjudged if respon- concerning the use of the land. sibility for the offence may be assigned under the Penal The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency manages a Code or the Act on Penalties for Smuggling. Nor is liability national funding programme on remediation of contamiadjudged in the instance of a minor offence deemed to be nated land from past practices. Potentially contaminated a trivial case. areas are identified, investigated and classified. No area has Under the Environmental Code, the supervisory authority yet been identified for remediation in respect of radioacmay issue any injunctions and prohibitions that are tive substances only. However, identification of potentially necessary in individual cases to ensure compliance with the contaminated areas is an ongoing process. requirements of the Code and provisions, judgements and other decisions issued in pursuance thereof. E.2.5.2 Regulatory inspections Nuclear activities and activities involving radiation are Regulations on civil liability for radiological damage are subject to extensive inspections under various laws. For contained in the Atomic Liability Act. The Act is largely radiation protection, nuclear safety and security, SSM is based on the contents of the Paris Convention on Nuclear responsible for supervision of compliance with the Act on Third Party Liability from 1960 and the Brussels Supple- Nuclear Activities and Radiation Protection Act, the mentary Convention from 1963, to which Sweden has Environmental Code as well as with conditions or regulaacceded. tions imposed under the Acts.

E.2.5 Institutional control, regulatory inspection, As far as concerns other environmental aspects covered by documentation and reporting the Code, the County Administrative Board performs supervision.

E.2.5.1 Institutional control

According to regulations or licence conditions on radiation According to the Ordinance to the Environmental Code, protection, the licence holder must conduct environmental SSM is also to provide regulatory guidance regarding monitoring. All discharges from facilities for storage or supervision of pollution damage and other environmental disposal of radioactive waste must be monitored by a damage caused by radioactive substances. nuclide specific measuring programme. The dose to any The implementer must on request submit to the Authority individual in the critical group is not allowed to exceed 0.1 the information and documentation required for its mSv/y. supervision. The Authority is also to be given access to the The general obligations contained in the regulations installation or site where the activities are conducted for SSMFS 2008:1 and several other regulations are applicable investigations and sampling to the extent required for also to decommissioning and dismantling activities, for supervision. The police authority shall provide assistance if example regarding provisions with respect to the moni- needed for the supervision. See section E.3.2.6 for a more toring of discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled detailed description of SSM’s supervisory processes and releases. SSM, has also issued additional licence conditions methods. for the decommissioning of reactors which complement the provisions in the regulations, concerning for example E.2.5.3 Documentation and reporting measurement programmes for the clearance of materials Reporting requirements on licensees and for site release. The Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code contains a number of The legal framework for the design of a geological disposal different documentation and reporting requirements. facility contain requirements on passive post-closure safety solutions, meaning there should be no need for additional The Nuclear Activities Act and the Radiation Protection safety measures or environmental monitoring after closure. Act focus on issues related to safety and radiation protec- Following the closure of a disposal facility and the tion. The Environmental Code requires operators to termination of licensee responsibilities, the institutional annually submit a general environmental report. The control will be overtaken by the state, including for environmental report shall describe the measures taken to example maintaining records, safeguards or land use comply with the conditions in the licence and the results restrictions. The Swedish parliament adopted amendments of the measures. to the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental SSM’s regulatory code requires a number of detailed Code in June 2020 to further formalise the state’s ultimate documentation and reporting. Below are some examples of responsibility for a closed geological repository, in accordinterest in the context of Joint Convention: ance with Sweden’s international commitments (see section E.2.7). – Licensees for nuclear reactors shall report annually to SSM what measures have been taken or planned to be SSM has also issued conditions regarding institutional taken to limit emissions of radioactive substances. control of existing shallow land burials, stipulating that institutional control shall continue until the radioactivity no – Results from environmental monitoring shall be longer is a ‘significant’ hazard to public health and the reported to SSM in accordance with a defined program environment. The municipalities’ detailed development

62 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

– Events leading to increased emissions of radioactive exceeded, the measures planned with a view to substances from nuclear facilities should be reported to reaching the reference values shall be reported. SSM as soon as possible, presenting the measures taken » Semi-annually report to SSM on the discharge of to limit the emissions. radioactive substances into air and water, shown as – Annual reporting to SSM on the management of discharge of activity, and doses to individuals in a nuclear waste: reference group.

» the quantities of nuclear waste occurring on the site » Semi-annually report to SSM on the results of or that have in any other way been transferred to environmental monitoring. this site; – At least once every ten years, licensees are required to » nuclear waste that has been transferred to disposal or perform a periodic safety review (PSR), i.e. an integrated which has been transported from the facility for analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility. The processing or storage at another facility, or which has PSR should cover both nuclear safety and radiation been subjected to clearance; protection with the purpose of clarifying how

» nuclear waste at the site at year-end, indicating the requirements stated in relevant legislation as well as nuclide and the locations where nuclear waste is issued in the form of regulations and conditions are stored; and met, and are expected to be met, over the following ten-year period. SSM conducts a comprehensive review » operating experience from waste management, and and assessment of the submitted review and its monitoring of waste management plans. references, and determines whether the necessary – Annual reporting to SSM on radioactive waste with conditions exist to operate the facility in a safe manner information on: until the next review; this outcome is documented in a » amount of waste with its various properties; review report. In the case of nuclear power reactors, the

report is submitted to the Government. » content of radioactive substances in the waste;

» who is responsible for the disposal of the waste; and Reporting requirements on the Regulatory body (SSM)

» planned final goal of the waste with a schedule and Reporting requirements also apply to SSM in accordance reference to the waste plan. with the appropriation directions, Government decisions and acts and ordinances. In this context, the following – A waste plan on the radioactive waste shall describe how reports may be mentioned: and when the waste should be disposed of. The plan shall be based on an evaluation of different ways of – Annual Activity Report and Financial Statement, with a handling the waste and kept up to date. summary of results, effects and costs of the regulatory activities, in accordance with general regulations issued – Before a plant is constructed, a decommissioning plan by the Government and Swedish National Audit Office must be drawn up for the future decommissioning of for such annual reports issued by all government the facility. Not later than one year after the final closure authorities. In its annual report, SSM gives an overview of the plant, the decommissioning plan shall be of the Authority’s supervisory activities and the status renewed and reported to SSM. The plan shall include of radiation safety in society. extensive details about the: – Every three years, the regulatory authority is required to » documentation on the plant; submit to the Government a review report on the » planning conditions; and nuclear industry’s research, development and

» decommissioning operations demonstration programme for disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, and the dismantling and – Annual information to SSM from all licensees of high decommissioning of nuclear installations (i.e. SKB’s activity sources (HASS) regarding the following: RD&D programme). In addition to the findings, » when a new source has been acquired; conclusions and recommendations as to the

» if the conditions specified in a record sheet have purposefulness and quality of the programme, the changed; review report also proposes conditions for the future conduct of the SKB RD&D programme that the » when the holder has transferred the source to a new Government may wish to prescribe under the Act on holder or to a recognised installation, supplemented Nuclear Activities. with information about the recipient of the source; and – The regulatory authority assigned by the Government shall on an annual basis report to the Government on » when the practice has ceased and no sources are held. the licences granted concerning the export, import or – The licence holders for nuclear activities shall: transit of nuclear waste and the construction,

possession or operation of shallow landfill sites. » Annually report to SSM on the measures that have been taken or are planned to be taken in order to limit – The regulatory authority also issues reports to a number the discharge of radioactive substances, with a view to of organisations, such as the European Commission, reaching defined goals. If the reference values are UNSCEAR, OECD, the IAEA, etc. on a regular basis,

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 63

in compliance with international conventions. Most of E.2.8 Information and transparency provisions at

this reporting is within the area of environmental existing nuclear facilities

radiation protection, but some parts also relate to It is considered crucial to give the general public insight

occupational radiation protection. into and information on nuclear activities. In municipalities

where major nuclear facilities are located (power reactors, In addition to the abovementioned reports, the regulatory research reactors and facilities for manufacturing, handling, authority issues periodic reports in order to inform the storage or disposal of nuclear material or nuclear waste), it public of major activities. The regulatory authority also is particularly important to provide the residents with issues reports related to its regulatory research programme correct and reliable information. For this purpose, ‘local and regulatory reviews. All reports published by the safety boards’ have been established in the municipalities regulatory authority are readily available to the media and hosting nuclear power plants. general public. The licence holder of a major nuclear power plant is

Reporting requirements on the National Debt Office required to give the local safety board insight into the

Every three years, the regulatory authority appointed by safety and radiation protection work at such plant. The

the Government (the National Debt Office) is required to licence holder must, at the request of the board, provide

submit a proposal for the nuclear waste fees to be paid by the board with information on the facts available and not

the licensees of nuclear power reactors in order to cover only give the board opportunities to study relevant

the costs for disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste and documents, but also access to plants and sites.

the dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear installa- The function of these boards is to obtain insight into tions. The regulatory authority also includes a review safety and radiation protection matters and to inform the report on the cost estimates provided by the licensees. public about these areas. Consequently, it is important to

point out that the board does not have the powers to

E.2.6 Enforcement of regulations and terms

impose requirements on nuclear power plants, or to

of licences

prescribe safety-enhancing or other measures for these The authorities have extensive legal, regulatory and plants. These functions rest exclusively with the regulatory enforcement powers. As described in section E.2.4 authorities. concerning prohibition, a licence may be revoked for

activities that do not fulfil the obligations set out in the For a more comprehensive description of measures for

legislation. If there is an ongoing licensed activity that does openness and transparency, see sections A.6.7, E.3.2.9,

not comply with regulations or terms of the licence, the G.3.1.2, K.3.1.5 and K5.

supervisory authorities may issue any injunctions and

prohibitions required in the specific case to ensure E.2.9 Licensing – implementation in practice of

compliance. Injunctions or prohibitions under the Acts legal and regulatory framework

may carry contingent fines. The following text describes the licensing system for the

treatment and disposal of spent fuel, radioactive waste, If a person fails to carry out a measure incumbent upon very low-level radioactive waste, and non-nuclear radioachim or her under the Acts or Ordinances, or regulations or tive waste. The system of release is also mentioned in this conditions issued pursuant to the Acts, or under the context. supervisory authority’s injunction, the authority may

arrange for the measure to be taken at his or her expense.

E.2.9.1 Facilities for the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste

E.2.7 Allocation of responsibilities

General about the Licensing Process

The Swedish legal framework allocates a clear division of The Environmental Code and Act on Nuclear Activities responsibilities between the bodies involved. As already govern the licensing of facilities for handling and disposal mentioned, the producer of spent fuel and radioactive of spent fuel and radioactive waste from the nuclear fuel waste has the responsibility of safely handling and cycle. In addition, the Radiation Protection Act applies to disposing of the waste produced. All the necessary establishing radiation protection conditions for the activity. measures and precautions should be taken by the waste These acts have different purposes and involve several producer. The authorities independently supervise, regulate authorities (see Figure E1). and review existing or planned activities involving spent

fuel and radioactive waste. During the licensing process, an important instrument is

the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Early The ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent consultation with the individuals likely to be affected, as fuel and radioactive waste rests with the State. This has well as with the government agencies, affected municipalipreviously been considered to be ‘a matter of course’ and ties and organisations, is emphasised in Swedish EIA not been explicitly expressed in the legislation. However, as legislation. The consultations must relate to the location, stated in section A.4, this will be formalised in an scope, design and environmental impact of the activity and amendment to the Act on Nuclear Activities that will enter to the content and structure of the EIA. into force 1 November 2020.

64 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

Figure E1 Process for licensing of nuclear facilities that is applicable to the spent nuclear fuel repository and encapsulation plant.

If an activity or measure is likely to have a significant environ- This shall nevertheless not apply in cases where another mental impact in another country, the Swedish Environ- site is considered to be more appropriate for the activity, or mental Protection Agency must inform the responsible if an appropriate site has been designated for the activity in authority in that country about the planned activity or another municipality that is likely to approve the activity. measure, and give the country concerned and the citizens

Approval according to the Act on Nuclear Activities

affected the opportunity to take part in a consultation

and Environmental Code

procedure concerning the application and the EIA. If the Government grants permissibility in accordance Permissibility according to the Environmental Code with the provisions of the Environmental Code, licensing According to the Environmental Code, the Government is approval needs to be issued for the nuclear activity under to consider the permissibility of certain activities such as the Act on Nuclear Activities and for the environmentally interim storage or the disposal of spent fuel or radioactive hazardous activity under the Environmental Code. The waste. An environmental impact statement must be Government (or the authority appointed by the Governsubmitted for the permissibility assessment. The Land and ment) grants a licence under the Act on Nuclear Activities, Environment Court reviews an application from the point based on review by the regulatory authority assigned by the of view of permissibility, which is thereafter forwarded to Government. A licence under the Radiation Protection Act the Government for final consideration. is not required for activities covered by the Act on Nuclear Activities.

Municipal right of veto

Following a Government permissibility decision, the Land According to the Environmental Code, the Government and Environment Court grants a licence and issues may only decide on the permissibility provided that the conditions regarding environmentally hazardous activities municipal council concerned agrees that the activities may under the Environmental Code. SSM may issue licence be located in the municipality (municipal right of veto). conditions under the Act on Nuclear Activities and However, without prejudice to the municipal approval, the Radiation Protection Act as part of a stepwise authorisa- Government may permit an activity that involves interim tion process following a Government licensing decision storage or disposal of spent fuel or waste if the activity is (see below). of utmost importance with regard to national interests.

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 65

Licence for Government SSM closure decision authorisation Licence for routine operations (Based on SSM and L&E Court reviews and Licence for trial after consultation with operations the host municipality) Licence to start construction

Licence to construct, possess and operate

Figure E2 The stepwise process of regulatory authorisation and Timeline supervision following a Swedish Government decision on licensing of a nuclear facility.

It may be noted that the review of an application under the installations, shallow land burials are licensed under both Environmental Code takes place in open court hearings at the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental the Land and Environment Court. At that hearing, all Code. In the Ordinance on Nuclear Activities, SSM is given interested parties may attend, pose questions and make the mandate to licence nuclear installations such as shallow comments. The applicant must verbally describe all land burials up to a specified inventory limit of 10 TBq, of relevant aspects of its case. Prior to the court hearings, which a maximum of 10 GBq may consist of alpha active SSM submits a statement on whether the application meets substances. Furthermore, shallow land burial is defined as the requirements of the Environmental Code. This an environmentally hazardous activity and must be statement is mainly based on SSM’s parallel review of the approved under the Environmental Code by the Land and licence application in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Environment Court. No approval by the Government is Activities. SSM is expected to participate in the hearings as needed before the Land and Environment Court can issue the competent authority concerning nuclear safety and a licence, including licence conditions, under the Environradiation protection issues. mental Code.

Continued Stepwise Process of Regulatory Authorisation Similar to other repositories for nuclear waste, applications are to be filed in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Following Government approval, the regulatory authority Activities and the Environmental Code, to SSM and the (SSM) authorises the start of construction, the start of trial Court respectively. An important instrument during the operations, the start of routine operations, and the licensing process is the Environmental Impact Assessment decommissioning of the facility (see Figure E2). A (EIA), which is required as a part of both licence applica- Government decision is again needed for delicensing and tions. The applicant should involve the individuals, the exemption from responsibilities. The authority reviews government agencies, municipalities and organisations the application to ensure that all obligations and licensing concerned in a consultation procedure. The consultations conditions have been fulfilled. must relate to the scope, design and environmental impact,

Safety Analysis Report and to the content and structure of the EIA.

The safety analysis report (SAR) is central in the review Licensing conditions can be issued under the Act on process and must be kept up to date throughout all the Nuclear Activities, Radiation Protection Act and Environsteps. The SAR should provide an overall view of how the mental Code. This means that SSM and the Land and safety of the facility is arranged in order to protect human Environment Court can issue the conditions necessary health and the environment against nuclear accidents. The from specific aspects concerning nuclear safety, radiation report is to reflect the facility as it is built, analysed and protection and environmental protection, respectively. verified, as well as show how the requirements for its Conditions may be issued in connection with licensing or design, function, organisation and activities are met. during the period of validity of the licences. In addition, and as appropriate, SSM examines the organisational, human and administrative capacity to carry E.2.9.3 Radioactive waste from medical use, research and out work to the extent and quality required as well as industry preliminary plans for decommissioning of the facility. Handling and disposal of radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry require a licence under the E.2.9.2 Shallow land burials Radiation Protection Act and Environmental Code. Shallow burial is used in Sweden for very low-level radioactive waste from nuclear activities. Like other nuclear

66 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

E.2.9.4 Clearance taken collectively in Cabinet, which means that all ministers Clearance of nuclear materials or nuclear waste must be in must be in agreement. The ministers’ performance of their accordance with the provisions of the Act on Nuclear official duties and the handling of government business is Activities as well as with the Radiation Protection Act, and scrutinised by the Riksdag Committee on the Constitution approved by the regulatory authority. Material may be (KU). cleared for unrestricted use, or for disposal as conventional The Government issues instructions and yearly approprianon-radioactive waste. A licence under the Environmental tion directions for the government authorities. These set Code, as is applicable to non-radioactive waste, may be out the tasks and objectives of the authorities’ activities needed if material that has been ‘cleared’ is to be disposed and the funding available to them. The Government of as non-radioactive waste. thereby has quite substantial scope for directing the activities of government authorities, but it has no powers

E.2.9.5 Decommissioning

to interfere with how an authority applies the law or According to the Act on Nuclear Activities, no specific decides in a specific case. licence is required for decommissioning of nuclear facilities. However, according to the Environmental Code, The Government is responsible for recruiting and appointing a licence is needed for decommissioning and dismantling the heads of government authorities. A Director General is of nuclear power reactors. In addition to the specific normally appointed for a period of six years. requirements (see also section E.2.1.3), the applicant is also Government authorities have to submit annual reports and required to demonstrate compliance with a number of financial statements to the Government, which summarise principles, e.g. the knowledge principle, the precautionary major results, effects, revenues and costs of its activities. and BAT principles, and the after-treatment liability The Swedish National Audit Office, under the auspices of principle. (F.6.1) the Riksdag, scrutinises the government authorities and enterprises to ensure their compliance with directives, rules

E.2.10 Conclusion

and regulations. Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 19.

The level of requirements imposed on Swedish authorities for openness and provision of information services to the

E.3 Article 20: Regulatory body

public, politicians and media is very high. The principle of public access to official documents has been enshrined in

1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a

regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the one of the fundamental laws, the Freedom of the Press legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article Act. No one needs to justify a request to view a public 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence document or to reveal their identity in order to gain access and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned to a particular document. The principle of public access responsibilities. also means that officials and others working in central 2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative government, municipalities and county councils have and regulatory framework, shall take the appropriate steps constitutional freedom of communication to the media. to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory The principle of public access entitles the general public to functions from other functions where organisations are access official documents, unless a decision has been made involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste manage- to classify them as confidential under the Public Access to ment and in their regulation. Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400).

In sections E.3.2.2, E.3.2.9 and E.3.2.10, the issues of

E.3.1 How Sweden is governed

independence of the regulatory function and transparency The Swedish Constitution is the legal basis for Sweden’s in regulatory activities and communication with the public parliamentary form of government and the political are further elaborated. principles by which the state is governed. It defines and delimits the tasks of Government, establishes the basic

E.3.2 The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

rights and freedoms of the people of Sweden and (SSM) prescribes the procedures for elections to the Riksdag The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is a central (Swedish parliament). administrative authority under the auspices of the Ministry

of the Environment. The Government governs Sweden by executing decisions taken by the Riksdag and initiating new laws and legislative The term “radiation safety” in Sweden encompasses the amendments. The Government is accountable to the areas of: Riksdag and must have its support to be able to implement – radiation protection; its policies. – nuclear safety; The Government is led by the Prime Minister, who is supported by a number of ministers, each with their own – nuclear security and non-proliferation; and

area of responsibility. Each ministry is responsible for a – information security. number of government authorities, tasked with applying the laws and carrying out the activities decided on by the In its function as the central regulatory body in radiation Riksdag and the Government. Government decisions are safety, SSM has different roles and responsibilities. SSM is

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 67

mandated to supervise, authorise, issue regulations and – provide data for radiation protection assessments and guides, coordinate nuclear and radiological emergencies, maintain the competence to predict and manage and to provide expertise and services with regard to all evolving issues. activities that apply to radiation in society.

International cooperation

In this respect, SSM is the authorised regulatory body for SSM’s missions and tasks with regard to international the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in cooperation include to: accordance with the provisions of the Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation Protection Act and the Environ- – carry out Swedish obligations in accordance with mental Code. conventions, EU ordinances/directives and other binding agreements (e.g. point of contact, report E.3.2.1 Missions and tasks drafting and being the national competent authority); The Governments’ directives on missions and tasks for – supervise that nuclear material and equipment are used SSM are specified in the Ordinance (2008:452) with as declared and in compliance with international Instructions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. commitments; Provisions on funding, reporting and specific assignments – carry out international cooperation work with national are found in the Governments’ annual appropriation and multinational organisations; directions for SSM. – monitor and contribute to the progress of international The missions and tasks can broadly be distributed into standards and recommendations; either a national or an international context, as briefly described below. – coordinate the activities needed to prevent, identify and detect nuclear or radiological events, also to organise

National responsibilities

and lead the national organisation for expert advice to SSM shall work proactively to maintain a high level of authorities involved in or leading rescue operations. radiation safety in society, and through its activities strive to: – prevent radiological accidents and ensure radiation safe Appropriation direction for 2020 operations and radiation safe waste management at In its appropriation directions for the fiscal year 2020, SSM nuclear facilities; was assigned to report to the Government on how the authority has worked to contribute to the development of – minimise risks and optimise the effects of radiation in national competence for today’s and future needs within medical applications; the authority’s areas of activity. SSM shall also present an – minimise radiation risks in the use of products and overall status report of the national competence within the services, or which arise as a by-product in the use of Authority’s areas of activity in relation to the needs. products and services; Another reporting requirement concerns how the Authority has developed its work to integrate Agenda 2030 – minimise the risks of exposure to naturally occurring into the national context within its area of operation to radiation; and help achieve the global goals for sustainable development. – contribute to an enhanced level of radiation safety internationally. E.3.2.2 Effective independence

The de jure and de facto independence from political Further according to the instruction, SSM shall: pressure and promotional interests is well provided for in – ensure that regulations and work routines are cost Sweden. The regulatory body in radiation safety, the effective and straightforward for citizens and enterprises Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), reports to the to apply and/or understand; Ministry of the Environment. Energy policy is managed – provide the information and analyses within its area of within the Ministry of Infrastructure. The Ministry of responsibility that the Swedish National Debt Office Finance represents the Government’s ownership in needs to be able to carry out its tasks under the Vattenfall AB (one of the major owners of several nuclear Financing Act (see section E.1.2.4); power reactors in Sweden). All Government matters are decided on collectively by the Prime minister and his/her – take the initiative for research, education and studies, ministers, in Cabinet. and conduct external analysis and development activities in order to contribute to national competence for needs SSM performs its regulatory work autonomously and today and for the future; independently. The Government has no powers to intervene in a government authority’s decision making in – be in charge of the Swedish metrology institute for applying the law or discharging its authority in individual ionising radiation; cases. All Swedish authorities are directed by the Govern- – operate a national dose register and, as appropriate, ment by Ordinances and annual budget appropriations, issue national individual dose passports; with decisions on funding, tasks and the general orienta-

– contribute to national competence development within tion of operations. Government authorities report on its the Authority’s fields of activities; and activities and decisions to the relevant ministry, but a

68 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

Figure E3 The present organisation of SSM (1 April 2020).

minister has no power to intervene in an authority’s All regulatory work is coordinated between the depart-

day-to-day operations, as ‘ministerial rule’ is prohibited. By ments with respect to providing the right skills and

this means the regulatory authority’s effective independ- resources to assigned activities, based on shared priorities

ence in its decision making is ensured. and goals.

The Director General is exclusively responsible for the

E.3.2.3 SSM’s organisational structure

Authority’s activities and reports directly to the Govern- As reflected in SSM’s organisational structure, shown in ment. The Authority is supported by an advisory council Figure E3, the Department of Radioactive Materials is the consisting of a maximum of ten members appointed by responsible department for all regulatory issues concerning the Government, usually members of parliament, highspent fuel and radioactive waste management, as well as level agency officials or representatives of interest groups. the supervision and authorisation of fuel cycle facilities The council has no decision-making powers. The function and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The department is to advise the Director General and ensure public also has an overall responsibility for transports, nuclear transparency (insight) in relation to the Authority’s security and nuclear non-proliferation issues. activities. The Department of Nuclear Power Plant Safety focuses SSM’s advisory committee on the safe management of on the supervision of nuclear safety and radiation protecspent fuel and radioactive waste is chaired by the head of tion on the part of nuclear power reactors in operation. the Department of Radioactive Materials. Its members are The Department of Radiation Protection coordinates appointed by the Director General and represent other

national nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness national or international authorities and independent

activities and maintains a function on duty around the institutions with relevant competence. The committee

clock for response to incidents and other urgent matters, as supports SSM regarding waste management practices and

well as the emergency organisation when mobilised. regulations and provides advice prior to key deci-

sion-making points and pronouncements. The department also regulates the use of radiation sources

in industrial and medical applications, performs laboratory SSM also has permanent advisory committees on reactor

measurements and calibrations, and is responsible for safety and research and development, as well as in other

non-ionising radiation issues and environmental monitoring. fields such as UV, EM fields and the use of ionising

radiation in oncology. International development partnership activities are

managed by the Office for International Relations.

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 69

Strategic management Operational control

Management process

International Emergency preparedness cooperation and and emergency response development A society safe from Licensing Communi cating Rule making Super vision the harmeful reviews and influencing effects of Securing radiation knowledge Laboratory operations, and skills environmental monotoring, measurements and calibrations

Supporting processes

Managing matters, records and archiving

Communi- Staffing and Accounting Legal affairs Purchasing IT cation competence and finance

Figure E4 SSM’s management system process scheme.

E.3.2.4 Leadership for safety E.3.2.5 Integrated management system

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has, on the SSM has an integrated and process-based management highest management level, established and integrated system which is certified in the areas of environment, fundamental values in the form of a vision, goals and quality management and occupational health and safety in strategies for safety as well as key organisational values, as a accordance with SS-EN ISO 14001:2015, SS-EN ISO basis for a strong safety culture and commitment to safety 9001:2015 and SS-ISO 45001:2018. The current certificates within its whole organisation. are valid until December 2021. The National Metrology Laboratory is supervised regularly by SWEDAC, the

Vision

Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assess- – A society safe from the harmful effects of radiation. ment, in accordance with the standard SS-EN ISO 17025:2018. The management system encompasses all of

Mission statement

SSM’s operations. The system is supplemented by a section – SSM works proactively and preventively to protect devoted to information security, which follows SS-ISO/ people and the environment from harmful effects of IEC 27001:2017 although the management system is not radiation, now and in the future. certified in that area. Internal and external audits are – SSM has a systematic and structured approach to performed yearly, which are one of the bases for contincontinual improvements to our processes in order to uous improvements to the system. develop our operations, render them more efficient and An interactive process tool is available through SSM’s achieve our objectives (see management system below). intranet. The comprehensive process map highlights the

Key values

sequence of all key processes, and has been updated since – Credibility, i.e. decisions based on facts and science. 1 January 2019 to enable an active ownership of all processes. – Integrity, i.e. accountable and independent, no undue Process information and associated guidance materials are influence. readily accessible within the interactive process tool. The processes and a robust document management system – Openness, i.e. transparent, actively informative, provisions support the users in the daily work. Figure E4 illustrates for public insight. SSM’s present comprehensive process map.

70 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

Internal and external audits – Managing reports SSM ensures that annual internal and external audits of the – Integrated safety assessments Authority’s activities are carried out. The SSM management system accounts for internal and external requirements; the – Periodic safety review, PSR

latter including ISO standards, statutes and legal provisions. These processes are used in the supervisory programme as The objective of internal audits is to check compliance described below.

with external and internal requirements, to investigate how

Supervisory programme

the ‘shared values’ are integrated in the day-to-day work, Over the past three years, SSM’s supervisory programme and to check whether the management system is effective has been fundamentally revised to provide better overview, and fit for purpose. SSM’s internal auditors are appointed assure complete alignment with regulations, and introduce by the Director General. Audit teams are formed based on a higher degree of risk-information in the frequency and experience, competence and audit objectives. scope of supervision. External audits are carried out every year. Audits on the The new supervisory programme was tested in 2017, and annual report, finances and effectiveness are conducted by formally introduced within the reactor safety department the Swedish National Audit Office. The requirements of in 2018. The programme was expanded and introduced ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 45001 and other relevant also for non-reactor nuclear facilities in 2019, with due requirements are audited by contracted external auditors regard to a risk-informed graded approach. The accredited by the government authority SWEDAC. From programme entails considerable changes and improvethe last external audit of SSM, conducted in September ments to the planning, implementation, and follow-up of 2019, three deviations were identified and some proposals supervisory activities. The supervisory programme is were made for improvement of the management system. structured with two basic parts, baseline supervision and The deviations and proposals are addressed within the demand-based supervision (see Figure E5). management system.

SSM places an increasing focus on development of Supervisory programme processes and approaches. The fundamental driving force is to raise the level of quality of our work and consequently achieve continually improving results. Other ration- General part ales are rendering our operations more efficient and improving the work environment for employees. Baseline

The work is comprehensive and the objective is to further Plant specific part elaborate the processes including policies, procedures and routines in order to achieve clarity and give the support that is needed for all employees.

E.3.2.6 Supervisory processes and methods

Regulatory supervision including inspection, review and Specific needs Demand-based for each year safety assessments are carried out by SSM as authorised by the Ordinance on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Ordinance. Figure E5 Supervisory programme structure. The documented findings from the supervisory activities provide a basis for SSM’s annual integrated radiation safety

Baseline supervision

evaluation for each authorised facility or activity. The requirements building up the baseline supervision plan Supervisory practices are divided into six fundamental aspects (see Figure E6): SSM has continued to develop its supervisory processes – Management and control and methods, which are also part of SSM’s overall management system. Since 2015, internal projects have been – Safety analysis

carried out with the aim of improving and simplifying and – Design thereby increase the quality and efficiency of SSM’s – Plant status supervision. – Operation The supervisory process is divided into the following seven – Environmental impact sub-processes in SSM’s management system:

– Compliance inspections The baseline supervision plan covers a period of 10 years

and describes the basic supervision groups that are carried – Surveillance inspections out each year for nuclear facilities in operation. By the term – Reviews supervisory groups is meant the delimitation of a supervi- – Managing events sory area, e.g. maintenance, which includes a number of

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 71

requirements. Over the 10-year period, the baseline subject matter of the inspection. An exit meeting is held supervision programme covers every requirement in the where preliminary results are communicated to the regulations at least once. licensee. The inspection report documents the purpose and objectives of the inspection, observations, compliance and The supervision groups are carried out every three, five or deviations from requirements, an assessment of the seven years, with due regard to a risk-informed graded significance of any deviations, and a proposal on any approach. There are a total of 36 supervision groups, further regulatory actions. including, e.g.: In addition to compliance inspections, SSM carries out – Safety analysis surveillance inspections to gather general information on – Operations safety issues and overall activities at the facility. For

non-reactor nuclear facilities, these surveillance inspections – Management system are carried out on an ad-hoc-need basis including an annual – Safety review meeting with the management of the facility. Some – Experience feedback surveillance inspections take place in connection with events, to follow up organisational change, and relating to – Security other current issues, such as findings from earlier inspec- – ALARA programme tions. In many cases, these inspections focus on non-technical issues, such as safety management and safety culture.

Preparation and documentation of surveillance inspections are simplified in comparison with compliance inspections, but the results are systematically documented and reported Plant Operation at SSM management meetings. Each surveillance inspecstatus tion typically takes 1–2 days on site for 1–2 inspectors. Safety analysis Often, a specialist on the subject matter for the visit accompanies the inspector.

If necessary, SSM also undertakes a process known as Management ‘special supervision’. Its use is decided by the Director and control General and is applied when the Authority is dissatisfied with the safety performance of a licensee. For other safety reasons, e.g. during test operations after a large plant modification, intensified supervision may be applied, meaning that more inspections are done and particular Design Environmental progress reporting is required. impact Under SSM regulations, inspection of the licensee programmes, activities and results of surveillance, and in-service inspection of mechanical components, are performed by an accredited control body (‘third-party Figure E6 Fundamental aspects of baseline supervision. control’). If the requirements are fulfilled, a compliance certificate is issued by the control organisation.

Demand-based supervision – Identification of Periodic Safety Reviews supervision needs

Requirements for Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) to be As an important complement to the baseline supervision, carried out for nuclear power reactors at least every 10 the demand-based supervision is defined for each facility years were introduced in the early 1980s. The requirements, on a yearly basis. It can therefore differ from year to year, developed to meet corresponding guidance in the IAEA depending on: Safety Standards, were extended in 2010 to cover also – Results from integrated safety assessments non-reactor nuclear facilities.

– Results from inspections carried out or events that have The requirements prescribe that the PSR should be carried occurred out in a systematic way. The purpose of the PSR is for the – Identified areas where supervision is deemed necessary licence holder to re-assess, verify and continuously improve from, e.g., events or concerns the safety of its nuclear installations. In addition, the PSR addresses any issues that might compromise the safety of – Major ongoing changes, technical or organisational facility for the remaining planned operating period, and – Other identified needs planned measures to counteract any such issues. Licensees

are required to make all reasonably practicable improve-

Inspections

ments in line with a risk-informed graded approach. SSM Compliance inspections are carried out by teams composed reviews the licensee’s PSR regarding confidence in the level of the site inspector(s) and one or more experts on the of nuclear safety and radiation protection, and the licence

72 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

Table E1 SSM’s competence supply model.

Measures Aims Examples of Methods

Attract To attract staff with the right education, Elaborated guidelines on how to systematically attract staff experience and competence Internal programmes for competent staff – A general introductory programme for new staff – Development programme for staff working with supervision

Recruit To recruit the right person with the Documented recruitment procedure right competence – Recruitment procedure based on the operational need for the right competence at the right time and place

Develop To develop the right competence for each task Competent leadership – Basic education and training of managers – Evaluation of each manager’s leadership

Keep To keep right competencies Competence transfer concept – Structured competence transfer aiming to, when staff retire, preserve competence that only one or a few staff members have

Terminate To terminate the employment in a structured Exit interview manner – For staff whose employment is terminated, a final discussion is conducted for receiving feedback

holder’s ability to maintain and increase it in the future. E.3.2.7 Human resources SSM’s review is partly based on benchmarking against General Information regulatory supervisory activities, while including an In 2019, 307 employees were employed at SSM; 168 men assessment of the licensee’s ability to operate the facility and 139 women. Their average age was 49. The same year safely until the next PSR. 63 new employees were recruited. The staff turnover rate, including retirements, was 13 per cent, which is an increase

SSM’s integrated safety assessments

from earlier years. SSM’s integrated safety assessments comprise radiation safety assessments of each major facility under SSM’s Compared with many other Swedish authorities, the staff supervision every two to three years, depending on the of SSM have a relatively high level of educational backcharacter of the facility at hand, in line with a risk-in- ground. This is a result of the many specialist areas formed graded approach. Based on all compliance covered by the Authority. inspections, surveillance inspections, reviews, authority In an international comparison, the number of regulatory decisions and other relevant information, evaluations and a staff in Sweden is relatively small for the size of the general appraisal are made of the nuclear safety, radiation nuclear programme. Many staff members are typically protection, security and non-proliferation control status of involved in several tasks, such as inspections, regulatory the facility in relation to relevant requirements. The basic reviews and approval processes, revision of regulations, material should also cover earlier information and conclumanaging research contracts and participation in public sions in order to identify trends that could otherwise be information activities. difficult to detect in a short-term perspective. The reports are presented at top-level management meetings with the SSM applies a competence supply model (see Table E1). licensees. The objective of the model is to provide an overview of the methods and other measures that SSM uses in order to An aspect of importance when drafting the report is the acquire and maintain the competence needed by the traceability from the basis of data, via the analysis, to the Authority. final conclusions and the assessment. It should be clearly described how SSM evaluated the relevant issues, and the Actions to attract and keep competence report should be comprehensible to interested parties SSM has continued to work on developing the Authority’s lacking expert knowledge in the assessed areas. In order to brand in order to attract and keep employees. Shorter perform the integrated safety assessments more effectively videos have been produced that highlight the professional and to improve the quality of the assessment, SSM register profile of some employees, ads have been designed with all identified deficiencies and issues from performed new images from the authority’s brand. SSM has also supervisory activities in a designated database. participated in student fairs with the aim of promoting the Authority as an attractive employer.

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 73

Employees on average undergo six days of training per E.3.2.8 Financial resources year. In 2019, a compulsory full-day education in adminis- The regulatory activities of SSM are largely financed trative law, state values and what it means to be a civil through yearly state budget appropriations. However, servant was arranged for all employees at SSM. specific supervisory activities regarding spent fuel and nuclear waste disposal as well as nuclear decommissioning The purpose of the education was to strengthen the are reimbursed from the Nuclear Waste Fund, as decided culture that should characterise a government agency, by the Government. SSM’s governance values and culture and convey that a good management culture is about the behaviours and The costs of the regulatory activities and related research attitudes that should characterise all government financed through budget appropriations are largely employees. This is in turn the basis for an efficient, legal recovered from the licensees in the form of fees recovered and functioning authority. to the state budget. The amounts of the fees are proposed annually by SSM but decided by the Government. The Section K.1.4 describes how SSM works with challenges in budgets for 2017, 2018 and 2019, including the funding of securing national competences in the short and long term. the separately-financed international cooperation and Management programme development work, are shown in Table E2. SSM has developed a management supply programme with In addition, fees for reviewing certain applications or the aim of providing the Authority with new managers. licensing work are paid directly to the Authority. The Following nomination, interviews and testing, 10 financial resources of the regulatory body have increased employees have been selected to undergo a managerial and in real terms as compared to what was reported in the sixth leadership training in 2020. With this program, SSM Swedish national report. The 2019 budget for SSM has creates an attractive career path that contributes to been increased further and totals approximately 532 million providing competent managers in the long-term. SEK.

The programme will run throughout the year. It will

Regulatory research and assistance by external experts

include training in managerial skills and leadership as well According to the Ordinance with Instructions for the as communication. SSM provides every participant with an Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the main purposes of experienced manager from SSM which acts as a mentor SSM’s research are to: during the year. – maintain and develop competence of importance for Competent supervision radiation protection and nuclear safety work, and A continuous professionals training programme named – ensure that SSM has the knowledge and tools needed to Competent Supervision, is compulsory for all employees carry out effective regulatory review and supervisory involved in SSM’s regulatory supervision activities. The activities. objective is for all inspectors to have the same basic skills for performing consistent supervisory work in accordance SSM supports basic and applied research, including with SSM’s internal processes and procedures, regardless development of models, software and experimental studies. of the facilities or activities that are the focus of one’s SSM has a total yearly research budget of approximately 70 supervision. million SEK (7 million euros). In addition, research relating to nuclear waste management (mainly spent fuel disposal)

Table E2 Budget of SSM in million SEK (1 SEK is about 0.1 euro).

Budget item 2017 2018 2019 Source of funding

Nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and

308.5 317 321 Mainly fees

radiation protection (including administration)

Supervision of nuclear facilities

145 163 166 Fees

(proportion of above)

Licensing of new nuclear facilities, including

10 15 15 Fees

new nuclear reactors

Scientific research and development work 76 76 76 Mainly fees

Final disposal of radioactive waste,

including licensing, financial control and 63 60 60 Nuclear Waste Fund

decommissioning

74 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

is financed through the Nuclear Waste Fund, in the order external review support than for research between 2011

of 10 million SEK per year. and 2019. Since 2018, SSM has again increased its budget

for external research in spent fuel disposal to around SSM provides funding for a number of research projects 1 million euros per year, in order to build competence and and positions at Swedish universities in order to develop continuity in knowledge in preparation for the future and sustain national competence and teaching capacity. regulatory review of SKB’s updated safety analysis reports Key areas include reactor physics, severe accidents and in the authorisation steps for construction and operation non-proliferation. Research is also funded through open of a spent fuel repository that would follow a government calls in the areas of radiation protection, waste managelicensing decision. ment and Man-Technology-Organisation (MTO).

E.3.2.9 Transparency in regulatory activities

Regulatory Research in the Area of Waste Management

According to the Ordinance with Instructions for the The former regulatory authorities, SKI and SSI, decided Swedish Radiation Safety Authority shall by means of already in the late 1980s to develop a high level of in-house communication and transparency contribute towards competence in geological disposal and post-closure safety public insight into all operations encompassed by the assessments. This was in order to prepare for the regula- Authority’s mandate. The aim of this work shall for tory review of SKB’s anticipated licence application for a example be to provide advice and information about spent nuclear fuel repository. Subsequently, the authorities radiation, its properties and areas of application, and about developed an extensive research programme covering radiation protection. different technical aspects of spent fuel disposal and safety

assessment methodology. Sweden has no government-ap- SSM publishes all its significant decisions on its website.

pointed TSO (Technical Support Organisation), instead the Through an e-register on the website, the general public

Swedish regulators have developed a network of national can view the documents sent from the Authority or

and international experts by involving universities, insti- submitted to it. The Constitution gives everyone the right

tutes and consulting firms, both nationally and internation- to access the documents held by the Authority. This does

ally, in their research programme. In the 1990s, SKI also not apply to documents subject to confidentiality due to

carried out two comprehensive safety assessment projects e.g. security aspects or other specified reasons. The

of the KBS-3 disposal method for spent nuclear fuel Authority provides documents not subject to confidenti-

(Project-90 and SKI SITE-94). In parallel with these ality upon request from the general public and journalists

research activities, SKI and SSI initiated a number of (see also sections K.3.1.5 and K.5).

international research initiatives in the areas of hydroge- Before issuing regulations, the financial and administrative ology (e.g. Intracoin and Hydrocoin), model validation (e.g. implications for the companies concerned must be Intraval), radionuclide transport, rock mechanics modelling examined. An important aim of this analysis is that the (e.g. Decovalex), biosphere modelling (e.g. BIOMOVS) and requirements in the regulations must be justified, and not protection of the environment (the European Commission unnecessarily increase costs or the administrative burden FASSET and Erica projects). for the operators. For this reason, SSM always communi- In addition to the more technical research programme, cates drafts through a referral process to obtain opinions

Swedish regulators in the past also carried out a research on these and other aspects of the proposed regulations.

programme on stakeholder dialogue together with environ- As part of the preparation of an Environmental Impact mental organisations, other non-governmental organisa- Assessment (EIA), an applicant must, before the applications and the municipalities involved in SKB’s programme tion documents are submitted, consult with the County for siting of a spent nuclear fuel repository (e.g. the Administrative Board, relevant authorities, the potential RISCOM I and the European Commission Riscom II host municipality, other stakeholders, the public (includes projects). These projects have contributed to developing NGOs). The purpose of this consultation is to provide methods and fora for stakeholder dialogue and a better information about the planned activities and to obtain understanding of the roles and needs of different groups comments and suggestions on issues that need to be of actors. addressed in the EIA. If the planned activity is large and In the years up until 2010, SSM’s budget for research funding complex, a number of consultation meetings with different

in the area of nuclear waste management varied between stakeholders may be required. SSM also participates in

1.5 and 2 million euros per year. However, during SSM’s consultation meetings primarily intended for the munici-

assessment of SKB’s licence applications for a spent fuel pality and other stakeholders concerned. The Authority

repository (2011–2018) and for an extension of the reposi- can thus explain its role in the assessment process and the

tory for short-lived radioactive waste, SFR (2014–2019), legal requirements underlying the review of the application.

there has been a shift in funding from research over to An application submitted to the Authority is sent on external review support. During the assessment period the referral to a large number of stakeholders, e.g. other main focus of the research has been on processes linked to authorities, the municipality concerned, County Adminis- SKB’s suggested barrier system for the geological repositrative Boards, universities and NGOs. The application will tory for spent nuclear fuel and on biosphere issues also be published on the Authority’s website and is open connected to dose estimation. About three times more for anyone to submit comments on. In the event the funding, a total of 3.5 million euros, has been used for

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 75

planned nuclear activity is large and complex, an interna- The strategy has both an internal and an external perspectional peer review of the application documents will be tive and applies to all employees. arranged. Other strategy documents include a media strategy and an According to the Environmental Code, the municipality Internet strategy. The crisis communication strategy was concerned generally has the right to veto siting of facilities formed through the experience gained during the accident for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. A at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. municipality may also arrange for an advisory referendum before it takes a final decision on whether to approve the E.3.3 Other relevant authorities project or exercise its right of veto. The following subsections describe additional Swedish government authorities with regulatory functions that are E.3.2.10 SSM’s communication policy the most relevant to this Convention, as listed below. According to the Government ordinance with instructions, – Swedish National Debt Office SSM shall, through information and transparency, – The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency contribute to providing the public with insight into all activities covered by its mandates. SSM’s communication – The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency policy specifies the responsibility of employees and – The Swedish Work Environment Authority managers for internal and external communication. The policy also emphasises the Authority’s key values – The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste of credibility, integrity and openness while defining its – County Administrative Boards implementation. – The Nuclear Waste Fund

Credibility

E.3.3.1 Swedish National Debt Office

– SSM’s messages are based on the laws and regulations The Swedish National Debt Office is the central governgoverning its operations. ment financial manager. The Debt Office tasks include – SSM clearly conveys that its recommendations and providing banking services for the central government, decisions are based on objectivity and facts. managing central government debt, providing state guarantees and loans and to manage government support

Integrity

for banks. – SSM communicates based on its mission: achieving a radiation-safe society. The Authority does not allow Since 2018, the Swedish National Debt Office is also itself to be influenced by other interests. tasked with securing the financing of nuclear waste management. The Debt Office review cost estimates – SSM clearly distinguishes between its own mission and submitted by licensees in accordance with the provisions actions, and those of others. of the Act and Ordinance on Financing of Management Openness of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities (see section – SSM communicates proactively and in an E.2.1.4) understandable and accessible way regarding its activities For each of the licensees, the Debt Office must prepare a and the issues it addresses. proposal for the nuclear waste fee which, based on an – SSM is open even with respect to issues that might have assessment, the nuclear licensee should pay over the a negative impact on the Authority. subsequent three calendar years. – SSM is attentive to the needs of its stakeholders, and

E.3.3.2 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

seek new ways of communicating with them. The task of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency SSM’s communication policy states that all employees are (MSB) is to enhance and support societal capacities for the responsible for communicating in accordance with the preparedness for and prevention of emergencies and Authority’s mission and fundamental values. It also states crises. MSB coordinates emergency preparedness funding, that all employees have the right to anonymously inform offsite emergency planning and oversees the planning of the media about our operations, according to the principle regional County Administrative Boards. MSB also evaluates of public access and officials’ freedom of communication. onsite and offsite emergency exercises and initiates educational efforts. SSM’s communication policy is accompanied by an overall communication strategy, listing different key target groups. E.3.3.3 The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency The strategy sets out how SSM’s vision and governance The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency monitors goals can be achieved from: conditions in the environment and progress in environ- – strategies for guidance of communication work, and mental policy. The Agency has the task of coordinating, monitoring and evaluating efforts involving many agencies – criteria for navigating selection of communication to ensure compliance with the Swedish Environmental activities. Code and to meet national environmental objectives.

76 Section E – Legislative and regulatory system

E.3.3.4 The Swedish Work Environment Authority E.3.3.6 County Administrative Boards

The Swedish Work Environment Authority’s overall The County Administrative Boards exercise supervision objective is to reduce risks of poor health and accidents in under the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) and Ordinance occupational environments and to improve workplaces (2003:789) and are responsible for planning and implefrom a holistic perspective, i.e. from the points of view of menting rescue operations in cases where the public needs physical, psychological and organisational aspects. The protection from a radioactive release from a nuclear Authority is tasked with (for example) ensuring compliance installation, or in cases where such release seems imminent. with occupational health and safety legislation.

E.3.3.7 The Nuclear Waste Fund

E.3.3.5 The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste The Nuclear Waste Fund is a government authority whose The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste is an mission is to receive and manage the fees paid by nuclear independent body under the Ministry of Environment. power companies and licensees of other nuclear facilities The Council’s mandate is to study issues relating to nuclear in Sweden. The Nuclear Waste Fund makes payments in waste and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and to accordance with Swedish National Debt Office’s decisions. advise the Government and certain authorities on these The authority has no staff of its own. It is governed by a issues. Council activities are financed through the Nuclear board of directors representing public service as well as Waste Fund, as approved by the Government. The the power plant owners. The board is responsible for mainmembers of the Council are experts within different areas taining an investment strategy that ensures a good return relating to the disposal of radioactive waste, not only in and satisfactory liquidity. Fund assets must be deposited in technology and science, but also in areas such as ethics and an interest bearing account at the National Debt Office, or social sciences. invested in treasury bills issued by the state or in covered According to the Government instructions from 1 March bonds. The administration of the Nuclear Waste Fund is 2018, the Council shall: managed by the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency. – Assess the research and development programme of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company

E.3.4 Conclusion

(SKB), licence applications and reports of relevance to Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 20. the disposal of nuclear waste. – At the latest nine months after SKB has reported on its RD&D programme, present an independent assessment of the research and development activities and other measures presented in the RD&D programme. The Council shall also monitor the activities carried out in the area of decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities. – Investigate and highlight issues regarding the management and final storage of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, as well as on the decommissioning and dismantlement of nuclear facilities. The Council shall advise the Government on these issues. Important target groups in addition to the Government are the authorities concerned, the nuclear power industry, municipalities, interested organisations and politicians and the media. – During February, every two years from 2018, report on the previous years’ work and their independent assessment of the current situation in the nuclear waste area. – Monitor the development of other countries’ disposal programmes for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive nuclear waste. The Council should also monitor and, when necessary, participate in the work of international organisations as regards disposal of radioactive nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel.

Section E – Legislative and regulatory system 77

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

F.1 Article 21: Responsibility of the

useful for safety shall be taken as a result of this proactive

and continuous safety work and be documented in a safety

licence holder

programme that is to be updated annually.

1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime The basic safety documentation (Safety Analysis Report,

responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive SAR, including Operational Limits and Conditions, plans waste management rests with the holder of the relevant for emergency response and physical protection) must be licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that formally approved by SSM. Plant and organisational each such licence holder meets its responsibility. modifications and changes in the safety documentation are

2. If there is no such licence holder or other responsible

to be notified and SSM can, if needed, impose additional party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting Party conditions and requirements. All other issues are dealt with that has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the as part of licensee self-assessments. SSM examines how radioactive waste. this responsibility is managed.

F.1.1 Regulatory requirements The basic radiation protection principles (justification,

optimisation and dose limitation) mentioned in section

F.1.1.1 The prime responsibility

E.2.1.2 as well as the use of the best available technique The licence holder has prime responsibility for the safety (BAT) apply to waste handling and disposal. These of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. A requirements are contained in for example SSM’s Regulathorough presentation of the overall legal requirements tions Concerning the Protection of Human Health and the imposed on a licensee under the Nuclear Activities Act, the Environment in Connection with the Final Management Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS follows from section E. 2008:37) and, regarding discharges, in Regulations on

Additional requirements at a more detailed level are set out Protection of Human Health and the Environment in

in, inter alia the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s connection with Discharges of Radioactive Substances

(SSM) Regulations on Safety in Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:23).

2008:1) containing a number of functional requirements SSM shall ensure that regulations and procedures used are for safety management, design and construction, safety cost effective and useful for individuals as well as analysis and review, operations, nuclear materials/waste companies. They must be written and designed so that the management and documentation/archiving. In addition, it regulatory body does not take over the prime responsibility is clearly pointed out in these regulations that safety shall for safety and radiation protection. be monitored and followed up by the licensee on a routine

basis, and deviations identified and corrected so that safety The supervision that SSM carries out shall ensure that

is maintained and further developed according to valid licensees fulfil the responsibility that lies with them

objectives and strategies. according to the provisions of laws, ordinances and

regulations, and that they operate the activity in a safe way The continuous preventive safety work required includes and while maintaining radiation protection. reassessments, analysis of events in one’s own and other

facilities, and analysis of relevant new safety standards,

practices and research results. Any reasonable measure

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 79

F.1.1.2 The ultimate responsibility The regulations also contain provisions stipulating that the The State has an overall responsibility for activities staff must be fit for their duties. This implies the stipulation regulated by the Act on Nuclear Activities. The ultimate of medical requirements for fitness to work, drug testing, etc. responsibility for a closed geological repository rests with the State (see section A.4 and E.2.7). F.2.1.2 Adequate financial resources to support safety

during operation and decommissioning

The general obligations in the Act on Nuclear Activities

F.2 Article 22: Human and financial stipulate that in order to obtain a licence, financial resources resources must be committed in order to manage the

general obligations, including safety obligations. Each Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to prospective licensee must be assessed in this respect during ensure that: the licensing procedure.

(i) qualified staff are available as needed for safety As regards nuclear power reactors and nuclear fuel cycle related activities during the operating lifetime of a spent facilities, funding of decommissioning is provided by fuel and a radioactive waste management facility; means of investments in government-controlled funds. (ii) adequate financial resources are available to support Licensees of nuclear facilities must pay a fee to the Nuclear the safety of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste Waste Fund in accordance with the Act on Financing of management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning; Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities, (iii) financial provision is made which will enable the as described in section E.2.1.4. This is to ensure financing appropriate institutional controls and monitoring arrange- of decommissioning work and safe handling and disposal ments to be continued for the period deemed necessary of spent fuel and nuclear waste, including the research following the closure of a disposal facility. needed for these activities.

F.2.1.3 Provisions for institutional control and monitoring

F.2.1 Regulatory requirements

after closure F.2.1.1 Qualified staff during the operating lifetime

As described in section E.2.1, the holder of a licence for A detailed presentation of the overall legal requirements nuclear activities are responsible for ensuring that all imposed on a licensee under the Nuclear Activities Act, the measures are taken that are needed for the safe handling Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste resulting from follows from section E. the activity. The legal framework does not require institu-

Basic provisions concerning the organisation and financial, tional control and monitoring after closure. This is because administrative and human resources for the nuclear activity regulatory requirements on a disposal facility for spent fuel are contained in the Act on Nuclear Activities. or nuclear waste mean that the facility is to be designed such that no institutional control or monitoring is required. These basic provisions are expressed in further detail in It ensures that a licensee may be exempted from its responregulations (SSMFS 2008:1 and SSMFS 2018:1). According sibilities when decommissioning and dismantling have to requirements in these regulation the activity must be taken place and all spent fuel and nuclear waste have been conducted with an organisation that has sufficient financial disposed of in a sealed and closed disposal facility. and human resources designed to maintain safety. As a part of the management system, it must be ensured that those The State has an overall responsibility for activities who work in the activity have the skills and aptitude regulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities. It follows that needed for tasks that are important for radiation safety. the State assumes responsibility for the arrangements and The skills needed and the skills that are available must be costs of any institutional control or monitoring conducted systematically identified and documented. If it is necessary once a licensee has been exempted from its responsibilities to achieve and maintain the needed skills, training should (see sections A.4 and E.2.7).

be conducted or other measures taken.

F.2.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

The regulations require that contractors and other hired

F.2.2.1 Qualified staff during the operating lifetime

personnel, have the competence and suitability otherwise SKB has in its management system implemented a process needed for the tasks that are of importance for safety in for systematically developing the organisation and ensuring the nuclear activity, and are to ensure that this is docuqualified staff and competence. The process is based on a mented. The regulations also require an appropriate and systematic approach for complying with internal and justified balance between the use of in-house personnel external requirements to ensure that adequate competence and contractors for safety related tasks. The regulations is available for maintaining high safety and achieving the require procurement of products and services of imporgoal of the activities in the short and long term. This tance for safety in the nuclear activity to be governed by process also clarifies roles and responsibilities within the the management system, and that the management system process. should clearly specify how contractors and suppliers of services and equipment for the nuclear activity are assessed In conjunction with the annual planning of activities, a and how these assessments are kept up to date. competence and staffing analysis is carried out. The

competence analysis shows the competence needed in a

80 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

position or role in order to perform required tasks in funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund (sections A.8.3 and

accordance with the needs of the activities. Roles of specific E.2.1.4) and directly from SKB’s owners depending on the

strategic importance or of importance for radiation safety type of costs.

are identified. The analysis is made on both individual and group level and with a timeframe of four to five years. F.2.2.3 Provisions for institutional control and monitoring

Strategic competence analyses with a timeframe of about after closure

ten years are conducted regularly but with slightly longer Post-closure institutional control and monitoring is not

intervals than the annual planning of activities. The purpose required by the legal framework (see section F.2.3.3 below).

of the strategic analyses for the planned construction of

F.2.3 Regulatory control

new nuclear facilities is to identify staffing needs (compe-

tence and number of personnel) and how competence is to F.2.3.1 Qualified staff during operation

be secured during the different construction phases. Compliance with the requirements for competence

assurance has been inspected by SSM since SKB took over The analyses show the competence needed to execute the the operation of Clab and SFR. The regulatory authority activities and the need for competence development either concluded at the time that the required systematic by further training of existing personnel or by new approaches are in place to ensure long term staffing and recruitment. Training programmes are established for competence of operations staff. individuals and groups when necessary to complement the

general introductory training for all new employees. During 2013 and 2014, SSM initiated a more systematic

inspection programme directed at SKB’s nuclear facilities, SKB has a competence management system in which i.e. Clab and SFR. The outcome indicated that there was competence assurance (documentation of competence and room for improvement in several areas. SSM therefore any gaps between requirements and assessed level) is issued injunctions requiring SKB to more clearly define performed for own personnel and consultants. matters such as: the distribution of responsibilities, safety The competence of personnel is developed for example management routines, control of requirements, manage-

through rotation programmes where employees are given ment of deviations, and methods for continuous improve-

an opportunity to work within different areas and in ments in general. SSM thereafter closely monitored SKB’s

different roles. SKB also has a competence transfer activities to improve the situation by means of in total

programme to prepare for generation changes and to three surveillance inspections in addition to review of

reduce the vulnerability to loss of competence. reporting on progress from SKB. SSM concluded in the

end of 2018 that the situation had improved such that the Regarding competence management in the very long term, requirements imposed by the injunctions were fulfilled and i.e. a 50–100 year perspective, there are two important that SKB conducts improvement work in a systematic and prerequisites that must be considered: satisfactory manner. SSM concluded that regulatory control – SKB’s activities are long-term and are planned to thereafter should be carried out as part of the baseline continue for about another 70 years, i.e. up until around supervision plan for SKBs facilities. 2090.

– SKB is a dominant actor in Sweden when it comes to F.2.3.2 Adequate financial resources to support safety

during operation and decommissioning

the management of radioactive waste, but tasks of SSM reviews the adequacy of financial resources to substantial extent will also be carried out by the owner support safety during operation and during decommiscompanies, suppliers and regulatory authorities. sioning as an integral part of the yearly inspection

The first point is an advantage as competence development programme. In addition, the National Debt Office reviews

and competence management can be planned in the long the adequacy of resources directed to SKB through

term. payments from the Nuclear Waste Fund, and decides on

the reimbursements made from the Fund. SKB has developed strategic competence management

plans and analysed the risks and problems that may arise

F.2.3.3 Provisions for institutional control and monitoring

when it comes to competence management in the long

after closure

term. SKB considers potential problems to be manageable. The legal framework for the design of a geological disposal

facility contain requirements on passive post-closure safety

F.2.2.2 Adequate financial resources to support safety

solutions, meaning there should be no need for additional

during operation and decommissioning

safety measures or environmental monitoring after closure. Business planning is performed on a yearly basis according Following the closure of a disposal facility and the to SKB’s management system. SKB’s board of directors, termination of licensee responsibilities, the institutional who also decide on the strategic plan for the subsequent control will be overtaken by the state, including for year and ultimately the yearly budget, initiate the planning. example maintaining records, safeguards or land use The plan, together with the RD&D Programme (section restrictions (see sections A.4 and E.2.7). A.6.3), cost calculations and plans for projects and

investments, are the basis for issuing instructions to the

F.2.4 Conclusion

organisation. Based on a payment plan, SKB then requests Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 22.

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 81

F.3 Article 23: Quality assurance

systems since the 1970s. The trend has been to move from

quality programmes to management systems, which include

Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to quality assurance of various critical processes.

ensure that appropriate quality assurance programmes The management systems are to varying degree process concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste oriented but important common elements are graded management are established and implemented. approach, safety classification, and validation and verifica-

tion. The purpose is to create a management system where

F.3.1 Regulatory requirements

design, construction, operation and decommissioning is In June 2018, new general requirements were implemented managed, controlled, assessed and developed, so that in the form of regulation SSMFS 2018:1. Among many requirements for safety are met. The overarching goal is to areas, this regulation covers quality assurance, thus create a management system that supports leadership and replacing similar requirements that were contained in management for safety. SSMFS 2008:1. What differ the new general requirements

from earlier requirements in this area is a more detailed The management system contains processes for managing

regulatory framework, including additional requirements requirements. These processes ensure that external

and clearer guidelines that are provided. SSMFS 2018:1 requirements such as laws, regulatory requirements and

requires nuclear activities with regard to related design, permits, as well as internal requirements are transformed

construction, operation and decommissioning to be into working methods within the different processes, and

managed, controlled, assessed and developed by means of accounted for in the design of facilities.

a management system so designed that requirements for The management system has a strong link to the safety safety will be met. The management system, including the analysis report (SAR), which normally is considered a part necessary routines and procedures, must be kept up to date of the management system. and be documented. This view on the integration of quality and safety with other business concerns into a total Typically, the management systems are described in a series

integrated management system is in line with the IAEA of documents structured in a hierarchical pyramid. The

Safety Requirements on Leadership and Management for number of levels in the hierarchical structure is established

Safety, GSR Part 2. by each licensee. The highest level typically contains a

comprehensive description of the organisation with The management system should cover all nuclear activities responsibilities for functions and processes, division of at the facility. It is furthermore required by SSMFS 2018:1 responsibilities and management principles together with to have the application of the management system, and its policies and directives to all departments and staff units. efficiency and effectiveness, audited systematically and The next level contains commitments defined by the periodically by a function having an independent position managers responsible on how to work with the tasks in relation to the activities being audited. An established delegated from the highest level. This includes process audit programme must be in place at the facility. descriptions, objectives and instructions for the different

Furthermore, it should be made clear by the management areas of responsibility. The lower levels contain instruc-

system how contractors and vendors are to be audited, and tions for specific activities and tasks, technical documenta-

how to keep the results of these audits up to date. The tion, job descriptions etc.

internal audit function should have a sufficiently strong The management system is available to everyone within the and independent position in the organisation and should organisation as well as contractors, consultants and report to the highest management of the facility. The regulatory authorities. Information and training in the audits should have continuity and auditors should have management system is given in proportion to needs. good knowledge about activities being audited. Audit intervals should take into account the auditing activity A common approach at all licensees is: “If we follow the

itself and the management function of the facility should management system, we comply with requirements”.

also be periodically audited.

F.3.2.2 SKB’s management system

The legal conditions for supervision of suppliers have In the past three years SKB has transformed its manage-

been changed through changes made in the Act on Nuclear ment system to a process based management system. To

Activities. This gives the regulatory body the possibility to support this transformation SKB has reinforced the

monitor how the safety requirements are followed Requirements Management Process, and restructured the

concerning activities conducted by suppliers or their Management Review Process. The purpose is to ensure

subsuppliers and contractors or their subcontractors or that all requirements are met, that the processes are safe

other parties delivering services to the licensed organisa- and efficient, and that the management system supports

tion. the line management to implement policies and to fulfil the

organisation’s goals and objectives.

F.3.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

A central part has been to define and implement ‘Line

F.3.2.1 Quality programmes and management systems

management with process support’. Each process has an Licensees in Sweden, generating or managing spent fuel owner from SKB’s executive management team, and is and radioactive waste, have had their own management supported by a processes team for the continuous process

82 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

development. To support the new structure and visualis- – A process for Internal Audits to review compliance with ation of the management system, a model has been the management system and to identify for areas for development in the form of a ‘House’, where all parts of improvements. The internal audit function itself is the management system can be reached on the intranet normally audited by a team where the team leader is (Figure F1). from another licensee (or from the corporate level), to ensure independence. The result from the internal audits is reported to SKB’s Managing Director and managers accountable for observed deviations. – A Purchasing Process, which includes evaluation of suppliers, using a graded approach that might include OVERARCHING supplier audits. The processes secure that all purchases of goods and services which might affect, directly or indirectly, safety, the environment or personnel, will be audited. Supplier audits are performed in a similar way by other licensees, to facilitate sharing of experiences from audits and to optimise learning. ORGANISATION PROCESSES

F.3.2.3 The Waste Management Process is owned by SKB

To fulfil the obligations in the licences to operate the nuclear facilities SKB has defined a Waste Management Process as one of the main processes in its management system, see Figure F2. To make it work it is essential that FACILITIES PROJECTS all other licensees (waste producers) whose radioactive wastes SKB receive and eventually dispose of align their waste management activities with this process. The process Figure F1 SKB’s ‘House’, the entrance to the management system. is supported by another process for defining Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). It is essential to secure that all The ‘House’ consists of the following parts: handovers of waste in the overall waste management – ‘Overarching’ contains the Management system process are in compliance with the relevant WAC. It is also manuals, e.g. Roles & Responsibilities, and the Policies, essential to keep records of all waste, since there is a long as well as the Business plan, Programmes for time perspective (decades) from where the process starts to improvement, and Scorecard/Dashboard where it ends. – ‘Organisation’ contains Organisation charts, and The Waste Management Process, which is owned and descriptions of all organisational units and their tasks controlled by SKB, ensures that the process from an and duties. overall perspective is understood and agreed by all waste – ‘Processes’ contains descriptions of all processes and producers. In order to increase the understanding of process instructions. process, WAC and other SKB controlled and shared central documents SKB has set up joint committees with all major – ‘Facilities’ contains specific information for each waste producers, primarily the nuclear power plants. In facility, for example Operations and maintenance addition to the central documents, each waste producer instructions, Safety analysis reports (SAR) and all does a breakdown of the Waste Management Process into technical documentation of the facilities. underlying instructions, which are part of the individual – ‘Projects’ contains descriptions and documentation of producer’s management system. ongoing Programmes and Projects. The central SKB-controlled and shared documents in the It is essential to evaluate performance, and therefore SKB Waste Management Process are: has several ways of assessing compliance with require- – A Waste Handbook, that describes the Waste ments and the management system, and for learning and Management Process. In the handbook it is stated for experience feedback: example which information SKB needs in the – A Safety Management Process that monitors safety, e.g. specifications from the waste producers and what the operations management and decision making related information the waste type descriptions must contain. to, for example, events and modifications of facilities or – Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). This document is organisation. This process is supported by a Safety owned by SKB and stipulates the WAC applicable to Review Process. SKB’s repositories. All waste producers using SKB’s – A process for defining ‘Programmes for improvement’, repositories are obliged to follow these WAC. e.g. developing an internal audit programme that is In addition, SKB controls the Waste Type Descriptions graded in frequency and depth, depending on risk and (WTD) which is set up with every waste producer individuimpact on safety. The audit programme addresses both ally. This is a safety report for each waste type from each daily operations and projects for modifications of waste producer. The document covers all steps in the waste existing facilities or development of new facilities.

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 83

Figure F2 Description in principle of how the Waste Management Process works, but not the exact description in the main process in SKB’s management system.

management process (waste production, conditioning, looking into licensee management of organisational storage, transportation, reception and operational safety in changes. the repository and post-closure safety) and present Furthermore, SSM conducts continuous supervision of the verification of WAC. SKB produces this document using a internal audit process. The results of internal audits are specification from the waste producer (covering the first covered in most inspections and reviews of specifically steps; waste production, storage and transportation) as a defined technical areas, and sometimes the subject of reference. inspections focusing specifically on audit programmes. The Waste Management Process is regularly evaluated by SKB together with the interested parties, including the F.3.3.1 SKB’s management system waste producers, to ensure that safety is not compromised. During 2013 and 2014, SSM intensified inspection In addition, SKB regularly audits the handling of radioac- activities by means of a more systematic inspection tive waste at the nuclear power plants and other waste programme directed at SKB’s nuclear facilities, i.e. Clab producers to ensure compliance with the waste manage- and SFR. The outcome indicated that there was room for ment process. These audits are defined as ‘process function improvement in several areas. SSM therefore issued audits’ that complement the waste producers’ internal injunctions requiring SKB to more clearly define matters audits. such as: the distribution of responsibilities, safety management routines, control of requirements, management of F.3.3 Regulatory control deviations, and methods for continuous improvements in As per the new supervisory programme, SSM conducts general. SSM thereafter closely monitored SKB’s activities baseline inspections in all areas. The MTO section has to improve the situation by means of in total three recently conducted baseline inspections of the licensees’ surveillance inspections in addition to review of reporting management systems, organisations, and organisational on progress from SKB. SSM concluded in the end of 2018 change management. The purpose of the baseline inspec- that the situation had improved such that the requirements tions regarding the management system is to monitor the imposed by the injunctions were fulfilled and that SKB current status and progress of the licensees’ principles for, conducts improvement work in a systematic and satisfacand their systematic work on, their respective systems. This tory manner. SSM concluded that regulatory control is to ensure that their management systems direct, control, thereafter should be carried out as part of the baseline evaluate and develop the organisation’s activities. Another supervision plan for SKBs facilities. purpose is also to determine whether the management system is suitable, up-to-date, accessible and effective F.3.3.2 The ‘Waste management process’ enough. Regulatory review of the ‘waste management process’ is central in SSM’s regulatory activities. In addition to baseline As far as concerns the baseline inspections in relation to an inspections of waste management activities, SSM reviews organisation, the purpose is to determine the current status the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) documents developed of the licensees’ organisations and their systematic work by SKB as well as the waste type description (WTD) on ensuring that they have an organisation with an documents developed by the nuclear waste producers. appropriate design for maintaining nuclear and radiation safety now and in the long term, as well as to judge the

F.3.4 Conclusion

suitability of the organisation. The inspections also include Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 23.

84 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

F.4 Article 24: Operational radiation

to be issued. In the meantime, necessary amendments have

been made to the earlier, existing regulations.

protection

F.4.1.1 Regulatory requirements for occupational

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps

radiation protection

to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel Swedish occupational radiation protection requirements or radioactive waste management facility: follow the requirements of Council Directive 2013/59/ (i) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public EURATOM of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably standards for protection against the dangers arising from achievable, economic and social factors being taken into exposure to ionising radiation. The principal provisions as account; regards occupational radiation protection in nuclear (ii) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to facilities are stipulated in the Radiation Protection Act radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally (2018:396) and in SSM’s regulations SSMFS 2018:1,

endorsed standards on radiation protection; and 2008:24 and SSMFS 2008:26; see also section L.1.

(iii) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncon-

General requirements

trolled releases of radioactive materials into the environment. Anyone who conducts an activity involving ionising

2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to

radiation shall ensure that a) it is justified, i.e. the benefits ensure that discharges shall be limited: to society or individuals outweigh the radiation harm; b) (i) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably the radiation protection is optimised and that c) exposure achievable, economic and social factors being taken into of workers and the public is kept below the applicable account; and dose limits. Consequently, the licensee must have the (ii) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situanecessary staff (knowledge, abilities and skills), economic tions, to radiation doses which exceed national prescripresources and a management system and an effective tions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection. organisation in order to take on these responsibilities and

to ensure proper radiation protection.

3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to

ensure that during the operating lifetime of a regulated

Optimisation

nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or Anyone who conducts a practice using or resulting in uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the ionising radiation shall ensure that the radiation protection environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its is optimised and that dose limits are not exceeded. In this

effects. context, dose constraints should be used as prescribed and

appropriate. The licensee must ensure that goals are set,

optimisation is performed and that the needed resources

F.4.1 Regulatory requirements

are made available in order to perform the actions and In order to regulate and create a basis for effective work towards the established goals. supervision of radiation protection at nuclear facilities,

including those for management of spent nuclear fuel and

Dose limits for workers

radioactive waste, basic radiation protection requirements The limit for any worker in terms of effective dose is are laid down in the radiation protection act and in 20 mSv in a calendar year. The corresponding limits for the regulations issued by SSM. lens of the eye, skin and extremities are, in terms of

On the 1 of June 2018, a new Radiation Protection Act equivalent dose, 20 mSv and 500 mSv, respectively. Lower

(2018:396) and a corresponding Radiation Protection limits, including age limits, apply for students and appren-

Ordinance (2018:506) entered into force. On the same day tices. Specific regulations also apply for pregnant and

a package of eleven SSM-regulations also came into force, breast feeding workers.

which together with the new Act and Ordinance trans- Data on intakes and individual radiation doses are kept in a posed the Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM. national dose register. Dose records are retained until an Among these, SSMFS 2018:1, The Swedish Radiation Safety individual reaches the age of 75, and for a minimum of Authority’s regulations on basic requirements for licensed activities 30 years after their work involving ionising radiation has with ionising radiation, has a particular over-arching role in ceased. laying down the fundamental requirements in the area of

nuclear safety and radiation protection and defining basic The average individual dose (for those who incur a

concepts to be applied. This includes, inter alia, evaluation radiation dose above or equal to 0.1 mSv during at least

of work conditions and events, a management system, one month of the year) at Swedish nuclear power plants is

required competence, protection and categorisation of approximately 1 mSv. Since 2016, no more than five

workers and work places, proof on fitness for duty, persons have received radiation doses above 10 mSv during

protection of the public and the environment, etc. Further a single year and no-one has received an annual effective

requirements are then to be found in more detailed radiation dose above 20 mSv since 2009 (see also Article

regulations under this ‘umbrella’. 15 Radiation Protection in Sweden’s eighth national report

under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Ministry Publica- Some additional SSM regulations, specifically referring to tion Series, Ds 2019.16). radiation protection and safety at nuclear facilities, are yet

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 85

Medical examinations Policy in the event of fuel failures

Each year, all workers must arrange to obtain a new At a nuclear power plant, it is mandatory to have a doctor’s certificate as proof of their being fit for service. A documented policy and strategy for avoiding fuel failures full medical examination must be performed the first time as well as managing occurring failures. The aim is to avoid a certificate is issued. unnecessary radiological impact to workers and the public and minimise the production of wastes with long-lived When renewed the physician, in consultation with the radionuclides. employee, taking into account the employee’s health condition

and the risks of exposure to ionising radiation, should Reporting

assess if the future service assessments need to be made at Annual reports are required describing the radiation shorter intervals than a year, whether future service protection work, the progress and evaluation of optimisaassessments should be based on medical examinations or tion work, and experiences from outages. In the case of an health declarations, and the scope of the medical controls. accident or events that led or could have led to the spread

of contamination or high doses, rapid communication to

Supervised and controlled areas

the regulatory body is required. Various other reports are Workplace zoning and a division into supervised and also required. The radiation protection expert oversees controlled areas are regulatory requirements. Areas must be timely and accurate reporting. marked and information provided about dose rates, sources, contamination levels, entrance restrictions, etc.

F.4.1.2 Regulatory requirements for environmental

There must be documented routines for the work with

radiation protection

ionising radiation. The principal provisions as regards environmental If in an area there is a risk of spreading radioactive radiation protection for nuclear facilities under normal substances (contamination) to other premises, or the operation are stipulated in the Radiation Protection Act annual effective dose might exceed 6 mSv, the workplace (2018:396), the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s must be classified as a controlled area. Access is then more regulation (SSMFS 2018:1) on basic requirements for restricted, protective clothing and personal protection licensed activities with ionising radiation, and the Swedish equipment might be mandatory, specific information/ Radiation Safety Authority’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:23, education is required and a personal dosimeter is to be amended in 2018) concerning the protection of human issued and worn. Within a controlled area, if the risk of health and the environment from discharges of radioactive receiving an annual effective dose of more than 50 mSv is substances from certain nuclear facilities. Below is a non-negligible, then the premises must be explicitly marked description of key provisions.

and admittance particularly restricted.

Public dose limits, dose constraints and critical group

Information and education The effective dose limit for members of the public is 1

All workers, both permanent staff and contractors, must mSv per year. A dose constraint for discharges of radioacbe informed about radiation risks, alarms, internal proce- tive substances to water and air (authorised releases) is set dures, and receive proper education and training prior to at 0.1 mSv per year and site, including all nuclear facilities working within a controlled area. The training shall be located at that site. The dose constraint is subject to adjusted to the scope and type of work to be performed comparison with the calculated dose to the most exposed and to the existing radiological working environment. It individual (similar to critical group). The dose models used should be repeated at least every third year. In addition, are approved by SSM.

more specific training is often required and the scope and The dose constraint is compared with the sum of a) the focus must then be adapted to the nature and environment effective dose from annual external exposure, and b) the of the work to be performed. committed effective dose resulting from a yearly discharge. A 50-year integration period is used for the committed

Site-specific instructions, radiation protection expertise

effective dose. If the calculated sum dose exceeds 0.01 The licence holder shall establish site-specific instructions mSv per year, realistic calculations of the individual for radiation protection and appoint a radiation protection radiation doses, using measured dispersion data, food manager. SSM approves the radiation protection managers, habits, etc., shall be performed. their capacity to act as a controller of the licensee’s implementation of the radiation protection legislation and

Discharges, optimisation and best available technology

to promote radiation protection work. A separate radiation According to the Radiation Protection Act, measures protection expert function, approved by SSM, should also should be taken to reduce discharges of radioactive be available for the licensee to provide expertise as necessary. substances as far as possible and reasonable taking into account existing technical knowledge and economical and

Instruments and equipment

social factors. For nuclear power plants, such measures All instruments used for radiation protection and control should be reported to SSM each year. These measures are of radiation doses shall be calibrated, with metrological then evaluated against specific reference and target values traceability, and before use undergo regular functional suggested by the licence holder and approved by SSM. checks. There must be documented routines for use, maintenance and functional control.

86 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

The reference and target values can be set for specific as possible be reported to SSM together with a description radionuclides or for groups of radionuclides and are of the actions taken to reduce the releases. established in Becquerel (Bq). The dose constraints of 0.1 mSv per year for discharges are used in the planning and F.4.1.3 Protection of the environment the work with limiting releases and restricting radiation Protection of the environment is included in international dose to the critical group. recommendations and the Swedish legal framework.

The dose to the public is calculated taking all relevant The International Basic Safety Standards, GSR Part 3 are exposure pathways into account. The dose constraint is a “designed to identify the protection of the environment as an issue tool for optimisation and the doses are supposed to be necessitating assessment, while allowing for flexibility in incorporating kept and optimised well below the dose constraint during into decision making processes the results of environmental assessments normal operation. that are commensurate with the radiation risks” (paragraph 1.35).

Furthermore, in the EU BSS it is stated: “While the state of

Release monitoring

the environment can impact long-term human health, this calls for a Releases of radioactive substances shall be monitored. All policy protecting the environment against the harmful effects of non-monitored releases must be investigated and an upper ionising radiation. For the purpose of long-term human health protecboundary shall be set for possible undetectable leakage to tion, environmental criteria based on internationally recognised air and water from each facility. scientific data (such as published by EC, ICRP, United Nations Releases via the main stacks of nuclear power reactors are Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Internato be controlled by means of continuous nuclide-specific tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) should be taken into measurements of volatile radioactive substances such as account” (no. 27 of the perambulatory clauses). noble gases, continuous collection of samples of iodine The Swedish Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) states and particle bound radioactive substances, as well as that “The aim of this Act is to protect people and the environment measurements of carbon-14 and tritium. against harmful effects of radiation”. Requirements in Swedish Discharges of radionuclides to water shall be controlled legislation regarding protection of the environment are through measurements of representative samples from found in SSMFS 2008:37, the Swedish Radiation Safety each release pathway. The analyses shall cover nuclide Authority’s Regulations Concerning the Protection of specific measurements of gamma- and alpha-emitting Human Health and the Environment in Connection with radioactive substances as well as, where relevant, the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear strontium-90 and tritium. Waste. These regulations specify ‘protection of the

environment’ as protection of biodiversity and the

Controls and testing

sustainable use of biological resources, and require an The function and efficiency of measurement equipment assessment to be performed describing effects from a and release limiting systems shall be checked periodically radiation protection view in habitats and ecosystems, and and whenever there are any indications of malfunctions. thereby demonstrating that the environment is protected.

Environmental monitoring The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s regulation

Environmental monitoring in the areas surrounding (SSMFS 2018:1) states that “The consequences of an activity nuclear facilities is performed in accordance with from a radiation protection point of view for the public and the programmes determined by SSM. These programmes environment must be assessed and documented based on the activities specify type and sampling frequency, sample treatment, nature and extent”. radionuclides to consider, reporting, etc. The licensees Assessments of the protection of the environment were carry out the environmental monitoring themselves or by performed in connection with the planned Swedish spent hired performers. Samples are analysed by laboratories that nuclear fuel repository and for the European Spallation have adequate quality assurance systems. To verify compli- Source. Requirements for such assessments are also ance, SSM performs inspections and takes random included in the licence conditions for decommissioning of subsamples for control measurements (bilateral inter-comthe nuclear power plants entering this phase and in the parisons) at SSM or at other independent laboratories, and licence for the pilot operation of the European Spallation regularly arranges proficiency tests for the laboratories Source. A similar requirement will also be included in the used by the nuclear facilities. up-coming regulations for the operation of nuclear power

Reporting reactors and for the operation of other nuclear facilities.

Releases of radioactive substances to air and water as well as results from environmental monitoring must be F.4.2 Radiation impact of spent nuclear fuel or reported twice a year to SSM. Furthermore, the licensees radioactive waste management facilities

report annually to SSM on adopted or planned measures to F.4.2.1 Occupational radiation doses limit radioactive releases with the aim of achieving their In general, individual and collective doses from managing specified target values. If established reference values are radioactive waste at nuclear power plants are low when exceeded, actions to meet the reference values shall be compared to the control, maintenance and service work reported. Events that lead to an increase in releases of connected with the operation. Nevertheless, work activities radioactive substances from a nuclear facility shall as soon are planned, in compliance with the requirements, to

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 87

Table F1 Radiation dose data for staff at Clab during the period 2012–2018.

No. of exposed staff Collective dose Maximum effective dose Average effective dose Year

radioactive waste at the nuclear power plants is, per site, in highest individual doses below a few mSv.

the order of tens of milli-mansievert (mmanSv). This The annual collective effective dose for the activities at the section presents examples of radiation doses received at whole Studsvik site varied between 0.15 and 0.23 manSv other facilities, including spent fuel and radioactive waste during the period 2016-2019. The average yearly individual management facilities. effective dose varied from 0.7 to 1.4 mSv per year, while

Clab the highest annual individual effective doses ranged from

At the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel 7.8 to 12.4 mSv during this period. The large variation in

(Clab), radiation doses are incurred during normal operation, incurred radiation doses reflects the varying types of work

including receiving, unloading and cleaning of transport and activities carried out at the site. It must be underlined

containers. In addition, maintenance and service of Clab’s that a fair fraction of the collective dose is not directly

internal lifting and handling equipment as well as the upkeep connected to waste management activities, but rather to

of the water purification system also result in radiation materials testing, fuel research and hot-cell activities. The

doses. The collective effective dose has varied in the range same is generally true for the highest individual doses.

of 15–35 mmanSv in recent years depending on the activities

Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant

performed. Radiation dose data for the operation of Clab For staff working with waste management at the fuel during the period 2012–2018 are shown in Table F1. fabrication plant Westinghouse Electric Sweden (WSE) AB,

SFR annual individual effective doses are reported to be of the

Open radiation sources are only in exceptional cases order of a few mSv. To put this into perspective, in 2018

managed at SFR, the Swedish disposal facility for low and (2017) the average effective dose due to external and

intermediate level waste. The wastes received are condi- internal exposure (committed effective dose) for all staff at

tioned in standard waste packages fulfilling waste accept- WSE was 1.7 (1.4) mSv, respectively and the highest

ance criteria (WACs). Thus, radiation doses should individual radiation doses were 10.8 (8.7) mSv.

originate from external radiation only. Contamination of The collective dose for WSE varied between 0.3_0.4 transport casks and waste packages has never occurred to manSv during 2013–2018, mostly in the lower half of the the extent that any airborne radioactivity, excluding interval. It should be noted that about 60–65% of the dose naturally occurring radon and radon daughters, has been is due to internal exposure. The measurements of radiation measured or reported. Since the start of operation of SFR, doses improved from 2013 when OSL-dosimeters were the total radiation dose (collective effective dose) has varied employed which better measure the high-energy beta between 0.0 and 6.0 mmanSv. This is lower than the 25 contribution than earlier TLDs. mmanSv per year that the repository was designed for.

Ågesta The Studsvik site

From the closed and partially dismantled Ågesta reactor Nuclear activities at the Studsvik site are undertaken by (PHWR), small amounts of tritium are released through three licensees, Studsvik Nuclear AB, AB Svafo and Cyclife drainage of the rock chamber where the shutdown reactor Sweden AB. The majority of these activities are related to is situated. The corresponding radiation doses to the public decommissioning and waste management, but some have been negligible. development work and research is also carried out,

especially regarding nuclear fuel and materials relevant for On July 15, 2019, Vattenfall AB was granted permission by

the nuclear sector. The two research reactors, R2 and R2-0, the Land and Environment Court to dismantle the Ågesta

were permanently closed in 2005. In 2010, the licences reactor. The plan is to start the dismantling work during

were transferred to AB SVAFO. Decommissioning is 2020. SSM decided in 2018 on new licence conditions for

ongoing and is expected to be completed at the end of the dismantling work. The estimated collective dose for

2020 after which conventional dismantling will start. The this activity is below 100 mmanSv.

88 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

F.5 Article 25: Emergency preparedness

F.4.2.2 Radiation doses from releases of radioactive substances

Figure F3 displays the estimated effective dose to the 1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and representative person (‘critical group’) from the releases of during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste radioactive substances from operating power plant sites for management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if the years 2009 to 2018. The resulting estimated effective necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency doses are less than 1% of the stipulated dose constraint of plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency. 100 microsievert (μSv) at all sites. The operation of PWRs 2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps at Ringhals, due to carbon-14, results in slightly higher for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for its releases from this site. territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive 0,35 waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.

0,30

F.5.1 Regulatory requirements

0,25

The emergency plans for the three operating NPPs and the 0,20 industry facilities at Studsvik Nuclear AB, AB Svafo and Cyclife Sweden AB include the installations for spent fuel

0,15

and radioactive waste management at these facilities. SKB 0,10 has an emergency plan for the Clab interim storage facility

Effective dose, µSv

for spent nuclear fuel. There is no formal requirement for

0,05

an emergency plan at SFR; however, a crisis management 0,00 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 and rescue organisation is nevertheless in place. SSM’s Forsmark Ringhals Oskarshamn revised regulations for emergency preparedness and response impose new requirements that, eventually, will Figure F3 Estimated effective dose (µSv) to the representative lead to a new investigation of SFR and possible revisions person in the critical group from releases of radioactive substances of the formal requirements for an emergency plan. from sites with operating NPPs. Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB (WSE) operates the fuel fabrication facility in Västerås. This facility also has an The releases of radioactive substances from the Barsebäck emergency plan as per SSM’s regulations. NPP (no operating reactors) and the facilities at Studsvik and Ranstad are shown in Figure F4 below. Extraction of Requirements for on-site emergency activities and plans for uranium from waste at Ranstad Mineral stopped in 2009 the nuclear facilities are included in several legally binding and decommissioning activities subsequently started. The documents: estimated doses due to releases from Clab, SFR and Ågesta – Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3); are not shown as they would not be discernible on the figure. – Civil Protection Act (2003:778) regarding protection against accidents with serious potential consequences

0,06

for human health and the environment; – Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789) regarding protection against accidents with serious potential

0,04

consequences for human health and the environment; – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) concerning safety in nuclear facilities;

0,02

– SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2014:2) concerning

Effective dose, µSv

emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities; and 0,00 2010' 2011' 2012' 2013' 2014' 2015' 2016' 2017' 2018' – SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2018:1) concerning basic Barsebäck Studsvik Ranstad Westinghouse regulatory requirements for all licensed activities involving ionising radiation. Figure F4 Effective dose (µSv) to the representative person in the critical group. Releases from Barsebäck NPP, Studsvik site, Ranstad The overarching objective of the Civil Protection Act site and Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant. (2003:778) is civil protection for the entire country – with consideration given to local conditions – for life, health, F.4.3 Regulatory control property and the environment against all types of See sections E.3.2.6 and E.2.5.2 about SSM’s control and incidents, accidents, emergencies, crises and disasters. The inspection work. Act requires preventive measures and emergency preparedness to be arranged by the owner or operator of a facility F.4.4 Conclusion conducting dangerous activities. The Act also defines the Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 24. responsibilities for the individual, the municipalities and the state in cases of serious accidents, including radiological accidents. The Act contains provisions on how

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 89

municipal fire brigades shall be organised and operated and the IAEA’s emergency preparedness categories, which stipulates that a rescue commander with a specified compe- introduces, the application of a graded approach tence, with far reaching authority, is to be engaged for all depending on the radiological hazard at the nuclear facility. rescue operations. According to the Act, the County SSM’s regulations SSMFS 2014:2 concerning emergency Administrative Board is responsible for rescue operations planning and preparedness have a radiation protection in cases where the public needs protection from a radioacperspective, including requirements for the following: tive release from a nuclear installation or in cases where such release seems imminent. – Emergency planning including alarm criteria and alarming; The Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:779) contains – logistics centre; general provisions concerning emergency planning and is more specific about reporting obligations, information to – emergency rooms, premises, facilities and assembly the public, and the responsibility of the County Adminis- places; trative Boards for planning and implementing public – training and exercises; protective measures, content of the off-site emergency plan, competence requirements for rescue managers and – iodine prophylaxis;

emergency planning zones around major nuclear facilities. – personal protective equipment; The County Administrative Board is obliged to draw up a – evacuation plan; radiological emergency response plan. At a national level, MSB is responsible for the coordination and supervision – contacts with SSM; of preparedness work for the rescue services’ response to – radiation monitoring; radioactive releases. SSM decides on necessary measures – emergency ventilation; for emergency planning at the nuclear installations and supervises the nuclear installations regarding these plans. – collection of meteorological data; and

The Act on Nuclear Activities contains general provisions – communication equipment.

on emergency response in the event of accidents at a Depending on the radiological hazard potential at the nuclear facility. The Act requires the licensee to have an facility, the requirements differ regarding logistics centre, organisation with sufficient financial, administrative and radiation monitoring, emergency ventilation and collection human resources to carry out protective measures in of meteorological data. connection with an accident at the facility. SSM’s regulations SSMFS 2018:1 includes regulations on SSM’s regulations SSMFS 2008:1 require the licensee in the basic regulatory requirements for all licensed activities event of an emergency to take prompt action in order to: involving ionising radiation. The regulations also transpose – Classify the event according to the alarm criteria; provisions of Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom, which – alert the facility’s emergency preparedness organisation; have not been included in the new Radiation Protection Act. The regulation SSMFS 2018:1 came into force on – assess the risk and size of possible releases and time 1 June 2018. SSMFS 2018:1 impose extensive requirements related aspects; relating to human factors on the following: – return the facility to a safe and stable state; and – Safety monitoring and follow-ups; – inform the responsible authorities. – the operating organisation and its design;

The actions must be documented in an emergency – management system, including safety culture; preparedness plan that is subject to safety review by the – safety objectives and strategies; licensee and must be approved by SSM. The plan shall be kept up to date and validated through regular exercises. – responsibilities and levels of authority;

SSM is to be notified of changes to the plan. The licensee – competence assurance, fitness for duty; is required to assign the staff and provide the suitable – occupational environment; facilities, technical systems, tools and protective equipment needed to perform the emergency preparedness tasks. The – planning of nuclear activities; emergency planning should include all design basis – design adapted to human capabilities and limitations; accidents, as well as beyond design basis events including – operational experience feedback; and severe events, and combinations of events such as fire or sabotage in connection with a radiological accident. – event investigation.

SSM’s former regulations concerning on site emergency F.5.2 National structure preparedness (SSMFS 2008:15) have been replaced by new Appointed central or regional authorities (i.e. county regulations. The new regulations concerning on site authorities) are responsible for managing nearly all emergency preparedness (SSMFS 2014:2) were issued in accidents and emergency situations involving nuclear 2014 and entered into force on 1 January 2015. Like the technology with potential off site consequences. However, previous enactment, SSMFS 2014:2 uses the concept of if a national emergency with the potential of affecting emergency preparedness categories (1, 2, 3 and 4) based on many citizens, with, linked, major negative cross sectoral or

90 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

Swedish Radiation National expert Safety Authority response organisation

Swedish Civil Licensee Contingencies Agency

Government

County Administrative Regional Actors Board

Other Authorities Municipalities Figure F5 The Swedish national structure for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear emergencies.

cross regional economic, environmental or other detri- the Secretariat for Crisis Management. The Secretariat

mental societal effects should occur, this will require monitors threat and risk developments around the clock,

decisions and actions by the Government. Sweden’s both domestically and internationally, and is the central

structure for emergency preparedness and response for focal point in the Government Offices. The Government’s

nuclear emergencies is shown in Figure F5. strategic direction for the Government Offices is prepared

by a group for strategic coordination that consists of the The County Administrative Board in each affected region state secretaries of all the ministries involved in the is responsible for planning and leading the regional management of a serious incident. This strategic coordinaemergency preparedness work. The board decides on tion group is convened by the Ministry of Justice’s state measures to be taken to protect the public, issues warnings, secretary or by an appointed state secretary. provides information to the public, and is responsible for

decontamination following radioactive fallout and releases. MSB has the responsibility in preparedness work to

The responsibility for directing rescue services also rests support coordination of preparedness measures taken by

with the County Administrative Board in each affected local, regional and national authorities. MSB also provides

county unless the Government decides otherwise. communication networks for competent authorities during

extraordinary events. It has the overall responsibility for A national contingency plan for dealing with a nuclear the Swedish national digital communication system accident has been in place since 2015. This national plan (‘Rakel’) that is used by national emergency services and describes basic preconditions such as the relevant legislaothers in the fields of civil protection, public safety and tion and the authorities involved in the management of an security, emergency medical services and healthcare during incident and the responsibilities of these authorities. The emergency situations. MSB also assists the Swedish plan also describes national coordination and liaison work Government Offices by providing documentation and of relevant authorities. The document outlines the information in the event of emergencies, providing resources available at national level and how they are methods for crisis communication, and coordinating requested and coordinated. International assistance is also official information to the public. described in the plan. In addition to this contingency plan,

there is a national action plan for improvements to SSM has the responsibility of coordinating necessary

emergency preparedness work. emergency preparedness and response measures for

preventing, identifying and detecting nuclear and radiolog- The Government is responsible for emergency manageical events that can damage human health or the environment at a national level. The Government’s mandate is ment. In the event of an emergency involving nuclear primarily strategic national issues. Responsibility for technology in Sweden, or outside Sweden with consemanagement and coordination of operational work rests quences for Sweden, SSM is the appointed National with the relevant authorities. The Government has the Competent Authority and is responsible for: overall responsibility to ensure that an effective crisis

management system is in place and that the crisis commu- – Providing advice and recommendations concerning

nication is credible. The Government is also responsible protective measures in the area of radiation protection;

for certain contacts with international organisations. The – radiation measurements;

Government Offices assist the Government in the crisis – maintaining and leading a national organisation for management work. measurement and expert support; and

A senior official for crisis management has a post at the – providing advice and recommendations to the Ministry of Justice. During emergencies, the senior official authorities assigned to deal with the impact of the has the task of ensuring that the crisis management work event. begins promptly, this official is also responsible for the

coordination and assistance of crisis management work at SSM is also responsible for keeping the Government

the Government Offices. The senior official is assisted by informed about the situation, expected developments,

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 91

available resources and measures taken as well as planned, In the event of an emergency at a Swedish NPP, the and, following a request by the Crisis Management licensee is responsible for immediately contacting the Coordination Secretariat at the Prime Minister’s Office, or national alarm centre (SOS Alarm AB), which will in its by MSB, to provide the information needed in order to turn alert the authorities and organisations responsible for give an overview of the situation. emergency management, see Figure F6. In the event of an emergency at a nuclear facility categorised in emergency A number of authorities, organisations and laboratories preparedness category 2, the alarm chain is similar in terms will work together, or operate as supporting functions to of the role of SOS Alarm AB. the national organisations mentioned above, in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Participating In the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency abroad authorities that have liaison roles for crisis management (including a possible request for assistance), the alert will include, for example, the Swedish Food Agency (SFA), go to SMHI, which is the national warning point. Upon an which is responsible for taking decisions on action levels alert, SMHI will, through SOS Alarm AB, contact the for the content of radioactivity in foodstuff, and the officer on duty at SSM. The officer on duty at SSM will Swedish Board of Agriculture (SJV), which is responsible then contact the Government ministry offices and central for taking decisions on action levels regarding agricultural and regional authorities with roles and responsibilities in practices and products. Other authorities that have the acute phase of a nuclear accident or incident. responsibilities during crises and that liaise with SSM, or receive advice and recommendations from SSM, include F.5.3 National monitoring the County Administrative Board, MSB, the Swedish Board The national expert response organisation comprises of Health and Welfare, the Swedish Customs, the Swedish government authorities, organisations and laboratories that Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), the have expertise in radiological assessment and radiation Swedish National Police Board, the Swedish Coast Guard monitoring. This organisation, coordinated by SSM, has as and the local rescue leader, police officers and medical its main purpose to perform radiation measurements. personnel. Figure F7 lists the contracted authorities, organisations and laboratories that have capabilities encompassing laboratory SMHI assists SSM by providing weather forecasts, weather analysis and field monitoring, mobile and airborne data and some dispersion calculations in the event of a monitoring, weather forecasting and plume dispersion radiological or nuclear emergency. prognoses. In addition to the tasks belonging to the In an international context, and in regards to the national expert response organisation, individuals engaged Community arrangement on early exchange of informa- in this response organisation may also have a role in tion, it is SSM’s responsibility as both an EU and IAEA providing expert advice during the response. designated Competent Authority, to promptly inform the European Commission, neighbouring countries that might be affected and the IAEA in accordance with the IAEA’s Conventions on assistance and early warning and the European Commission’s Convention on early warning. Furthermore, SSM is also responsible for continuously providing information on the measures that Sweden intends to take due to an emergency situation.

County Administrative Public alert Regional stakeholders Alert in emergency Board planning zone

Swedish Radiation International org. Radio Sweden Safety Authority Neighbouring countries

Licensee

Swedish Civil SOS Alarm Contigencies Agency

Other stakeholders Other authorities in respective sector

Figure F6 Alarm sequence for an emergency event Government Respective ministry at a Swedish nuclear facility.

92 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

and automatic information on dose rates to be used in

decision making on early public protective actions in the

case of an accident at a Swedish NPP. Figure F8 shows

monitoring stations set up around the Forsmark NPP.

Sweden also has six permanent air sampling stations

operated by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

Expert Response Organisation

and a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) • Swedish Defence Research Agency, station located in Stockholm. These stations continuously FOI (Umeå) Umeå sample air in order to collect any airborne radioactive • Geological Survey of Sweden, material. Air filters are regularly collected and transported SGU (Uppsala) to a laboratory for measurement and evaluation. The • Cyclife Sweden AB (Nyköping) detection system is sufficiently sensitive to measure activity • Linköping University (Linköping) levels in the order of tens of microbecquerel per cubic

• Göteborg University (Göteborg) metre [μBq/m ] and is also used for environmental 3

• Lund University (Malmö region) monitoring. Uppsala • Swedish Meteorological and Stockholm As the County Administrative Boards are responsible for Hydrological Institute, SMHI Nyköping (Norrköping) Linköping implementing public protective actions during and after a Norrköping nuclear emergency, the boards’ emergency response • SSM (Stockholm region) Göteborg planning also encompasses radiation monitoring. Moni-

toring of dose rates and collection of air samples for the

purpose of public protective actions are performed by Figure F7 Sweden’s national expert response organisation for nuclear local rescue services from municipalities within each Malmö and radiological emergencies. county at predefined locations or routes. During a nuclear

emergency, the relevant County Administrative Board Sweden has a gamma monitoring network that presently coordinates response and monitoring activities with the has 28 permanent stations spread throughout the country. national expert response organisation and government The stations are designed to provide warnings and rapid authorities. information about radiation levels. Each gamma station

continually records the dose rate and can be monitored

F.5.4 Medical emergency preparedness

online. If the dose rate exceeds a predefined alarm level, The county council is responsible for medical disaster notifications are automatically transmitted to SSM’s preparedness. Injured persons are treated at the site of the radiation monitoring data management system where, emergency, in hospitals or at medical health centres. depending on the alarm, further actions will be taken by

the officer on duty at SSM. The alarm level is set to detect At major national hospitals, mainly university hospitals in

deviations from prevailing conditions. In addition to the Sweden, more advanced treatment and care can be

national gamma monitoring network, new stations were arranged. Cooperation and sharing of resources also take

installed around the NPPs in Sweden in 2019. The new place between European hospitals in the event of major

monitoring stations provides information on the dose rate accidents. The Nuclear Medical Expert Group (RNMEG)

at 90 locations around the NPPs. While the national is part of the operative emergency resources available to

gamma monitoring network is primarily used as an early the National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW) in

information system, the new stations provide fast, reliable connection with radiological incidents. They assist the

Figure F8 New monitoring stations around the Forsmark NPP (the insert shows a monitoring station).

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 93

NBHW, and through the NBHW also other authorities, Sweden has a long tradition of participating in interna-

with specific medical advice regarding, for example, acute tional emergency preparedness exercises. This allows for

and late radiation injuries, and treatment thereof. Practi- testing of aspects related to bilateral and international

tioners from the medical fields of haematology, oncology, agreements on early notification and information exchange.

radiology, and disaster medicine are represented in Sweden regularly participates in the IAEA Convention

RNMEG. Exercises (ConvEx), the OECD/NEA International

Nuclear Emergency Exercises (INEX), and yearly

F.5.5 Exercises ECURIE exercises.

A number of emergency preparedness exercises of various

scopes are conducted every year in Sweden. These vary in F.5.6 Measures taken to inform neighbouring

complexity from simple tests of alarm systems to full-scale states

national exercises. Periodical testing of the alerting systems Sweden has ratified the International Convention on Early

between the power plants and authorities is performed Notification and the Convention on Assistance in the Case

each year. of a Nuclear Accident. An official national point of

contact has been established that is available around the Every other year, a large exercise is carried out at one of clock. Sweden has registered field and laboratory resources the three nuclear power sites for the purpose of checking with the international assistance programme, Response and the planning and capability of the on and off site organisa- Assistance Network (RANET), managed by the IAEA tions. The full-scale exercises are designed to enable evaluaunder the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a tion of command at the regional level, national interagency Nuclear Accident, and participates actively in developing liaison and public communication. The full-scale exercises the RANET system. are often also used for testing of international communica-

tions. Sweden has bilateral agreements with Denmark, Norway,

Finland, Germany, Ukraine and the Russian Federation The respective County Administrative Board where the regarding early notification and exchange of information in plant is located has the responsibility for planning these the event of an incident or accident at an NPP in Sweden exercises, often with the assistance of MSB, which is also or abroad. An agreement at regulatory body level has also in charge of evaluations and follow-up analyses. SSM been signed with Lithuania. Sweden uses the ECURIE participates in planning and evaluation. Usually, 15 to 30 information system for information exchange within the organisations participate in these exercises, including the European Union and the Unified System for Information regulatory bodies and the Government. Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE) system for

In 2019 the County Administrative Board of Uppsala notification and information exchange between the IAEA

arranged the Sea Eagle exercise. It was the largest nuclear member states.

exercise ever organised in Sweden. The exercise comprised In addition, the five Nordic countries of Denmark, of four different parts: Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have compiled a

1. An alarm exercise to test the alarm chain. Nordic manual (NORMAN) for cooperation between their

respective regulators in response to and preparedness for 2. A main nuclear exercise that lasted for 36 hours. This nuclear and radiological emergencies and incidents. The part of the exercise tested the national, regional and manual describes practical arrangements regarding commulocal abilities to act and coordinate rescue services nication and information exchange to fulfil the stated during disrupted conditions (known as a ‘grey zone’ obligations in bilateral agreements between the Nordic scenario), countries. These arrangements also apply to a response to

3. A radiation monitoring exercise, including two days of events or threats of malicious use of radioactive material

radiation monitoring in the field including international and threats or malevolent acts concerning nuclear facilities.

assistance. Other aspects include small scale events, such as the

4. A table top exercise where the long term effects of the spreading of rumours and minor incidents, having

accident were discussed. consequences limited to public concern and interest by the

media, or a need for exchange of technical information In addition, a number of more limited on site functional between nuclear and radiation safety regulatory bodies. The exercises are conducted at all the Swedish NPPs every year. arrangements defined in the document include all phases Specific plans exist for these exercises. Exercised functions of events, including intermediate and recovery phases. include accident management, communication within the

emergency preparedness organisation, environmental NORMAN also takes into consideration the current

monitoring and sampling, assessment of core damage and international development concerning response to and

source terms and assessment of total environmental conse- preparedness for nuclear and radiological incidents and

quences of a scenario. The rescue forces are exercised emergencies, as well as other key international aspects.

regularly, as well as first aid and emergency maintenance. Communication exercises are performed five times per

SSM frequently participates in such exercises both as an year, in compliance with NORMAN. These exercises

observer and in its supervisory role, or for the purpose of include procedures for alerts and communication by means

exercising the authority’s own emergency staff. of video conference systems.

94 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

F.5.7 Nuclear accidents abroad to an improved capability to cope with emergency situa- As demonstrated by the effects on Sweden due to the 1986 tions in Sweden. The aim is to provide guidance to Chernobyl accident, Sweden can be affected by radiological authorities on joint methods and processes for enabling consequences as a result of a nuclear accident abroad. shared direction and coordination. The recommendations Although the foreseeable consequences are such that the developed by MSB have resulted in a review of SSM’s use of iodine tablets, sheltering, evacuation or relocation emergency response organisation to enable SSM to of people due to fallout is unlikely, the impact can be efficiently provide advice and recommendations to other substantial on agriculture, animal breeding, forestry, authorities.

hunting, recreation and private household activities On 22 October 2015, the Government of Sweden (fishing, mushroom picking, game hunting, vegetable commissioned SSM, in consultation with MSB, relevant gardening, etcetera). County Administrative Boards and other involved authori- SSM and other authorities distribute information in case of ties and stakeholders, to perform a review of emergency a transnational emergency. County Administrative Boards planning zones and emergency planning distances applying that are affected still have the responsibility to provide to activities involving ionising radiation. On information and take any protective action needed in their 1 November 2017, SSM published its report on new respective regions. During the Fukushima Daiichi accident, emergency planning zones and distances for nuclear power which had no direct impact on Sweden, SSM and other plants and other nuclear facilities in Sweden. In order to central authorities, such as NBHW and MSB, were implement new zones for the nuclear power plants, responsible for communicating the consequences of the amendments to the Civil Protection Ordinance have been event. SSM’s emergency response organisation was prepared by MSB. The amendments entered into force 1 activated and worked around the clock for three weeks July 2020 and will be implemented on 1 July 2022 at latest.

analysing and evaluating the situation in order to give With regard to fuel cycle and waste management facilities, advice to the Swedish embassy and Swedish citizens in SSM in its report identified that the Västerås fuel fabrica- Japan. The nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP tion plant could retain its present emergency planning underlined the importance of international cooperation zone, though with small adjustments, and that the concerning information exchange. SSM’s role as an emergency planning zones and emergency planning advisory authority is maintained in the event of a nuclear distances applying to the facilities at the Studsvik site near accident abroad. Nyköping could be discontinued. These changes have been implemented following decisions made by SSM and the

F.5.8 New developments in emergency preparedness

regional County Administrative Boards. With regard to the A system for electronic transmission of plant process Clab facility, situated close to the Oskarshamn NPP, an parameters from the Swedish NPPs in operation is now in extended planning distance of two kilometers is being place at SSM’s emergency centre. Together with the prepared but pending the Government’s decision on the parameter transmission, an online visualisation tool has NPP’s emergency zones. been developed in close cooperation with the Swedish NPPs, where a graphical interface of the reactor and key A national strategy for radiation measurements in the event safety systems are shown. There are about 20 graphical of a nuclear or radiological accident is being developed by views per unit and identical views are shown at the NPPs SSM, MSB and the County Administrative Boards. The and SSMs emergency centre in order to facilitate commu- project focuses primarily on a possible accident at a nication and minimise misunderstandings. Work is ongoing Swedish NPP. After this, the project will broaden its scope on how to best implement and utilise the information to cover other nuclear and radiological emergencies.

provided during a crisis. SSM’s staff needs to be educated, SSM has developed a new Radiation Geographical trained and exercised on how to manage the system and Information System (RadGIS) software for reporting, therefore exercise scenarios of events have been provided storing, extracting and visualising radiation monitoring data by Ringhals AB and OKG AB. With regard to Forsmark and environmental samples collected during an emergency. AB, scenarios are under development. The expectation is The new software, RadGIS 2, replaces RadGIS 1, which that this work will be completed in 2020. Furthermore, the was developed in the 1990s. RadGIS 2 was launched on information flow from the NPPs to SSM have to be 15 April 2019 and is used by all Swedish organisations that modified in order to optimise the interaction. perform radiation monitoring and sampling during a Models for the Bayesian belief network based (BBN) nuclear emergency.

software tool for fast source term predictions (RASTEP) Drawing upon the Nordic Flag Book, SSM is in the has been developed for all Swedish reactor units that will process of developing national guidelines on protective be in operation after 2020. The implementation of actions during a nuclear or radiological emergency at RASTEP in the crisis organisation is an ongoing activity, it facilities and activities belonging to emergency preparedincludes the use of RASTEP in relation to deterministic ness category 4. In this process, SSM collaborates with approaches, available and prioritised information, and other authorities involved in emergency preparedness and interpretation of results. response. The guidelines will supplement the review of MSB has developed recommendations for shared grounds Swedish emergency planning zones and distances (SSM for collaboration and management, which will contribute Report 2017:27) which took into consideration facilities

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 95

belonging to emergency preparedness categories 1, 2 and 3. 1 June 2018. The regulation contains new requirements The guidelines will use the concepts of reference levels, for logistics centres and provisions concerning the dose criteria and operational intervention levels in an ability to receive aid and support from external emergency exposure situation, in line with recommenda- organisations. Also, some concepts have been renamed. tions contained in ICRP 103 and IAEA GSR Part 7. An – The structure of the regulation has been changed. Some official draft has been sent out for comments and the requirements that were previously found in guidelines are expected to be finalised during 2020. SSMFS 2014:2 (on site emergency preparedness and FOI, MSB, SFA, SJV and SSM collaborate closely within response) are now instead found in SSMFS 2018:1 the national expert council on remediation (NESA). The (basic regulatory requirements for all licensed activities purpose of NESA is to collect and share information on involving ionising radiation). different aspects of remediation among the participating – New monitoring stations have been installed around the organisations, other central authorities and the County NPPs in Sweden. The new stations will provide Administrative Boards. The work of the council includes information on dose rates at 90 locations around the revision of national guidelines on remediation and food NPPs. The last stations went online at the end of 2018 production in the event of fallout of radioactive and are currently undergoing an evaluation process. substances in Sweden. – Two ordinances, 2015:1052 and 2015:1053, entered into In addition, a new radiation monitoring system for fallout force on 1 April 2016. These ordinances replace the former mapping in Sweden is currently undergoing development. Emergency Preparedness and Heightened Alert Ordinance The system will be based on mobile gamma spectrometry (2006:942) that is now split into two parts without any and be used for detailed mapping of dose rates around major revisions of the content having being made. Swedish NPPs in the case of a nuclear accident. The plan is to have the new system up and running by the end of

F.5.9 Regulatory control

2020. It will replace the current system, which involves Over the past few years, regulatory control of on-site measurement of dose rates using handheld instruments in emergency preparedness and response has focused on discrete positions. implementation of the new requirements regarding Regarding implementation of Council Directive 2013/59/ logistics centres introduced in the regulations Euratom, the analysis for identification of necessary SSMFS 2014:2. During 2018 and 2019, surveillance amendments to the Swedish regulatory framework has led inspections were carried out at all the nuclear facilities in to several changes relating to emergency preparedness and emergency preparedness category 1, to ensure that the response in the Swedish radiation protection legislation. facilities had established logistics centres as required (the Hence, the following developments are also of relevance requirements concerning logistics centres entered into with regard to the obligations of Article 25: force on 1 July 2018) (see Table F2). – A new Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) which In addition to this, a couple of inspections of facilities in entered into force on 1 June 2018. It is applicable to emergency preparedness categories 2 and 3 have been workers and the public during an emergency. carried out, as well as observations of a couple of exercises at facilities in emergency preparedness category 1. – A new Radiation Protection Ordinance (2018:506) which entered into force on 1 June 2018. It sets Regulatory control has shown that on site emergency reference levels to be applied in the case of a preparedness at the Swedish nuclear facilities has been radiological emergency and includes requirements for strengthened in recent years and that the main elements of optimisation. SSMFS 2014:2 have been effectively implemented. – Updated regulations, SSMFS 2014:2 (revised through

F.5.10 Conclusion

SSMFS 2018:26), concerning on site emergency Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 25. preparedness and response, entered into force on

Table F2 Swedish nuclear facilities by emergency preparedness category.

96 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

F.6 Article 26: Decommissioning

preparatory activities and requirements on the safety report and supporting documents for dismantling and demolition. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to First in 2017, and subsequently updated in 2018, SSM ensure the safety of decommissioning of a nuclear facility. issued additional licence conditions for decommissioning Such steps shall ensure that: of Units 1 and 2 of the Barsebäck, Oskarshamn and (i) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are Ringhals nuclear power plants as well as the Ågesta reactor. available; These licence conditions complement the provisions of (ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational SSMFS 2018:1 and especially of SSMFS 2008:1, radiation protection, discharges and unplanned and concerning:

uncontrolled releases are applied; – allowed preparatory activities before dismantling and (iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency demolition is authorised; preparedness are applied; and (iv) records of information important to decommissioning – the content of the following safety documentation:

are kept. » safety report for dismantling and demolition,

» operational limits and conditions for the facility,

F.6.1 Regulatory requirements

According to the Act on Nuclear Activities, a licence » waste management documentation,

holder for a nuclear activity is responsible for ensuring that » final decommissioning plan, all measures are taken in order to ensure safe decommis- » decommissioning strategy for the entire site, and sioning of facilities in which the operation has been discontinued until such date that all operations at the » work package notifications and reports.

facilities have ceased and all radioactive waste has been Additionally, the licence conditions specify requirements disposed of. It follows that a licence holder is not for discharges and environmental monitoring as the exempted from responsibilities under the Act until regulation SSMFS 2008:23 is not applicable during decommissioning has been completed and all radioactive dismantling and demolition of a nuclear power reactor. waste has been disposed of in a final repository that has been closed. These additional licence conditions facilitated the licensee’s efficient preparation of the safety report and supporting According to the Radiation Protection Act a licence holder documents for dismantling and demolition. for a nuclear activity must take all the measures necessary for radiation protection of people and the environment. SSM’s authorisation is based on the reviews and approvals Furthermore, when a nuclear facility is to be decommis- of the safety documentation and the environmental sioned the licence holder must take all the measures monitoring programme for dismantling and demolition. necessary for clearing remaining buildings and the site as The safety documentation consists of the safety report, the soon as reasonably possible. operational limits and conditions, the waste management documentation, and supporting documents such as the According to the Act on Nuclear Activities, no specific final decommissioning plan and the decommissioning licence is required for decommissioning of nuclear strategy. If deemed necessary, the safety documentation facilities. However, according to the Environmental Code, and environmental monitoring programme have to be a licence is needed for decommissioning and dismantling revised and approved by SSM during the execution of of nuclear power reactors. In addition to the specific decommissioning. requirements (see also section E.2.1.3), the applicant is also required to demonstrate compliance with a number of Before dismantling and demolition activities are allowed to principles, e.g. the knowledge principle, the precautionary commence, the licensee is required to notify SSM of the and BAT principles, and the after-treatment liability work package. These notifications complement and principle. concretise the previously approved safety documentation. After the completion of the work package the licensee has The general regulations SSMFS 2008:1 define ‘decommisto prepare and submit a work package report to SSM. This sioning’ as measures adopted by licensees after the final report contains, amongst other things, information on the shutdown of a facility in order to dismantle and demolish amount, content and treatment of the radioactive waste the facility in a safe manner, as well as to reduce the produced. amount of radioisotopes from the nuclear activities in the remaining buildings and the site to such levels so that they Moreover, a final decommissioning report on the actual can be cleared. The general regulations SSMFS 2018:1, and execution of the decommissioning work is required to be in particular SSMFS 2008:1, set out a number of general compiled and submitted to SSM after the dismantling and requirements relating to decommissioning. These include demolition work is completed. This report must include requirements relating to documentation of the facility, descriptions of the experience gained and the final state of prerequisites for planning, and the decommissioning the facility. The final decommissioning report should also activity itself. include a description of the management of all the wastes arising from dismantling and demolition, including During 2016, a dialogue was initiated with licensees of conventional wastes. soon to be dismantled nuclear reactors about allowed

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 97

The regulations contained in SSMFS 2008:38 require The remaining general obligations contained in the archiving of documentation at nuclear facilities. The regulations SSMFS 2018:1, SSMFS 2008:1, and several licence holder must archive safety documentation and other regulations are applicable to decommissioning and documentation related to radiation protection aspects of a dismantling activities regarding: practice. If the practice ceases, the archives are to be – availability of qualified staff and financial resources (as transferred to the National Archives of Sweden or accounted for in section F.2); Regional Archives. – application of provisions with respect to operational Detailed requirements on keeping registers for radioactive radiation protection, discharges and unplanned and waste at nuclear facilities are stipulated by SSMFS 2008:1. uncontrolled releases (as accounted for in section F.4); The register must for instance contain information on the and waste’s origin, its amount and radionuclide-specific – application of provisions with respect to emergency content. preparedness (as accounted for in section F.5). During the current period, SSM has developed its rules for clearance of materials and release of sites and issued the

F.6.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

regulations SSMFS 2018:3 concerning exemptions from Licence holders are responsible for decommissioning of the Radiation Protection Act and the clearance of their nuclear facilities. Decommissioning of the plants is materials, building structures, and sites. The regulations described in plans that are maintained throughout the replace the former regulations SSMFS 2011:2. facilities’ operation. The degree of detail depends on the

The main criteria for clearance of potentially contaminated amount of available information. These decommissioning waste, materials, and buildings are: plans also form the basis of decisions on financing for decommissioning activities, see sections A.4, E.2.1.4 and – Removal of contamination as far as reasonably F.2.2.2. achievable Management of decommissioning waste is coordinated – Dose criterion in the order of 10 μSv per year to any through SKB. Future transport and disposal of decommismember of the public. sioning waste are also tasks of SKB. – The main criteria for site release are:

F.6.2.1 Nuclear power plants

– Removal of contamination as far as reasonably Twelve commercial reactors were commissioned at the achievable Ringhals, Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Barsebäck sites in – Dose criterion 100 μSv per year to any member of the southern Sweden between 1972 and 1985, see Figure A1. public As a result of political decisions, the twin BWR units – In the case of release for restricted use: Reliable Barsebäck 1 and 2 were shut down permanently in 1999 restrictions must be in place such that the effective dose and 2005, respectively. In 2015, the operators decided on to any member of the public would not exceed 1 mSv an additional phase-out of the four oldest reactors at per year if the restrictions should fail. Oskarshamn (BWR units 1 and 2) and Ringhals (BWR unit 1 and PWR unit 2) by 2020. The decisions were based on The clearance of building structures and areas in accordance the overall business and energy market situation with with a control programme has to be approved by SSM. falling electricity prices.

Clearance of waste, materials or buildings is only applicable Oskarshamn 1 was permanently shut down in June 2017. on potentially contaminated objects, i.e. not on objects that Oskarshamn 2 has not been in operation since a substantial are judged to be free from contamination or activation modernisation programme was begun in 2013, and has from the licensed activity. In some cases, this is checked by been permanently shut down since December 2016. The taking samples or making in-situ measurements. It is then operator, OKG, applied for a licence to decommission the praxis to require that the detection limits for these measreactors pursuant to the Environmental Code. The Land urements should be less than in the order of 10 % of the and Environment Court authorised OKG in 2017 to clearance levels. proceed with its post-shutdown planning activities and SSM’s regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities authorised SSM to issue additional requirements as (SSMFS 2008:1) were primarily developed for nuclear necessary. The licences for decommissioning unit 1 and 2 reactors in power operation. With few exceptions, there is were obtained in 2019.

currently no mechanism in the Swedish regulatory As regards the reactors at Ringhals, unit 2 was permanently framework for automatic lifting of requirements that were shut down in December 2019 and unit 1 is planned to shut applicable during power operation, even in cases where all down in December 2020. Work is ongoing to assess the the nuclear fuel has been removed. Instead, the licensees prerequisites for decommissioning and to evaluate how the have to apply for exemptions on a case by case basis. In specific decommissioning steps should best be resolved. order to facilitate this process, SSM published a guideline in 2015 containing an assessment of requirements that As far as the remaining six operating reactors are remain applicable following the removal of nuclear fuel. concerned, the planned operating time is currently 60 years. This applies to the reactors Forsmark 1, Forsmark 2

98 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

and Forsmark 3, Oskarshamn 3 as well as Ringhals 3 and have made the competence and staffing plans even more

Ringhals 4, all of which were commissioned between 1980 important. Activities regarding competence planning have

and 1985. therefore been intensified and the plans are now more

detailed. The goal is to secure competencies during the At Barsebäck 1 and 2, all spent nuclear fuel was removed entire decommissioning process and to support a good by 2006. Reconditioning and removal of nuclear waste transition process when the sites are progressing from from the operational phase are ongoing. Preparations for having several reactors in operation to only having one or and detailed planning of dismantling and demolition have two at each site. The need for special training in relation to intensified since 2016. Segmentation of the reactor decommissioning activities will influence training activities pressure vessel internal components has been completed. in the future. Following completion of the segmentation activities, the

next stage of dismantling is planned to commence in 2020.

F.6.2.2 Ågesta PHWR

The licence from the Land and Environment Court for the The pressurised heavy water reactor in Ågesta was dismantling and demolition, including on-site interim permanently shut down in 1974. Two steam generators storage of waste, was obtained in 2019. Site release in were dismantled and waste treated at Studsvik in the early accordance with regulatory requirements is planned for 1990s as part of an NEA research project. A licence for mid-2030s. continued care and maintenance until 2020 was issued

SKB has been contracted by the nuclear power companies under the Environmental Code by the local Land and

to participate in planning and execution of the future Environment Court in November 2008.

decommissioning. SKB’s participation mainly involves In 2019, the licensee obtained a new licence under the compilation of the development needs identified by the Environmental Code for the dismantling and demolition licensees, coordination of general methods and procedures of the reactor. Also, SSM approved the safety documentafor transport and disposal of radioactive waste, and tion and the environmental monitoring programme for compilation of the decommissioning-related costs dismantling and demolition. Dismantling and demolition reported by the licensees. The nuclear power companies activities are planned to commence in 2020. have jointly agreed on the tasks SKB coordinates in connection with waste management, for example develop- During the current period, a radiological characterisation

ment of industry guidelines for clearance and industry was performed and a 3D model has been made of selected

guidelines for reporting of decommissioning plans. In the parts of the facility. Certain for the dismantling and

future, each nuclear power company will be responsible for demolition necessary systems have been upgraded or will

the future decommissioning nuclear waste inventory, while be upgraded in the near future, e.g. the electrical power

SKB will be responsible for compiling the inventory and supply and the lifting and ventilation systems.

imposing requirements for the waste (waste acceptance Since the Ågesta reactor is an older facility that has been criteria) so that it can be transported and disposed of in shut down for decades, a number of measures have been the appropriate repository. taken to update the documentation. These include

Plant-specific and scenario-specific decommissioning collecting all the relevant documentation and digitalising

studies have been performed for all the Swedish nuclear selected parts of this in order to provide a good basis for

power plants in order to estimate waste quantities, timeta- defining the extent and limitations of the decommissioning

bles and costs. The studies serve as a basis for determining project.

capacities in SKB’s planned waste management system and The different waste streams that will be generated in fees to be allocated to the Nuclear Waste Fund. conjunction with dismantling and demolition of the Ågesta

SKB and the nuclear power companies participate in reactor have been identified. For each waste stream,

various national and international fora and collaborations different steps are being evaluated up to clearance or final

regarding decommissioning that may be of value for disposal through one of the available deposition alternatives.

activities in Sweden.

F.6.2.3 Old research and other facilities at Studsvik

The challenges posed by the accelerated timetable for the

Studsvik materials testing reactors

decommissioning of four reactors at Ringhals and The two materials testing reactors at Studsvik (one tank Oskarshamn, as well as the start of segmentation and type and one mobile pool type) were permanently shut interim storage of reactor pressure vessel internal compodown in 2005. A number of preparatory activities have nents at the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, have led to an been performed, e.g. decontamination of two test loops in increased focus on decommissioning planning by the 2008, before dismantling of the reactors commenced in licence holders and SKB. As a consequence of the 2015. dismantling and demolition of Barsebäck 1, Barsebäck 2,

Oskarshamn 1, Oskarshamn 2, Ringhals 1 and Ringhals 2 By the end of 2019, most of the building structures have

commencing before the extended SFR is ready to receive been emptied, i.e. the reactors and their auxiliary systems,

decommissioning waste, the licensees need to provide as well as the reactor pools have been dismantled. The

interim storage of this waste at their sites or externally. building structures are currently being prepared for

clearance for demolition. Structures more than one meter The decisions to permanently shut down four reactor units below the ground surface will be left in place after

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 99

clearance. Applications for clearance of the buildings and for the spent nuclear fuel repository. It was included in the

sub-surface structures are expected during 2020. Only the application under the Act on Nuclear Activities for

laboratory wing of the facility will be kept by the licensee disposal of spent fuel and under the Environmental Code

to be used for other purposes, such as management of for the KBS-3-system. An update of the decommissioning

nuclear waste. plan was made in 2017 in order to harmonise with current

regulations and to follow the industrywide structure for a

Other installations

decommissioning plan. There are a number of other old facilities at the Studsvik No decommissioning plan has yet been prepared for SFL, site that are to be decommissioned in the future. Prelimisince the design of the facility is only in the conceptual nary decommissioning plans for these facilities have been stage. Decommissioning will start in conjunction with prepared by the licence holders and submitted to SSM for repository closure, which is expected to take place in the evaluation, in accordance with requirements contained in mid-2050s. the general regulations.

F.6.2.4 Studsvik Nuclear and Cyclife facilities at Studsvik F.6.2.7 Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant

Studsvik Nuclear and Cyclife are licensees of a number of A preliminary decommissioning plan for the Westinghouse

nuclear facilities at Studsvik. Preliminary decommissioning fuel fabrication plant has been prepared and submitted to

plans for these nuclear facilities have been prepared and SSM in accordance with requirements in the general regula-

submitted to SSM in accordance with requirements in the tions.

general regulations.

F.6.3 Regulatory control

F.6.2.5 Installations in Ranstad See sections E.3.2.6, E.2.5.2 and F.3.3 for details on SSM’s

The uranium mining and milling facilities in Ranstad were system of controls and inspections.

constructed and operated in the 1960s. In total, about 200 In addition to issuing additional licence conditions for tonnes of uranium were produced. The uranium open-cast decommissioning, see section F.6.1, SSM analysed its mine and mill tailings deposits were restored and covered personnel resources needed for authorising dismantling in the 1990s. Until 2009, part of the facility was used for and demolition activities and their regulatory control. extraction of uranium from waste originating from nuclear During the current period, new staff was recruited and fuel fabrication. trained in advance of the gradually increasing workload.

All dismantling, demolishing and restoration activities have SSM also adapted its approach to reviewing safety reports been completed during the current period. In 2019, SSM to better address the issues which are specific to dismanapproved the clearance of the site which has been released tling and demolition. Thereby, SSM could within 18 from regulatory control. months thoroughly review and approve the safety reports

Only the mill tailings deposits will remain under institu- and supporting documents for dismantling and demolition

tional control. The remaining duties for the licensee consist of Units 1 and 2 of the Barsebäck and Oskarshamn

of the preparation of the final decommissioning report nuclear power plants and the Ågesta reactor.

and compilation of an archive. During the current period, SSM gained additional experi-

ence from applying the general regulatory requirements to

F.6.2.6 SKB facilities

a number of dismantling projects, e.g. the two materials In preparation for its application under the Act on Nuclear testing reactors at Studsvik (section F 6.2.3) and the Activities for the extension of SFR, which was submitted segmentation of reactor internals from Units 1 and 2 of in 2014, SKB developed a new decommissioning plan for the Barsebäck nuclear power plant and Unit 2 of the the facility. Decommissioning of SFR will begin when Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. The existing general operation ceases. Decommissioning is completed when the regulations have proven to be sufficiently well suited for above-ground facility has been released from regulatory the purposes of nuclear safety and radiation protection for control and there are no radiological reasons to prevent the these projects. SSM is confident that the existing general establishment of another industrial activity on the site. regulations are also well suited for the planned large scale Current plans call for 60 years of operation for the nuclear decommissioning projects during the next period. power plants and a few more years for Clink. Decommissioning of SFR could thereby start in the early 2070s. During the decommissioning period of a nuclear reactor,

SSM’s regulatory control is twofold: first, based on a SKB has conducted a decommissioning study of the systematic basic inspection programme for nuclear combined Clab and encapsulation facility (Clink), based on facilities; and second, linked to work packages. Typically, all the current planning while also focusing on waste volumes, dismantling and demolition measures are bundled into the content of radionuclides and costs. A preliminary 8–12 work packages per reactor. An example of a typical decommissioning plan for Clab was updated and submitted work package is the segmentation of the reactor pressure to SSM in 2017. vessel. As a matter of course, SSM also conducts on-site

A preliminary decommissioning plan has been prepared inspections in order to supplement the review process

100 Section F – Other General Safety Provisions

encompassing the work packages. Follow-up inspections are conducted during implementation of the work package. Following completion of a work package, a final report has to be submitted to SSM for review. SSM is currently performing regulatory control of ongoing dismantling measures at Units 1 and 2 of the Barsebäck and Oskarshamn nuclear power plant and the Ågesta reactor. During the coming period, SSM’s regulatory control at Units 1 and 2 of the Ringhals nuclear power plant will focus on preparatory activities and the authorisation of dismantling and demolition. SSM is currently also reviewing and inspecting procedures for clearance of materials from the dismantling of Units 1 and 2 of the Barsebäck nuclear power plant, Units 1 and 2 of the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant and of the Ågesta reactor. During the current period, SSM’s regulatory control of decommissioning was not only restricted to the classical tools of reviews and inspections. SSM decided to take a more proactive stance and arranged, for instance, twice a year workshops on the various technical and regulatory issues of decommissioning. Regularly, some 80–100 participants from the industry join these workshops. The mix of lectures given by nationally and internationally recognised experts and group discussions supported the building-up of knowledge and networks necessary for the safe and efficient conduction of the large-scale decommissioning programme in Sweden.

F.6.4 Conclusion

Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 26.

Section F – Other General Safety Provisions 101

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

The articles of the Joint Convention that specifically relate (v) provide for effective protection of individuals, society to the safety of spent fuel management (Articles 4 to 10 and the environment, by applying at the national level are covered in this section) have many similarities to the suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory articles that specifically address the safety of radioactive body, in the framework of its national legislation which has waste management (Articles 11 to 17, covered in section due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and H). To avoid unnecessary duplication, reporting on the standards; matters (primarily regulatory requirements) that are (vi) take into account the biological, chemical and other common to both section G and section H is presented in hazards that may be associated with spent fuel managefull in section G only. Where appropriate, references to ment; these accounts are made from the corresponding parts of (vii) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictsection H. Where the Convention’s requirements differ able impacts on future generations greater than those between the safety of spent fuel management and the permitted for the current generation; safety of radioactive waste management, this is stated in (viii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations. the respective section. All aspects of the safe management of spent nuclear fuel, including development of a geological disposal facility, are covered by this section, whereas G.1.1 Regulatory requirements

the relevant aspects of the programme for other radioac-

G.1.1.1 The general obligations of licence holders

tive waste repositories are described in section H. Licence holders of nuclear power plants are expressly responsible for the safe management and ultimate disposal

G.1 Article 4: General safety

of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste that they generate. As accounted for in section E.2.1.1, the Act on

requirements

Nuclear Activities requires that the holder of a licence for the operation of a nuclear power reactor shall – in liaison Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to with the other holders of a licence for the operation of ensure that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately nuclear power reactors – establish and carry out an RD&D protected against radiological hazards. In so doing, each programme for the safe handling and final disposal of Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to: spent fuel and nuclear waste associated with their activities. Every third year, the programme must be submitted to the (i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are adequately Government, or to an authority assigned by the Governaddressed; ment (i.e. the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM), (ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste asso- for evaluation.

ciated with spent fuel management is kept to the The legal obligations on licence holders of nuclear power minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle plants do not formally extend to requiring them to provide policy adopted; facilities for disposal of wastes from nuclear facilities other (iii) take into account interdependencies among the than commercial nuclear power reactors, or radioactive different steps in spent fuel management; waste originating from non-nuclear activities. However, the (iv) take into account interdependencies among the scale of operations relating to disposal of licence holders’ different steps in spent fuel management; nuclear wastes is such that other wastes, including wastes

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 103

from historic nuclear activities and radioactive wastes of In the Radiation Protection Act (2018:396) it is stipulated

institutional origin (collected and treated by Cyclife Sweden that radioactive waste shall be handled and disposed of in a

AB) can be accommodated in the licence holders’ repository manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protection

facilities. Costs for management and disposal of wastes point of view.

from non-nuclear activities are covered by fees paid by the General requirements on the design and assessment of producers to Cyclife Sweden AB (section E.2.1.4). post-closure safety for disposal facilities are established in

two separate regulations. These include specific regulations

G.1.1.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations

on the protection of human health and the environment in Basic safety obligations on licence holders for nuclear connection with the final management, including disposal, facilities are stipulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities. of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, with a focus on The requirements are further clarified in the basic regulaapplication of radiation protection principles for the long tory requirements for radiation safety in association with term (SSMFS 2008:37). There are also regulatory requirelicensed activities (SSMFS 2018:1) as well as in general ments concerning principles for assuring and assessing regulations on safety in nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1). post-closure safety of a disposal facility (SSMFS 2008:21). In these regulations it is stated that, in order to ensure

adequate protection at all stages of spent fuel management

G.1.1.3 Criticality and removal of residual heat

and radioactive waste management, the licensee shall: The general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) state that

– undertake all licensed activities, including the radiological accidents are to be prevented by the design,

management of spent fuel, in such a way that the construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a

quantity of waste that is generated as well as its content facility. Requirements relating to the prevention of

is restricted as far as is reasonably practicable; unintended criticality are addressed in provisions for

– ensure that a documented plan is drawn up and defence in depth, while heat generation and removal of

maintained for all radioactive wastes arising from or residual heat must be considered when establishing the

supplied to the licensed activity, based on an evaluation operating limits and conditions of any nuclear facility,

of alternative management options; including storage facilities, both for normal operation and

design-basis events. Provision shall be made in design of – undertake, document and maintain a safety analysis storage arrangements for reserve capacity to enable showing how facilities and management systems for relocation of material. Passive safety functions shall be spent fuel and radioactive waste management, alongside used as far as is reasonably practicable in the design of other relevant aspects of facility safety, ensure systems for storage of spent fuel. compliance with regulatory requirements regarding

design, function, organisation and operation;

G.1.1.4 Interdependencies among the different

– establish documented guidelines for how safety shall be steps in spent fuel management

maintained at the facility as well as ensure that the The fact that licence holders are responsible for the

personnel performing duties important for safety are handling and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel that they

well acquainted with the guidelines; generate provides an incentive to consider all steps from

generation to disposal. Detailed requirements are stipulated – ensure that the activities carried out at the facility are in SSM’s general regulations on safety in nuclear facilities controlled and developed with the support of a quality (SSMFS 2008:1) and with regard to the control of nuclear system which covers those activities of importance for material (SSMFS 2008:3): safety; – Measures for the safe on-site handling and storage of – ensure that decisions on safety-related issues are spent fuel shall be analysed and verified, and included in preceded by adequate investigation and consultation so the safety report of the facility. The safety report shall that the issues are comprehensively examined; also include measures that need to be taken on-site to

– ensure that adequate personnel are available with the prepare for the safe subsequent transport, storage or

necessary competence and suitability in all respects with disposal of spent fuel. (SSMFS 2008:1)

regard to those tasks that are of importance for safety, – An inventory of all spent fuel on-site must be kept as well as ensure that this is documented; updated at all times. (SSMFS 2008:3) – ensure that responsibilities and authority are defined and – Plans shall be drawn up providing a general description documented with respect to personnel carrying out of management, including final disposal, of spent work that is important for safety; nuclear fuel likely to be generated while operating the

– ensure that the personnel are provided with the facility (SSMFS 2018:1). The plans shall be reported to

necessary conditions to work in a safe manner; the authorities for approval before commissioning of

– ensure that experience from the facility’s own activities and nuclear reactor facilities and incorporated in the safety

from similar activities elsewhere is continuously utilised report (SSMFS 2008:1).

and communicated to the personnel concerned; and – Where deviations in the type, quantity or condition of

– ensure that safety, through these and other measures, is spent nuclear fuel occur relative to the plans as

maintained and continuously developed. stipulated above, necessary measures for management

of the non-conforming material shall be explained and

104 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

documented in a separate plan. This plan shall be (EIA). The EIA should also include a description of the

independently reviewed for safety implications and measures, through design and management actions, that

reported to the authorities before the measures are are envisaged to prevent, reduce or remedy adverse effects

implemented (SSMFS 2008:1). associated with these hazards (section E.2.3.4). Specific

licence conditions relating to mitigating measures taken by – Acceptance criteria shall be derived stating the the operator are typically established at the time of properties of the spent nuclear fuel that can be received licensing. for storage, final disposal or any other treatment.

Acceptance criteria shall, so far as is reasonably Supervision of activities that deal with chemical and

practicable, be formulated while taking into account biological hazards is primarily exercised by County

safety and radiation protection throughout all stages of Administrative Boards.

spent fuel management and shall be included in

corresponding safety analyses. Procedures must be in G.1.1.7 Striving to avoid impacts and undue burdens on

place for the verification of material against acceptance future generation

criteria on receipt by facilities further along the As described in section B.1.1, the overall system for

management chain, as well as for the management of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste is

material that does not meet the acceptance criteria, e.g. governed by fundamental principles adopted by the

by returning it to the consignor or by taking measures to Swedish Parliament. The first governing principle is that

rectify identified deviations (SSMFS 2008:1). financial costs for the treatment and disposal of spent fuel

and radioactive waste from nuclear activities shall be

G.1.1.5 Protection of individuals, society and the environment

covered by fees that licensees are required to pay. The General safety provisions relating to radiation protection second principle is that the licensees are to safely dispose are described in section F.4.1. Radiation protection of the of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear public and the environment in connection with operational activities. Although the state formally has the ultimate spent fuel management is addressed in general regulations responsibility for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste relating to the safety of nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1). from nuclear activities, these principles imply that a burden As noted above (section G.1.1.2), safety and radiological on future generations should be avoided, especially with protection objectives for disposal facilities, with a focus on regard to the fundamental aspects of safety and financial post-closure protection of individuals, society and the costs. The principles also imply that action should be taken environment, are established in separate regulations without undue delay, i.e. the generation that has benefited (SSMFS 2008:37, SSMFS 2008:21); see also section L.1. from the nuclear power generation should also deal with Fundamental principles and requirements for radiological the management and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel and protection in relation to spent fuel management and radioactive waste. disposal can be summarised as follows: SSM’s regulations on discharges of radioactive substances – Human health and the environment shall be protected (SSMFS 2008:23) require that human health and the from the detrimental effects of ionising radiation during environment shall be protected from harmful effects of all stages of the final management of spent nuclear fuel ionising radiation during the operation of a nuclear facility or nuclear waste, as well as in the future, in accordance as well as in the future. Furthermore, the regulations with internationally endorsed criteria and standards. SSMFS 2008:37 specifically require that human health and

– A disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel and/or nuclear the environment shall be protected from detrimental

waste shall be designed so that the annual risk of effects of ionising radiation during all stages of the final

harmful effects after closure does not exceed 10 for a -6 management of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste,

representative individual in the group exposed to the including after closure of a disposal facility.

greatest risk.

G.1.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

– Disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste shall

be implemented so that biodiversity and the sustainable G.1.2.1 The general obligations of licence holders

use of biological resources are protected. RD&D programme 2019

The nuclear industry, through its co-owned company, SKB,

G.1.1.6 Account of biological, chemical and other hazards

has since the mid-1970s performed research on the Biological, chemical and other hazards associated with an long-term management of spent fuel and final disposal of activity are addressed from a regulatory perspective in the radioactive waste. The formal requirement for an RD&D licensing process under the Environmental Code (sections programme to be submitted for regulatory evaluation was E.2.3 and E.2.9). During operation the operator is required established in 1984 when the Act on Nuclear Activities was to continuously take protection measures and precautions promulgated. Since 1986, SKB has produced twelve to prevent or hinder their activities from causing detriment RD&D programmes, with a central focus on development to human health or the environment from chemical, of the KBS-3 system as the industry’s preferred alternative biological and other hazards, as well as from a radiological for the disposal of spent fuel. The current status of SKB’s point of view. Any such risks that might be associated with licence applications in relation to establishing KBS-3 is the activity in question should be analysed and reported in outlined in sections A.9.4, A.10.2 and K.1.1. the corresponding Environmental Impact Assessment

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 105

In September 2019, SKB submitted the most recent deposition tunnels, as well as methods for construction of RD&D programme to the regulator, SSM, for review and a repository accesses and excavation of deposition tunnels public consultation, in preparation for the Government’s and deposition holes. Technology development also takes decision concerning the licence holders’ fulfilment of their place in the field of nuclear safeguards in liaison with legal obligations. In their RD&D Programme 2019, SKB IAEA, Euratom and SSM. presents its plans for research, development and demonstration during the period 2020–2025 (SKB Report G.1.2.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations TR-19-24, December 2019, can be downloaded from Specific measures taken by the licensees regarding general www.skb.se). safety requirements are discussed in sections G.3.2 (facility siting), G.4.2 (facility design and construction), G.5.2 The programme consists of three parts: (assessment of facility safety) and G.6.2 (facility operation). Part I SKB’s activities and plan of action General measures that have been taken by licence holders with respect to the continued safe management of spent Part II Waste and final disposal fuel include the following. Part III Decommissioning of nuclear facilities

Spent fuel storage at reactor sites

The plan of action developed by SKB on behalf of its All spent nuclear fuel was removed from the Barsebäck owners gives the rationale for the research, development units 1 and 2 and transferred to the Clab central storage and demonstration need in order to construct and commis- facility by 2006. Facilities for spent fuel storage have also sion new facilities for spent nuclear fuel and waste manage- been emptied at Oskarshamn units 1 and 2, which have ment. As regards the KBS-3 system for final management been permanently shut down since June 2017 and of spent nuclear fuel, what remains is the construction and December 2016 respectively. Defueling of units 1 and 2 at commissioning of a new facility for encapsulation of spent Ringhals is currently estimated to take 18 months and 26 nuclear fuel adjacent to the Clab interim storage facility, the months respectively, taking into account cooling requirespent fuel repository, and the development and manufac- ments and the capacity for fuel transport to Clab. ture of transport casks for canisters of spent nuclear fuel. The process of handling damaged fuel with failed cladding While SKB’s licence applications remain under consideraduring the emptying nuclear power plants is the subject of tion by the Government, the company is preparing the special consideration. Two separate methods have been next applications, including a preliminary safety analysis developed, both of which entail the use of water-tight report, which will need to be submitted to SSM for special containers with the dimensions of PWR and BWR approval to start construction. SKB is also preparing the fuel. The intention is that these containers will then be necessary documentation regarding changes to Clab that encapsulated and disposed of in the same way as standard will be necessary to make use of the increase in licensed fuel elements. In the method used in the storage pools of storage capacity that has been applied for. the nuclear power plants, developed by Westinghouse and Even when SKB has reached the maturity in research and known as Quiver, the content of the container is dried development required to obtain licences under the Nuclear after the cladding has first been punctured to ensure Activities Act, further research and technology develop- complete drying. An alternative method has been ment is needed to support construction and commis- developed for damaged fuel that has been sent for analysis sioning of the facilities. Identified areas of research relating and/or treatment to Studsvik. Here the damaged fuel rods to the final repository for spent fuel are focused on are segmented in hot cells before drying and transfer to providing knowledge to enable a more realistic assessment special cases and finally into transport boxes that have the of post-closure safety that can be used as a basis for same dimensions of PWR or BWR fuel elements. optimisation of repository component design and layout. Among other things, this includes further work on process Central storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) understanding regarding the characterisation and behaviour SKB is the licensee for Clab, the central interim storage of spent fuel, processes affecting canister corrosion facility for spent nuclear fuel located at the OKG site. mechanisms and slow resaturation of the bentonite buffer. From the start of operation in 1985 until 2006, the operations were contracted to OKG. In January 2007, SKB Technology development is focused on completing the took over Clab’s operations in order to manage the facility detailed design of both the encapsulation plant and spent as part of SKB’s own organisation. fuel repository. Prior to the construction of the encapsulation plant, technology and methods for the industrial The storage capacity at Clab is limited in two main production of canisters must be developed and described. respects: the permissible quantity of spent nuclear fuel in The necessary technical systems must be specified, the facility, and the number of physical storage positions in including methods for nuclear fuel measurement, the the pools. According to forecasts from the nuclear power drying of fuel assemblies as well as the remote welding and plants, the quantity of spent nuclear fuel in Clab will reach inspection of canisters during encapsulation. For the the current authorised limit of 8,000 tonnes at the end of repository, technology development includes the definition 2023. As noted in sections A.9.4 and K.2.4, SKB has of investigation methods to verify the site descriptive therefore, as part of its application for construction and model for the Forsmark site, further development of operation of the combined encapsulation plant and interim technical systems for deposition, backfilling and sealing of storage facility, Clink, also applied for increasing the

106 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

interim storage capacity to 11,000 tonnes. After a Govern- Transportation of spent fuel ment decision, SKB must submit a preliminary safety The annual transport volume is currently on average 90 analysis report, describing the changes to be implemented, casks with spent nuclear fuel between the nuclear power to SSM for approval. The upgrading of the facility and plants and Clab. A contract was signed in October 2013 submission of the corresponding safety analysis are with Holtec International Power Division, Inc. for the planned to take place at the latest in 2023. design, licensing and manufacture of five new spent fuel transport casks with auxiliary equipment. The NRC’s The total cooling requirement for storage of 11,000 tonnes approval of the new cask HI-STAR 80 was obtained at the of fuel amounts to 12 MW. An upgrade of the existing end of September 2018 and the US Department of cooling capacity in Clab has been implemented and the Transport has issued a licence. An application for validasafety analysis report for the facility is being updated with tion of the licence was submitted to SSM at the end of respect to this. Other measures to free more storage space 2018. Manufacturing has been initiated at the delivery of for fuel will be required beyond the year 2028. SKB has the first new fuel transport cask is planned for the spring therefore initiated a project to segment the control rods of 2021. from BWR reactors that currently occupy significant volumes space in Clab’s storage pools. After segmentation, New bottom shock absorbers for existing fuel transport the control rods can be packed more tightly in new storage casks (Type TN17/2) have been delivered. The cask canisters and returned to the storage pools. It is estimated supplier has updated the safety analysis report and applied that the work will take approximately five years to for a new certificate from the French regulatory body, complete. By this measure, the storage capacity is expected ASN. SKB plans to apply for Swedish validation of the to be sufficient until around 2034. certificate in the spring of 2020. If significant further delays arise in the programme for At present m/s Sigrid makes about 20 trips per year, which commissioning of the encapsulation plant and/or reposi- means that there is an overcapacity in the transportation tory for spent fuel, it is conceivable that the unloading of system. After 2030, however, the need for transportation Clab’s storage pools could be delayed beyond 2034. SKB of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is expected to contingency plans in such an event include the possibility double when several of SKB’s new facilities have been of transferring fuel that is currently still stored in normal commissioned. This includes, in particular, the additional storage canisters to compact storage canisters. This would transport of encapsulated nuclear fuel from the Clink enable continued operation of the facility, within the facility to the spent fuel repository. Work is being carried 11,000 tonnes limit, until around 2040. In addition, there is out by SKB to ensure that assumptions regarding transport the potential for the core components and control rods in needs, including logistics associated with servicing and store at Clab to be unloaded and transferred to another site transhipments between sea and land, are verified and, for storage, based on approved methods used for other where necessary, revised. activated metal components from nuclear power plants.

Biological, chemical and other hazards associated with

Should even this measure prove to be insufficient to

spent fuel management

accommodate programme delays, SKB will consider both This topic was addressed as part of SKB’s RD&D wet and dry interim storage options for further extending programme as well as during the national consultations capacity. carried out under the Environmental Code regarding Existing documentation shows that there is a small number SKB’s plans for disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Non-radioof fuel assemblies with leaking fuel rods at Clab. A detailed logical environmental risks arising during construction and plan for handling these fuels will be established as part of operation of the planned facilities (encapsulation facility current RD&D programme, taking account of experience and geological repository) were assessed (SKB Report from the emptying the nuclear power plants of damaged 2009, P-09-78, can be downloaded at www.skb.se) and the fuel. In addition, the long-term inspection programme for outcomes presented by SKB in the EIA submitted to the fuels in interim storage has revealed weaknesses in the Land and Environment Court as part of the licence construction for certain fuel types that could potentially application for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. A cause problems when handling the fuel. This information post-closure chemotoxic assessment for the disposal of is being taken into account in the design development for spent nuclear fuel was also performed by SKB (SKB the encapsulation facility. Report 2010, P-10-13, can be downloaded at www.skb.se). As noted in Sweden’s sixth report under the Joint Conven-

G.1.3 Regulatory control

tion, all areas of improvement identified in the post-Fukushima stress test analysis of Clab have now been addressed G.1.3.1 The general obligations of licence holders by SKB. It has been shown that the facility can withstand Evaluation of the RD&D programme an earthquake with a return frequency of 10 /year with a -5 In September 2019, SKB submitted the nuclear reactor safety factor of 2. The updated SAR shows that boiling of licensees’ twelfth programme for research, development the pool water after loss of electric power supply or other and demonstration, RD&D Programme 2019, to SSM for extreme disturbances of the cooling system will not occur review and broad consultation with national stakeholders. within a period of 30 days. In March 2020, SSM submitted the results of its evaluation

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 107

and a statement to the Government with a recommenda- tion of the periodic safety review itself, rather than

tion to approve SKB’s RD&D programme. deficiencies in regulatory compliance.

As was previously the case in 2017, and in the light of the

G.1.4 Conclusion

ongoing scrutiny by Government of SKB’s licence Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 4. applications for an encapsulation plant and a spent fuel

disposal facility (see section A.8.2.2 and K.1.1), the

regulatory evaluation of the programme was constrained G.2 Article 5: Existing facilities

so as not to forestall an eventual licensing decision.

However, the overall conclusion as regards spent fuel Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to

management was that the programme demonstrates review the safety of any spent fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for progress in work to develop and implement necessary that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all solutions in a manner consistent with licence holders’ reasonably practicable improvements are made to obligations under the Act on Nuclear Activities. Research upgrade the safety of such a facility. and development activities were judged to take sufficiently

broad perspective regarding the safe management of spent

G.2.1 Review of existing facilities for spent fuel

fuel. This includes work focused on understanding of

management

spent fuel properties and behaviour, including criticality By the time the Joint Convention entered into force with safety and radionuclide solubility. In addition, SKB’s regard to Sweden, the situation was satisfactory as regards research and development activity relating to the disposal safety of spent fuel management facilities. The elements of canister was considered to provide appropriate contributhe Joint Convention have long been implemented in the tions to knowledge development relating to canister form of requirements imposed by the Swedish legal and degradation, as well as an acceptable basis for future regulatory framework, as well as being implemented in industrial implementation in design, manufacture, inspecmanagement of spent fuel. Dedicated inspection and tion, and testing. review activities carried out in the early 2000s confirmed

that licensees’ activities were in conformance with the legal

G.1.3.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations

and regulatory requirements. This conclusion has been

Inspections and surveillance

reaffirmed during subsequent inspection and review As noted elsewhere in this report, SSM undertakes activities. compliance and surveillance inspections relating to the safe

management of spent fuel in accordance with its legal

G.2.2 Conclusion

authorisation and the mandate defined by the Government. Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 5.

The results of inspections and surveillance are fed back to

nuclear facility licensees on an ongoing basis, summarised

G.3 Article 6: Siting of proposed facilities

annually in meetings at senior management level, and

compiled routinely in reports that provide an integrated

1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps

evaluation of radiation protection and safety. These reports to ensure that procedures are established and impleare produced annually for nuclear power plants and every mented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:

three years for SKB. In the latest integrated evaluation for (i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to SKB, published in June 2018, SSM assessed radiation safety affect the safety of such a facility during its operating associated with the Clab interim storage facility to be lifetime; acceptable. Previously identified deficiencies in mainte- (ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on nance and inspection with regard to plant ageing, as well as individuals, society and the environment;

the use of systematic methods for safety analysis were (iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility deemed to have been addressed in an appropriate manner. available to members of the public;

Moreover, SSM in July 2018 closed out the enforcement (iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a

notice from three years previously relating to required facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that

overall improvements in SKB’s organisation, management facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general

and control for safety. data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the

likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory. Furthermore, an overall evaluation of a licensee’s capacity

2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the

to continue conducting its activities is made at least every appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not ten years through periodic safety review. SSM completed in have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by 2019 its scrutiny of SKB’s latest periodic safety review of being sited in accordance with the general safety requireits activities. In its summary, SSM concluded that the ments of Article 4.

company has the necessary prerequisites to continue

operation of the Clab interim storage facility in accordance

G.3.1 Regulatory requirements

with requirements on nuclear safety and radiation protec-

G.3.1.1 Assessment of safety and environmental impact

tion. Identified weaknesses were associated primarily with Under the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear how issues were reported and addressed in the documenta- Activities, a licence is required in order to construct,

108 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

possess and operate any nuclear facility (the licensing the final management of spent fuel or nuclear waste procedure is described in sections E.2.3 and E.2.9). An shall contain requirements that are determined by how application must demonstrate that the requirements are safety is to be achieved in the corresponding disposal fulfilled in accordance with these items of legislation as well facility after closure. as those of the Radiation Protection Act. It must also be – A description of measures taken to ensure adequate made clear that the more detailed requirements established protection of workers, the public and the environment in SSM’s regulations can be met. In relation to safety issues from the harmful effects of radiation, as required by the regarding the siting of proposed facilities for management Radiation Protection Act and regulations promulgated of spent fuel, key regulations in this context are: under that Act. – Regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities It is further explained in regulations relating to develop- (SSMFS 2008:1) ment of geological disposal facilities (SSMFS 2008:37) that – Regulations concerning safety in connection with the site selection should be seen as contributing to identificadisposal of nuclear materials and nuclear waste (SSMFS tion and implementation of the best available technique 2008:21) for the repository system as a whole. – Regulations concerning the protection of human health and the environment in connection with the final G.3.1.2 Public information and involvement management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste The legal framework for licensing of nuclear activities (SSMFS 2008:37) stipulates provisions on transparency, openness and public participation. There are several procedures that serve the Key elements of the parallel licence applications are the purpose of involving the public as part of siting of new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and preliminary spent nuclear fuel management and nuclear waste facilities. safety report. As mentioned above, an EIA must be performed for any

new nuclear facility. Swedish legislation emphasises the role The Environmental Code requires as part of the general of the public and other stakeholders in establishing the ‘rules of consideration’ that site selection is undertaken in scope of the EIA. The programme for developing an EIA such a way as to make it possible for the objectives of the must for instance contain a plan for the formal process of activity or development to be achieved with a minimum of consultation with stakeholders. In particular, the developer damage and detriment to human health and the environmust initiate early consultations with those parties that ment. The Environmental Code also specifies procedures might be affected by a new facility. for carrying out the EIA, as well as its content. The EIA must contain the following elements: Parties that must be consulted include:

– a description of the planned activity or course of action – municipalities that may host the facility, with details of its location, design and scope; – regulatory authorities, in the case of facilities for spent – a description of the measures that are planned with a fuel and nuclear waste management these are primarily view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse SSM and County Administrative Boards, effects; – national environmental organisations, – the information needed to establish and assess the main – local interest groups, and impacts on human health, the environment and management of land, water and other resources that the – affected individuals, e.g. land owners or those living planned activity or course of action is likely to have; close to a proposed site.

– a description of possible alternative sites and alternative County Administrative Boards have an important function designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a besides participating in the consultations. They are required specific alternative was chosen, as well as a description to assist the developer in identifying stakeholders and to of the consequences if the activity or measure is not facilitate consultations and the exchange of information. implemented; and In addition to requirements on the applicant for public – a non-technical summary of the information. consultation in the development of an EIA, the regulatory authority (SSM) invites a broad range of interested parties Requirements regarding the content of the preliminary to provide comments in association with its evaluation safety report, submitted in support of a licence application every three years of the nuclear power plant licence under the Act on Nuclear Activities, are stated in the holders’ joint RD&D programme (see section G.1.1). In regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities, and summary, interested parties are provided with information include (for example): regarding, among other things, the programme for – A description of how the site and its surroundings can development of new facilities, as well as a possibility to affect the safety of the facility during its operational influence the pre-licensing process through comment and lifetime. opinion.

– A description of the design basis, including the According to the Act (2006:647) and Ordinance (2008:715) requirements that have determined the design and on Financing of Management of Residual Products from construction of the facility. Descriptions of facilities for

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 109

Nuclear Activities, the municipalities that might host a affected, the responsible authority as designated by the

spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste management facility, Government shall inform the competent authority in that

including a disposal facility, are to be reimbursed for country about the planned activity. The country concerned

information activities aimed at their residents. Since the and the citizens who may be affected should be given the

mid-1990s, municipalities have been reimbursed for their opportunity to take part in the consultation procedure. The

information activities associated with SKB’s siting process Government has designated the Swedish Environmental

in connection with geological disposal of spent fuel. The Protection Agency to be responsible for this task.

municipalities of Östhammar and Oskarshamn continue to As part of this procedure, and in accordance with Article 5 receive reimbursement as the prospective host communiof the Espoo Convention, Sweden invited all countries ties for the disposal facility and encapsulation plant, respecaround the Baltic Sea for a joint consultation meeting in tively. In 2004 the Parliament approved a new regulation in March 2016 regarding SKB’s KBS-3 licence application the Financing Act, which made it possible for certain under the Environmental Code. The parties had previously non-profit, non-governmental organisations as well to been provided with information, compiled by SKB, and apply for financing for participation in the public consultawere given the opportunity to submit comments relating to tion activities relating to SKB’s licence applications. These the assessment of the environmental impacts of the organisations were entitled to financial support from the project, covering both the planned encapsulation plant and Nuclear Waste Fund at the discretion of SSM until 12 geological disposal facility. A record of the process, months after the EIA had been formally announced by the including statements from neighbouring countries and Land and Environment Court (for further details. As of SKB’s response to issues raised, was submitted to the Land January 2017, following the expiry of this period, the and Environment Court as part of the scrutiny of the Government has made it possible for non-governmental licence application under the Environmental Code. organisations meeting the same criteria as before to instead

apply for continued financial reimbursement as part of the As an EU Member State, Sweden is also required to apply

state budget appropriation, first via the Swedish Environ- Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty. This Article obliges each

mental Protection Agency and subsequently via SSM. Member State to provide the Commission with general

data relating to any plan for the disposal or discharge of Prior to the Government’s final decision in relation to radioactive waste in whatever form to enable a determinalicensing the development of an encapsulation plant and a tion on whether the implementation of such a plan is liable spent nuclear fuel repository, the host municipality to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil concerned has a right to veto and is expected formally to or airspace of another Member State. Information declare its support or rejection of the decision. In practice, regarding the planned encapsulation plant and repository the formal consultations, financial support to host municifor spent nuclear fuel, currently the subject of the Governpalities and certain environmental organisations, and the ment’s licensing review process (see section A.8.2.2 and municipal right to veto have to date been very beneficial to K.1.1), will be submitted at the appropriate time to the the overall quality of engagement and to wider public Commission in accordance with Article 37. acceptance of the licensing process for a spent fuel

repository. Guided by recommendations from regulators

G.3.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

and Government in their reviews of the reactor licensees’ All planned major facilities for spent fuel and radioactive RD&D programme, SKB’s strategy of involving local waste management, including repositories, will be sited, communities on a voluntary basis in the siting process for a constructed and operated by SKB. The supporting RD&D spent fuel repository has been another important factor. programme is also run by SKB. The following activities

The Swedish approach to building trust in the high-level have recently been carried out or are in progress:

waste management system together with the integrity of – The RD&D programme has been reported on every

the regulator was credited as a good practice in the 2012 third year since 1986. The most recent RD&D report

IAEA IRRS review. was submitted in September 2019.

G.3.1.3 Consulting contracting parties – Consultations and an EIA for the planned encapsulation

Sweden (as well as the EU, Canada and USA) has ratified facility and repository for spent nuclear fuel began

the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a formally in 2002, but in practice started as part of SKB’s

Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention). The siting programme in the mid-1990s. The consultations

purpose of the convention is to seek cooperation to were concluded in May 2010.

prevent transboundary environmental effects and to – Consultations and an EIA for the planned extension of

impose the requirement for informing neighbouring the final repository for short-lived radioactive waste,

countries and the general public about planned activities SFR, began in 2010 and a licence application was

that might cause environmental effects. The provisions of submitted to SSM in December 2014.

the Convention are mainly implemented in the Swedish Environmental Code by means of the requirements A summary of the siting process and related consultations

imposed for consultation relating to the production of in respect of the planned repository for spent nuclear fuel

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). The Environ- was provided in Sweden’s fifth national report published

mental Code specifies that if another country may be in 2014.

110 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

G.3.3 Regulatory control nuclear safety, radiation protection and safety, best meets SSM and its predecessors (the Swedish Nuclear Power the siting requirements of the Environmental Code. It is Inspectorate, SKI, and the Swedish Radiation Protection nevertheless recognised that constructing the encapsulation Authority, SSI) reviewed and analysed SKB’s siting plant adjacent to Clab entails certain risks that SKB will programme for a deep geological disposal facility for spent need to take measures to minimise. The Land and Envifuel over a period of more than three decades prior to the ronment Court, in its statement to Government on the submission of the licence applications. The main instru- conclusions of its scrutiny of SKB’s licence application ments for regulatory control of SKB’s siting programme under the Environmental Code, did not question SKB’s have been: arguments for siting either the encapsulation plant or the spent fuel repository. – review of SKB’s recurrent programme for research, development and demonstration (RD&D programmes), Both SSM and the Land and Environment Court

concluded that the consultation process undertaken by – consultation meetings with SKB on their detailed site SKB in development of the EIA was acceptable. SSM investigations at two candidate sites, found that consultation on matters relating to radiation – participation in EIA consultation meetings led by SKB safety was timely, that it involved the correct parties and in accordance with the requirements in the that it considered the issues that should be addressed. Environmental Code, and

– independent review and analyses of SKB’s site G.3.4 Conclusion

investigation data and site descriptive models. Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 6.

Based on the outcome of review activities related to the

RD&D programme, the Government concluded in a G.4 Article 7: Design and construction of decision in 2001 that SKB could start detailed investiga- facilities

tions at the candidate sites using the KBS-3 method as a planning premise for the site investigation. The Govern- Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ment noted that this did not remove the need for formal ensure that:

justification of method selection at the time of repository (i) the design and construction of a spent fuel managelicensing. ment facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and The Government also concluded that SKB should conduct the environment, including those from discharges or consultation meetings with SKI and SSI during the full uncontrolled releases; duration of the site investigation programme. Both (ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as authorities contributed to these consultation meetings, necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning of which were held between 2001 and 2010, by asking a spent fuel management facility are taken into account; questions and providing comments related to SKB’s site (iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and investigation methods as well as their interpretation of construction of a spent fuel management facility are site-specific information. A series of reports (available at supported by experience, testing or analysis. www.ssm.se) is publicly available covering all external regulatory reviews and analyses of SKB’s site investigation G.4.1 Regulatory requirements programme. Regulatory requirements in Sweden for limiting the

possible radiological impact on individuals, society and the As part of its scrutiny of the licence application, SSM environment, including impacts from discharges or formally reviewed SKB’s selection of Forsmark as the site uncontrolled releases, are founded upon the basic provifor the proposed repository for spent nuclear fuel. SSM’s sions contained in the Act on Nuclear Activities, Radiation conclusion was that, of the locations considered within the Protection Act and Environmental Code. framework of the voluntary engagement process, Forsmark is the most suitable site from the perspective of

G.4.1.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact

radiation safety (SSM Report 2018:04, available at www. According to SSM’s basic regulatory requirements for ssm.se). According to the Authority’s assessment, none of radiation safety in association with licensed activities the alternative locations considered during the site involving ionising radiation (SSMFS 2018:1), there must be selection process demonstrated properties that, taken defence in depth, adapted to nature of the activity and together, were more advantageous from the perspective of involving the application of several consecutive technical, preventing, limiting and delaying releases from the organisational and administrative measures, to counter the engineered and geological barriers. The factors judged to occurrence and limit the development of events and condiweigh most heavily in favour of Forsmark in relation to the tions that are of significance to the radiation safety. Such other locations are its relatively homogeneous rock mass measures should also be designed to maintain the effectivewith few water-bearing fractures at repository depth. ness of the barriers placed between a radiation source and Moreover, SSM assessed that SKB’s preferred location for workers, the general public and environment. All facilities, the encapsulation plant adjacent to the central interim premises and locations where licensed activities are carried storage facility, Clab, is one that, from the perspectives of out must be designed so that radiological exposure of the

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 111

workforce to ionising radiation, as well as the dispersal of sioning and waste management. Moreover, all licensees for radioactive material, can be limited and measured. nuclear activities are responsible for financing the measures Moreover, their design must be such that release of needed in order to manage and dispose of nuclear waste radioactive material to the environment can be limited and and spent nuclear fuel, as well as to decommission and monitored as far as is reasonably practicable and so that dismantle their facilities. exposure of the public to ionising radiation is avoided. Regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations Results from monitoring of releases to air and water must (SSMFS 2008:1) contain requirements regarding decombe documented and reported. missioning plans for nuclear facilities, stating that safe SSM’s general regulations concerning safety in nuclear decommissioning must be taken into account when facilities (SSMFS 2008:1) provide more detailed require- designing a facility, and that conceptual plans for decomments that apply to the construction, operation and missioning shall be made available prior to construction decommissioning of all types of nuclear installations, and kept under review thereafter (see also section L.1). including facilities for the treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. A basic requirement is G.4.1.3 Technology supported by experience that radiological accidents shall be prevented through a The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear basic facility-specific design that incorporates multiple installations (SSMFS 2008:1) specify requirements barriers as well as a facility-specific defence in depth system. regarding design and construction. A facility must be The defence in depth shall be achieved by ensuring that: designed so as to:

– the design, construction, operation, monitoring and – be able to withstand component and system failures; maintenance of a facility is such that abnormal events, – have reliability and operational stability; incidents and accidents are prevented; – be able to withstand events or conditions that can affect – multiple devices and measures exist to protect the the installation’s barriers or safety functions; and integrity of the barriers and, if the integrity should be – enable maintenance, inspection and testing of those breached, to mitigate the ensuing consequences; and systems, components and equipment that are relevant to – any release of radioactive substances, which still may safety. occur as a result of extreme events, incidents and accidents, is prevented or, if this is not possible, Design principles and design solutions must be tested controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared under conditions representative of those that may occur measures. during the intended use of a facility. If this is not practicable, they must be tested or assessed in a manner that Further requirements on design and construction for demonstrates that they have the durability, reliability and limiting radiological impact are defined in specific regula- operational stability required for them to fulfil their tions regarding safety and radiological protection objectives function and importance to the safety of the facility. for the final disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste Consideration must also be given to the capability of (SSMFS 2008:21, SSMFS 2008:37). Safety after the final operational personnel to monitor and manage the facility closure of a repository shall be maintained through a under normal operational conditions, as well as during system of passive barriers, each of which should work, in abnormal events, incidents and accidents that may occur. one or more ways, to contain, prevent or delay the With regard to the design and construction of a repository, dispersal of radioactive material, either directly or indirectly it is clear that the scope for testing and learning from through protecting other barriers in the disposal system. experience is limited, especially in relation to the timescales The barrier system should be durable against the condifor safety performance after final closure. This places tions, events and processes that may affect the function of particular emphasis on the evidence base for demonindividual barriers and should be designed and implestrating, as noted above, good understanding of the mented with regard to Best Available Technique (BAT). conditions, events and processes that may affect the The objective is to ensure that all reasonable measures to function of individual barriers in the disposal system, and assure the protective capability of a disposal facility are that all reasonable measures to assure its protective considered in all stages of its development, operation and capability have been considered. final closure.

G.4.1.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for G.4.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

decommissioning G.4.2.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact

The Act on Nuclear Activities establishes that the holder The safety philosophy applied in the design of all Swedish of a licence for nuclear activities is responsible for the safe nuclear facilities is based on the principles of defence in decommissioning of their facilities. depth and of using multiple barriers to prevent the

unplanned release of radioactive material to the environ- The Act on Nuclear Activities also states that licence ment. Facilities are designed to ensure that releases of holders of nuclear power plants shall ensure that compreradioactive material in normal operation are limited as far hensive research and development activities are conducted as is reasonably practicable. in order to fulfil the requirements concerning decommis-

112 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

This safety philosophy underpins the design and planned could commence in around 2070 and be concluded within construction of the encapsulation facility and final five to seven years. During work on preparing the decomrepository for spent fuel according to the KBS-3 system, missioning plan for Clink, no reason has emerged why the currently the subject of the Government’s licensing review decommissioning should be more complicated than for the process. other nuclear facilities, whose decommissioning is closer in time.

G.4.2.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for

decommissioning Decommissioning of the spent fuel repository

Implications of reactor decommissioning A preliminary decommissioning plan was prepared for the for intermediate storage of spent fuel spent fuel repository and is included in the licence applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities for final disposal Removal of reactor internals and defueling comprise the of spent nuclear fuel and under the Environmental Code first stage when decommissioning nuclear power plants, for the KBS-3 system. An update of the plan was made in ultimately involving the transport of all remaining spent 2017 in order to harmonise with current regulations and to fuels from temporary storage at the reactor site to the follow the industry-wide structure for a decommissioning central interim storage facility, Clab, which is operated by plan. Decommissioning begins after operation is SKB. Dismantling and demolition of fuel storage pools on concluded, i.e. when all spent nuclear fuel has been the reactor sites are planned to be undertaken as part of disposed of and the deposition tunnels have been backthe overall programme of work defined by the power plant filled and sealed. Decommissioning entails closure of the licensee. remaining parts of the underground openings and Emptying of the final cores is also dependent on the demolition of the surface facilities. No contamination is capacity of Clab to receive the spent fuel. The closure of expected to be present in the facility at the time of closure, several nuclear power plants in the period 2016–2021 for which reason demolition is carried out in the same way means an increased demand to receive spent fuel at Clab to as for a conventional facility. accommodate the complete unloading of the reactors in a timely manner. This, in turn, requires careful planning of G.4.2.3 Technology supported by experience deliveries of spent fuel to ensure that reception at the

General information

interim storage facility can progress without significant The principle of proven technology is broadly accepted delay in defueling, and hence other aspects of decommisand implemented in the design and construction procesioning, at the nuclear power plants. In the meantime, dures for nuclear facilities in Sweden. As is evident from uprating of the cooling capacity for the storage pools at the licence applications submitted for Clink and the spent Clab has been achieved through the installation of a new fuel repository (see sections A.10.2 and K.1.1), a reference residual heat removal system, which is a prerequisite for design has been adopted for the repository barriers for the facility to be able to accommodate an increased long-term safety that fulfils the design premises for the inventory of spent fuel over the current 8,000 tonnes KBS-3 system. At the same time, a feasible approach to licensed capacity. production and a quality control programme has been According to current forecasts, this capacity will be presented.

reached by the end of 2023, i.e. close to the point in time The licence applications for Clink and the spent fuel when transferring the final cores from Ringhals units 1 and repository were developed against the background of 2. SKB has applied (see section G.1.2) to increase the SKB’s research, development and demonstration maximum inventory in Clab to 11,000 tonnes, and is programme, including experience from a number of preparing documentation regarding detailed changes to the preliminary safety analyses, starting with the KBS-3 report facility and its operation. in 1983 (the first complete safety analysis of the KBS-3 In the 2040s, when it is planned that the most modern method), followed by SKB-91 (focusing on the technical reactors will be decommissioned, Clab is not assumed to barriers), SR-97 (focusing on the geological barrier), and constitute a limitation. This is because fuel will start to be lastly SR-Can in 2006 (a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the developencapsulated and transported to the spent fuel repository ment of the SR-Site safety analysis that supported SKB’s and thereby free up space in pools at the interim storage licence application). These iterative safety analyses have facility. had multiple roles including guiding the technical development of the disposal method and site selection, identifying Decommissioning of Clink areas requiring further research, and determining whether a The decommissioning plan for the combined interim repository for radioactive waste complies with the regulastorage and spent fuel encapsulation facility (Clink) was tory requirements for long-term safety. This stepwise updated by SKB in 2013 in conjunction with compiling process, including reviews by the authorities, international supplementary documentation for the licence application experts as well as interested stakeholders of both the safety for Clink. Clink will be decommissioned when all spent analyses and SKB’s RD&D reports, has proven to be an nuclear fuel has been encapsulated and disposed of in the effective way of raising the level of knowledge regarding spent fuel repository. The timetable depends on when the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It has also last nuclear power reactor is permanently shut down. provided feedback to SKB’s technological development According to current planning, decommissioning of Clink and design work.

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 113

The Canister Laboratory, Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory and openings in relation to each other. The revised design

Multi-purpose Test Facilities have all been used for several premises serve as a basis for the preliminary safety analysis

years in developing technologies for encapsulation and reports which SKB compiles prior to the start of construc-

disposal of spent fuel. In addition, certain tests have been tion of the spent fuel repository and Clink’s encapsulation

conducted and will continue to be undertaken in the future plant. The design premises will be formally presented to

in collaboration with Posiva, SKB’s sister organisation in SSM when the PSAR is submitted.

Finland. There are also underground laboratories and Further revision of the design premises will be performed laboratories for metallurgical research available in Europe in response to the conditions issued during the licensing and other parts of the world. In addition, there are process and in conjunction with updating of the safety industrial facilities in many countries with access to the analysis reports. More detailed specification or re-appraisal knowledge and resources needed to carry out development of the relative importance of requirements between work for SKB. different systems may also need to be done during detailed

The experience gained from experiments and tests in these design or prior to implementation.

laboratories will continue to be used to move forward

Quality control and inspection

detailed design and construction work of the encapsulation ‘Quality control and inspection’ refers to the measures that plant and repository for spent nuclear fuel. Ongoing need to be taken to provide assurance that the requiretechnological development is being pursued in order to ments imposed on the facilities during operation and after proceed from the basis of schematic solutions to solutions closure of the spent fuel repository are satisfied. The goal tailored to an industrialised process involving stipulated is that the results obtained should conform to acceptable requirements for quality, cost and time. A large proportion values for properties that contribute to safety and radiation of the remaining development work consists of building protection. up a production system with effective quality control.

Planned production methods as well as plans for quality

Design premises

control and inspections in the production of the barriers The design premises comprise requirements which the for long-term safety have been described in general terms KBS-3 facilities with their barriers must satisfy in order to in the production line reports that support SKB’s licence ensure safety both during operation and after closure. The applications. As development of production and testing design premises specify e.g. what mechanical loads the methods progresses towards full-scale industrialisation, the barriers must be able to withstand, limitations concerning work on quality control and inspection will also progress. the composition and properties of the barrier materials, Systems for quality control and inspections will be acceptable deviations in the dimensions of the barriers, established and implemented to quality assure the producand acceptance criteria for the various under-ground tion of the barriers. openings.

A number of important activities in this process are to: An initial set of design premises and other requirements is specified in the applications for construction of the spent – establish principles for safety and quality classification;

fuel repository and the encapsulation facility. However, it is – establish what aspects are to be quality controlled and

not possible to specify all detailed design premises for a quality inspected, points in time when quality control

given product or process from the outset. Requirements, and inspections are to be performed, and by whom in

technological development and safety assessment must terms of first, second and third parties;

instead be defined as the work proceeds. A revision of the – establish and qualify processes, methods, equipment and design premises that were presented in the licence applicapersonnel for manufacturing and installation, testing and tions has been carried out together with Posiva (Posiva inspection; SKB report 01). These revisions are being used as input for

the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) (see section – establish the procedures that are to be applied in

G.5.1) that is being developed by SKB. production to ensure that the KBS-3 repository satisfies

quality requirements. The basic principles for evaluating design premises

pertaining to several barriers in the spent fuel repository Plans

are: In the short term, the goal of technological development is

to ensure that the technology needed for starting construc- – The design premises shall altogether lead to compliance tion of the spent fuel repository and encapsulation plant is with requirements related to the safety of the entire available. In the case of the spent fuel repository, this spent fuel repository. mainly refers to investigation methods and technology for – The design premises shall be feasible and verifiable for construction of the repository accesses. Such material is

all the barriers concerned. also needed to describe how matters relating to nuclear

– Design premises that entail simple, robust and effective safety will be addressed prior to the start of trial operation,

solutions are preferred. i.e. during construction of accesses, the central area and

the first deposition area. This document is called ‘Suus’

These principles are used to establish requirements for (Swedish acronym for ‘safety during construction of the

fuel, canister, buffer, backfill, closure and underground final repository’) and is being prepared by SKB prior to the

114 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

start of construction. Technological development is also Qualification of processes with associated equipment, needed for the various systems that must be in place in the personnel and suppliers must have been completed and repository area, descriptions of which support the PSAR documented. A comprehensive system for quality control that will be presented by SKB in support of its application and inspection of canister manufacturing, production of for approval to the start construction. buffer and backfill components, handling and installation of canister, buffer and backfill, and the process of After submission of the PSAR, there are several other underground construction must also be implemented. milestones during the design and construction of the planned facilities where key input is needed from techno- Before a licence can be obtained for trial operation of logical development. This includes: Clink and the spent fuel repository, a renewed safety analysis report (SAR), reflecting the facilities as they have – When starting the detailed design of the encapsulation been constructed, must be submitted. Before an operating plant, the component technical systems must have licence can be obtained, a supplemented SAR must be essentially passed the detailed design phase. When prepared and submitted to SSM (see section G.5.1). Results starting the detailed design of the canister and experience from commissioning tests and trial manufacturing facility, the technology and methods for operation in each facility must be presented in this updated production of canisters must be fully developed and SAR. This means that the production reports relating to work on an industrial scale. technology deployment will be updated using results and – Prior to the start of construction of the encapsulation experience from full-scale tests, qualification work and plant and canister manufacturing facility, the systems commissioning tests. that have undergone detailed design shall have been procured and plans for qualification shall have been G.4.3 Regulatory control established and incorporated into the plans for SSM and its predecessors (the Swedish Nuclear Power construction. Inspectorate, SKI, and the Swedish Radiation Protection

– Before detailed design of the spent fuel repository’s Authority, SSI) have over the past three decades reviewed accesses can start, the observational method for SKB’s development of the KBS-3 disposal method for underground construction must be implemented and a spent nuclear fuel. The main instruments for regulatory detailed characterisation programme for ramp and control of SKB’s design development work have been:

shafts must be available. – regulatory review of the recurrent research,

– Below the level of the top seal on the spent fuel development and demonstration programmes (RD&D repository, the design premises stipulate requirements programmes),

for the permeability of the installations intended to seal – technical reviews, with support from international peer the repository at depth. This in turn imposes other reviews, of SKB’s preliminary safety assessments requirements for rock works below the level of the top presented during the development of the KBS-3 seal. It must then be verified that excavation methods, method, and inspection programmes and methods for rock support – consultation meetings between SKB and SSM (and its and grouting satisfy these requirements. predecessors) concerning site investigations and the – Detailed design of the production of buffer and backfill content of SKB’s safety reporting. shall be completed as a basis for detailed design of the The authorities devoted considerable review resources over production building at the repository site. the pre-licensing period to evaluate a range of scientific – Installation methods and methods for testing and and technical issues relating to the engineered and natural inspection of buffer and backfill must have been barriers, including the evolution and long-term behaviour designed in detail and verified prior to detailed design of of copper canisters and the bentonite buffer, as well as the the deposition area. effects of construction activities on the bedrock. Attention was also given to the suitability of safety assessment Technical systems that are needed in the combined storage methods used to underpin SKB’s design development. facility and encapsulation plant, Clink, must have been Based on these reviews, the authorities were able regularly purchased, fabricated, installed, tested and qualified prior to provide feedback to SKB on the technical basis for its to commissioning tests of the KBS-3 system. Furtherdevelopment of a repository system for spent nuclear fuel. more, before commissioning tests can be conducted, methods and sub-processes for excavation of deposition As part of the review of the RD&D programmes, the tunnels and deposition holes in the repository must have authorities have also provided review comments and been devised and qualified. The deposition system must requested clarifications related to SKB’s gradual evolution also be put into non-active operation before commis- and refinement of barrier design as well as reference sioning tests can be undertaken, which means that methods for rock excavation, construction and manufactechnical systems for handling and transport of canisters, turing activities. No definitive judgments regarding the buffer and backfill must have been fabricated, installed and acceptability of design options and manufacturing tested. The systems will undergo integration tests to ensure processes were made during these pre-licensing reviews that equipment and technical systems are fully compatible since the responsibility for development of the disposal as intended before conducting the commissioning tests. method rests entirely with the implementer.

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 115

G.5 Article 8: Assessment of safety of

A key requirement imposed on the implementer, as stated in the Act on Nuclear Activities, is that the RD&D

facilities

programmes should be sufficiently broad in scope. This requirement is to a certain extent reflected in the regulatory Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to requirement, noted above, that the barrier system for a ensure that: repository should be designed and implemented giving (i) before construction of a spent fuel management wide consideration to reasonable measures to assure the facility, a systematic safety assessment and an environprotective capability of the facility. Against this backmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented ground, SSM and its predecessors have over the years, by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be including in the review of SKB’s licence applications, carried out; requested additional reporting regarding alternative (ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management methods and disposal concepts, e.g. disposal of spent facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety assessnuclear fuel in very deep boreholes, as a basis for compar- ment and of the environmental assessment shall be ison with the KBS-3 method. prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i). When performing the licensing review, SSM gave detailed consideration to SKB’s rationale for the choice of the

G.5.1 Regulatory requirements

KBS-3 method for final management of spent nuclear fuel. The Authority’s conclusion was that SKB has adequately G.5.1.1 Assessment of safety complied with the requirement on demonstrating use of Requirements for safety assessment, safety review and Best Available Technique, both in relation to the choice of reporting are specified in SSM’s regulations concerning technical solutions for each individual barrier and to the safety in nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1). These apply to barriers’ collective function in achieving a radiologically the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including safe repository to protect people and the environment facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel against harmful effects from releases of radioactive and radioactive waste. The basic provisions regarding materials after closure (SSM Report 2018:04, available at safety assessment and review can be summarised in the www.ssm.se). SSM recognised that extensive research and following paragraphs. development, testing and analysis have been conducted

Safety analysis

with respect to the KBS-3 method, as well as to increase Analyses of conditions of importance for the safety of a understanding of the properties, events and processes of facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed importance for assessing the repository’s protective and taken into operation. The analysis shall subsequently capability. be kept up-to-date. The safety analyses shall be based on a As regards the planned encapsulation facility to be systematic inventory of such events, event sequences and operated in conjunction with Clab, SSM deemed in its conditions that could lead to a radiological accident. licensing review that SKB’s design has the potential to meet requirements for limits, optimisation and Best Safety report Available Technique, for example through multiple systems A preliminary safety report (PSAR) shall be prepared and measures for treatment at source and limiting before a facility is allowed to be constructed in order to discharges of radioactive materials to air and water. The show how relevant safety requirements are met. The safety Authority considered that the facility is designed to be report (SAR) shall be updated to reflect the plant as it has equipped with redundant systems to protect the integrity been constructed, analysed and verified before trial of barriers and prevent releases in the event of faults and operation of the facility is allowed to start. The SAR and failures. associated documentation of operating limits and conditions must subsequently be supplemented on the basis of The Land and Environment Court, in its statement to experience from a programme of commissioning tests Government on the conclusions of scrutiny of SKB’s before the facility is allowed to be taken into routine licence application under the Environmental Code, did not operation. At each of the above steps, the safety report call into question SKB’s overall arguments for choice of shall be evaluated and approved by SSM. method but, unlike SSM, considered that SKB would need to present further documentation clarifying the long-term The safety report must subsequently be kept up to date. protective function of the copper canisters, in order for For example, plant modifications are to be assessed against the repository to be considered permissible in accordance conditions described in the SAR. Plans for substantial with the provisions of environmental legislation. SKB, at changes must be reflected in a new PSAR, which must be the Government’s request, submitted the results from approved by SSM before being used as the basis for trial additional theoretical and experimental studies in April operation of the modified facility. New safety standards 2019. and practices, which have been assessed by the licensee and found applicable, shall be documented and inserted into G.4.4 Conclusion the SAR as soon as corresponding modifications or other Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 7. plant measures have been performed.

116 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

The content of the safety report is specified in the for construction, operation and closure of the disposal regulations SSMFS 2008:1. Not only the safety systems, but facility. The safety assessment must cover the length of all plant structures, systems and components of importance time for which barrier functions are required, though at for the defence in depth are to be described in the SAR. least ten thousand years.

Safety review The regulations SSMFS 2008:37 comprise basic requirements for protection of human health (expressed as a risk A safety review shall confirm that all applicable safety-retarget), general environmental protection goals, and the lated aspects of a specific issue have been taken into application of optimisation and Best Available Technique account and that appropriate regulatory requirements with (BAT). The corresponding guidance advises on reporting respect to the safety in design, function, organisation and for different time periods after closure, selection of activities of a facility are met. The review must be carried scenarios, calculation of risk, dealing with uncertainty, and out systematically and be documented. A safety review is risk dilution. to be performed first within those parts of the organisation responsible for the specific issues under consideration

G.5.1.2 Environmental assessment

(‘primary review’). A second safety review shall then be According to the requirements of the Act on Nuclear performed by an internal safety review function established Activities, an environmental impact assessment (EIA) shall for this purpose, which has an independent position be prepared for a licence application under the Act. These are relative to those parts of the organisation responsible for the same requirements as stated in the Environmental Code. design and operation.

The Environmental Code also contains detailed requirements

Safety programme

stating what an EIA should contain and how it should be After it has been taken into operation, the safety of a prepared. facility shall be continuously analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. Any need for improvement regarding The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the safety measures, engineering or organisational issues that direct and indirect impacts of a planned activity or measure arises as a result of such analyses and assessments shall be as listed below. An environmental impact statement must documented in a safety programme. The safety programme contain the following information:

must be updated on an annual basis. – a description of the planned activity or course of action

with details of its location, design and scope;

Periodic safety review of facilities

At least once every ten years, licensees are required to – a description of the measures that are planned with a perform a periodic safety review (PSR), i.e. an integrated view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility, see effects, for example action to prevent the activity or sections E.2.5.3, E.3.2.6 and K.2.3). measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;

Modifications

– the information needed to establish and assess the main A safety review shall be performed for engineering or impacts on human health, the environment and organisational modifications to a facility that can affect the management of land, water and other resources that the conditions specified in the safety report, and essential planned activity or course of action is likely to have; modifications to the report made accordingly. Before such modifications may be included in the report, SSM shall be – a description of possible alternative sites and alternative notified. SSM has the power to determine that additional designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a or other requirements or conditions shall apply with specific alternative was chosen, as well as a description respect to the modifications. of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented; and

Post closure safety

– a non-technical summary of the information. Additional requirements concerning the long-term radiation protection and nuclear safety of a disposal facility G.5.2 Measures taken by the licence holders are stipulated in the regulations concerning safety in

G.5.2.1 Safety assessments

connection with the disposal of nuclear material and

Background

nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:21), as well as in the regulations and general advice on the protection of human Some key aspects of the assessment work undertaken by health and the environment in connection with the final SKB, including the role of external peer reviews, were management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste described in Sweden’s fifth national report, published in (SSMFS 2008:37). 2014. SKB is currently developing the basis for assessment so that the PSAR for the spent fuel repository and Clink The regulations SSMFS 2008:21 contain requirements for can be submitted to SSM in support of an application to the design of the repository, barrier functions and safety commence construction, provided that relevant licences reporting. The safety assessment for a disposal facility shall for development of the facilities are granted by the address all features, events and processes that might lead to Government. SKB also plans to prepare and submit to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure. Such SSM a PSAR for the existing Clab facility in support of safety assessments are required as a basis for applications measures to increase Clab’s interim storage capacity.

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 117

Interim storage facility, Clab Forsmark, were reported to SSM between 2013 and 2015

Based on the initial review of the licence application for an in response to requests for supplementary information

encapsulation plant for spent fuel to be co-located with during the regulatory review of the licence application

Clab, SSM identified areas of improvement relevant for the under the Act on Nuclear Activities.

safety analysis report of Clab. SSM subsequently (2013) Furthermore, as noted elsewhere, SKB in April 2019 issued an improvement notice to SKB to update the safety submitted as part of the licensing process, and at the analysis report in areas relating to safety requirements, Government’s request, the results from additional theoretsafety analysis and safety classification. SKB has since ical and experimental studies relating to potential copper modernised the safety analysis report for Clab in several corrosion mechanisms, together with an updated analysis steps between 2016 and 2020. of their implications for radiation safety (SKB Report

Among other things, the safety analysis has most recently 2010, TR-19-15, can be downloaded at www.skb.se). This

been supplemented with a probabilistic safety assessment, was partly in response to the Land and Environment

including a human reliability analysis of all safety-related Court’s conclusion that further documentation was

manual actions. The basic safety concept of Clab relies on required in order to clarify the long-term protective

passive and inherent safety with extensive grace periods function of the copper canisters in the KBS-3 disposal

before any action is needed to avoid adverse conditions. concept, if the repository were to be considered permis-

The human reliability analysis strengthens the safety case sible in accordance with the provisions of environmental

for relying on manual actions to achieve a safe state in case legislation. From SKB’s perspective, however, the work was

of incidents or accidents in the facility. The safety demon- already planned as part of the updated supporting material

stration has also been extended to include a more compre- for the PSAR to be submitted to SSM as part of an

hensive risk assessment of beyond design basis accidents. application to commence construction of the repository,

The analysis, based on IAEA and WENRA guides for once a licence had been granted. The central conclusions

design extension conditions, is considered by SKB to of SKB’s safety analysis, that a KBS-3 repository capable

demonstrate that there are sufficient margins in the design of fulfilling long-term requirements for radiation protec-

of the facility such that sequences leading to significant tion and safety can be built and safely operated at the

fuel degradation are practically eliminated. Forsmark site, remain unaltered.

Combined spent fuel storage and encapsulation facility,

G.5.3 Regulatory control

Clink

G.5.3.1 Clab

SKB’s updated (January 2015) safety analysis for the SSM has assessed the updated ‘modern standards’ Safety combined encapsulation plant and storage facility, Clink, Analysis Report for Clab, submitted by SKB in several was undertaken in response to SSM’s request for an stages in response to the Authority’s 2013 improvement improved system description and correspondingly updated notice. In September 2017, SSM concluded that SKB had preliminary safety analysis report (F-PSAR). The scope was responded to an acceptable extent to the main parts of the also expanded to account for the safety implications of improvement notice. The following stage in SKB’s increasing the interim storage capacity in the storage pools updating of the SAR included an expanded probabilistic of Clab from 8,000 to 11,000 tonnes of spent fuel. safety analysis. This was reviewed by SSM in 2018, Updating of supporting materials to the licence application concluding that the analysis was of generally high quality, under the Act on Nuclear Activities also led to supplebut that work remained (albeit with limited relevance to ments made to the EIA submitted in support of the overall safety) to address certain shortcomings – identified licence application under the Environmental Code. in SKB’s own internal safety review – regarding the The F-PSAR describes how nuclear radiation safety in consistent management of uncertainties and analysis of

Clink will be maintained. The design of the facility and specific initiating events. In its review of the next stage in

description of how the requirements are met will gradually updating the SAR, SSM assessed that SKB had demon-

be clarified and specified in detail as technological develop- strated capacity to safely accommodate at Clab the elevated

ment progresses and viewpoints are received from SSM residual heat removal requirements associated with

during the licensing process. acceptance of the final cores from Oskarshamn units 1

and 2 as well as Ringhals units 1 and 2 over a relatively SKB also provided an account of its assessment of the short period, following their early shutdown. consequences of planned and potential discharges

associated with operation of the Clink facility as part of SSM is currently (at the time of preparing Sweden’s

the consultation procedure undertaken by the Swedish seventh national report) undertaking a review of final main

Environmental Protection Agency in accordance with update of the SAR. In addition to providing a full compre-

Article 5 of the Espoo Convention. hensive update of the safety analysis report for the facility,

to underpin future operations, it is understood that this

Repository for spent nuclear fuel

SAR will form the basis for a forthcoming application in More in-depth assessments and analyses of some aspects support of necessary changes to the facility should the of the safety assessment SR-Site, based on SKB’s reference Government grant a licence for increased storage capacity design for disposal according to the KBS-3 method at at Clab.

118 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

G.6 Article 9: Operation of facilities

G.5.3.2 SKB’s licence applications

Some key aspects of the regulatory review activities undertaken by SSM, including an account of the parallel Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to procedures for licensing under the Swedish Environmental ensure that: Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities, were described in (i) the licence to operate a spent fuel management Sweden’s fifth national report published in 2014. This facility is based upon appropriate assessments as description was supplemented in Sweden’s sixth national specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion report (2017) by a summary of the key findings from of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the SSM’s review of SKB’s licence applications for the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety combined spent fuel storage and encapsulation facility and requirements; the planned repository for spent fuel. (ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments, as specified Having submitted a comprehensive statement on the in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary; results of its scrutiny of SKB’s licence applications to (iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and Government in January 2018, SSM plays no further direct testing of a spent fuel management facility are conducted part in the decision over licensing for these facilities under in accordance with established procedures; the Act on Nuclear Activities. Likewise, the Land and (iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related Environment Court, after submitting its findings to fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a Government, also in January 2018, plays no further part spent fuel management facility; unless and until a determination has been made on the (v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely permissibility of SKB’s plans in accordance with the manner by the holder of the licence to the regulatory requirements of the Environmental Code. SSM has, body; however, responded to Government requests for further (vi) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating commentary and clarification in relation to criticisms raised experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate; by some stakeholders, and has taken part as a consultee in offering comments on SKB’s supplementary analysis of (vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using potential corrosion mechanisms. After a thorough information obtained during the operating lifetime of that technical review of the additional material that had been facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body. submitted by SKB, SSM in September 2019 concluded that it reinforced the Authority’s previous conclusions that

G.6.1 Regulatory requirements

SKB’s preferred site is suitable, the disposal concept is SSM’s general regulations concerning safety in nuclear feasible, and the safety analysis provides confidence that installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contain legally binding the disposal system fulfils strict regulatory requirements for requirements relevant to all obligations under Articles 9 safety and radiological protection, before and after final and 16. These requirements are summarised below. closure. SSM is now making preparations to review the documenta- G.6.1.1 Licence for facility operation tion, including PSAR, which SKB needs to submit in A comprehensive preliminary safety report shall be support of an application to begin construction of both prepared by the licensee and assessed by SSM prior to the encapsulation plant and repository for spent nuclear starting construction of a nuclear facility (see section fuel, if and when a licence is granted by Government. G.5.1.1). Following construction, the safety report (SAR) shall be updated to reflect the facility as constructed, G.5.4 Conclusion analysed and verified through inspection and non-active Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 8. tests before commissioning and trial operation is permitted. The SAR must subsequently be supplemented as necessary on the basis of experience from a programme of commissioning tests before the facility is permitted to be taken into routine operation. At each of the above steps, the safety report shall be evaluated and approved by SSM. The safety report must subsequently be held up to date and revised as necessary to reflect modifications or changes to safety standards and practices.

G.6.1.2 Operational limits and conditions (OLCs)

Documented and up-to-date Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs) are required for all facilities, containing necessary information as further specified in an appendix to the regulations. Preliminary OLCs must be defined by the licensee and approved by SSM prior to commissioning and trial operation of the facility. They must subsequently

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 119

be updated, alongside the safety report, to reflect experi- that is important for the safety of the plant. The regula-

ence from commissioning tests, as well as any subsequent tions specify the content of the different reports, with

operational experience and assessments. further general guidance on the fulfilment of reporting

requirements, including implementation of a graded The OLCs must, together with the operating procedures, approach, being provided in support of the regulations. ensure that the conditions postulated in the safety report One of the fundamental regulatory requirements concerns are maintained during the operation of the facility. The the actions to be taken by the licensee in the event of OLCs must be subjected to a two-fold safety review by the deficiencies in barriers or in the defence in depth system. licensee (see section G.5.1.1) and submitted to the regula- These actions include first assessment, adjustment of the tory authority for approval. The licensee must notify the operational state, implementation of necessary measures, regulatory authority about any proposed changes to OLCs performance of safety reviews, and reporting to SSM. after they also have been subjected to a two-fold safety

review. In a further appendix to the regulations, events and

conditions related to deficiencies in barriers and defence in

G.6.1.3 Programmes for collecting and analysing depth are identified that require different responses operating experience depending on the category of events that they belong to.

Suitable, verified and documented procedures are required Three categories of incident are defined:

for all operational states, including accidents. The proce- – Category 1: Observed severe deficiency in one or more dures for operability verification and procedures used in barriers or in the defence in depth system, or an operational states other than normal operation shall be otherwise well-founded suspicion that safety is severely subjected to a two-fold safety review by the licensee. threatened. (In such cases, the facility must be brought Procedures for maintenance that are important for safety to a safe state without delay.) are also covered by this requirement. Maintenance

programmes are to be documented. Inspection and testing – Category 2: Observed deficiency in a barrier or in the

of mechanical components must be carried out according defence in depth system, considered less severe than

to qualified methods and verified procedures. that referred to in category 1, or an otherwise well-

founded suspicion that safety is threatened. (In such

G.6.1.4 Engineering and technical support cases, the facility is allowed to continue operation during

The licensee shall ensure that appropriate personnel are the period of time when corrective action is being taken

available with the competence and suitability necessary to and under certain limitations and controls.)

undertake those tasks that are important for safety, and – Category 3: Temporary deficiency in the defence in also ensure that these qualifications are documented. A depth system, arising when an event or condition is long-term staffing plan is required. Use of contractors as corrected that, in the absence of such measures, could opposed to own personnel should be carefully considered lead to a more severe condition, and which is in relation to developing and sustaining adequate in-house documented in the facility’s operational limits and professional skills. The necessary competence should conditions. always be available in-house for procuring contractors and

for managing and evaluating the results of contractors’ In all three cases, corrective measures must be subjected to

work that is of importance for safety. a two-fold internal safety review by the licensee. The

results of these reviews shall be submitted to SSM. As

G.6.1.5 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner

regards category 3 incidents, there is no requirement to The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear submit a specific report to SSM. Rather, it is sufficient to installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contain a specific chapter provide a compilation of these events in the annual report. about reporting requirements and an separate appendix

specifying these requirements for various types of events. G.6.1.6 Programmes for collecting and analysing

Briefly, these can be summarised as: operating experience

The licensee shall ensure that experience from its own – Reporting without delay: emergency alarm events and facilities and from similar activities in other relevant events and conditions in category 1 (see below) facilities is continuously analysed, used and communicated – Reporting within 16 hours: INES events of Level 2 or to the personnel concerned. Furthermore, all events and higher conditions that are detected and which are important for

– Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation safety must be investigated in a systematic manner in order

report about alarm events or events and conditions in to determine sequences and causes, as well as to establish

category 1 any actions required in order to restore safety margins and

prevent recurrence. The results of such investigations are – Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation to be disseminated within the organisation as well as being report of events and conditions in category 2 submitted to SSM, and shall contribute to the continuous

In addition, there are requirements for daily reporting of improvement of safety at the facility. Furthermore,

the operational state and the occurrence of any abnormal according to SSM’s regulations on the disposal of nuclear

events or disturbances, as well as requirements for a material and nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:21), it is the

comprehensive annual report summarising all experience responsibility of the licensee, for as long as a disposal

120 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

facility is in operation, to keep itself and SSM continuously the licensing conditions. In the case of spent fuel manage-

informed of conditions that can be of importance to the ment, this concerns arrangements for the handling of

assessment of disposal facility safety, including implica- spent fuel at nuclear power plants as well as the Clab

tions for post-closure radiological safety. interim storage facility.

The original OLC for each facility is derived from the

G.6.1.7 Decommissioning plans

safety analyses in the SAR, in which the behaviour of the Decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste managefacility is described. Corrections and updates take place ment facility other than a disposal facility are prepared and when new and better knowledge is available, either from updated as necessary using information obtained during research, tests or operational experience. Suggestions for the operating lifetime of that facility. These plans are changes in OLC are reviewed carefully from the point of reviewed by the regulatory body. view of safety at different levels in the operating organisa- Regulations set out a number of specific requirements tion, and are ultimately approved by the regulatory body

relating to decommissioning, including: before being included in the document.

– A preliminary plan for the future decommissioning of The fact that the OLC is reviewed and revised regularly has the facility, to be compiled before construction of such contributed to making it a living document. It is also part facility; of the quality and management system and used frequently

– Safety and radiation protection at the time of by the operations staff in particular. An essential part of

decommissioning shall be taken into account during the the OLC is a general clause stating “...should any uncertainty

construction of a facility and before changes are made arise concerning the interpretation of the text, the general purpose of

to an existing facility; the OLC shall provide guidance. This means that the facility, in all

indefinite situations, shall be maintained in, or brought to, a safe – The preliminary plan shall be supplemented and kept up state.” Another component of the OLC is the descriptive to date for the duration of the facility’s operation and background to the document. The account of the backshall be reported to SSM every ten years; ground is an important means of preserving the – During the operation of a facility, observations and knowledge and experience of those who participated in the

events that have significance for planning and execution original production of the OLC, and communicating this

of decommissioning shall be documented on an information to new staff. Modified and maintained

ongoing basis; equipment must pass an operability test to verify that the

– When a decision has been made on final shutdown of a equipment fulfils specified operational requirements before

facility within a certain period of time, an integrated being accepted for use in continuous operation.

analysis and assessment of how safety is to be

G.6.2.3 Established procedures

maintained during the time remaining until the facility’s All activities that directly affect the operation of the facility closure shall be conducted without delay. An analysis are governed by procedures of different kinds covering and assessment must also be performed of normal operation, emergency operation and functional organisational changes during the closure period and testing. Maintenance activities undertaken under a maintepersonnel requirements during decommissioning. The nance programme approved by the licence holder are also analyses, assessments and measures emanating from to a great extent accomplished according to procedures. these must be documented and reported to SSM. These are, however, not always as detailed as the operating See also section F.6.1. procedures, in which activities are described in step-by-step

sequences. Signing off the completion of steps carried out

G.6.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

under the procedures is mandatory in most cases in order G.6.2.1 Licence for facility operation to confirm the completion and facilitate verification.

SKB anticipates that authorisation to start operations of its The development of procedures follows specified direcplanned facilities for the final management of spent fuel tives, which include reviewing the documents, normally by (the combined encapsulation plant and spent fuel storage more than one person other than the author before being facility, Clink, as well as the spent fuel repository), will approved by the operations manager or someone else at follow the procedures specified in SSM’s regulations. A full the corresponding level of authority. The same applies to commissioning programme will be developed during the revision procedures. Revision procedures are to be carried course of facility construction, and will be submitted to out continuously in particular maintenance procedures SSM for approval alongside the safety report for the when new experience is obtained. Emergency procedures completed facilities, taking into account results from have been developed in order to deal with anticipated operinspection and non-active tests. ational occurrences and design basis accidents/distur-

G.6.2.2 Operational limits and conditions (OLCs) bances.

The operational limits and conditions for nuclear facilities

G.6.2.4 Engineering and technical support

are described in the OLC, a document which is considered The principles for staffing are reported in section F.2.1.1. to be one of the cornerstones of governing and regulating Competencies that might not be completely available the operation of nuclear activities in Sweden. Each OLC is within the licensee’s own organisation at all plants include, facility-specific and subject to approval by SSM as part of

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 121

for example, expertise and human resources for materials in the event of unusually high radiation exposure to and chemical assessments, radiation shielding and environ- individuals. These types of non-routine reporting are mental consequence calculations, expertise and resources primarily directed towards SSM. for software for safety applications, and also process control and measurement techniques. IT functions in G.6.2.6 Programmes for collecting and analysing particular are normally outsourced, though are still operating experience available onsite. The intention is always to possess The objective of the analysis and feedback programme purchasing competence within the operating organisation, concerning operating experience is to learn from one’s own as well as have capability to evaluate the results of analyses and others’ experience and thus prevent reoccurrence of and calculations, etc. that are performed by consultants. events, particularly events that might affect the safety of the facility. The operating experience feedback process G.6.2.5 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner consists of a wide variety of activities within the plant There are two main types of licensee event reports (LER). organisation as well as externally. The more severe one, called ab abnormal event, requires the facility to inform SSM within one hour. A final report G.6.2.7 Decommissioning plans must be submitted within ten days from the time of the Before a facility may be constructed, a decommissioning event, and the analysis of the event and appropriate plan is to be drawn up for the future decommissioning of measures to prevent recurrence are subject to approval by the facility (see also section G.4.2.2). The degree of detail SSM. Only a very limited number of events of this in the plan increases as the time for decommissioning category have occurred at Swedish nuclear facilities over approaches. The plan must be supplemented and kept up the years; none have occurred at the waste management to date for as long as the facility is in operation, and is and spent fuel facilities. These events would typically also presented to SSM together with the periodic safety reviews. be of such a level of severity so as to warrant reporting in Among other things, the decommissioning plan contains a accordance with the International Nuclear Event Scale facility description, a plan for the decommissioning (INES). activities, and plans for management and disposal of The other type of LER, called ‘RO’ (Reportable Occur- radioactive waste. Before a dismantling operation may rence), is used for less severe events. This type of event is commence, the decommissioning plan must be supplementioned in the weekly report, which is sent to the mented and presented to SSM. The safety analysis report regulatory authorities and followed up by a final report for the facility must be supplemented and revised in within 30 days. The reports are reviewed at different levels accordance with the post-operational activities planned at of the operating organisation and approved by the the facility. The revised safety analysis report is reviewed operations or production manager before submission. and approved by SSM.

The front of the standardised report form describes the G.6.3 Regulatory control event and related circumstances in general: identification

G.6.3.1 Operational limits and conditions

number, title, reference to the OLC, date of discovery and SSM routinely reviews applications from licensees for length of time until corrective actions were completed, changes to the OLCs at licensed facilities, as well as for conditions at the time of occurrence, system consetemporary exemptions from the authorised OLCs. Based quences, a contact person at the plant and activities on the application and supporting information provided by affected by the event. The reverse side of the document the licensees, together with associated safety analyses, gives an account of the event, using the following assessments are made regarding how the proposed changes headings: or exemptions contribute to the risk profile of the facility. – event sequence and operational impact, The most significant modification to OLCs for spent fuel – safety significance, management facilities assessed by SSM in the period – direct and root causes, covered by the present report relates to SKB’s proposed change to the cooling capacity at Clab from 8.5 MW to a – planned/decided measures, and nominal 10.8 MW (see also section G.5.3.1). This was – lessons learned from the event. notified, together with a supporting safety analysis for Clab with its newly upgraded cooling system, in September If the description of the event is extensive, additional 2018. SSM concluded that SKB had demonstrated pages may be attached to the form. Reports are also compliance with regulatory requirements regarding the required in accordance with the OLC when the permitted extended heat removal requirements. levels of activity release from the facility are exceeded, or

122 Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management

G.7 Article 10: Disposal of spent fuel

G.6.3.2 Procedures

Operational and maintenance procedures are normally not reviewed by SSM. Only in connection with event investiga- If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory tions would SSM request that a procedure be submitted for framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel review. for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to One specific area of interest continues to be the inspection the disposal of radioactive waste and maintenance programme in relation to storage ponds at the Clab storage facility. SSM has required SKB to

G.7.1 Regulatory requirements

develop and implement a control programme to ensure According to the Act on Nuclear Activities, the following that possible structural changes are detected and evaluated definitions apply: in time. Surveillance of SKB’s programme for rock and concrete inspections at Clab is undertaken on an annual – spent nuclear fuel which has not been disposed of in a basis. disposal facility is defined as nuclear material; and

– spent nuclear fuel which has been disposed of in a

G.6.3.3 Incident reporting

disposal facility is defined as nuclear waste. Licensee event reports are reviewed upon arrival at SSM by the site inspector in charge, who then asks the facility for Reprocessing is not part of the back end of the nuclear clarification if necessary. As a matter of routine, all LERs fuel cycle in Sweden, (see section C), and the policy and are screened once a week by a permanent group of practices for management of spent nuclear fuel are direct inspectors and specialists in order to assess the event, the disposal, following interim storage for a period of some analysis and the measures taken by the licensees. If there 30–40 years (see section B). are any regulatory concerns, the issue is brought up at a It is also clearly stated in the general obligations in the Act management meeting and a decision made about any on Nuclear Activities (Section 10) that the holder of a further measures to be taken by SSM. licence for nuclear activities is responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken that are needed for:

G.6.3.4 Experience feedback analysis

Regulatory control in this area is achieved through the – maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the procedures described in section E.2.5.2. For example, SSM activities and the manner in which they are conducted, carries out regular planned surveillance of SKB’s routine and operations and incident follow-up at the Clab interim – ensuring the safe handling and final disposal of nuclear storage facility. This enables SSM to follow how the waste arising from the activities, or nuclear material operations team works to transform experiences and arising therein that is not reused. lessons into preventative actions and to be proactive in working with safety. The experience feedback programme G.7.2 Measures taken by the licence holders is also followed up by SSM in connection with specific The practical implication is that spent fuel from Swedish event investigations and other inspections and reviews. nuclear power plants is de facto treated as high level radioactive waste.

G.6.4 Conclusion

Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 9. G.7.3 Conclusion Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 10.

Section G – Safety of Spent Fuel Management 123

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

The articles of the Joint Convention that specifically relate (iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society to the safety of radioactive waste management (Articles 11 and the environment, by applying at the national level to 17, covered in this section) have many similarities to the suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory articles that specifically address the safety of spent fuel body, in the framework of its national legislation which has management (Articles 4 to 10, covered in section G). To due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and avoid unnecessary duplication, reporting on those matters standards; (primarily regulatory requirements) that are common to (v) take into account the biological, chemical and other both section G and section H is presented in full in section hazards that may be associated with radioactive waste G only. Where appropriate, references to these accounts management; are made from the corresponding parts of section H. (vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predict- Where the Convention’s requirements differ between the able impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation; safety of spent fuel management and safety of radioactive waste management, this is stated in the respective section. (vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations. The programme for radioactive waste repositories is described in this section, whereas the issues relevant to the development of a geological disposal facility for spent H.1.1 Regulatory requirements nuclear fuel are described in section G. H.1.1.1 The general obligations of licence holders See section G.1.1.1.

H.1 Article 11: General safety

H.1.1.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations

requirements Basic regulatory requirements for radiation safety in

association with licensed activities (SSMFS 2018:1) include Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to general regulations for the management of radioactive ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management waste from both nuclear and non-nuclear activities. These individuals, society and the environment are adequately include requirements relating to: protected against radiological and other hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appro- – documentation of a radioactive waste management priate steps to: plan, based on an up-to-date evaluation of alternative management options, indicating how and when the (i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat waste will be taken care of, generated during radioactive waste management are adequately addressed; – segregation at source of wastes with different properties (ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is so far as is reasonably practicable to enable their kept to the minimum practicable; effective management, (iii) take into account interdependencies among the – documentation and preservation of information different steps in radioactive waste management; regarding waste generation, providing information necessary to support their ongoing management,

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 125

– annual reporting of waste arising to the Swedish – the amount of waste that has arisen or has by other Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) in accordance with a means been brought to the facility; specified schedule. – waste that has been transferred to a disposal facility or has been transported from the facility for treatment or Regulations that apply to both spent fuel and radioactive storage in another facility, or that has been cleared; waste from nuclear facilities are described in section G.1.1.2. Additional requirements that apply only to – waste that at the turn of the year is present at the radioactive waste from nuclear facilities include the facility, the nuclide inventory of the waste and following. information on its location; and

– experiences from handling of the waste and a follow-up

Identification of radioactive substance content in

of established plans.

nuclear waste

The radioactive substance content of nuclear waste that is Discharges to air and water from a facility to the to be transferred to a repository without further handling, surrounding environment are regulated in accordance with or which is intended to be stored for a period of time SSMFS 2008:23, see section F.4.1.2. exceeding two years, shall be identified through nuclide-specific measurement. In cases where this is Regulations relating to the clearance of nuclear and neither feasible nor possible, the radioactive substance non-nuclear waste have been issued in the form of SSMFS content may be determined in some other way. Prior to 2018:3 (section L.1). measurement and registration, the waste is to be classified

H.1.1.3 Criticality and removal of residual heat

into items corresponding to waste packages, components, See section G.1.1.3. containers or other units matching the material in question in order to enable reliable identification of the activity

H.1.1.4 Interdependencies in waste management

content.

and minimisation of radioactive waste

Records of nuclear waste – An up-to-date inventory of all radioactive waste on-site A licensed facility must have records of the items of shall be available at all times (SSMFS 2008:1). nuclear waste generated at the facility or present at the – Measures for the safe on-site handling, storage or facility. To the extent that is feasible and possible, these disposal of waste shall be analysed and included in the records must be kept up to date. Each registered waste safety report for the facility. The measures for on-site item is to be clearly marked for identity purposes. The handling shall take into account the requirements for records must also contain information about the manage- safety posed by the continued handling, transport and ment of each waste item that has left the facility. For each disposal of the waste. The safety report shall also waste item, the records must provide information about: include measures that need to be taken on-site to – the waste item’s identity (marking), prepare for the safe transport to, or storage or disposal in, a nuclear waste facility (SSMFS 2008:1). – the corresponding type description or separate description of the waste (when applicable), – Plans shall be drawn up providing a general description of management, including disposal, of all waste types – the origin of the nuclear waste or from which part(s) of that are likely to be generated while operating the the facility the nuclear waste has come, facility. The plan for management of such materials – the nuclear waste’s previous treatment, if any, and its shall also state the measures being taken to limit the present physical and chemical form, quantity of nuclear waste and its content of radioactive – quantity, substances. The plans must be reported to the authorities before the waste is generated (SSMFS – nuclide-specific content of radioactive substances, with 2008:1). reference date and uncertainty in terms of the nuclide content, – As regards waste whose type or quantity deviates from that specified in the plans as stipulated above, all – external radiation level, with distance and reference date, necessary measures for management of the – position in the storage facility or repository, and non-conforming material must be explained and – the date of treatment performed: in the case of nuclear documented in a separate plan. The separate plan shall waste intended to remain at the facility for a period of be reported to the authorities before the waste is time exceeding two years, the records must also provide handled (SSMFS 2008:1). information about the time schedule for the ongoing – Acceptance criteria shall be derived, stating the management. properties of the material that can be received for storage, disposal or some other management.

Reporting

Acceptance criteria shall, so far as is reasonably A report concerning the past calendar year must be practicable, be formulated while taking into account submitted to SSM. This report is to comprise a summary safety and radiation protection throughout all stages of account of the following: the ongoing management. Procedures must be in place

126 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

for management of material that does not meet the radioactive waste. The formal requirement for an RD&D acceptance criteria in that it is returned to the consignor programmes to be submitted for regulatory evaluation was or by taking measures to rectify identified deviations established in 1984 when the Act on Nuclear Activities was (SSMFS 2008:1). promulgated. – The possibility that limitation of discharges to the In September 2019, SKB submitted the twelfth RD&D environment may imply increased radiation doses to programme to the regulator, SSM, for review and a public personnel is to be taken into account through consultation, in preparation for the Government’s decision optimisation considerations as well as the consequences concerning the licence holders’ fulfilment of their legal of other waste management arrangements (SSMFS obligations (SKB Report 2016, TR-19-24, December 2019, 2008:23). can be downloaded at www.skb.se). In RD&D Programme 2019, SKB presents its plans for research, development

H.1.1.5 Protection of individuals, society and the

and demonstration during the period 2020–2025. The

environment

programme consists of three parts: See section G.1.1.5. Part I SKB’s activities and plan of action

H.1.1.6 Account of biological, chemical and other hazards

Part II Waste and final disposal As noted in section H.1.1.2, above, SSM requires updated registers to be kept for all waste and spent nuclear fuel at a Part III Decommissioning of nuclear facilities nuclear facility. The registers for every waste item (e.g. The programme for low and intermediate level waste package or component) shall include information on, includes day-to-day management of waste generated among other things, any treatment that has been applied during operation as well as work to realise the remaining and the physical and chemical form of the waste. parts of the system that are needed for the safe long-term The question of chemical and biological hazards with management and disposal of low and intermediate level regard to the long-term performance of a repository is waste. The overall programme for the waste management addressed in the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s system is primarily led by SKB, but in some respects also regulations concerning safety in connection with the by the nuclear power companies, as well as actors such as disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste (SSMFS AB Svafo and Studsvik Nuclear AB. 2008:21). Applications were submitted in late 2014 under the Act on Only packages approved by SSM are allowed to be Nuclear Activities and Environmental Code for permission transported to a repository. This approval presupposes to extend the SFR repository for short-lived waste in order compliance of the methods for waste management with to accommodate decommissioning wastes. The licence the conditions and acceptance criteria stated in the safety applications are currently (at the time of preparing this report of the repository. Furthermore, the licensee must report) with the Government for decision (see also section submit documentation showing that due regard has been A.8.3.2 and K.1.2). taken to all relevant aspects, including biological, chemical An evaluation of post-closure safety issues based on a and other hazards with regard to the long-term perforconceptual design for the proposed SFL repository (the mance of the repository. geological repository for long-lived low and intermediate level waste) was delivered in autumn 2019. The main

H.1.1.7 Striving to avoid impacts and undue burdens on

future generations results from the study were presented in conjunction with See section G.1.1.7. the twelfth RD&D programme. The RD&D programme also presents an analysis of siting factors and a proposed H.1.2 Measures taken by the licence holders stepwise siting process for SFL. According to SKB’s current plans, the SFL repository could be commissioned

H.1.2.1 The general obligations of licence holders

around 2045. Decisions on the premature closure of four reactors have affected the national action plan for low and intermediate In the above-mentioned work, experience from the level waste by bringing forward the need for interim operation of SFR constitutes an important knowledge base storage of waste from facility dismantling as well as the for the development and construction of new repositories need for decommissioning planning to be developed and for low and intermediate level waste. concretised sooner (see also section F.6). The final repositories that SKB plans to establish for low and H.1.2.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations intermediate level waste include an extension of the SFR Measures taken by the licensees regarding general safety disposal facility to accommodate short-lived decommis- requirements are discussed in sections H.3.2 (facility siting), sioning wastes, and constructing the SFL deep geological H.4.2 (facility design and construction), H.5.2 (assessment repository for long-lived low and intermediate level waste. of facility safety) and H.6.2 (facility operation). Some of the nuclear power companies are arranging for

RD&D programme 2019

temporary interim storage of short-lived decommissioning The nuclear industry, through its co-owned company, SKB, waste until the extension of SFR is commissioned. For has since the mid-1970s performed research on the example, Barsebäck Kraft AB has existing storage facilities long-term management of spent fuel and final disposal of

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 127

that can be used for interim storage, but the capacity needs In the light of the ongoing scrutiny by Government of

to be increased to accommodate the short-lived waste that SKB’s licence applications for extension to the SFR

will be produced during decommissioning of Barsebäck disposal facility (see also section A.8.3.2 and K.1.2), the

Units 1 and 2. It is also expected that existing on-site regulatory evaluation of the programme was constrained

storage capacity will also need to be increased to accom- so as not to forestall an eventual licensing decision. The

modate short-lived wastes from the decommissioning of overall conclusion from the regulatory review as regards

Oskarshamn Units 1 and 2. nuclear waste management in Sweden was, however, that

the programme was assessed to be fit for purpose in Long-lived wastes from decommissioning will be stored at relation to the research and development activity required the power plants or at suitable alternative locations, where to support a programme consistent with the licence these can be identified, until SFL is ready for operation. At holders’ obligations under the Act on Nuclear Activities. Barsebäck, the plan is for the site to be cleared completely

before SFL is due to be commissioned, so on-site storage With regard to the safety evaluation for SFL, summarised

of long-lived waste from dismantling is not currently an in the RD&D report, SSM assessed that SKB’s continued

option. work with safety analysis need to be developed with regard

to, among other things, methodology and assumptions, AB Svafo currently operates an underground interim with the aim of reducing uncertainties and to ensure that storage facility for long-lived low and intermediate level the basic safety concept for the repository is fully reflected waste, which is use for storing not only its own long-lived in the analysis of its protective capabilities. This, in turn, waste, including legacy waste, but also waste from other will support the development of preliminary acceptance licensees such as Studsvik Nuclear AB. This facility does criteria for long-lived low and intermediate level wastes, to not have capacity to receive more waste. AB Svafo is guide decisions on future treatment, conditioning and therefore planning to construct an additional building for packaging. SSM also agreed with SKB’s conclusion that it is interim storage of low and intermediate level waste arising important to reduce uncertainties surrounding the forecast from its ongoing decommissioning operations. This inventory for the waste that is planned to be disposed of in interim storage facility will be located at the Studsvik site, SFL, including legacy wastes from historical activities and constructed as an extension to an existing storage within the Swedish nuclear research programme. building. The intention is that it should be commissioned

around 2021. A notification of the modification to SSM further noted that SKB’s facilities for disposal of low

operations covered by the existing nuclear licence was and intermediate level waste are designed also to accom-

submitted to SSM in June 2019. An environmental permit modate both nuclear wastes arising from nuclear activities

for the interim storage facility was granted by the Land and other than commercial nuclear power (the specific obliga-

Environment Court in January 2017. tion of the licence holders) and radioactive wastes from

non-nuclear activities. The Authority therefore concluded AB Svafo is also currently studying the prospects for that there is a need to ensure that SKB’s development of a conditioning and re-packing legacy wastes from historical national system for the final management of all radioactive activities within the Swedish nuclear research programme. wastes is reflected in the way in which future RD&D The study will analyse how different waste fractions are to programmes are described and reviewed. be handled and what the possibilities are for management

and final disposal. However, technical issues concerning

H.1.3.2 Basic provisions and licence obligations

how long-lived waste from AB Svafo, Studsvik Nuclear AB Regulatory control of specific measures taken by the and Cyclife Sweden AB is to be treated and packaged for licensees regarding general safety requirements is discussed disposal can only be finally resolved when acceptance in sections H.3.3, H.4.3, H.5.3 and H.6.3. criteria for long-lived wastes at SFL are established.

See also the description of the outcome of SSM’s inte-

H.1.3 Regulatory control grated evaluation of radiation protection and safety for

SKB’s facilities, contained in section G.1.3.2 (Inspections

H.1.3.1 The general obligations of licence holders

and Surveillance).

Evaluation of the RD&D programme

In September 2019, SKB submitted the nuclear reactor H.1.4 Conclusion

licensees’ twelfth programme for research, development Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 11.

and demonstration, RD&D Programme 2019, to SSM for

review and broad consultation with national stakeholders.

In March 2020, SSM submitted the results of its evaluation

and a statement to the Government with a recommenda-

tion to approve SKB’s programme.

128 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

H.2 Article 12: Existing facilities and H.3 Article 13: Siting of proposed past practices facilities

Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the 1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps appropriate steps to review: to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management (i) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if (i) (to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are affect the safety of such a facility during its operating made to upgrade the safety of such a facility; lifetime; (ii) the results of past practices in order to determine (ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility whether any intervention is needed for reasons of on individuals, society and the environment; radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in (iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be available to members of the public; sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the (iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a social costs, of the intervention. facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general H.2.1 Existing facilities data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the By the time the Joint Convention entered into force with likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory. regard to Sweden, the situation was satisfactory as regards 2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the the safety of radioactive waste management facilities. appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by The elements of the Joint Convention have long been being sited in accordance with the general safety requireimplemented in the form of requirements imposed by the ments of Article 11. Swedish legal and regulatory framework, as well as being implemented in the management of radioactive waste in

H.3.1 Regulatory requirements

Sweden. The conformance of licensees’ activities with the

H.3.1.1 Assessment of safety and environmental impact

legal and regulatory requirements is nevertheless something See section G.3.1.1. that constantly needs reaffirming through inspection and review activities.

H.3.1.2 Public information and involvement

See section G.3.1.2.

H.2.2 Past practices

H.2.2.1 Regulatory requirements H.3.1.3 Consulting contracting parties

As described in section E.2.1.4, a funding mechanism is See section G.3.1.3. established in the legislation to cover expenses for liabilities Information regarding the planned extension of the SFR originating from the establishment of a nuclear disposal facility, currently the subject of the Government’s programme in Sweden. This special funding primarily licensing review process (see also section A.8.3.2 and contributes to the decommissioning of research reactors at K.1.2), will be submitted to the European Commission at Studsvik, the Ågesta reactor and clean-up activities at the the appropriate time in accordance with Article 37 of the former uranium mine in Ranstad. Euratom treaty.

H.2.2.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

H.3.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

The four utilities operating nuclear power reactors jointly own a special company, AB Svafo, to deal with manage- H.3.2.1 Repository for short-lived low and intermediate ment of the legacy waste and decommissioning of level waste from decommissioning decommissioning of the research reactors at Studsvik and A summary account of the siting process and related the Ågesta reactor. consultations undertaken by SKB in respect of the development of a repository for short-lived radioactive H.2.2.3 Regulatory control waste from decommissioning was provided in Sweden’s Decommissioning of the research reactors at Studsvik and fifth national report, published in 2014. SKB’s environthe Ågesta reactor as well as management of decommis- mental impact statement in support of licence applications sioning waste is subject to regulatory control. Regulatory under the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear review of these activities are part of SSM’s baseline Activities was submitted in December 2014. As noted in supervision which will continue until the facilities have Sweden’s sixth national report, one consequence of consulbeen free released and the licensee exempted from any tation with the local municipality for the preferred site (as further responsibilities. an extension to the existing SFR) was that SKB in May 2017 withdrew from the scope of its licence application a H.2.3 Conclusion request for permission to temporarily store certain Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 12. long-lived low and intermediate level wastes within the

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 129

proposed facility, pending the final repository for such instance be based on those factors (e.g. protection of wastes (SFL). human health and the environment, land use, access to infrastructure, potential to obtain societal support) that are SKB’s licence applications for extension to the SFR more easily determined at an early stage in siting, on disposal facility currently (at the time of preparing this condition that geological prerequisites can be met. report) the subject of scrutiny ahead of a formal Government decision. According to this model, the development of a siting process would be undertaken within the scope of an EIA H.3.2.2 Repository for long-lived low and intermediate consultation, starting from regions (at Forsmark and level waste (SFL) Laxemar/Simpevarp) where good geoscientific informa- As noted above, SKB’s RD&D Programme 2019 included tion already exists and that have previously been identified not only an evaluation of post-closure safety issues for the as being of national interest for geological disposal of proposed SFL repository but also an analysis of siting radioactive waste. In a first stage, comparative studies factors and a proposed stepwise siting process for the would be made with other regions where relevant data have facility. been obtained at appropriate geological depth or that have previously been highlighted as having potential advantages SKB indicates that a future licence application should from a radiological safety perspective. Were such areas contain a systematic comparison of available alternative shown to have obvious benefits, they could then be locations, taking account of key factors relevant to siting. included in the siting process if it were judged to be The identified key groups of factors for determining a reasonably practicable. More detailed site investigations preferred site are based on those adopted in corresponding and consultations would then be undertaken to develop the siting studies for the nuclear fuel repository and SFR. They necessary basis for selection of a preferred location. include: – safety and radiation protection after repository closure

H.3.3 Regulatory control

– a robust basis for meeting radiation safety

H.3.3.1 Repository for short-lived low and intermediate

requirements in the long term;

level waste from decommissioning

– technical feasibility – necessary conditions to enable In its published assessment and statement to Government technical implementation and operation of the facility; regarding SKB’s licence application to extend the SFR – environment and health – limited impact on the facility to accommodate short-lived low and intermediate environment and public health at a reasonable cost; level waste from decommissioning, SSM shared SKB’s assessment that the site is suitable and that there are – societal aspects – societal acceptance at the chosen as obvious synergies to be gained from co-location. SSM well as the alternative site. noted further that the location under the sea bed (at least SKB then gives an account of the various factors that are for the initial period after repository closure) had the included in each main group. According to SKB, the advantage of providing a low hydraulic gradient, which requirements relating to safety and radiation protection are would give rise to very slow groundwater flow in the similar, though not identical, to those for the spent fuel surroundings of the repository. It also meant that the repository. Key differences are that the total rock volume likelihood of intrusion would be very low during this required for SFL is considerably smaller and that heat period. generation from the wastes does not place any require- The site is considered by SSM to have advantages for ments on the potential host rock’s thermal properties. limiting the release of radioactive substance, not only in Information gained from investigations supporting siting terms of the relatively low groundwater flow rate, but also of the spent fuel repository (but also knowledge from the chemically-reducing conditions that are expected to other facilities, including Clab, SFR and the Äspö labora- dominate the repository environment after closure. Even tory, as well as rock cavern storage facilities at Studsvik and the proposed depth at which the repository extension Oskarshamn) is considered to be relevant to building up would be construction was judged to be suitable given the basic knowledge of geoscientific factors relevant to siting hazard presented by the waste, estimates of potential SFL. SKB draws the conclusion that it is unlikely, especially future permafrost depth and possible future human given the relatively small size of the planned repository, actions. that a meaningful ranking of alternatives can be based on SSM considered that the question of siting is to a large geoscientific information alone. extent a balance between advantages for radiation safety SKB also highlights challenges in achieving societal during the first 1000 years or so after closure and time acceptance – that it takes time to build up acceptance and period afterwards (e.g. for an inland site with even lower that it can never be taken for granted. On the basis that groundwater flow). Since the facility is designed for an several regions are potentially suitable from a geoscientific inventory of predominantly short-lived radionuclides, SSM perspective, but that it is not considered feasible to rank considers the potential advantages of possible alternative the technical suitability of alternatives in the absence of locations to be very limited, to the extent that they would site-specific geoscientific investigations, SKB therefore not justify the additional cost and inconvenience. Likewise, suggests that the selection process should in the first the Land and Environment Court, in its statement to

130 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Government on the conclusions of its scrutiny of SKB’s development of the design of a facility for long-lived

licence application under the Environmental Code, did not waste. A mechanism has therefore been established

question SKB’s arguments for siting the repository as an whereby SSM can provide guidance to SKB on regulatory

extension to the existing SFR. expectations relating to concept development for such a

facility, and to ensure that post-closure safety and radiation SSM noted that SKB had carried out a fairly extensive protection issues are accorded due priority in a future siting consultation process in relation to the siting of the facility, process. Following publication in autumn 2019 of SKB’s and its impacts on human health and the environment, latest safety evaluation report for SFL, SKB has specifically although there was no detailed consultation on matters requested that SSM undertakes a detailed review of the relating to design alternatives. The Land and Environment evaluation and underlying reports. See also section G.4.1. Court, in its corresponding assessment and statement to

Government, concluded that the consultation process was

H.4.1.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact

acceptable in relation to expectations established in the See section G.4.1.1. Environmental Code.

H.4.1.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommis- H.3.3.2 Repository for long-lived low and intermediate sioning level waste (SFL)

See section G.4.1.2. In its review of SKB’s RD&D Programme 2019, SSM

reviewed and commented on the identified siting factors

H.4.1.3 Technology provisions for closure of repositories

and proposed stepwise siting process proposed for SFL. According to Section 14 of the Act on Nuclear Activities, Other actors, including provincial government and local licensees retain their obligations to dispose of the nuclear municipalities, as well as Luleå University and the Royal waste and nuclear material in a safe manner until these Academy of Sciences, also offered comments on SKB’s obligations have been fulfilled. In accordance with Section proposals. SSM concluded that the proposed EIA-consul- 16 of the Act on Nuclear Activities, SSM determines tation to be led by SKB in the coming years was likely to whether these obligations are fulfilled. With respect to a be extensive, with many involved parties. It would also be repository, this can be achieved only after SSM has necessary to ensure that the work was underpinned by approved the final closure of the repository. In this concrete understanding of what is known, and what is not respect, final closure is defined to entail backfilling of currently known, in terms of requirements for concept and tunnels and shafts up to ground surface level in a manner technical development. Nevertheless, it was considered consistent with the safety analysis which, according to positive that SKB planned to start a consultation process SSM’s regulations concerning safety in connection with the and SSM recommended that the formal discussions should disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste (SSMFS encompass both siting and technical alternatives. 2008:21), must demonstrate how safety after closure is

maintained through a system of passive barriers. This in

H.3.4 Conclusion

turn means that technology provisions for closure need to Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 13. be developed at the design stage, as part of a comprehen-

sive design for the repository facility.

H.4 Article 14: Design and construction

H.4.1.4 Technology supported by experience

of facilities

See section G.4.1.3.

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to

H.4.2 Measures by the licence holders

ensure that:

H.4.2.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact

(i) (the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide for suitable measures to limit The safety philosophy applied in the design of all Swedish

possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and nuclear facilities is based on the principles of defence in

the environment, including those from discharges or depth and of using multiple barriers to prevent the

uncontrolled releases; unplanned release of radioactive material to the environ-

(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as ment. Facilities are designed to ensure that releases of

necessary, technical provisions for the decommissioning radioactive material in normal operation are limited as far

of a radioactive waste management facility other than a as is reasonably practicable.

disposal facility are taken into account; This safety philosophy underpins the design and planned (iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the construction of the extension to SFR to accommodate closure of a disposal facility are prepared; short-lived low and intermediate level waste from decom- (iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility missioning, as well as the conceptual designs under

are supported by experience, testing or analysis. development for the SFL repository for long-live low and

intermediate level waste. A specific example of how design

and construction measures to limit radiological impact

H.4.1 Regulatory requirements

have been informed by experience from related facilities is As a result of the review of the industry’s RD&D provided in H.4.2.4, below. programme 2016, it was decided by the Government that

consultation was needed between SSM and SKB regarding

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 131

H.4.2.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommis- A simplified design for overall closure of the spent fuel

sioning of radioactive waste management facilities repository has been proposed based on completed

Current planning relating to new waste management sensitivity analyses. It is noted that the size and function of

facilities in Sweden is focused mainly on alternative storage closure components may ultimately have an impact on

and disposal solutions for long-lived wastes, including details of the repository design, which means that

those arising from decommissioning of nuclear power continued efforts are needed in this area. SKB’s forward

plants as well as legacy wastes from past practices. Concep- RD&D programme therefore incorporates the drawing up

tual plans for decommissioning are taken into account as of an overall closure plan to yield more details with respect

appropriate in facility design and in accordance with SSM’s to the closure sequence as well as the required function and

regulations (SSMFS 2008:1; see also G.4.1.2). These plans potential size of closure plugs.

will be assessed by the regulator at the appropriate time Analyses in support of the proposed extension of SFR to when the relevant permissions are sought. accommodate short-lived wastes from decommissioning A recent very simple process working in practice is the have resulted in updated requirements on the closure

development of decommissioning plans for the new components for SFR as well as the development of a

interim storage facility for low and intermediate level coordinated closure plan for the extended facility. Closure

waste, to be constructed by AB Svafo as an extension to an is currently described on the conceptual level, with the

existing waste store on the Studsvik site (see section intention that knowledge concerning materials, design and

H.1.2.2). An outline description of decommissioning plans installation should be improved prior to the completion of

was originally submitted together with the licence applica- the PSAR. Separate studies of individual closure compo-

tion for the facility under the Environmental Code, which nents (e.g. modelling of concrete plugs) have been carried

was approved in January 2017. Plans for decommissioning, out to develop an understanding of how properties are

dismantling and demolition of the facility, consistent with expected to evolve over time, with the aim of defining

regulatory requirements, were subsequently examined as requirements in more detail. SKB is planning for continued

part of the PSAR for the proposed facility change in June technological development of concrete plugs with the aim

2019, when the licensee sought permission from SSM to of achieving a robust design that meets the relevant set of

begin construction. requirements and practical conditions for the repository.

In this particular case, however, since the new store is

H.4.2.4 Technology supported by experience

classed as an extension to an existing storage facility, the The principle of proven technology is broadly accepted plans for decommissioning are addressed as a modification and implemented in the design and construction proceto the SAR for the combined facility. The simple nature of dures for Swedish nuclear facilities. The use of properly the facility means that there are no radiological safety environmentally qualified equipment ensures functioning challenges associated with planning for decommissioning of safety-related systems and components under at the design stage. This in turn will be reflected in an emergency conditions. update to the overall decommissioning strategy for Svafo’s

operations on the Studsvik site. The development of engineered barrier designs for the

planned extension to the SFR-facility reflects experience

H.4.2.3 Technology provisions for closure of repositories gained from design and operation of the existing facility. In

An account of the current status of SKB’s technological particular, the vault for intermediate level wastes, known as

development programme relating to plans for closure of 1BMA, has been demonstrated to exhibit design flaws that

the spent nuclear fuel repository and SFR was provided in have given rise to cracks in the concrete structures that

Sweden’s fifth national report published in 2014. form the base and walls of the vault. SKB has since

demonstrated, through modelling studies undertaken in Activities relating to the design, development and verificaresponse to an enforcement notice, that such cracks may tion of plugs for closure of deposition tunnels in the spent not ultimately have a particularly significant impact on the fuel repository, including full-scale tests at the Äspö flow of groundwater through the wastes. Nevertheless, laboratory, are summarised in SKB’s RD&D Programme lessons learned from the causes of the cracking have been 2019. SKB notes that the purpose of the plugs is to keep taken into account in the design and construction methods the backfill in the deposition tunnels in place while for the corresponding vault in the extended facility. A minimising leakage of oxygen from access tunnels during prototype for the revised vault design has been installed at the repository operating period, until the adjoining main the Äspö laboratory to test the revised methods. tunnel can be closed. The full-scale tests were conducted

over a period of three years, demonstrating the feasibility

H.4.3 Regulatory control

of constructing the plug system that can withstand In performing reviews of licence applications for both the pressurisation using materials that conform to perfor- KBS-3 final repository for spent nuclear fuel and the mance requirements for the repository barrier system as a proposed extension of the SFR facility to accommodate whole. Reporting on gas transmissivity testing was short-lived low and intermediate level wastes from published in 2018. Lessons learned from evaluating the decommissioning (sections A.9.4.2, A.10.3 and K.1.2), SSM construction and dismantling of the plug will be compiled has given consideration to SKB’s reference designs, into a basis for further studies on materials and methods including plans and provisions for final closure. In both for plug design and construction.

132 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

cases, SSM has issued statements to Government based on H.5.1.2 Environmental assessment

the results of its comprehensive regulatory review of See section G.5.1.2.

supporting material to the licence application, declaring

that SKB will be able to meet regulatory requirements for H.5.1.3 The licensing procedure

operational and long-term safety of the disposal facilities. See section G.5.1.3.

The Authority has also identified during its reviews a range

H.5.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

of issues that need to be addressed as the repository design

and construction work progress in detail and underlying Waste storage facilities

safety analyses are updated ahead of future decision stages In 2016, AB Svafo submitted an environmental impact

in programme implementation. assessment to the Land and Environment Court in support

of its licence application under the Environmental Code to In its review of SKB’s RD&D Programme 2016, SSM construct a new interim storage building for low and emphasised the importance of SKB developing, as soon as intermediate level waste on the Studsvik site. Subsequently, it is feasible to do so, a sufficiently justified and detailed in June 2019, AB Svafo submitted a preliminary safety repository design concept as a robust starting point for the report (PSAR) to SSM, describing the radiological safety next phase in the development process. In this respect, implications of the store in terms of an extension to the SSM stressed the need to ensure that the outcomes of licensee’s existing above-ground storage arrangements on safety assessments are of sufficient quality to support site. Both the environmental assessment and the PSAR guiding decisions about the direction of future activities were comparatively simple documents, appropriate to the (for example, with respect to requirements for barrier nature of the hazard and reflecting the nature and purpose functions and their influence on concept development). of the store, where the primary focus is on shielding to The new safety evaluation study for SFL, submitted in protect the workforce and ventilation to maintain a suitable support of RD&D Programme 2019, was judged by SSM environment for long-term storage of metallic waste to have gone some way in this direction, by highlighting containers. certain critical factors affecting performance for this type

of facility. However, as noted in section H.1.3.1, there Short-lived operational and decommissioning waste

remains a need to demonstrate how the selected barrier In December 2014, SKB submitted parallel applications to

system design reflects the principles of minimising release SSM and the Land and Environment Court for permission

from the facility so far as is reasonably practicable. Such to develop an extension of SFR. The purpose of the

information will potentially make an important contribu- expansion is to accommodate disposal of additional

tion to defining preliminary acceptance criteria for wastes short-lived LILW, including those generated by demolition

destined to be disposed of in the SFL facility. of Swedish nuclear reactors. The licence application

includes an environmental impact assessment and a

H.4.4 Conclusion

comprehensive preliminary safety assessment report for Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 14. the extended SFR facility as a whole.

The first preliminary safety analysis report (F-PSAR),

H.5 Article 15: Assessment of safety submitted in support of SKB’s licence application, will be of facilities further updated and detailed so that it can be submitted to

SSM as a PSAR for approval prior to starting construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to of the facility. The safety report reflects a systematic

ensure that: analysis of both operational and post-closure safety

(i) before construction of a radioactive waste manage- considerations for the disposal facility. An updated safety

ment facility, a systematic safety assessment and an envi- analysis report that is meant to reflect the as-built facility

ronmental assessment appropriate to the hazard will then be prepared prior to trial operation. In the case

presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime of SFR, this means that the safety analysis report for the

shall be carried out; present disposal facility for operational LILW will, at this (ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, point, be replaced by the updated safety analysis report a systematic safety assessment and an environmental describing trial operation of the extended facility. Before assessment for the period following closure shall be the extended facility will then be allowed to begin routine carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria operation, the safety analysis report must be supplemented established by the regulatory body; with experience gained from trial operation. (iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste manage-

ment facility, updated and detailed versions of the safety

Long-lived operational and decommissioning waste

assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be A comparison of different design concepts for the prepared when deemed necessary to complement the repository for long-lived waste (SFL), including a qualitaassessments referred to in paragraph (i). tive assessment of alternative barriers and their long-term

safety function, was presented by SKB in 2013. SKB has

H.5.1 Regulatory requirements

now (autumn 2019) completed an updated safety evalua-

H.5.1.1 Assessment of safety, including post-closure tion, based on its preferred conceptual design for SFL.

safety The safety analysis is not yet at the stage where it can be

See section G.5.1.1. considered appropriate as support for a permit to start

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 133

H.6 Article 16: Operation of facilities

construction. This was, however, not SKB’s purpose of

the safety evaluation. According to SKB’s current planning

schedules it is not expected that the SFL repository will be Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to

commissioned before around 2045. ensure that:

(i) the licence to operate a radioactive waste manage-

H.5.3 Regulatory control

ment facility is based upon appropriate assessments as Short-lived operational and decommissioning waste specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion

At the time of preparing the Sweden’s sixth national report of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the

(2017) SSM was continuing its examination of SSM’s facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements; licence application, including F-PSAR, for the extension and continued operation of SFR as a disposal facility for (ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments as specified both operational and decommissioning short-lived in Article 15, are defined and revised as necessary; radioactive wastes. The Land and Environment Court’s (iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and public hearings into SKB’s licence application under the testing of a radioactive waste management facility are Environmental Code was held over a two-week period in conducted in accordance with established procedures. For September/October 2019. SSM and the Land and Envia disposal facility the results thus obtained shall be used to ronment Court submitted their findings to Government verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and for consideration in October and November 2019, to update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for the

respectively. period after closure;

(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related Having submitted its findings to Government, SSM plays fields are available throughout the operating lifetime of a no further direct part in the decision over licensing of the radioactive waste management facility; extension to SFR under the Act on Nuclear Activities. (v) procedures for characterisation and segregation of Likewise, the Land and Environment Court, after submitradioactive waste are applied; ting its findings to Government, plays no further part (vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely unless and until a determination has been made on the manner by the holder of the licence to the regulatory permissibility of SKB’s plans according to the requirebody; ments of the Environmental Code. (vii) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating

SSM is now making preparations to review the documenta- experience are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate; tion, including a PSAR covering operation and post-closure safety, which SKB needs to submit in support of an (viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are application to begin construction of the extension to SFR, prepared and updated, as necessary, using information if and when a licence is granted by Government. obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and

Long-lived operational and decommissioning waste are reviewed by the regulatory body;

At the time of preparing this report, SSM had just started (ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained its detailed review of the safety evaluation report published during the operating lifetime of that facility and are by SKB in autumn 2019 regarding the proposed SFL reviewed by the regulatory body. repository. As noted above, SKB’s planning schedule

suggests that it will be several years before a safety

H.6.1 Regulatory requirements

assessment is submitted in support of a licence application, See section G.6.1. and even more before an application to start construction

and operation. In the meantime, SSM expects to continue

H.6.1.1 Initial authorisation

in dialogue with SKB during pre-licensing with the aim See section G.6.1.1. providing guidance on regulatory expectations for future

safety analyses and licence applications.

H.6.1.2 Operational limits and conditions

See section G.6.1.2.

H.5.4 Conclusion

Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 15.

H.6.1.3 Established procedures

See section G.6.1.3.

H.6.1.4 Engineering and technical support

See section G.6.1.4.

H.6.1.5 Procedure for characterisation and segregation of waste

All waste to be disposed of in SFR, which is described in

detail in section D.1.4.5, must conform to predefined waste

acceptance criteria. The characteristics of each waste type

are documented in a Waste Type Description (WTD). The

134 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

WTDs are prepared by the waste producer in close contact The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear

with the licence holder of SFR (SKB). The completed installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contain legally binding

WTD is sub-mitted to SSM for approval. SSM reviews the requirements relevant for all obligations of Article 9.

WTD and may issue specific conditions for the disposal of These requirements are summarised in section G.6.2.

a particular waste type. To ensure consistent and comparable WTDs, guidelines have been issued for the structure H.6.2.1 Initial authorisation

and content of the WTDs. Wastes that are to be disposed SKB anticipates that authorisation to start operations of its

of in shallow land burials are specified and described in the planned disposal for low and intermediate level waste will

licences (see section D.1.4.2). The licensee must notify follow the procedures specified in SSM’s regulations. A full

SSM at least three months in advance of each such commissioning programme will be developed during the

disposal campaign and must then provide information course of facility construction, and will be submitted to

about each waste package. SSM for approval alongside the safety report for the

completed facilities, taking into account results from

H.6.1.6 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner inspection and any relevant non-active tests.

See section G.6.1.5. SKB submitted parallel applications to SSM and the Land

and Environment Court in December 2014 regarding

H.6.1.7 Programmes for collecting and analysing

development of an extension to SFR, see also section

operating experience

A.8.3.2 and K.1.2. The purpose of the expansion is to See section G.6.1.6. accommodate disposal of additional short-lived wastes

H.6.1.8 Decommissioning plans including those generated during decommissioning of

See section G.6.1.7. Swedish nuclear reactors. According to current plans, it is

anticipated that construction can start in 2023, with

H.6.1.9 Plans for closure of disposal facilities operation commencing in 2029.

SSM’s regulations contain several requirements relating to Also according to SKB’s current plans, outlined in the safety and radiation protection after closure (see sections RD&D programme for 2019, it is anticipated that licence G.3.1 and G.4.1). There are no specific requirements applications for the repository for long-lived low and concerning the closure of repositories for spent nuclear intermediate level waste (SFL) can be submitted around fuel or radioactive waste; however, as noted earlier (section 2030. This presupposes that a suitable siting process, in H.4.1), licensees retain their legal obligations for safe consultation with SSM and affected municipalities and management until they are judged to have been fulfilled, other interested parties, results in the identification of a which in practice entails approval by SSM of the final preferred location by the end of the 2020s. closure of the repository. This, in turn, means that the

plans and technical provisions for closure need to be Wastes that will ultimately be consigned to SFL are

developed at the design stage and updated during the currently stored at Studsvik, are being produced via the

operational lifetime of the disposal facility. decommissioning of nuclear power plants and other

facilities, and in some cases are being stored as in the fuel In the case of the SFR facility, the existing repository for storage pools at Clab. Conditioning and packaging facilities short-lived low and intermediate level operational waste, will need to be developed to meet identified waste acceptrequirements relating to closure planning are issued as a ance criteria for SFL before disposal can take place. licence condition. According to this licence condition, SKB Additional interim storage arrangements are also likely to is required to have a developed plan for the future closure be required, for example to accommodate long-lived of the facility. The requirement is important as future wastes from reactor decommissioning (including core and closure could ultimately entail the imposition of restricother internal components) as well as future wastes arising tions on the operation of the facility, such as on the from research, industry and medical applications. mechanical performance, physical dimensions or chemical

characteristics of the waste and waste containers. The closure

H.6.2.2 Operational limits and conditions (OLCs)

plan should be held under continuous review and may be See section G.6.2.2. modified as long as all relevant requirements are still met.

H.6.2.3 Established procedures

H.6.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

See section G.6.2.3. No radioactive waste disposal facilities have been commis-

sioned in Sweden since 1988, when the repository for H.6.2.4 Engineering and technical support

radioactive operational waste (SFR) was licensed for See section G.6.2.4.

operation. As noted previously, in addition to the reposi-

tory for spent fuel, two additional final disposal facilities H.6.2.5 Procedure for characterisation and segregation of

need to be constructed and taken into operation: a waste

repository for short-lived low and intermediate level See section H.6.1.5.

decommissioning waste, and a repository for the disposal

of long-lived low and intermediate level waste.

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 135

H.6.2.6 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner proofing membrane to protect barriers and waste in the In late 2012, SKB informed SSM that it was suspected that rock vault for intermediate-level waste (1BMA) and the errors could have been made in documentation relating to silo, as well as the addition of a sprinkler in the operations the material contents of a specific type of waste package building. Within the parameters of renovation work, from Studsvik that had been accepted at the SFR disposal projects continue for replacement of fire alarms, evacuafacility for short-lived low and intermediate level waste. tion alarms, fibre-optic networks, systems for monitoring Regulatory consent for disposal of this type of waste and control (SCADA systems), and gates and doors in the package was originally granted in 1994. The ISO waste underground area of the repository. containers contain concrete-grouted wastes in 200 litre drums, while the content of individual drums varies H.6.2.8 Decommissioning plans considerably in content depending on the original source, As described in section G.6.1.7, the general regulations which included institutional waste producers (both civil concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) and military) as well as nuclear licensed activities. comprise requirements for preparation of decommissioning plans for all nuclear facilities. The degree of detail In total 75 waste containers of this type were disposed of in such a plan increases as the time for decommissioning between 1994 and 2005, containing an estimated 2,800 approaches. waste drums. Subsequent to their disposal, non-destructive examination of similar, though mostly older (and therefore A preliminary decommissioning plan for the extended SFR not fully representative) drummed wastes remaining in facility has been prepared for the application under the Act storage at Studsvik had given rise to suspicions that the and under the Environmental Code for authorising the content of a significant fraction might not comply with extension and continued operation of SFR.

conditions for acceptance at the disposal facility. SKB

H.6.2.9 Plans for closure of disposal facilities

reported its intention in 2013 to retrieve the waste at an According to the current plans, closure of repositories will appropriate time, but noted that a decision would be taken not take place for at least 30 to 60 years. Closure is thus still only after further investigations had been undertaken. At part of SKB’s RD&D programme and an item for future first it was considered that the liquid content of the wastes safety assessments. Planning for closure has been undermight be the most significant anomaly and that non-comtaken for SFR and is reported as part of the supporting pliance, rather than a significant hazard to the workforce or material for the licence application to extend the facility. the environment, was the primary consideration. However, subsequent analyses, ordered by the regulator to guide the

H.6.3 Regulatory control

analysis of available options, revealed that a fraction of the packages were likely to contain very large numbers of small H.6.3.1 Operational limits and conditions Ra-226 sources (night sights from former military weapons). SSM routinely reviews applications from licensees for changes in the OLCs at licensed facilities, as well as for The presence of such sources, and possibly other longtemporary exemptions from the authorised OLCs. Based lived radionuclides, in the waste has potentially significant on the application and supporting information provided by implications for long-term radiation protection, both in the licensees, together with associated safety analyses, terms of the slow release of radionuclides from the assessments are made regarding how the proposed changes undisturbed repository and the possible consequences to or exemptions contribute to the risk profile of the facility. those directly exposed in the event of human intrusion. See also section G.6.2.5.

H.6.3.2 Procedures

Operational and maintenance procedures are normally not

H.6.2.7 Programmes for collecting and analysing

reviewed by SSM. Only in connection with event investiga-

operating experience

tions would SSM request that a procedure be submitted for The objective of the analysis and feedback programme review. concerning operating experience is to learn from one’s own and others’ experience and thus prevent recurrences of

H.6.3.3 Engineering and technical support

events, particularly those that might affect the safety of the SSM has also continued to carry out follow-up reviews of facility. The operating experience feedback process consists SKB’s plans for engineering countermeasures relating to of a wide variety of activities within the plant organisation degradation of the structural concrete in the BMA vault at as well as externally. SFR, but has yet to take a final decision regarding the When SFR was built, the intention was that the facility proposals that have been submitted. would receive waste up until 2010. Due to the prolonged operating time of the nuclear power plants, SFR’s H.6.3.4 Characterisation and segregation of waste operating phase will also be prolonged, which imposes new As described in section H.6.1.5, all waste types must be demands on the maintenance of the facility. In addition to approved by the regulator before disposal. Compliance remedial and preventive maintenance, the maintenance with regulations is verified by inspections carried out both programme includes identification, handling and preven- at the waste producer and the operator of the disposal tion of age-related deterioration and damage. In recent facility, e.g. SFR or shallow land burials. These inspections years, a number of maintenance projects have been carried for instance cover administrative routines, documentation, out in SFR. These have included installation of a water- equipment and radiological measurements.

136 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

H.7 Article 17: Institutional measures

One specific area that has been a matter of some attention

in recent years has been the disposal of certain operational

after closure

waste streams to the 1BMA vault for intermediate level

waste at SFR. In particular, SSM has raised concerns Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to regarding the swelling of bitumen-solidified ion-exchange ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:

resin and its potential implications for the integrity of the (i) records of the location, design and inventory of that engineered barrier. In this case it is important to know if facility required by the regulatory body are preserved; the waste may swell and, if so, how large the swelling (ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monipressure of the waste may be. Experiments conducted at toring or access restrictions are carried out, if required; the Äspö underground repository have shown that the and

matrix associated with the bituminised waste form is not (iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an sufficiently tight to prevent the ion exchange resin from unplanned release of radioactive materials into the envi-

swelling. SSM has underlined in an enforcement notice the ronment is detected, intervention measures are imple-

importance of updating and harmonising the definition of mented, if necessary.

waste acceptance criteria for SFR, with particular emphasis

on the disposal of bituminised wastes. H.7.1 Record keeping

The regulations on information archiving at nuclear

H.6.3.5 Incident reporting

facilities (SSMFS 2008:38) contain requirements for record As described in section H.6.2.6, SKB in 2012 informed SSM management, under which specified documents concerning about potential errors in documentation relating to the location, design and inventory of waste are required to be material contents of a specific type of waste package from kept in archives for more than 100 years. Moreover, the Studsvik that had been accepted for disposal in the SFR. general advice to the regulations SSMFS 2008:37, which

SSM issued in March 2015 an injunction requiring SKB to concern protection of human health and the environment

report to SSM to present an account of its plans in the in connection with final management of spent nuclear fuel

light of several key questions relating to the nature and and nuclear waste, states that the implementer should

timing of intervention. SKB reported to SSM in October produce a strategy for preservation of information so that

2015. In its review statement in March 2019, SSM appropriate measures can be undertaken before closure of

supported SKB’s decision to retrieve the waste, but the repository. Examples of information that should be

questioned whether SKB’s preferred option to retrieve the taken into consideration include information about the

waste in the 2030s (i.e. after commissioning of the planned location of the repository, its content of radioactive

SFR-extension) was in fact optimal. SSM therefore issued substances, and its design. Relevant records are to be

in March 2019 an injunction requiring SKB to report a transferred to national and regional official archives when

plan for when the waste should be retrieved, with reference facilities are decommissioned or closed.

to potential degradation of the waste containers. SKB SSM is currently considering which specific regulatory submitted a revised analysis of options in February 2020, requirements (rather than general advice) on record giving explicit consideration to SSM’s concerns regarding keeping, if any, may be appropriate to a disposal facility for degradation of the waste packages in situ within SFR, but radioactive waste. This involves consideration of the not significantly changing its previous conclusions purpose of such record-keeping and its contribution to regarding the optimum time for retrieval. At the time of overall radiation safety, as opposed to, for example, a more preparing the present report, SSM had not yet taken a final general desire to convey particular information to future decision position regarding SKB’s plans. See also section generations. It is recognised that a disposal facility operator G.6.2.5. will need to be aware of any such requirements from an

early stage in order to ensure that appropriate measures are

H.6.3.6 Experience feedback analysis

in place. See section G.6.3.4.

H.7.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

H.6.3.7 Decommissioning plans

Generally, licence holder organisations are responsible for Regulatory requirements (section G.6.1.7) specify that the development and management of records, and they updates of the decommissioning plan should be reported carry out the necessary RD&D on these subjects. The to SSM and reviewed by the regulatory authority alongside RD&D activities performed by SKB as a basis for the related updates of, and supplements to, the facility’s safety design work on repositories are based on the fact that the analysis report. The revised safety analysis report must be design is to be such that the safety of a closed repository is reviewed and approved by SSM before dismantling and not dependent on surveillance or monitoring, even though demolition are allowed to commence. However, no final it may be expected that some institutional controls – such decision on dismantling and demolition is expected for as safeguards for nuclear materials – need to be in place several decades in respect of SKB’s disposal facilities or after closure. other waste treatment facilities.

Monitoring programmes, covering both geoscientific and H.6.4 Conclusion ecological parameters, were already initiated at the time of

Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 16. the site investigations of the proposed site for the reposi-

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 137

tory for spent fuel and at the SFR site. A similar tion of their wider implications. If monitoring after programme is envisaged for the planned repository for closure, or any other measure to facilitate the retrieval of long-lived low and intermediate level waste (SFL). With a disposed materials, or to make access to the repository few exceptions, these programmes have continued after the difficult, is prescribed, its potential implications for completion of the surface-based site investigations, and disposal system performance must be considered (SSMFS will continue both during construction and operation of 2008:21). the repositories.

H.7.3 Institutional control

As construction and operation proceeds there will be a Requirements for institutional control after closure of a need to regularly reassess the selection of monitoring waste repository are neither established nor formally parameters, monitoring objects and measurement frequendecided. The general regulations concerning safety in cies. If judged useful, long-term experiments carried out nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) stipulate that a facility underground to explore impacts on key barrier functions for the disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that may be included. the barriers provide the required safety without monitoring A quality control programme will be developed prior to or maintenance after the disposal facility is closed. This is excavation with the objective of ensuring fulfilment of the specified further in the regulations concerning safety in design premises and other requirements for the construc- connection with the disposal of nuclear material and tion work and for the operations. Safeguards control will nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:21), in which it is stipulated be implemented to the degree needed. The control that safety after closure of a disposal facility shall be programme with its quality documentation is the basis for maintained through a system of passive barriers. Also, the assessing whether the construction and operational work regulations for protection of human health and the conform to the safety-related requirements as expressed in environment in connection with the final management of stated design premises and requirements for efficiency and spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:37) quality. The objectives and content of the control require that the long-term performance of a disposal programme will be defined prior to the underground facility should not rely on any active measures. construction work, but will evolve and be adjusted in The four shallow land burials for short-lived very low-level response to experience gained. waste (at Oskarshamn, Forsmark, Ringhals and Studsvik) Repository closure is a stepwise process, from consecu- are located within the premises of the power plant or tively closing a deposition tunnel to closing one or several licensed industrial facility at that location. Therefore, access deposition areas before the entire repository is closed. restrictions for the repositories are maintained through the Monitoring is planned to continue until all waste has been access restrictions that apply for the entire facility. Instituemplaced and closure of the repository facility is tional control in this case is requested for a period of up to commenced. At closure, monitoring systems that are 50 years after closure of the burial, primarily in order to accessible only from underground will be decommissioned minimise the potential for inadvertent disturbance of the successively. The extent to which the closure process itself wastes while the contamination is above clearance levels. It needs to be monitored must be considered at that time. is the task of the owner and operator of the disposal facility to demonstrate how the requirement for institu- A surface-based monitoring system may in principle be in tional control can be maintained over that period. For operation even after repository closure. The extent of the longer periods of time, it is foreseen that the environpost-closure monitoring programme will essentially be mental hazard and risk are principally of a non-radiological determined by decisions made at, or shortly before, nature. Prolonged requirements for institutional control closure. It is appropriate that any decisions on requiremay be issued by county or municipal administrations. The ments for post-closure monitoring are taken by the municipalities’ detailed development plans are also of decision-maker at the time of closure with full consideraimportance, by providing conditions concerning future use

138 Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

of the land. All nuclear facilities, including shallow land disposal facilities, are within areas where detailed development plans have been established.

H.7.4 Intervention measures

As described above, SSM’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:1, SSMFS 2008:21) stipulate that a facility for disposal of nuclear waste must be designed so that safety after closure of a disposal facility is provided by a system of passive barriers. Prior to disposal facility closure, the final safety assessment must be renewed and approved by the regulatory authority. Based on a regulatory review, the Government makes a decision on final closure of the disposal facility and whether the licence holder may be relieved from its responsibilities and obligations. Thus, if intervention measures need to be taken after the licence is surrendered, these will be the responsibility of the State.

H.7.5 Conclusion

Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 17.

Section H – Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 139

Section I – Transboundary Movement

I.1 Article 27: Transboundary movement

2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its

spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of

1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary

latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal. movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with 3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects: the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding (i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of international instruments. maritime, river and air navigation rights and freedoms, as In so doing: provided for in international law; (ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive (i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that transboundary waste is exported for processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination; after treatment to the State of origin; (iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel (ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international obligations which for reprocessing; are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized; (iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is (iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination exported for reprocessing to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting shall consent to a transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the from reprocessing operations to the State of origin. regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or

the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this I.1.1 Regulatory requirements

Convention; There are four different enactments that must be consid- (iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall ered in order to obtain a complete picture of the Swedish authorize a transboundary movement only if it can satisfy regulatory requirements regarding transboundary

itself in accordance with the consent of the State of desti-

movement of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste:

nation that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met

prior to transboundary movement; – the Radiation Protection Act (2018:396);

(v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take

– the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities;

the appropriate steps to permit reentry into its territory, if

a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed – Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009; and

in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe

– the Act (2000:1064) on the Control of Dual-use items

arrangement can be made.

and Technical Assistance.

Section I – Transboundary Movement 141

Sweden has implemented Council Directive 2006/117/ I.1.3 Experience of transboundary movements Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and Cyclife Sweden AB carries out volume reduction of control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel in radioactive waste on a commercial basis by incinerating the national legislation, i.e. the Radiation Protection Act combustible waste and melting scrap metal. The activities and the Act on Nuclear Activities. are to a certain extent based on services to companies abroad, and Cyclife Sweden AB imports radioactive waste In summary, and as specified in the Radiation Protection and scrap metal for the purpose of volume reduction. Act, a licence to export spent nuclear fuel or radioactive Remaining radioactive waste is returned to the country of waste from Sweden cannot be granted if the destination is: origin. Approximately two hundred transboundary i. south of latitude 60 degrees south; shipments of this kind are carried out each year. ii. a State party to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention which is not a member of the European Union; I.1.4 Conclusion The Swedish party complies with Article 27. iii. a State that has forbidden the import of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste; or iv. a State that, in the opinion of the responsible Swedish authorities, does not have the technical, legal or administrative resources to safely manage the spent nuclear fuel, or administrative resources to safely manage the spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste.

I.1.2 Regulatory control

Sweden follows the administrative procedures set forth in Directive 2006/117/ Euratom in order to ensure that states of destination and states of transit have the opportunity to give their prior consent, and are notified as is stated in the directive.

142 Section I – Transboundary Movement

Section I – Transboundary Movement 143

Section J – Disused Sealed Sources

J.1 Article 28: Disused sealed sources

In addition to the regulations, SSM can also issue licence

conditions concerning the management of disused sealed

1. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its sources. For sealed sources incorporated into electrical or

national law, take the appropriate steps to ensure that the electronic equipment, there is producer responsibility

possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed established through the Ordinance (2014:1075) on

sources takes place in a safe manner. Producer Responsibility for Electrical and Electronic

2. A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry into its Equipment.

territory of disused sealed sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a J.1.2 Measures taken by the licence holders

manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused

J.1.2.1 Disused sealed sources

sealed sources. Licence holders are required to keep records of all sources

in their possession and report to SSM when a practice

J.1.1 Regulatory requirements

involving sealed sources ceases, when the ownership of a The management of disused sealed sources is covered by particular sealed source has been transferred to another the Radiation Protection Act (2018:396). According to the licensee, and when a disused sealed source is either Act, anyone who has conducted activities involving sealed returned to a manufacturer or supplier, or sent for disposal. sources must ensure the safe management, including

disposal if needed, of the disused sealed sources. The Since one of the fundamental principles of radioactive

Radiation Protection Act allows the re-entry of disused waste management is that radioactive waste generated in

sealed sources into Sweden. Sweden shall be disposed of in Sweden, disused sealed

sources that are to be disposed of can be sent to the only Detailed requirements for the management of disused recognised radioactive waste management facility in sealed sources are found in regulations issued by SSM, see Sweden, Cyclife Sweden AB, for treatment and storage Annex L.1.1. SSMFS 2018:1 incorporates the provisions on before disposal. However, Cyclife Sweden AB is not high activity sealed sources from the Basic Safety Standards required to accept disused sealed sources. The company Directive 2013/59/Euratom. Before issuing an authorisaoperates on a commercial basis. If Cyclife Sweden AB for tion for practices involving high-activity sealed sources, some reason does not accept disused sealed sources for SSM must ensure that adequate arrangements exist for the treatment, the licence holder will have to store the source safe management of sources, including when they become on site unless it is possible to return the source to the disused sources. This may provide for the return of supplier or send it for reuse or recycling. When Cyclife disused sources to the supplier or to the recognised waste Sweden AB accepts receiving a disused sealed source for management facility Cyclife Sweden AB. Financial treatment and disposal, the company also assumes the provision must have been made to cover the cost of ownership of the sealed source which includes the management of the disused sources safely should the financial liability. licence holder become insolvent or go out of business.

Section J – Disused Sealed Sources 145

At Cyclife Sweden AB the disused sealed sources are with Cyclife Sweden AB accepting the responsibility to treated and stored pending disposal in either the disposal manage and dispose of orphan sources, the company facility for short-lived low and intermediate level waste, assumes the ownership of the sources. The orphan sources SFR, or the disposal facility for long-lived low and interme- are transported to the Studsvik site, where they are treated, diate level waste, SFL. During storage, the sources are conditioned and stored pending disposal. Short-lived retrievable. Cyclife Sweden AB receives approximately disused sealed sources, including orphan sources, can be 250-300 disused sealed sources on a yearly basis, not disposed of in SFR. Disused sealed sources must meet the counting a number of discarded ionising smoke detectors. same criteria as any item of short-lived LILW in order to be disposed of in SFR. The majority of disused sealed J.1.2.2 Orphan sources sources, including orphan sources, are long-lived. These Licence holders are required to take all the measures sources are stored at the Studsvik site until SKB’s planned necessary so as not to allow for sealed sources to fall disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate level outside of regulatory control. Nevertheless, on rare waste, SFL, is in operation. Should Cyclife Sweden AB occasions, orphan sources are found, usually at scrap metal choose not to accept to manage an orphan source, the recycling facilities. If the licence holder responsible cannot source has to be stored by the finder pending a solution. be identified, the State will provide financial resources for the management and disposal of the orphan source. This J.1.3 Regulatory control is made possible through a special governmental funding SSM plans and performs inspections regularly at establisharrangement that allows SSM to cover the costs up to a ments in the non-nuclear sector. When it comes to certain amount for the management and disposal of research centres and hospitals, the entire practice is orphan sources and legacy radioactive waste. The funding inspected, including routines for treatment of waste and at the moment is SEK 3.0 million per year. the facilities where radioactive waste and disused sealed sources are stored. Handling of disused sealed sources and Several orphan sources are recovered every year, using the back-end issues in general are usually brought to the financial resources provided by the State. To date, no attention of SSM in connection with inquiries made by orphan high activity sealed sources have been found. The licence holders about these issues. finder of an orphan source is required to contact SSM and apply for funding for the safe management and disposal of

J.1.4 Conclusion

the source. SSM commissions Cyclife Sweden AB to Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 28. manage and dispose of the orphan source. In connection

146 Section J – Disused Sealed Sources

Section J – Disused Sealed Sources 147

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

K.1 Measures taken to address

K.1.2 Complete licensing of the extension of the SFR repository for low and intermediate-level

suggestions and challenges at

waste

previous review Since the Joint Convention Review meeting in 2018, the

regulatory review process for SKB’s application, to extend

K.1.1 Complete licensing for construction

the SFR repository for short-lived low and intermediate

of an encapsulation plant and a spent nuclear

level operational waste to receive decommissioning waste,

fuel repository

has also reached the point of governmental decision. In Since the Joint Convention Review meeting in 2018, the 2019 SSM finalised its review and participated in the Land review process for the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and waste and Environment Court’s public hearing and consultation Management Co. (SKB’s) licence applications for construcprocess. SSM’s final review statement, recommending the tion and operation of an encapsulation plant and a deep approval of SKB’s proposed extension and continued geological repository for spent fuel has been completed. In operation of the facility, was sent to the Government in January 2018, both the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority October 2019. A month later the Land and Environment (SSM) and the Land and Environment Court submitted Court submitted its review statement to the Government final review statements to the Government for licensing and concluded that extension was permissible according to decisions. SSM recommended the approval of SKB’s the Environmental Code. SKB’s licence applications are application for a licence to possess, construct and operate now awaiting licensing decision by the Government (see an encapsulation plant and a final repository under the sections A.9.4.2 and A.10.3). nuclear activities act. However, the Court stated that SKB

would need to present further documentation clarifying the

K.1.3 Addressing issues arisen from shutdown

long-term protective function of copper canisters, for the

of several nuclear power reactors

repository to be considered permissible in accordance with The progress made in preparing for decommissioning in the provisions of environmental legislation. Sweden since the previous national report and the sixth

Upon request from the Government, SKB submitted review meeting, is recognised as a strong feature in the

supplementary information on these issues related to the effective implementation of a national strategy for the

copper canister in April 2019. After a renewed public immediate decommissioning of reactors in Sweden, see

consultation and a thorough technical review of the new section K.3.1.6.

material, SSM reiterated its earlier statement to the Decommissioning of nuclear reactors is also addressed in Government that SKB’s preferred site is suitable, the sections A.9 and A.10 from a waste management systems disposal concept is feasible and the safety case fulfils strict perspective and described in more detail in section F.6 with regulatory requirements. SKB’s licence applications are regard to measures to ensure the safety of decommisnow awaiting licensing decision by the Government. For sioning of nuclear facilities. Decommissioning is also more detail see sections A.9.4.1 and A.10.2. addressed in section K.2.2 as a measure for safety with

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 149

regard to the development of waste acceptance criteria for K.1.4.2 Measures taken to improve competence provision

long-lived waste, and in section K.3.1.1 with regard to SSM

continuity in the waste management programme as a Within SSM a project has started to develop a systematic

strong feature in establishing repositories for decommis- and effective system to compile annual updates of the

sioning waste. current status of the knowledge management framework.

There are also plans to initiate the earlier reference group

K.1.4 Competence for nuclear safety and

contributing to the above mentioned Government

radiation protection

assignment from 2016. The reference group consists of

K.1.4.1 Long-term competence provision some seventy institutions: CEOs; research managers; staff

On December 2016, SSM received a government assign- managers; professors and associate professors in the field

ment regarding the provision of long-term competence. of nuclear technology and radiation protection; regional

Two main background factors are given that describe this authorities (county councils); various interested parties

government assignment: from the health care; the Swedish Research Council, the

Government Research Council for Sustainable Develop- – International requirements regarding the provision of ment; the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research; relevant education programmes and national representatives from licensees and the Ministry of the competence in the area, together with the findings of Environment. SSM will also continue to have a dialogue international peer review (IRRS follow-up mission), with the central government research councils. conducted in 2016, which showed that Sweden does not

fully comply with IAEA standards for maintaining

SKB and the nuclear industry

competence in radiation protection and nuclear safety. As described in section F.2.2.1, SKB requires competence

– The decisions of the nuclear power industry to shut within many areas, especially within natural science and

down four nuclear power reactors up to and including technology, and SKB thus works actively with competence

2020, comprising changed circumstances that may have management in both the short term and the long term.

an impact on knowledge management not only in the Generally, the national trends with a declining interest for nuclear power sector, but also in relevant educational technical and scientific education poses challenges for SKB programmes. and for Swedish industry as a whole. SKB works together

with its owners to increase the attractiveness of the nuclear In September 2018 SSM submitted its report to the industry. For example, SKB collaborates with companies Government. Some conclusions from the report are as and schools, primarily at the locations where SKB is active, follows: and participate in labour market days, fairs and various – the national competence supply system in the field of industry events. In order to secure competence in the nuclear safety and radiological protection needs to be country in the longer term, collaboration with universities strengthened to meet today’s requirement for and university colleges is strategically important. competence and needs in coming years; In general, and in a long time perspective, SKB expects – there is need for a national strategy and cooperation in most of the need for personnel to be satisfied by personnel order to increase the efficiency of the system for the with basic education, who are then further trained by SKB provision of skills (competence); for the company-specific applications. In addition, there is – an increase in financing of critical research a need for a smaller number of persons with in-depth

environments is required. A better, formal liaison competence, for example postgraduates, combined with

between state actors involved in financing research is long experience of areas important for SKB.

necessary; In summary, SKB has developed strategic competence – there is also a need to secure vital educations in areas of management plans and analysed the risks that may arise, importance to nuclear safety and radiological protection, and considers potential problems to be manageable, if so that objectives of these educations remain clear and identified actions are successfully implemented. up-to-date and that quality in teaching is up-held; and Within the nuclear power industry recruitment campaigns – outreach activities in order to attract students to select has been implemented. Further a network for future education and careers in areas relevant for radiation competence supply has been established between Vattenprotection and nuclear safety are necessary. fall, Uniper in Sweden and TVO in Finland.

– The continued measures taken on behalf of both the

Educational system

nuclear industry and the state, are addressed in the Regarding the educational system, Uppsala University has following sub-sections. restarted in the fall of 2019 a previously discontinued

150 Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

nuclear educational programme. The programme is partly devises). The presence of these sources in the waste funded by Vattenfall. In addition, Chalmers University of significantly affects the long-term radiation protection both Technology has launched education on distance aiming to in terms of dose consequences from the undisturbed maintain competence in, reactor physics and nuclear repository, as well as the dose consequences in the event chemistry. The training is a part of the EU-programme of human intrusion. In the review statement in March Horizon. 2019, SSM supported SKB’s decision to retrieve the waste. However, in the review SSM identified factors that could

Investigation of the need for future research

point to an earlier retrieval compared to SKB’s preferred In December 2019 SSM was asked by a government option to retrieve the waste in the 2030s after the extension assignment to describe and clarify the need for research in of the SFR is expected to be in operation. SKB presented the Authority’s areas of activity in the future and what the comparison of the different options in February 2020. sources of funding should be used to maintain a national At the time of preparing the present report, SSM had not competence supply within the Authority’s areas of yet taken a final decision regarding SKB’s plans. See also competence that follow EU directives, conventions and section H.6.2.6 and H.6.3.5. IAEA standards.

K.1.6 Complete implementation of actions arisen

SSM reported back on this task in March 2020. SSM has

from the follow-up IRRS mission

earlier identified critical and vulnerable research areas. To increase research funding for the critical areas identified in K.1.6.1 After the 2016 IRRS follow-up the previous SSM report on long-term competence A full scope IAEA IRRS mission to Sweden was provision (see section K.1.4.1), the authority now proposes performed in 2012. The outcome of the 2016 follow-up that the Government raises SSM’s research grants to SEK mission was that two of 22 recommendations remained 130 million and requires Swedish research funding open. See also section 8.12. ‘Follow-up of the 2012 IRRS organisations such as the government Research Council for review mission’ in Sweden’s Eighth National Report under Sustainable Development (Formas), Sweden’s Innovation the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Ministry Publication Agency (Vinnova), the Swedish Research Council and the Series, Ds 2019:16, 2019. In general, the IRRS team was Swedish Energy Agency to make research calls within the satisfied with the approach of Sweden to address findings identified research areas to an ambition level corre- and the work in closing recommendations. Some progress sponding to about SEK 50 million per year. SSM has also after the 2016 follow-up is described below. suggested how the research funding should be shared between the Swedish state and the licensees. K.1.6.2 Competence for nuclear safety and radiation

protection

K.1.5 Management of non-conformities of waste See section K.1.4.

disposed at the SFR facility

As described in section H.6.1.5 and F.3.2, all waste types K.1.6.3 Operational experience and dissemination of must be approved by the regulatory function before significant experience disposal. Compliance with regulations is verified by The second open recommendation was R4: “SSM should inspections carried out both at the waste producer and the systematically evaluate operational experience from non-nuclear operator of the disposal facility, e.g. SFR or shallow land facilities and radiation protection events and activities, and should burials. These inspections for instance cover administrative establish and implement guidance for the dissemination of all routines, documentation, equipment and radiological significant operating experience lessons learned to all relevant measurements. authorised parties”. In late 2012, SKB informed SSM that errors could have In order to improve the evaluation of operational experiarisen in documentation relating to the material content of ence of non-nuclear facilities and radiation protection a certain type of waste package from Studsvik that had events and activities, SSM has implemented several been accepted for disposal at SFR. The following year, measures. These include improving the dissemination of SKB reported its intention to retrieve the waste (up to incident reports, exchanging information between the regu- 2,800 barrels in 75 containers) at an appropriate time, but latory authority, the licensees, and other national and that a decision would be taken only after further investiga- international organisations, and making more information tions had been undertaken. Although SSM accepted that on events available on SSM’s website. A procedure for the wastes did not represent an immediate hazard to the assessing reports from licensees, including deciding on workforce or wider environment, the regulator ordered in how to disseminate information they contain, is estab- March 2015 that SKB provide an analysis of available lished. It contains guidance on the management and assessoptions and the rationale for the actions SKB intended to ment of incident reports in health and dental care, and the undertake. When producing the requested reports, it was management of events in other practices and industries discovered that the waste also included large quantities of and research. Ra-226-sources from previous military use (night aiming

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 151

K.1.6.4 Outlook K.2.3 Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR)

Sweden has invited an IRRS-mission to Sweden in autumn Since the previous Joint Convention review process, PSRs

2022 followed by an ARTEMIS mission in spring 2023. have been carried out for the Westinghouse nuclear fuel

Before this, about a year earlier, a self-assessment will be factory (WSE), in Västerås, in 2019. The regulatory review

performed. In this context the two open recommendations of the PSR concluded that the facility is operated in line

will be re-evaluated and any additional actions will be with regulatory requirements but that there are room for

taken, as appropriate. improvements as regards full compliance with all require-

ments. SSM requested WSE to present an action plan to

address outstanding issues by 31 January 2020, which has

K.2 Other measures taken to improve

been reported to the regulatory authority. SSM also requested

safety WSE to report the next PSR not later than 1 July 2024.

K.2.1 Preparing for a decommissioning phase PSRs have also been carried out for the disposal facility for

The progress made in preparing for decommissioning in short-lived LILW (SFR) in Forsmark as well as for the

Sweden since the previous national report and the sixth interim storage facility for spent fuel (Clab) in Oskar-

review meeting, is recognised as a strong feature in the shamn, in 2020, both facilities operated by SKB. The

effective implementation of a national strategy for the regulatory review of the PSRs concluded that both

immediate decommissioning of reactors in Sweden, see facilities are operated in line with regulatory requirements

section K.3.1.6. and are expected to be operated safely until the next PSR.

SSM will follow up findings from the PSR within the Steps and measures to ensure the safety of decommisregular inspection programme. sioning of nuclear facilities are described in more detail in

section F.6.

K.2.4 Safety implications of long term management of spent fuel K.2.2 Development of waste acceptance criteria

Due to the decisions to decommission both Oskarshamn

for long-lived waste

units 1 and 2, and Ringhals units 1 and 2, there is an At present there is a considerable amount of long-lived increased demand to receive spent fuel at Clab to accomwaste in the waste producers’ storage facilities and modate the complete unloading of the reactors in a timely additional long-lived waste will arise during the continued manner. An uprating of the cooling capacity for the operation and decommissioning of the nuclear facilities. In storage pools at Clab has been made, by a modification to order to avoid that future transportation and disposal is the existing residual heat cooling system. The uprating is impeded, it is important to clarify how the long-lived waste also made in preparation of a planned increase of the is to be managed and characterised and which requirestorage capacity of spent fuel from 8000 tonnes to 11000 ments may be imposed on the waste today. There is thus a tonnes, pending the completion of the licensing of the need to specify preliminary waste acceptance criteria for KBS-3-system. the planned geological repository for long-lived radioactive

waste (SFL). Based on the initial review of the licence application for an

encapsulation plant for spent fuel to be collocated with In their latest RD&D programme from 2019, SKB presented Clab, SSM identified areas of improvement relevant for the the results from an evaluation of the post-closure safety of safety analysis report of Clab. As a result, SSM issued an the proposed repository concept for SFL. This evaluation, injunction to SKB to update the safety analysis report in which was done during 2015–2019, provides some areas relating to safety requirements, safety analysis and guidance for future acceptance criteria for the waste. The safety classification. SKB has since modernised the safety assumptions regarding waste form and packaging used in analysis report for Clab in several steps between 2016 and the safety evaluation have been based on the management 2020. The safety analysis has been supplemented with a of the waste to date. The results of the safety evaluation probabilistic safety assessment, including a human reliamay therefore be used in the continued work to provide bility analysis of all safety-related manual actions. The basic answers to how the present and former management safety concept of Clab relies on passive and inherent safety affects the conditions for future disposal. In addition to with extensive grace periods before any action is needed to requirements related to the post-closure safety of the avoid adverse conditions. The human reliability analysis repository, requirements related to the construction, strengthens the safety case for relying on manual actions to transportation and handling during operation will serve as achieve a safe state in case of incidents or accidents in the a basis to further define waste acceptance criteria. As the facility. The safety demonstration has also been extended details of the repository design are finalised, it will be to include a more comprehensive risk assessment of possible to establish waste acceptance criteria. It should be beyond design basis accidents. The assessment, based on noted that waste producers should not commence final IAEA and WENRA guides for design extension condiconditioning of waste until a verified repository concept tions, demonstrate that there are sufficient margins in the exists. design of the facility such that sequences leading to

significant fuel degradation are practically eliminated.

152 Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

K.2.5 Development of SSM’s regulatory framework Hierarchical structure

A new hierarchical and more transparent structure of

K.2.5.1 Major review and revision of SSM’s

SSMFS has been implemented. This has been achieved by

Regulatory Code

bringing together in one and the same regulations all SSM has conducted a major review and update of its provisions that are common to all types of activities with Regulatory Code of Statutes (SSMFS). The first parts of ionising radiation. This measure replaced seven earlier the new Code were finalised, issued and entered into force regulations. in June 2018. Some remaining parts regarding regulations on the management of nuclear waste (see section K.2.5.2) The hierarchical order of the regulations is divided into the and nuclear power reactors will gradually be completed and following levels. come into force between 2021 and 2022. – Level 1; one regulation (SSMFS 2018:1, see section L1) Experience has demonstrated the need to clarify and containing all basic and common requirements for broaden the regulations in order to create more predicta- activities with ionising radiation requiring a licence bility for the licensees and to improve the regulatory (medicine, research, industry and in the nuclear area). support. Other reasons for this revision are the IPPAS The regulation specifies requirements in the Radiation mission reports to Sweden in 2011 and 2017 (follow-up Protection Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities and report) and the IRRS mission reports to Sweden in 2012 has considered other international requirements and and 2016 (follow-up report). The 2012 IRRS mission documents published by the International Commission report concluded that Swedish regulations for nuclear on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the European Union facilities have, historically, emerged as the need for (EU), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulation arose. and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). Moreover, the Swedish Government has, through government assignments, ordered SSM in 2012 and 2013 to – Level 2; at this level there are several regulations review the regulations concerning nuclear power reactors, clarifying some of the basic provisions of Level 1, to ensure that appropriate requirements are in place for adapted to the substantive issues to which the potential new nuclear power plants, taking into account the provisions of Level 2 regulations apply. In addition, experiences of events and accidents that have occurred certain provisions specify general requirements in law. and new international safety standards. In 2015, the The regulations on level 2 regulate issues that are of government assignment was amended and expanded to significance to different activities separately and are include a general review of regulations on the safety of adapted to each type of facility. nuclear power reactors. – Level 3; at this level the regulations specify design and operational parts, where some of the provisions at levels Below is a general outline of how SSM has managed some 1 and 2 are more detailed in various respects. challenges in the process of review and revision of its Code.

K.2.5.2 Proposal for regulations on the management

Guidelines

of nuclear waste

As one of the results of the IRRS mission conducted in The purposed regulations on the management of nuclear 2012 SSM decided to develop guidelines to its regulations. waste aim to ensure a radiation safe handling and final So in parallel with the work of reviewing and updating the disposal of nuclear waste. Radiation safe treatment means Authority’s Regulatory Code (SSMFS), guidance text has all measures taken with regard to radiation protection and been prepared for each of the provisions in the various safety. Handling means all measures from the generation regulations. of waste until it has been released or placed in a final The purpose of the guidance text is to gain better under- repository and it final closure. An important prerequisite standing and thus fulfilment by the licensees of the for radiation safe treatment is a careful and comprehensive provisions by putting them into a context where the planning of the entire treatment process. purpose, background, considerations of the provision and The regulations constitute development of, and replacehow they are intended to be applied. For each provision, ment of large parts of, section 6. SSMFS 2008: 1 (see the guide also specifies the international requirements, section L1 about SSMFS 2008:1). The regulations will be guidelines and recommendations upon which it is based sent on a broad referral in autumn 2020 and are scheduled (e.g. issued by Euratom, IAEA, ICRP, WENRA). to take effect in early 2022. These guidance texts are only digital. The idea is that they can be easily updated as new experiences arise from K.2.5.3 Pre-study on the need for update of regulations supervision or if a provision is appealed and the judicial for final repositories proceedings give precedents on how the provision is to be Currently there are two regulations, issued in the 1990s, interpreted. on spent fuel and nuclear waste disposal (see section L1). The regulations need to be updated to better reflect national and international requirements. In the pre-study it is also considered to merge the requirements into one single regulation.

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 153

K.3 Strong features, major challenges

K.2.5.4 Pre-study on the need for regulations for nuclear activities other than nuclear power plants

and areas for improvement identified by

At present, a number of regulations apply to both nuclear

power plants in operation and other nuclear facilities. The the Contracting Party

experience from supervision shows difficulties in applying

K.3.1 Strong features

the same requirements to such different operations (as In its fifth and sixth national reports under the Joint nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities) with Convention, Sweden reported on strong features relating fundamentally different risks linked to the operations. to continuity of the waste management programme, A study was initiated within SSM to address this issue. The allocation of responsibilities, the functions of the regulastudy recommends that specific regulations be developed tory authority and a stepwise licensing process with specifically for non-nuclear-power-plant nuclear facilities. provisions for stakeholder involvement. These strong In this way, the requirements can be better adapted to the features have been central for Sweden’s progress in the specific risks associated with these facilities. These licensing of a deep geological repository for spent fuel, regulations are proposed to regulate construction, analysis, identified as a Good Practice at the previous review operation, decommissioning and final closure (of a meetings, and are still relevant as summarised below. geological repository). However, the preparation of such At the sixth review meeting, the decommissioning of regulations awaits a formal decision in spring 2020. nuclear reactors in Sweden was addressed as a challenge for In this context it should also be noted that extensive work future development. The progress made since the previous is underway to update regulations for analysis, design and national report in the development of regulatory requireoperation of nuclear power plants. ments, dialogue with operators, decommissioning planning and preparation, and the review and authorisation leading K.2.5.5 Preparation of licence conditions for interim to the commencement of large scale dismantling activities, storage and a future encapsulation facility is recognised and summarised below as a strong feature in Ahead of the planned expansion the existing interim the effective implementation of a national strategy for the storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) and the immediate decommissioning of reactors in Sweden. construction of a planned new encapsulation plant (combined with Clab), SSM has developed a proposal with K.3.1.1 Continuity in the waste management programme a set of licence conditions for those facilities. When the Building public confidence and acceptance in the managefacilities are merged they will be regarded as one and the ment and disposal of radioactive waste and spent nuclear same facility as they will be combined with shared technical fuel strongly benefits from a national system based on systems. The combined facility will also be considered as a consistent and long-term strategies and planning. In new facility (Clink). Sweden, financial arrangements have been in place and performing successfully for over three decades in parallel The purpose of the proposed conditions for Clab is to with the continuous progress of a research and developspecify certain aspects of construction work and safety ment (RD&D) programme for waste management, analysis for the planned expansion based on existing decommissioning and disposal. regulations. The purpose of the proposed conditions for the encapsulation facility (which is expected to be Strategies are being implemented, for example with the constructed at a later stage) is to supplement or replace establishment of the central interim storage for spent fuel those decided for Clab. The conditions focus on accept- (Clab) and disposal facility for LIL-SL operational waste ance criteria, evaluation thereof and optimisation of the (SFR) in the mid-1980s. Licence applications for an construction of the plant. Using a graded approach, encapsulation plant and deep geological repository for requirements that are considered reasonable for new spent fuel as well as for an extension of the SFR facility to nuclear reactors, such as WENRA’s Safety Reference accommodate decommissioning waste, have been Levels, will be applied to Clink. submitted to the regulatory authority SSM, subsequently reviewed and are currently pending Government licensing In the spring of 2020, the licence conditions were sent on decisions. SSM in 2020 reported to the Government on referral to SKB. SKB’s twelfth RD&D programme, with a specific focus on decommissioning waste management and the establishment of a future repository for long-lived LILW.

K.3.1.2 Stepwise licensing process with early regulatory involvement

Starting in the beginning of the 1980’s, the regulatory authorities have every three years reviewed the nuclear industry’s mandatory RD&D programme, developed by its implementing organisation SKB. This long-term regulatory engagement in the pre-licensing process of siting and development of disposal options has included broad public

154 Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

consultations and subsequent review statements to the integrity of the regulator has become increasingly crucial

Government as a basis for approval and strategic decisions with the progression of the licensing review of SKB’s

on the continued direction of the programme. The application for a spent fuel repository.

formalised pre-licensing process has enabled the authorities to monitor SKB’s siting process, perform pilot safety K.3.1.5 Provisions and actions taken for transparency

assessments, take part in pre-licensing consultations, and stakeholder involvement

participate in international projects and carry out inde- The legal framework for licensing nuclear activities contains

pendent research on geological disposal. provisions governing transparency, openness and public

participation. The licensing review for a spent fuel reposi- Following the pre-licensing phase, a key element in tory in Sweden has strongly benefited from the provisions Sweden’s regulatory framework is the clearly defined and for a transparent and predictable siting and licensing stepwise licensing process. A licence application for the process, with an active involvement of stakeholders. construction, possession and operation of a nuclear facility is reviewed by the regulatory authority, SSM, and the Land SKB’s siting of a spent fuel repository has engaged local

and Environment Court, and decided on by the Govern- communities in open dialogue. The concerned municipali-

ment. Following a Government approval, SSM in a ties have been involved on a voluntary basis and with the

stepwise process authorises the start of construction, the possibility to withdraw at all stages, from the initial

start of trial operation, the start of routine operation, and feasibility studies to the detailed site investigations. This

the eventual decommissioning or closure of the facility. A voluntary participation has also benefited from the

Government decision is again needed for the de-licensing understanding that an eventual host municipality ultimately

and exemption from responsibilities. The Authority has the right to veto a Government decision for a nuclear

reviews the application to ensure that all obligations and installation.

licensing conditions have been fulfilled. Preceding the licence application that was submitted in

March 2011, SKB conducted a number of consultation

K.3.1.3 Clear division of roles and responsibilities

meetings with stakeholders to inform about the planned The division of responsibilities is clear in the regulatory activities and to obtain comments on issues that needed to framework, with an effective separation between the be addressed in the formal Environmental Impact Assessfunctions of the regulatory body and those of the nuclear ment (EIA). The experiences from the RD&D review energy industry. The nuclear licensees have prime responsiprocess and the participation by the regulatory authority in bility for the safe operation of their facilities and transports these meetings contributed to building public and local as well as the safe disposal of spent fuel and radioactive communities’ confidence in the regulator’s independence waste. Swedish nuclear power plant licensees also have a and in the overall licensing process. common obligation to conduct research and development of disposal solutions (the RD&D programme) and to carry To enable an active public participation during the licensing

out cost estimates as a basis for payments to the Nuclear process, host municipalities, regional authorities and certain

Waste Fund. environmental organisations have also received financial

support through the Nuclear Waste Fund. These stake- The legislation provides the regulatory authority with a holders were involved in the pre-licensing process, are well strong mandate as well as extensive supervisory and informed and have over time built a good capacity for enforcement powers. As a regulator, SSM is authorised to constructive dialogue. issue legally binding requirements regarding all aspects of nuclear activities and radiation protection. SSM supervises In order to support the initial review and analyse the

SKB, the power plant operators and other licensees of quality of SKB’s application, SSM arranged for an interna-

nuclear activities in fulfilling their responsibilities for safe tional peer review of the post-closure safety case,

operation of facilities and transports as well as in planning organised by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Results

for decommissioning and disposal. were made available and communicated by the review team

to the public and stakeholders in meetings at SSM and the

K.3.1.4 Independence and competence of the regulatory host municipality in 2012.

authority

SSM also distributed SKB’s license applications according SSM is the national regulatory body with a clear mandate in to the Act on Nuclear Activities as part of a broad national the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection, nuclear consultation. During the continued licensing review, all security and nuclear non-proliferation. SSM is provided relevant documents, including detailed supporting docuwith the adequate authority, competence and financial and mentation to the licence application, supplementary human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. information requests by SSM together with SKB’s SSM’s regulatory independence in its decision making responses, external experts’ technical review reports and according to the legal mandate is underpinned by Swedish SSM’s review statements, have been successively published legislation (see section E.3), but it is also a matter of public on SSM’s website. These have also included minutes from service culture and values. As a strong, independent and dialogue meetings between SSM and SKB, and the fully accountable national authority, SSM is confident and publication by SSM of preliminary results between June trustworthy in upholding high safety standards. The 2015 and March 2016.

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 155

Swedish official documents are publicly available and the – The financial support provided to stakeholders through right to anonymously request or access a public document the Nuclear Waste Fund, which has made it possible for is protected. This applies unless a decision has been made local host municipalities and certain environmental to classify them under the Public Access to Information organisations to build their capacity to take an active and Secrecy Act (2009:400). Reasons for secrecy might part in formal consultations. include interests of national security, international In practice, these provisions have been very beneficial to relations, commercial relations, or individuals’ right to the overall quality and public confidence in the licensing privacy. SSM provides information services to the public process for a spent fuel repository. However, maintaining concerning its regulatory activities and regularly publishes public trust and stakeholder confidence have been chalreports to inform interested parties and stakeholders. The lenging at critical decision points during the licensing SSM website is used to provide information on current phase. For further information on measures taken to events and authority decisions. SKB report series are made complete the licensing since the previous review meeting, public as well and can be downloaded from www.skb.se. see section K.1.1. In parallel with the licensing review and being the competent regulatory authority on nuclear activities, SSM K.3.1.6 Effective regulatory review of decommissioning participated in the Land and Environment Court’s of nuclear reactors consultation process under Sweden’s environmental Twelve commercial reactors were commissioned at the legislation. This included submitting a consultation Ringhals, Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Barsebäck sites in statement in June 2016 and giving independent testimony southern Sweden between 1972 and 1985. The twin BWR in a five-week public court hearing in September to units Barsebäck 1 and 2 were shut down permanently in October 2017. 1999 and 2005. In 2015, the utilities decided to shut down

the four oldest reactors at Oskarshamn (BWR units 1 and In January 2018, both SSM and the Court submitted final 2) and Ringhals (BWR unit 1 and PWR unit 2) before review statements to the Government. Preceding the 2020, i.e. ahead of their estimated operating time. The licensing decision, the Government has an obligation to Ågesta PHWR was permanently shut down in 1974. consult with the host municipalities. The decommissioning strategy is immediate dismantling The key contributing features to a successful stakeholder and operational as well as the regulatory control activities engagement in the licensing process for a spent fuel are financed through the National Nuclear Waste Fund. repository in Sweden can be summarised as follows.

Since the previous review meeting, SSM has arranged two – The nuclear industry’s shared obligation for the workshop seminars a year on the various technical and development of waste management and disposal regulatory issues of decommissioning, with between 80 solutions, manifested in SKB’s RD&D programme, and 100 industry participants. These meetings, with group together with associated regulatory review, public discussions on selected topics and presentations by consultations and Government approvals every three recognised experts, have greatly supported the dialogue, years. building of knowledge and adherence to regulatory – The financial provisions, including the re-calculation of requirements that is necessary for the safe and efficient fees to be paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund every three decommissioning of Swedish reactors. years, as well as continuous reimbursements for the RD&D programme progress, including spent fuel Essentially, a comprehensive regulatory system for management. decommissioning of nuclear facilities was already in place. However, certain adaptations and amendments to the – The clear allocation of responsibilities between nuclear requirements had to be made by SSM in order to facilitate power plant licensees and their implementing for the operators to prepare their applications for decomorganisation SKB, the independent regulatory authority missioning and supporting documents. SSM achieved this and the political decision level. by issuing additional licensing conditions for the seven – The local municipalities’ voluntary participation in the units which are permanently shut down or which will be siting process and right to veto a decision by the shut down in the near future. Government to grant a licence for a nuclear installation. In 2017, and updated in 2018, SSM issued specific licence – The plan for the formal process of consultation with conditions for the decommissioning of the Barsebäck, stakeholders that a prospective licensee is required to Oskarshamn, Ringhals, and Ågesta reactors. These submit in accordance with the requirements of the complement the provisions of SSM’s general regulations Environmental Code as part of the development of an concerning allowed preparatory decommissioning activities environmental impact assessment (EIA). and the content of the safety documentation. SSM has also

– The open access to public information and dialogue developed its regulations for the clearance of materials, with stakeholders in the licensing review under the building structures and sites. The licence conditions and nuclear activities act. enhanced regulations have facilitated the licensee’s efficient preparation of safety reports and supporting documents for dismantling and demolition.

156 Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

Preparatory decommissioning activities at the Oskarshamn disposal. Hence, if Cyclife for some reason denies to

and Barsebäck units and the Ågesta reactor have included receive radioactive waste, the holder of the waste has no

the segmentation of reactor internals and radiological other waste management company to turn to.

characterisation. In late 2019, all five reactors had received – There are no designated storage facilities available, so a environmental licences for decommissioning from the holder of non-nuclear radioactive waste which is denied Land and Environment Court, as well as authorisation by Cyclife Sweden AB has to store the waste on-site from SSM to start large scale dismantling and demolition until further notice which in many cases is not an ideal activities. situation.

SSM’s authorisation for the start of dismantling and – Long-lived radioactive waste typically cannot be demolition activities is based on regulatory review of the disposed of in SFR, thus it has to be stored until SFL is safety documentation and the environmental monitoring in operation which will be in 2045 at the earliest. programme. The safety documentation basically consists Because SFL is not yet constructed, the final costs for of the safety report, the operational limits and conditions, disposal in the repository are very difficult to determine the waste management documentation, and supporting today. Cyclife Sweden AB has indicated that it might be documents such as the final decommissioning plan and the too much of a financial risk for them to assume decommissioning strategy. responsibility for long-lived non-nuclear radioactive

waste. Also, even though SKB has entered into

K.3.2 Challenges and areas of improvement

agreements on final disposal of non-nuclear radioactive

K.3.2.1 Management of radioactive waste from outside waste with both Cyclife and ESS for instance, these

of the nuclear fuel cycle agreements do not mean that SKB will accept waste for

The radioactive waste management system that has been disposal without reservation. SKB has no obligation to

established in Sweden throughout the years is primarily receive non-nuclear radioactive waste.

focussed on spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste arising – Non-nuclear activities will continue to generate from the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power radioactive waste for many years to come, after both reactors. The general attitude regarding radioactive waste SFR and SFL have been closed. This has become from hospitals, educational and research facilities and particularly pronounced with the planning and non-nuclear industries has been that the volumes and construction of the ESS facility (see section A.8.1.8). activities are so low that it can be managed within the The ESS facility is expected to produce considerable system created for the management of spent nuclear fuel amounts of long-lived radioactive waste, both from and nuclear waste. This is reflected in the one-off compenoperation and from decommissioning which will need sation payment that the Government in 1984 agreed to the to be disposed of in SFL. According to the timetable predecessor of Cyclife Sweden AB, Studsvik Energiteknik ESS will cease its operation in 2065, whereas SKB plans AB, to cover future costs for disposal in SFR of radioactive to have SFL closed by 2055. waste originating from non-nuclear activities.

K.3.2.2 Management of human resources and

A holder of non-nuclear radioactive waste therefore relies

maintaining knowledge

on commercial solutions where waste management The time horizon for the Swedish nuclear industry’s companies on a voluntary basis agree to manage and current waste management plans extend until the latter dispose of the waste. The companies involved have no part of the 21 century. This poses big challenges on the obligation to receive non-nuclear radioactive waste for long-term planning of competence management and treatment, storage or final disposal. Holders of non-nuprovision of human resources for the regulatory authority, clear radioactive waste pay Cyclife Sweden AB to treat, the nuclear industry and the national educational system. store and dispose of radioactive waste. When Cyclife The issue of complying with international requirements on Sweden AB accepts to receive the waste, the company also the terms of relevant education programmes and national assumes the responsibility for the waste. Cyclife has competence in the areas of radiation protection and safety agreements with SKB for the disposal of radioactive waste was also a specific recommendation in the IRRS report of in SFR, in the planned extended SFR and in the planned 2016. SFL.

In addition, the Swedish nuclear and waste management By and large, this system has worked over the years. programme is currently moving into a phase of nuclear However, there are shortcomings which can make it a reactor decommissioning and step-wise implementation of challenge for holders of non-nuclear radioactive waste to disposal solutions. This transition involves challenges in fulfil their statutory responsibility for the waste, both in the securing the provision of relevant competence both in the present and in the future: short and long term.

– Cyclife Sweden AB is the only recognised radioactive Section K.1.4 describes the strategic planning and measures waste management facility in Sweden for managing taken by the Swedish Government, the regulatory non-nuclear radioactive waste. It operates on a authority, the nuclear industry and educational institutions commercial basis and is not obliged to accept to address the above challenges. non-nuclear radioactive waste for management and

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 157

K.4 Policy and plans for international

SSM publishes and makes the Swedish national reports of the Joint Convention publicly available on SSM’s official

peer review missions

website. SSM is also planning to publish questions and As a Member State of the European Union, Sweden is comments received from other contracting parties, required to periodically, and at least every 10 years, arrange including the responses to these questions. All documentafor self-assessments to be made and invite international tion filed that relates to the production of each national peer reviews of its national framework, competent report from Sweden is obtainable from SSM upon request regulatory authority, and/or national programme with the in accordance with the Swedish principle of public access aim of ensuring that high safety standards are achieved in to official records. the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. SSM has the task of submitting proposals to the Government on the appropriate time schedule for such assessments and international peer reviews. As described in section K.1.6, a follow-up IRRS mission was carried out in Sweden in 2016. Sweden is now planning for a new full-scope IRRS mission to be carried out in autumn 2022 and an ARTEMIS in spring 2023.

K.5 Actions to enhance openness and transparency in the implementation of the obligations under the Convention

The legal framework for the licensing and supervision of nuclear activities in Sweden also stipulates provisions on transparency, openness and public participation. As an example, the regulatory review of SKB’s and the power plant licensees’ triannual RD&D programmes, as well as SKB’s and the authorities’ consultation with stakeholders in connection with the licence applications for a spent fuel repository, provide opportunities for broad public participation in the development of a Swedish system for managing spent fuel and radioactive waste. The siting and development of a spent fuel repository in particular has benefited from the provisions for an open, transparent and predictable pre-licensing and licensing process, with the active involvement of stakeholders. These provisions and the actions taken are described as strong features of the Swedish waste management system in section K.3.1.5. Furthermore, according to the Ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (2008:452), SSM is required to ensure that a current national plan is in place for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste corresponding with the content required under Article 12 of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom. In the process of developing or amending this plan, SSM should give appropriate representatives of relevant agencies, local authorities, the public and industry an opportunity to comment.

158 Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety

Section K – General Efforts to Improve Safety 159

Section L – Annexes

L.1 Summary of applicable regulations

– Radioactive sources intended for exposure

A brief description is provided below of the Swedish – Radioactive waste

Radiation Safety Authority’s (SSM) regulations with – Discharge of radioactive substances relevance to the safe management of spent fuel and – Decommissioning radioactive waste, presented by main areas of application. As considerable work has been carried out on revising the L.1.1.2 Regulations on activities requiring notification content and overall structure of SSM’s Regulatory Code (SSMFS 2018:2) (see also sections A.6.5 and K.2.5). These regulations include activities that only need to be

notified. This is an application of the principle of graded

L.1.1 General radiation protection safety

approach according to art. 24.1 Council Directive

regulations

2013/59/Euratom.

L.1.1.1 Regulations on basic requirements on activities

The regulations apply to the following activities; sealed and

involving ionising radiation requiring permit (SSMFS

unsealed sources below certain activity levels, orthodontic

2018:1)

and veterinary x-ray diagnostics, cabinet x-ray equipment, These regulations contain all basic and common requiretechnical devices for measurement, control, analysis and ments for activities with ionising radiation requiring a laboratory use, microwave drying, medical solariums and licence (in medicine, research, industry, and in the nuclear professional trade in radiation sources, etc. area). The regulation specifying requirements in the Radiation Protection Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities Basically the regulations have the same requirements as in and has considered other international requirements and SSMFS 2018: 1 but in a less extensive application. documents published by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the European Union (EU), L.1.1.3 Regulations and general advice concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the safety in certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1) Western European Nuclear Regulators Association These general regulations are primarily worded to apply to (WENRA). nuclear power reactors. However, because the application of the regulations is subject to a graded approach, the To each of the paragraphs there are a guidance explaining regulations are also applicable to all licensed nuclear the purpose, background, considerations, application of facilities. This is regardless of the size or type of facility, the provision and references to the provisions. i.e. research or materials testing reactors, fuel fabrication The regulation contains basic provisions on e.g.: plants, facilities for handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel, and facilities for handling, storage or disposal of – Risk Analysis nuclear waste. – Physical protection The purpose of the regulations is to specify the measures – Emergency preparedness needed for preventing and mitigating radiological accidents,

– Management system preventing illegal access to nuclear material and nuclear waste, and conducting efficient supervision. The regulations – Protection of workers cover the following areas: – Protection of the public and the environment

Section L – Annexes 161

– Application of multiple barriers and defence in depth L.1.2.2 Regulations and general advice on the protection

of human health and the environment in connection with

– Response to detected deficiencies in barriers and the

the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear

defence in depth

waste (SSMFS 2008:37)

– Organisation, management and control of activities These regulations apply to the disposal of spent nuclear significant for safety fuel and nuclear waste. They are not applicable to landfills for low-level nuclear waste. The basic requirement is that – Actions and resources for maintaining and developing human health and the environment shall be protected from safety detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during operation – Physical protection and emergency preparedness as well as after closure. Another important requirement is – Basic design principles that impacts on human health and the environment outside Sweden’s borders are not permitted to be more severe than – Assessment, review and reporting of safety those accepted in Sweden. – Operations of the facility The regulations contain provisions on areas such as BAT – On-site management of nuclear materials and waste and optimisation, the risk criterion and most exposed – Reporting to SSM of deficiencies, incidents and group, time periods for the risk analysis and demonstration accidents of compliance for different time periods. – Documentation and archiving of safety documents

L.1.3 Regulations on or related to non-nuclear

– Final closure and decommissioning radioactive waste – For most of the requirements, general advice on their L.1.3.1 Regulations on smoke detectors for domestic interpretation has been issued. use containing radioactive sources (SSMFS 2008:47) These regulations stipulate that the discarded units are to L.1.1.4 Regulations on radiation protection managers at be collected and shipped for disassembly.

nuclear power plants (SSMFS 2008:24)

According to these regulations, a licence holder is required L.1.3.2 Regulations on smoke detectors for industrial to appoint a radiation protection manager at the facility in use containing radioactive sources (SSMFS 2008:44) order to implement radiation protection conditions issued These regulations stipulate that the disused units should be by the authorities and to supervise compliance with these handled as radioactive waste and returned to the supplier conditions. or manufacturer.

L.1.1.5 Regulations on filing at nuclear power plants L.1.4 Regulations on discharges and protection of (SSMFS 2008:38) workers and the public

These regulations apply to filing of documentation that

L.1.4.1 Regulations on the protection of human health

has been drawn up or received in connection with the and the environment from discharges of radioactive operation of nuclear power plants. Certain documentation substances from certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:23) must be filed. If the practice ceases, the archives are These regulations contain provisions on releases of required to be transferred to the National Archives of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities during normal Sweden. operation based on optimisation of radiation protection. Compliance is to be achieved by using the best available

L.1.2 Regulations on final disposal

technique (BAT). The optimisation of radiation protection L.1.2.1 Regulations concerning safety in connection shall include all facilities located within the same geographwith the disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste ically delimited area. The effective dose to an individual in (SSMFS 2008:21) the critical group of one year of releases of radioactive These regulations, in force since 2002, contain specific substances to air and water from all facilities located in the requirements for design, construction, safety analysis and same geographically delimited area shall not exceed 0.1 safety reporting of disposal facilities in view of the period millisievert (mSv). after closure of the facility. For the period before closure, the general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) apply. L.1.4.2 Regulations on radiation protection of workers

exposed to ionising radiation at nuclear power plants

The regulations concerning long-term safety for disposal

(SSMFS 2008:26)

of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste specifically cover: These regulations contain provisions on limitation of – qualitative requirements for the barrier system exposures as far as reasonably achievable while having taken into account societal and economic factors. For this – scenario definitions and classifications purpose, the licence holder must ensure that goals and – timescales for the safety assessment (as long as barrier needed actions for control are established and documented functions are needed to isolate and/or to retard and that the needed resources are available. dispersion of radionuclides, but for at least 10,000 years) – topics to be covered in the safety report

162 Section L – Annexes

L.1.5 Regulations on emergency preparedness, L.1.7 Regulations on shipments and reporting physical protection and safeguards

L.1.7.1 Regulations on the control of transboundary L.1.5.1 Regulations on emergency preparedness at shipments of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2014:2) (SSMFS 2009:1)

These regulations apply to the planning of emergency These regulations apply to transboundary shipments of preparedness and radiation protection measures in the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel within the event of an emergency or a threat of an emergency at European Union as well as from or to the European nuclear facilities. Union, provided that Sweden is the country of origin, country of destination or country of transit. The regulations contain provisions on planning of emergency preparedness, alarm criteria and alarms, The regulations, which implement Council Directive premises, assembly stations, iodine tablets, personal 2006/117/Euratom, require prior authorisation for moving protection equipment, evacuation, education and training, radioactive waste and spent fuel across borders if the item radiation surveillance, filtration, meteorology data, etc. is being sent from, through, or to an EU country. Additional provisions on emergency preparedness are stipulated in the regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority concerning safety in nuclear facilities.

L.1.5.2 Regulations on physical protection of nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:12)

These regulations contain requirements on organisation of physical protection, clearance of staff, tasks for security staff, central alarm station, perimeter protection, protection of buildings, protection of compartments vital for safety, access control for persons and vehicles, protection of control rooms, communication equipment, searching for illegal items, handling of information about the physical protection, and IT security. Design details about the physical protection are to be reported in a classified attachment to the SAR of the facility.

L.1.5.3 Regulations on the control of nuclear material, etc. (SSMFS 2008:3)

These regulations apply to the measures required to meet the obligations resulting from Sweden’s agreements in order to prevent proliferation and unauthorised dealing with nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel placed in the final repository, nuclear equipment and related software and technology.

L.1.6 Regulations on clearance and exemption

L.1.6.1 Regulations on exemptions from the Radiation Protection Act and on clearance of materials, building structures and areas (SSMFS 2018:3)

These regulations contain provisions on the clearance of materials, rooms, buildings and land that have been used in practices involving ionising radiation.

Section L – Annexes 163

L.2 List of acronyms

ALARA As Low As Reasonable Achievable (a principle applied in radiation protection) ATB 1T Waste container for transportation of long-lived low and intermediate level waste AM Interim storage for low and intermediate level waste (Studsvik site) AU Storage facility for radioactive waste (Studsvik site) AV Swedish Work Environment Authority BAT Best Available Technique BFA Rock Cavern for Waste (Oskarshamn site) BKAB Barsebäck Kraft AB BLA Rock vault for low level waste (part of the SFR facility) BMA Rock vault for intermediate level waste (part of the SFR facility) BSS Basic Safety Standards BTF Rock vault for concrete tanks (part of the SFR facility) BWR Boiling Water Reactor Clab Centralt Lager för Använt Bränsle (central interim storage facility for spent fuel) Clink Integrated central interim storage facility and encapsulation plant ConvEx IAEA Convention Exercises ECURIE European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange EIA Environmental Impact Assessment ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group EU European Union FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency FR0-A Treatment facility for radioactive non-nuclear waste (Studsvik site) HA Incineration facility (Studsvik site) HCL Hot Cell Laboratory (Studsvik site) HELCOM The Helsinki Commission HERCA Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities HRL Hard Rock Laboratory IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection IGD-TP Implementing Geological Disposal of radioactive waste Technology Platform INES International Nuclear Event Scale INEX OECD/NEA International Nuclear Emergency Exercises INRA International Nuclear Regulators’ Association IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service ISO International Standard Organisation KBS-3 Proposed method for disposal of spent nuclear fuel KTH Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (Royal Institute of Technology) LER Licensee Event Report LILW Low and Intermediate Level Waste LLW Low Level Waste MOX Mixed oxide fuel MSB Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency MTO Interaction between Man, Technology and Organisation NBHW National Board of Health and Welfare NEA Nuclear Energy Agency within the OECD

164 Section L – Annexes

NESA National Expert Council on Remediation NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials NORMAN Nordic manual for cooperation between the respective regulators in the five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in response to and preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergencies and incidents NPP Nuclear Power Plant (including all nuclear power units at one site) OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OKG Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp AB OLC Operational Limits and Conditions OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report/Preliminary Safety Report PSR Periodic Safety Review PWR Pressurised Water Reactor QA Quality Assurance R0-A Treatment facility for radioactive non-nuclear waste (Studsvik site) RadGIS Radiation Geographical Information System software for reporting, storing, extracting and visualising radiation monitoring data and environmental samples collected during an emergency RANET Response and Assistance Network RD&D Programme for Research, Development and Demonstration RN-MEG Nuclear Medical Expert Group RO Reportable Occurrence SAR Safety Analysis Report/Safety Report SFA Swedish Food Agency SFL Disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate level waste SFR Disposal facility for short-lived low and intermediate level waste SKB Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company SKI Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate SMA Melting facility (Studsvik site) SMHI Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute SNAB Studsvik Nuclear AB SR-Site Long-term safety assessment for the spent fuel repository SSI Swedish Radiation Protection Authority SSM Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) SSMFS SSM’s Regulatory Code STUK Finnish Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority SVJ Swedish Board of Agriculture TSO Technical Support Organisation USIE Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators WENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association VLLW Very Low Level Waste WSE Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB WTD Waste Type Description

Section L – Annexes 165

L.3 National Report Preparation Team

Coordination and editing group

Björn Dverstorp, SSM (Sweden’s national point of contact for the Joint Convention) Johan Anderberg, SSM Erica Brewitz, SSM Karin Bärudde, SSM Bengt Hedberg, SSM Tomas Löfgren, SSM Magnus Westerlind, SKB Gabor Szendrö, Ministry of the Environment

Text contributions and review

Martin Amft, SSM Michael Egan, SSM Leif Granholm, SSM Peter Frisk, SSM Ingemar Lund, SSM Sara Sundin, SSM Anders Wiebert, SSM Pierre Arvidsson, SKB Jenny Brandefelt, SKB Markus Calderon, SKB Camilla Fiedler Blackhammar, SKB Klas Källström, SKB Peter Larsson, SKB Anders Lindblom, SKB Patrik Vidstrand, SKB Michael Öster, SKB

166 Section L – Annexes

Figure L1 This report has been produced by a working group of representatives from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and with the support of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). The team collaborates while keeping distance to avoid the spread of covid-19.

Section L – Annexes 167

Departementsserien 2020 – Kronologisk förteckning

1. Ett nytt brott om olovlig befattning med betalnings- 18. Ökad rättssäkerhet och snabbare verkställighet instrument. Genomförande av non-cash-direktivet. Ju. i internationella familjemål. Ju. 2. Uppenbart ogrundade ansökningar och fastställande 19. Genomförandet av MKB-direktivet i planav säkra ursprungsländer. Ju. och bygglagen. Fi. 3. Konkurrensverkets befogenheter. N. 20. Översyn av lagstiftningen om flyttning av fordon m.m. I. 4. Klimatdeklaration för byggnader. Fi. 21. Sweden’s seventh national report under the Joint 5. Kompletterande bestämmelser till utträdesavtalet Convention on the safety of spent fuel management mellan Förenade kungariket och EU i fråga om and on the safety of radioactive waste management. medborgarnas rättigheter. Ju. Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the 6. Material och produkter avsedda att komma i kontakt Joint Convention. M. med livsmedel. N. 7. Inkomstpensionstillägg. S. 8. En ny växtskyddslag. N. 9. Utökad målgrupp för Allmänna arvsfonden. S. 10. Ny lag om källskatt på utdelning. Fi. 11. Säkerhetsskyddsreglering för Regeringskansliet, utlandsmyndigheterna och kommittéväsendet. Ju. 12. Registrering av kontantkort, m.m. Ju. 13. Stärkt skydd för vissa geografiska beteckningar och ändringar i den känneteckensrättsliga regleringen av ond tro. Ju. 14. Genomförande av arbetsvillkorsdirektivet. A. 15. Reglering av undersköterskeyrket – kompetenskrav och övergångsbestämmelser. S. 16. Stärkt barnrättsperspektiv för barn i skyddat boende – förslag till bestämmelser rörande bl.a. omedelbar placering, sekretess och skolgång. S. 17. Skärpt kontroll över explosiva varor. Ju.

Departementsserien 2020 – Systematisk förteckning

Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet Miljödepartementet

Genomförande av arbetsvillkorsdirektivet. [14] Sweden’s seventh national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management

Finansdepartementet

and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Klimatdeklaration för byggnader. [4] Sweden’s implementation of the obligations of the Ny lag om källskatt på utdelning. [10] Joint Convention. [20]

Genomförandet av MKB-direktivet i plan- och Näringsdepartementet bygglagen. [19] Konkurrensverkets befogenheter. [3]

Infrastrukturdepartementet Material och produkter avsedda att komma i kontakt Översyn av lagstiftningen om flyttning av med livsmedel. [6] fordon m.m. [20] En ny växtskyddslag. [8]

Justitiedepartementet Socialdepartementet

Ett nytt brott om olovlig befattning med betalnings- Inkomstpensionstillägg. [7] instrument. Genomförande av non-cash-direktivet. [1] Utökad målgrupp för Allmänna arvsfonden. [9] Uppenbart ogrundade ansökningar och fastställande av säkra ursprungsländer. [2] Reglering av undersköterskeyrket – kompetenskrav och övergångsbestämmelser. [15] Kompletterande bestämmelser till utträdesavtalet mellan Förenade kungariket och EU i fråga om med - Stärkt barnrättsperspektiv för barn i skyddat boende borgarnas rättigheter. [5] – förslag till bestämmelser rörande bl.a. omedelbar placering, sekretess och skolgång. [16] Säkerhetsskyddsreglering för Regeringskansliet, utlands myndigheterna och kommittéväsendet. [11] Registrering av kontantkort, m.m. [12] Stärkt skydd för vissa geografiska beteckningar och ändringar i den känneteckensrättsliga regleringen av ond tro. [13] Skärpt kontroll över explosiva varor. [17] Ökad rättssäkerhet och snabbare verkställighet i inter nationella familjemål. [18]

Section L – Annexes 171

172 – Annexes