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Translation of SOU 199411

K; O-c Sou

93.;

$a‘

Statens offentliga utredningar

Egg’

Statsrédsberedningen

HAD THERE BEEN A WAR...

Preparations for the reception

of assistance 1949-1969

military

Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy,

Stockholm 1994 SOU 199411

Translation Ingrid Tersman and Hans Zettermark, National Defence Research Establishment

SOU och Ds kan kopas frén Fritzes kundtjfinst. For remissutséindningar av SOU och Ds svarar Fritzes, Offentliga Publikationer, pé uppdrag av Regeringskansliets forvaltningskontor

Bestéillningsadressz Fritzcs kundtjéinst 106 47 Stockholm Fax 08-20 50 21 Telefon 08-690 90 90

ISBN 91-38-13612-0 Graphic Systems AB, Goteborg 1994 ISSN 0375-250X

To the Prime Minister

resolution of 8 July 1992, the Government authorized the Prime

In a

Minister to appoint a commission consisting of, at the most, six members tasked to examine information on preparations to receive military assistance; to appoint one of the members as chairman, and to decide on

experts, secretary, and other assistancesupport to the commission.

From 20 July 1992, with support of this authorization, County Gov-

Gosta Gunnarsson chairman, former Assistant Under-Secretary ernor Wilhelm Carlgren, former Ambassador Leif Leifland, former Ambassa-

dor Yngve Mdller, Professor Olof Ruin, and Professor Goran Rystad

were appointed as Commission members. Appointed experts Ambassador Krister Wahlbiick, from 24

as were

September 1992; Assistant Under-Secretary Nils Gyldén, from 12 October 1992; and Head of Division, Court of Appeal, Rolf Holmquist.

The latter tasked to assist in reviewing the report with respect to was secrecy.

From 1 August 1992, Judge Fredrik von Arnold was appointed Secre-

tary of the Commission. As Assistant Secretaries to the Commission Bo Petersson, Ph.D., 15 August 1992 to 5 November 1993, were

Brigadier ret. Rolf Gustafsson 1 January to 30 April 1993, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bjorn Porat 1 January to 30 April 1993 and 3

von

December 1993 to 14 January 1994. Louise Hugemark appointed to assist the Commission in certain

was

archival research, 1 April to 31 August 1993. Assistant professor Kent

Zetterberg and Senior Archivist Lars Ericson have also been of assistance to the Commission with archival research. Ingrid Tersman and Hans Zettermark, of the National Defence

Research Establishment, translated the Commission report into English.

Kerstin and Roger Tanner, Ordvéixlingen AB, have reviewed the translation.

Pia Cederholm from 15 October 1992 and Ulla Ekholm 1 February

to 30 April 1993 served assistants to the Commission. as

The Commission has adopted the name of the Commission on Neutrality Policy [Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen] SB 19920l. The Commission now presents its unanimous report SOU 1994211 Had there been a war... Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969. This concludes the Commission’s assignment. Stockholm, February 1994 Gasta Gunnarsson

Wilhelm Carlgren Leif Lezfland Yngve Moller

Olof Ruin Gdran Rystad

Fredrik von Arnold

Table of contents

o o o o o . . . . - n o o . 0 u o o . . - - u . . - . - - . -

Introduction 37 . - . o o - o s o o u The Commission’s remit 37 . . . o . - - . . . o - - - - . o u The Commission’s sources 38 . . On future research . . . . o - o o u - . u - o u

. . . o - - . . . . . . - - - - . .

Relevant defence decisions 59

. . . . . . . - . . u o - - - u u

Security background 59

. - o . 1 .

Scandinavian defence negotiations 1948-49

o - o - - . - The 1958 Defence Decision and its

preliminaries 78

- . . . - . - a o o o o o 0 0 The 1968 Defence Decision and its

preliminaries 90

o o - - o - - o - - - - - u u

U.S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden 99

. . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . 0 4.1 Background 99 . - . . . . - . . . . 4.2 NSC 281, 1948 100 . . . . . . . . . 4.3 NSC 121, 1952 101 - . o . . - - . . . - - . . . 4.4 NSC 60061, 1960 103 . o o . . o 0 a o . a - - a - . . . - - . .

4.5 Summary and conclusions 109

. . . . . o . - . . - - . o - u u

Peacetime contacts with the Western Powers 113

International contacts 113 o u u u . . . . . . . - . . 0

Peacetime procurement of equipment and supplies, and technical cooperation 119

o . - o - - . - - u -

Air safety collaboration 126

Ions - . - - - . . . . - . . o o o

Intelligence 129

o - - u o o - - - u . . o a -

Preparations for the reception assistance 137

. . . . . . .

Contacts on operational issues 137

- - - . . . . - . . o o . . .

War planning and studies 173

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Measures taken within the Military High Command 180

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Measures relating to ground operations 192 . . . . . . . . . Measures relating to naval operations 195 . . . . . . . . . . Measures relating to air operations 209 . . . . . . . . . . . . Preparations for wartime procurement of equipment

and supplies 228 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preparations for resistance in the event of

occupation 234

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Concluding assessment of military preparations for cooperation with the Western Powers 238

. . . . . . . .

How much did the Government know 245 . . . . . . . . . . Background 245 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Partial Scandinavian defence cooperation 248

. . . . . . . . Contacts with the Western great powers 253 . . . . . . . .

Concluding assessment 261 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary

Summary

1 Introduction

Chapter

The Commissions remit

The Commission has understood its remit to mean that all forms of prep-

aration for support and for military cooperation with the Western Powers during 1949-69 should be explored to the extent possible. However, a detailed study of cooperation in the field of intelligence has not

more been deemed part of the task. The extent and the direction of the Commission’s investigation have

been affected by the of the study. As documents gradually

urgency

become declassified, the possibility cannot be excluded of new information, especially from foreign archives, modifying the picture provided by the Commission certain extent, especially concerning the 1960s.

to a

The Commission has exercised the greatest possible openness in giving its account. As rule, however, not possible to make the extensive

a

source material used publicly accessible.

The Commission sources

The Commission has conducted research in large number of Swedish a

and foreign archives, both public and private. A key source has been the

archives of the Swedish Defence Staff well those of the top-secret as as

service staffs and of certain regional military authorities.

Research has been carried out archives in Denmark, Norway,

Russia, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. In addition,

certain NATO archives have been examined. Much foreign source material, however, still classified.

In the of archives of organizations and private individuals,

case

primarily number of diaries kept by key actors have been of interest.

a The Commission has obtained information from than 200 more

people. The majority Swedes who, during the period studied, held

are

positions judged to be of interest in this context, e.g., politicians, diplomats, ministry staff, officers, and others service with the National Defence. In toto, the interviews have materially contributed to making the picture complete and nuanced than that offered by the

more

8 Summary

written sources. The Commission has conducted a research seminar entitled Sweden, the Nordic region, and NATO during the Cold War.

On fi4ture research

Research on Swedish security policy during the post-World War

era seems regrettably inadequate, especially when compared with Finland and Norway. of the greatest importance for future debate and decision-making to draw upon solid knowledge of and a broad outlook on Swedish security policy as hitherto pursued. We hope that this report will help to improve the conditions for such research.

Chapter 2 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

Starting points in international law

Neutrality, as defined by international law, can be claimed only in times of war. Its core non-participation in war between other states. In the case of Sweden, the declared intention to maintain neutrality in the event of war has solely been unilateral statement of intent. A deliberate a policy has been to avoid formal security policy ties. Restrictions adhered to to enhance the credibility of the Swedish neutrality policy - - were self-imposed.

Government declarations

During the Cold War, Sweden’s security policy was most often characterized as non-participation in alliances peacetime, aiming at neutrality in war, often referred to as the Swedish policy of neutrality. This section discusses Government foreign policy declarations in Parliament, and certain other official statements concerning Swedish security policy. The account shows that Government declarations concerning the substance of the policy of neutrality underwent certain changes over time. Thus, in 1949, the Government made statement to the effect that a an alliance treaty was the sole [form of cooperation] to lie beyond the boundaries of the neutrality policy in peacetime. In the following year, the Government rejected the idea of Sweden pursuing a policy of neutrality biased in any particular direction. was emphasized that was not possible to predict what policy would be

Summary 9

pursued the future during unknown external conditions. The Government also raised the issue whether peacetime technical military cooperation with Denmark and Norway consistent with Swedish security was policy and made a statement giving the impression that such cooperation was judged impossible. Expressly excluded however, only the kind was, of cooperation which its political substance came close to the defence union, e.g., combined staff talks and combined defence plarming. We have noted that time and again during the 1950s, a discussion concerning the setting and preconditions for the policy of neutrality resurged. In 1956, Parliament rejected motion that the Swedish of a policy neutrality be given a legal foundation. Responding to a question in Parliament concerning the so-called Hjalmarson affair, Prime Minister Erlander explained that the policy of neutrality did not allow liberty of action in the sense that Sweden, following the outbreak of a major war, without being attacked, could choose to side with one of the warring parties. Preparations and discussions regarding military cooperation with members of a greatpower military alliance were therefore precluded Sweden wished to maintain the credibility of its foreign and defence policies. During most of the 1960s, there was fundamental agreement across party lines on the substance of the policy of neutrality. In 1968, however, triggered by the Vietnam debate ensued what profile war, a on a neutral state should have in the foreign policy field. Here, Erlander quoted inter alia parts of his to the 1959 parliamentary own response question, but did not repeat the statement that preparations and discussions concerning military cooperation with members of a great-power military alliance were precluded.

Chapter 3 Relevant defence decisions

To provide a security policy background, the chapter with short opens a description of more important developments during the first half of the Cold War. Then the Commission provides extensive of the an account 1949 Scandinavian Defence Committee and of the report, two key defence decisions of that time, those of 1958 and 1968, and their preliminaries.

The Scandinavian Defence Committee

In October 1948, the governments of Demnark, Norway, and Sweden appointed a joint committee to explore the prospects of military

10 Summary

cooperation between the three states, either in the form of a defence

union in the form of partial defence cooperation. The Committee or submitted its report in early 1949. The expert studies included in the report state inter alia that the [Scandinavian] states could not repel a Soviet attack for length of time without Western assistance. Defence any

preparations in peacetime and strategy in war, therefore, had to be

shaped in such to create conditions for receiving military a way so as

assistance as well as support in the form of vital supplies. The fundamen-

tal idea, therefore, to gain time, i.e., to endure long enough to make was Western supportive actions possible. The Committee determined that the defence of Scandinavia included

missions that should be carried out jointly by the armed forces of the individual countries, and requiring considerable technical and organizational preparations, and combined exercises, to be carried out already in peacetime. Cooperation could be prepared either within the framework

of defence union without such binding treaty. In the latter case, a or a

however, preparations could not be carried far within a defence

as as union. The Committee unanimous to the need for assistance from was as

the Western Powers. The Danish and Norwegian members stressed that precondition for rapid and effective assistance was that preparations

a

had been made in peacetime. The Swedish members did not wish to explicitly underwrite this statement. On the other hand, they were prepared state that armed assistance from abroad would already be

to

required at initial stage of defensive war, and that would take

an a

several months for such assistance to arrive, preparations had been

no

made in peacetime. As of the differences of opinion, primarily between the

a consequence

Norwegian and Swedish governments, concerning a Scandinavian defence union’s connections to the Western Powers, the negotiations on

such union broke down in the end of January 1949. While the a Norwegians wanted form of association with the West, the some fundamental view of the Swedish Government was that a defence union should remain independent of the and aim at neutrality in great powers,

A statement, made by Erlander in the parliamentary debate

war.

following the breakdown of the defence union negotiations, made clear that the Swedish Government had not, in principle, dismissed the idea of receiving assistance from the Western Powers wartime.

The 1958 Defence Decision and its preliminaries

The 1958 parliamentary Defence Decision was the most consequential of

the post-war thus far. to shape the structure of the Swedish era was

Defence, its equipment, and its operational strength well into

National

Summary 11

the 1970s. was preceded by the 1955 Defence Committee, within the Ministry of Defence and under the direction of the Minister of Defence, and tasked to assist in reviewing the recommendations of the Supreme Commander the future of the armed forces CB 54. The Committee

on

included representatives of each of the four largest political parties.

The CB 54 had stated that Swedish did suffice report resources not to

repel an attack by a great power for any length of time, without external economic and military assistance. Hence, Swedish strategy must focus on creating conditions for Sweden to be supported, war, by states in whose interests would be to assist According to the Supreme

us. Commander, Sweden could not expect any rapid assistance, except for Western strategic bombing. The initial phase of the Defence Committees work devoted to was

security policy and strategic issues. These issues were extensively discussed in a briefing memorandum prepared within the secretariat of

the Committee. For reasons expanded in the final report, this upon memorandum can be taken to express the Defence Minister’s view on issues discussed therein. The memorandum discussed inter alia assistance from the Western Powers. Such assistance could be either direct or indirect. Direct

assistance entailed, for example, air strikes using atomic against

weapons

a sealift concentration during a seaborne invasion, interdiction of lines of communication during ground operations, supply of ordnance and

fuel, and protection of Indirect assistance entailed the Western convoys.

Powers, by means of their operations, reducing the prospects of the Soviet Union projecting against Sweden, by interdiction

power e.g.

strikes against air bases, naval bases, embarkation ports from which

attacks could be launched also against Sweden, well associated land as as lines of communication. Thus, indirect assistance, like direct assistance,

to a great extent involved air operations. A key component of indirect assistance was stated to be operations tying down those forces

enemy

which could otherwise have been employed against No sharp

us. distinction was made between the two forms of assistance.

The probability of Sweden receiving direct assistance from the West

in the fierce opening phase of a major war was deemed low. The prospects for such assistance was judged greater in potential later stage a

of the war. Indirect assistance judged the most significant. The

was memorandum further discussed how to promote direct assistance and -

thus also create conditions for receiving forms of indirect

some assistance. The significance of personal contacts, good communications

equipment, peacetime Swedish preparations for general coordination of air operations, and a limited employment of strike and bomber units, and

certain coordination of air surveillance, was pointed to. also was

12 Summary

determined that some preparations for direct assistance had been made

already, and that others could be. Certain preparations, however, were of such a character that they could not be made advance, considering the policy of non—participation in alliances.

The issue of external assistance was not addressed at all in the final,

public version of the Defence Committee report, and was only briefly

alluded to in the 1958 Defence Bill.

The 1968 Defence Decision and its preliminaries

The next major defence decision, building on the work of the 1965

Defence Committee, taken by Parliament 1968. Neither the

was

committee report nor the Defence Bill includes any explicit references to

external assistance. The Committee did, however, discuss the issue of Swedish nuclear and indirectly also touched upon the issue of weapons, intervention other states in the case of an attack on Sweden. While the Committee recommended that Sweden should not procure nuclear

weapons, stated that anyone contemplating an attack on Sweden, with

without the of nuclear weapons, would have to reckon with the or use

use of nuclear weapons against such an operation, although Sweden did not such weapons. In all major aspects, Sweden was thus placed

possess

under the nuclear umbrella in much the same way as neighbouring

countries could be taken to be. The Committee also addressed the issue of how Sweden would act in

an acute crisis situation. The Committee emphasized that was not possible to fiilly predetermine what policy a government might have to under still unknown future conditions. The aim of our security

pursue

policy and defence planning must be to create freedom of action for

our

future contingencies. This statement displayed continuance of the

a

Government’s view of the early 1950s.

The fact that external assistance discussed to a lesser extent in was

1968 than in 1958 and 1949 can probably be attributed to several factors. For thing, the threat of gradually diminished as relations

one war

between the superpowers improved, added to which, Sweden’s National Defence was gradually and considerably strengthened.

4 U.S. vis-a—vis Sweden

Chapter policy

This chapter discusses the U.S. policy documents adopted by the

President of the United States following deliberations in the National

Security Council NSC. The first document, from 1948, was prepared

Summary 13

under the influence of the emerging discussions Scandinavian on a defence union. Scandinavia was judged to be of strategic interest to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The three Scandinavian countries

did not have prospects of withstanding Soviet attack for length

any a any

of time, but given limited deliveries of equipment and external assist-

ance, a certain deterrent could be created. The United States should inter alia demonstrate its dissatisfaction with Sweden’s apparent failure to distinguish between the West and the Soviet Union, and Sweden sway

into eventual alignment with the West. Swedish requests for military

assistance were to be granted only after the requirements of states having declared their intention to cooperate with the United States and its allies had been met.

In early 1952, a new policy document drafted. Now the United

was

States had, for the time being, accepted the Swedish policy

of non-

alignment. was the interest of the United States for Sweden to be the best possible position to resist Soviet pressure or aggression. The

overall U.S. attitude towards Sweden should reflect the conviction that,

also barring formal Swedish NATO membership, the defence of Europe

would benefit from closer Swedish association and cooperation with its NATO neighbours and with the United States. Sweden should be allowed

to purchase military equipment and be provided with strategic technology. The Swedish National Defence could be strengthened by the exchange of military information and increased participation by Swedish officers in formal military training in the United States. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden should be encouraged to cooperate in planning and strategy. The United States was not to create the impression, however, that Sweden could reap all the benefits of NATO membership without assuming corresponding obligations. In 1960, following discussions in the NSC, with several interventions in substance by President Eisenhower, revised U.S. policy adopted

a was

vis-a-vis Scandinavia. Generally, Sweden viewed favourably.

was very

The Swedish National Defence held in relatively high regard.

was was deemed to be of great significance that Sweden maintained up-to—date an

defence and acquired early-warning, air command-and-control systems, and advanced weaponry compatible with and complementary to those planned for procurement NATO allies. On the other hand, Sweden should be discouraged from acquiring its nuclear Were

own weapons. Sweden to be attacked in the context of major the United States a war, should encourage and assist Sweden in its resistance of Soviet attack. a Were Sweden to be the victim of isolated Soviet aggression, the United States should be prepared to come to the assistance of Sweden part of as a U.N. or NATO action. The United States to other were encourage

NATO states i.e. Denmark and Norway to maintain discreet liaison

14 Summary

with the Swedish National Defence, paving the way for possible future active military cooperation. No further policy document concerning Scandinavia appears to have been adopted during the 1960s.

5 Peacetime with the Western Powers

Chapter contacts

International contacts

The Swedish policy of neutrality has not been deemed to constitute an frequent international military contacts. In order to avoid impediment to national isolation in thinking and expertise, such contacts have been encouraged. Also, these contacts have been seen as fostering international for, and appreciation of the role of, the Swedish National respect Defence. Defence attachés at the larger Swedish embassies played a significant role of interest here that the defence attachés day-to—day contacts. in Washington the end of the 1950s noticed pronounced shift in the at a attitude of the U.S. military establishment towards them. Thereafter, the U.S. attitude opened considerably, and the Swedes viewed themselves up be in much-favoured position concerning information. to a During this period, Swedish officers and technical experts increasingly travelled abroad, especially to the Nordic countries, Western Europe, and North America. Usually, such travelling required Government permission. The Commission has studied, in particular, the exchange of visits flag—officer level. Most of these appear to have been courtesy at calls also comprising scheduled study visits. echelon personnel travelled for the of study, and also Lower purpose attended military colleges abroad. Foreign officers, primarily from the Nordic countries, attended Swedish military colleges. Certain duty exchanges occurred between Sweden and certain NATO countries. connections, Swedish officers, of whom later Through these many reached positions, obtained in-depth knowledge of the military top organization, tactics, and technology of the Western Powers; they also formed lasting ties of friendship with Western officers.

Imports military equipment and technical cooperation

of

Towards the end of the 1940s, the Swedish National Defence was quantitatively large, but its equipment mostly outmoded. There was a need for imports of technically advanced equipment, and this could great satisfied by the Western Powers. Over time, Swedish profile only be a

Summary 15

evolved in the area of military technology. In aspects, Swedish

many

solutions were distinctly different from those chosen by the

great powers, and this would have forced an enemy to commit against resources

unique, Swedish, technology. There remained, however, need for

a

imports of Western military equipment and technology. Initially, the United States and the United Kingdom opposed to

were

the export of high technology equipment to Sweden. One the

reason was

wish to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the Swedish policy of neutrality. Gradually, as hopes of thus influencing Sweden to join NATO were written off, Sweden was given opportunity to import military

more equipment from these states. Also, from 1951 Sweden’s non-official on, and limited cooperation with the Western Powers their ban on on exports of strategic goods to the Eastern Bloc contributed to this end. In 1952,

an agreement was reached on terms for Swedish purchases of military equipment, etc. from the United States. Only towards the end of the decade, however, did larger-scale exports of high-technology military equipment transpire, as Sweden was permitted to purchase U.S. missiles.

The 1952 agreement expanded 1961, forming the basis for was a set

of agreements on the exchange of technology between the two states. From this sprang an extensive and close cooperation military

on

technology, which was not discontinued even when Swedish-U.S.

relations were in cold storage in the end of the 1960s, as a consequence of the official Swedish attitude to the Vietnam war.

For its national sustenance, Sweden dependent imports of inter

was on

alia oil and other petroleum products. To facilitate such imports in the

event of blockade Sweden had POL-port with associated or war, a

storage facilities constructed in the Fjord of Trondheim [in Norway]. The complex, completed in 1962, turned out to be bad investment,

a

however, due to changes in the military-strategic situation, and later

was sold.

Collaboration air safety on

During the first half of the 1950s, the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish air forces initiated collaboration air safety issues border

on areas

SVENORDA. This collaboration aimed at facilitating navigation in order, among other things, to guide aircraft emergencies, either

to

their home base, or to landing sites in neighbouring

emergency a

country. In 1960, the collaboration formalized, and the formerly

was

secret collaboration was now made public. Participating in these

activities were a number of air defence control centres each country, and certain air bases were designated for landing. Communiemergency

cations by wire, radio, and radio relay established between the

were

16 Summary

ground facilities. Uniform signal procedures in English were developed. Landing procedures practised to some extent at air bases across were borders. This collaboration made possible for Swedish Air Force personnel gain knowledge of terrain, facilities, airfields, and communications to procedures in Denmark and Norway. Likewise, officers of these states obtained information Swedish airbases. Swedish military air traffic on controllers too gained experience of NATO air traffic control procedures. International collaboration also took place maritime search and on These activities were exclusively civilian. rescue.

Intelligence

The Commission has judged its mandate to include a non-exhaustive review of the cooperation between Swedish Military Intelligence and its Western counterparts. No detailed study, however, has been more carried out. Swedish Military Intelligence has earlier been studied inter alia by the 1974 Intelligence Committee. The Committee concluded that Sweden stood to gain than to lose by cooperating with other states more in the field of intelligence. Through such cooperation, Sweden could gain to information requiring special resources not at our disposal. access At this time, general intelligence managed by Section 2 of the was Defence Staff. A special unit, the so-called T—Office, tasked with the non-official collection of intelligence, subordinate to the head of was section. In 1961, organization, IB, formed, by the merger of a new was T—Office and another unit, B-Bureau, dealing with security intelligence. Another important intelligence collection agency was the National Defence Radio Institute FRA for signals intelligence, focusing on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. Already in the latter part of the 1940s, the Defence Staff initiated intelligence collaboration with Norway and, extent, Denmark. to some This collaboration continued throughout the period, albeit with some interruptions. Collaboration was also initiated early on with the United Kingdom and the U.S. Army and Air Force in Europe. Over time, regularly recurring contacts evolved. Meetings bilateral, and were information exchanged the Warsaw Pact order-of-battle, and joint was on analyses of the material were made. No formal agreements, however, on peacetime intelligence exchange to have been reached between the Defence Staff and its foreign seem do pre-arrangements to whether the actual collaborpartners; nor any as ation continue following outbreak of Even so, the were to an war. Defence Staff had been pondering how to collaborate with foreign

Summary 17

intelligence agencies in war, were the Government to permit such collaboration. The secret intelligence service, i.e. T-Office and B-Bureau as well as their successor, IB, also had close contacts with foreign equivalents, e. g.

in several NATO states. In the 1960s, IB and intelligence organizations of some NATO states made mutual preparations for the exchange of

liaison officers in contingencies.

At the end of the 1940s, FRA collaborated closely with Denmark and

Norway on signals intelligence. Collaboration with certain states also took place in the following decades. Reportedly, there were no prepara-

tions exclusively for collaboration in commitments

war, nor were any concerning wartime collaboration made to other states.

Chapter 6 Preparations for the of assistance reception

Contacts on operational issues

Shortly after the 1949 breakdown of the negotiations on a Scandinavian

defence union, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Nils Swedlund, submitted

to the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, a memorandum on the planning of certain military cooperation with Denmark and Norway. In September that same year, the Cabinet agreed to the implementation of some of the measures proposed. These comprised planning of communications and for coordination of air surveillance, interceptor control, air force search and rescue, and military weather service. Swedlund’s proposals concerning planning of certain army and naval cooperation, however,

were mostly shelved.

Already in the spring of 1949, i.e. prior to the Cabinet decision, the Swedish National Defence had been in contact with Denmark primarily

on the defence of Oresund, and with Norway air force cooperation.

on

Furthermore, combined air defence exercises had been conducted by the

Norwegian and Swedish air forces, with the consent of both governments. On Swedlund’s initiative, discussions were opened in the spring of

1949 between the Swedish and the Norwegian military high commands on collaboration areas agreed to by the Swedish Cabinet. These

discussions continued for a few years. The Danish National Defence was also approached. From 1952 onwards, the interest of the Swedish

Military High Command in inter-Scandinavian contacts seems to have subsided. The Scandinavian collaboration closely followed by the

was British and the Americans. Their hope that Sweden thus could be linked closer to NATO might be one explanation.

18 Summary

No documents such studies or plans on the makeup of the Scandinaas vian collaboration have been found. For this and other reasons, the results achieved carmot be accurately established. Norwegian interest in this collaboration appears to have been quite weak, and achievements not

all that far-reaching. Contacts with the Danish seem mainly to have

addressed the defence of Oresund.

One for the Swedish Military High Command gradually

reason

assigning less priority to Scandinavian collaboration presumably that,

following the establishment of AFNORTH NATO’s Northern Command, their Danish and Norwegian colleagues no longer held full

national operational responsibility. Another, and perhaps more signifi-

cant, presumably that direct contacts evolved between reason was Sweden and the United States.

Already at the end of the 1940s, the Swedish Military High Command had concluded that Sweden could not resist Soviet aggression for any

length of time without some form of assistance from the Western

Powers. This conviction persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the spring of 1949, the Swedish Embassy in Washington and the Swedish Military High Command set out to foster U.S. understanding of Swedens security policy and to instill a favourable perception of the capabilities of the Swedish National Defence. These activities did not, however, result in any immediate shift in the disapproving U.S. attitude towards the Swedish security policy’s focus on neutrality in war. For another couple of U.S. policy towards Sweden was characterized

years,

by efforts to make Sweden accede to the Atlantic Pact. Over time, the

United States assumed accommodating attitude towards Sweden a more

Cf Chapter 4.

As of the 1951 visit to Sweden by the British Secretary

a consequence

of the Air Ministry, Henderson, Defence Minister Vougt, with the consent of Erlander, dispatched memorandum on the Swedish armed

a

forces and planning to the British Govermnent. At the time, the

war substance of the memorandum must have been deemed top secret. The communication of the memorandum made the British Minister of Defence invite Vougt to visit the United Kingdom to inter alia discuss certain degree of coordination of Sweden’s defence with that of the a Western Powers. Vougt, however, declined the invitation. When visiting Sweden in the autumn of the same year, the British Foreign Secretary sought to raise the issue with Erlander, who adopted a reserved attitude.

Later that the then deputy Foreign Minister, Dag

same year,

Hammarskjold, told the British ambassador to Sweden that informal coordination of Swedish defence planning with that of the United

Kingdom inconceivable. All the same, Harnmarskjold maintained was that would be of Sweden to be privy to parts of the Western use were

Summary 19

planning for the contingency of Soviet invasion of Scandinavia.

a

Sweden could then act autonomously when drawing and revising its

up own plans, while taking Western plans into consideration.

Prompted by Vougt’s memorandum, the British Chiefs of Staff submitted in writing their opinions likely of in

on a course a war Scandinavia, and the organization of the Swedish armed forces, well as

as proposals for measures strengthening its capabilities. In the spring of 1953, following almost of discussions and repeated revisions,

two years

the report was communicated to the Swedish Military High Command where was enthusiastically received. The British ambassador to Sweden was, however, not successful when he shortly thereafter sought to raise, with the Swedish Under-Secretary of State, the issue of exchanging military information between the United Kingdom and Sweden.

Before this, the British had received several indications to the effect

that the Swedish Military High Command interested in establishing

was cooperation with NATO. As a consequence, the autumn of 1952,

contacts of this kind were established with AFNORTH in Norway. In

this context, a small party of Norwegian officers, of whom army one was from the NATO staff, to visit Sweden to discuss certain were

aspects of combined Norwegian-Swedish planning. Furthermore, in

1953, the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Command invited was to make an unofficial visit to Sweden. has not been established whether these visits took place.

Swedlund, appointed Supreme Commander 1951,

acted, but to no

avail, in 1951-53 to persuade the United States to appoint highly

a

qualified military representative to serve in Sweden, which he the

saw as

only way of preparing for wartime cooperation. In May 1953, a small

party of Swedish officers visited the United States, and later that same

year, a U.S. delegation visited Sweden in return. At these meetings, Swedish representatives presented the problems Sweden would encounter

the event of a Soviet attack. The meetings did not result in any

exchange of actual plans, only in general conclusions. Reportedly,

no further visits were made to follow up these talks.

In the early half of the 1950s, also other contacts wartime

on

cooperation occurred between Swedish and U.S. military officers.

Colonel Bernt Balchen, USAF, in his efforts to link the Norwegian up

and Swedish defences, had meetings, for example, with top-ranking

Swedish Air Force officers. not certain, however, that Balchen’s

endeavours were officially authorized. In private conversations with their Swedish colleagues, NATO officers

said there was no NATO planning for direct armed support of Sweden in the event of war. In view of Sweden’s neutral posture, the issue was

deemed too sensitive; also, there serious shortage of NATO

was a

20 Summary

forces. According British officer, would be difficult to establish to a military cooperation, Sweden to find itself on the Western side were after having been drawn into a major war, since no preparations had been made for this. In the opinion of a U.S. officer, Sweden, in building its Air Force, did not have to acquire heavy bombers, since their up missions could very well be carried out by USAF and RAF with atomic bombs from remote bases. At a briefing of some Cabinet members and the non-socialist party leaders the spring of 1953, the Military High Command emphasized that the assistance Sweden might obtain from the Western Powers in a major war primarily consisted of strategic bombing. Furthermore, an alleviating fact that only parts of Warsaw Pact forces could be was employed against Sweden. As far as has been established, contacts between the Swedish National Defence and the Western Powers on operational issues were highly sporadic for the remainder of the 1950s, as well as the following decade. In the autumn of 1955, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided, however, to maintain secret contacts with Sweden, and to again task an officer to handle contacts with the representative of the Swedish Supreme Commander. Their proposal was that the Commander USAEUR, should handle this task, the ultimate aim of which was to make Sweden ready to contribute to the defence of Scandinavia to the greatest extent possible, and to buttress Sweden’s capabilities and resolve to resist Soviet pressures. Readers should be reminded that the Commission has only had limited to U.S. documents from the latter part of very access the 1950s and the 1960s, as much material still classified. The shortest routes for USAF and RAF bombers to and from key targets in the Soviet Union traversed Swedish airspace. A pertinent question for the Western Powers, therefore, was whether they would have to calculate with Swedish interception of NATO overflights, Sweden declared itself neutral. Partly in the light of experiences from World War the assessment was evidently made that Sweden would not engage Western bombers en route to the Soviet Union. Until the early 1960s, in fact, Sweden’s air defences were incapable of effective action against high altitude overflights. The Commission has found evidence substantiating information to no the effect that Sweden granted permission for overflights of Swedish airspace, or for emergency landings at Swedish airbases, by the U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, U-2. The issue of Swedish acquisition of nuclear weapons was linked to the Swedish-U.S. contacts in far as high-level U.S. officers, on a few as occasions in the latter part of the 1950s, made statements to the effect that the United States, in contingency, might supply Sweden with U.S. a

Summary 21

nuclear weapons. The position of State Department, however, was wellnigh the contrary. The impact of the restrictive position on the proliferation of nuclear weapons emerged clearly in the policy towards Sweden adopted by the President in 1960.

War planning and studies

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Swedish military planning focused almost exclusively on defence against an attack from the Soviet Union

the Warsaw Pact. Neither war plans nor operation orders reveal any

indications of advance preparations for cooperation with the Western Powers. Nor did the extensive studies, which inter alia formed a basis for centrally issued plans and orders, include allusions to advance any preparations having been made for cooperation with or reception of assistance from the West. On the other hand, these studies recurrently addressed Sweden’s prospects of obtaining non-prepared military assistance from the Western Powers, in the event of a Soviet attack. The risk of an isolated Soviet attack on Sweden was judged to be remote. So—called indirect assistance was deemed to be the principal form of potential Western assistance, should the Soviet Union attack Sweden in the of great conflict. Expectations that Sweden would course a power receive rapid early assistance seem to have been low partly because preparations for its reception could not be made in peacetime. One precondition for such assistance that Sweden could defend itself was unaided long enough to make Western intervention worthwhile. A further precondition was that the Western Powers should interpret a Soviet attack Sweden material threat to their own interests. In on as a time, the issue of Western assistance was played down the studies.

During the first half of the 1950s, at least, the Military High Com-

mand was not alien to the idea of military intervention by Sweden, should the Soviet Union seek to Denmark and Norway; even in occupy situation where the for the time being, was honouring a aggressor, Swedish neutrality. In this way Sweden could forestall encirclement. Exercises and war games involving cooperation with the Western Powers seem to have been rare occurrences.

Measures taken within the Military High Command

From the early 1950s, the Defence Staff had a certain readiness for cooperation with the Western Powers were Sweden to be drawn into Highly qualified individuals were designated to augment the offices war. of the military attachés at certain Swedish missions abroad as well as to receive foreign officers at the Swedish wartime National Defence

22 Summary

Headquarters Hogkvarteret. At all times, a total of some thirty officers

appear to have been assigned to such wartime duty. The dispatch of officers to other states required prior authorization by the political leadership. The states to which liaison officers might be dispatched were primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and to some extent, Denmark.

One prime task an emergency contingency was to secure deliveries

of essential war supplies to Sweden. This included working for the

fulfilment of the existing contracts for the sale of equipment, as well as furthering the procurement of additional equipment. Arranging transpor-

tation of the equipment to Sweden was an additional task. These things

might already have to be accomplished prior to the outbreak of war, and

could then, to a certain extent, be managed by special trade delegations. An attack on Sweden, was presumed, would lead to the country being drawn into the war on the side of the Western Powers. The liaison

officers sent abroad should therefore be ready for wide-ranging collaboration with foreign military authorities, even including straight-

forward operational cooperation. No detailed planning to this end appears, however, to have been carried out. A start was made in the first half of the 1960s, but planning was discontinued following consultations

between the Minister of Defence and the Supreme Commander.

There no information indicating that the Swedish planning was carried out in concert with representatives of the prospective host countries, nor that the planning was known there at all. Generally, this

planning was surrounded by the utmost secrecy, and many of those designated for this wartime duty were not at all made privy. The principal means of communication between upper—echelon staffs, air defence centres, etc. Sweden the 1950s, were primarily wire,

utilizing the Swedish Telecom system, and short-wave radio. These were

also the principal means of communicating with other states in crisis and war. Eventually, a nationwide, military radio relay network was created, primarily to meet the requirements of the Air Force. A few radio-relay connections were directly linked to Denmark and Norway, making technically feasible for the National Defence Headquarters, at its wartime dispersal location, to gain access to NATO’s European network. Reportedly, this was not practised. In the beginning of the 1960s, a secure telex link was established between the Defence Staff and USAFE Wiesbaden, West Germany.

The purpose of this link was reportedly to transmit alert messages between continental Europe and Sweden contingencies.

No further evidence has emerged to indicate that the Defence Staff or

the wartime National Defence Headquarters had any permanent communications links with other states.

Summary 23

Towards the end of the 1960s, a large number of ultra~high frequency

radio stations procured for long—range communications. were

Measures relating to ground operations

During the entire period, the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a massive superiority

in ground forces compared with NATO. In the initial stage of a war, the

European NATO states would have had to rely largely on their national

ground forces. Successively, units arrived from across the as army

Atlantic, these would presumably be employed along the central front.

This being so, the Swedish assessment was that the prospects of rapid

Western assistance by ground forces virtually nil. No plarming

were to have been carried out for receiving such units from NATO seems states.

However, in the early 1950s, some preparatory planning appears to

have been carried out for Swedish ground forces operations in north-

ernmost Norway, and possibly also in Trandelag.

Measures relating to naval operations Contacts had long been cultivated between the Swedish and Western

navies. Essentially, they to have concerned the exchange of

seem

experience derived from technological developments, procurement, and

training. In this context, there to have been considerable mutual seems candour. At times, senior Swedish naval officers discussed general strategic and operational issues with representatives of Western states.

Reportedly, however, no talks took place on direct operational cooper-

ation with Western naval forces. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Swedish Navy had two main wartime

missions, viz. to join with air and ground forces in repelling an across-

the-Baltic invasion of Sweden, and to protect imports from the West.

During most of the 1950s, the Navy Command deemed that no Western naval operations of significance to the Swedish defence in the Baltic Sea could be reckoned with. Gradually, however, with the West German build-up of naval forces the Baltic Sea, and particularly following the establishment of BALTAP in 1962, expectations of some cooperation with NATO in the Southern Baltic seem to have risen. Wartime imports, all-important to Sweden, would be dependent predominantly transportation across the Atlantic and the North

upon sea

Sea. Early talks were held between Swedish and foreign naval

on, officers allowing ships route to Sweden irrespective of on en war -

whether Sweden had become involved or remained neutral to join

- Western However, conclusive decisions seem to have been convoys. no

24 Summary

made. The Commission has made a special study of two regions where

cooperation with the Western Powers could be assumed to be of special

pertinence, viz. the Swedish West Coast and Oresund. All through this period, the prime task of the West Coast naval

commanding officer was to protect import shipping and sea lanes along the West Coast. As late as the early 1960s, one of his principal tasks was

stated to be cooperation with allied naval forces and preparations for the basing of them, following specific directives. This task was also a prerequisite for the protection of imports. Until the early 1960s,

cooperation with NATO naval forces in the Kattegat and the Skagerrak

was much enlarged on in regional war planning and strategy studies. The Chief of the Navy issued directives to the effect that two operating bases

on the West Coast were to be given sufficient logistical capacity for

basing of an allied naval force, as well as for receiving merchantmen.

Furthermore, in 1956 the Chief of the Navy issued orders for planning the reception and basing of allied primarily Danish and Norwegian

naval forces on the West Coast. No combined plarming with the Western Powers on cooperation appears, however, to have been carried out. Nor do any concrete actions appear to have been taken in preparation for cooperation. As long as the bulk of the naval forces of the Soviet Union were based in the Baltic Sea, was a vital interest, according to the Western Powers as well as the Swedish Navy High Command, to close the Baltic

Approaches in a tense political situation with an imminent threat of war.

Western and Swedish transports across the Atlantic would otherwise be

threatened by, e.g. Soviet submarines. A complicating factor here was

the status of Oresund according to international law.

In 1949, the Danish and Swedish navies commenced combined

planning facilitate effective closure of Oresund. In the the

to same year,

Government appointed a committee to study the feasibility of closing the

Swedish side of Oresund to passage in a crisis, while remaining neutral.

The Committee proposed inter alia a certain amendment in the Swedish

neutrality regulations and combined planning with the Danish Navy in peacetime. No amendment of the statutes was made, however. has not

been feasible to determine the character and extent of potential collaboration in the 1950s between the Danish and Swedish navies in the defence of Oresund. There information indicating that plans for the closure of

Oresund were in some way coordinated. There may also have been a

certain amount of intelligence cooperation. No operational cooperation

seems to have taken place between naval authorities across Oresund in

the 1960s. In conclusion, the Commission finds that very elaborate and wide-

Summary 25

ranging preparations would have been imperative in order for the Swedish Navy to carry out combined operations with NATO naval forces. There no evidence of such preparations having been made. Yet, until the early 1960s, Swedish planning recurrently involved ideas on how such cooperation was to be effected, should Sweden be forced into war on the side of the Western Powers following a Soviet attack. This planning apparently ceased roughly at the time when the operational command of the naval forces was transferred to the Defence Staff.

Measures relating to air operations soon became clear to Swedish observers that Western strategic interests in Sweden were above all concerned with the possibilities of flying across Swedish airspace, and with the risks of the adversary doing the same. Likewise, was evident that air assets would be the main form of assistance that the Western Powers could conceivably divert to Sweden. Swedish discussions on measures to facilitate the reception of foreign assistance were consequently to focus on air warfare. No plans for cooperation with foreign air forces have been found, however; and, reportedly, none existed. Sophisticated command and control of air forces from the ground requires a system, the main components of which are air—combat control centres, radar stations, and communications. With the introduction of the so-called STRIL 60 system in the 1960s, Sweden advanced to the international forefront in this field. A key element of the communications system was the permanent radio relay network that the Air Force had been building since the 19505. With reference to the inter-Scandinavian air safety cooperation, SVENORDA, some radio relay links were established to control centres in Denmark and Norway. was technically feasible to connect these links to NATO’s European network. The links permitted voice and unsophisticated data transmissions. The capacity was sufficient to transmit crude data for air-combat control, e.g., general data on the character of an enemy strike mission or data on plarmed friendlyallied air missions. was not feasible, however, to transmit radar images via these links, and so the prerequisites for a comprehensive integration of air defences were lacking. To avoid accidental firing on friendly aircraft, IFF systems Identifica-

tion, Friend or Foe were developed. These systems used radio signals

permitting air combat control centres to automatically identify friendly aircraft. The Swedish designation was IgenKiinnings-system. IFF systems were surrounded by the utmost secrecy. Initially, Sweden was restricted to purchasing obsolescent IFF systems from the Western

26 Summary

Powers. Towards the end of the 1940s, studies were initiated aiming at the procurement of an indigenous IFF system, autonomous from its great—power equivalents. At the end of the 1950s, work had advanced far enough for the Swedish prototype’s performance to be evaluated, and compared with that of a U.S.British system, designated Mark X. Considering that the Western system was not fully accessible to the Swedish Air Force, the Swedish system was deemed to offer the greatest benefits. One prerequisite for the procurement of the Swedish system, however, was for Mark X interrogators to be installed at certain radar stations on the ground, due to the great importance attached to being able to identify possible allied aircraft which, wartime, could be expected to utilize Swedish airspace.

In 1961, the procurement was being planned of a number of Mark X

units intended for Swedish radar stations. Trials with this equipment to be conducted, and certain personnel were trained in operating it. were Later in the same year, aims were lowered, probably because the United States and the United Kingdom were on the point of introducing a new version, Mark XII. In view of the trials and training conducted on Mark X, should have been fairly straightforward, however, to install the more modern equipment, should be supplied to Sweden, e.g. in a crisis. Through its activities in the IFF sphere, Sweden acquired freedom of action in terms of technology so that, should an over~arching policy decision be made, a capability for the identification of possible Western allied aircraft could rapidly be established. Loran C long-distance radio navigation system of U.S. origin. a Initially, served primarily military purposes, i.e., precision navigation of U.S. strategic submarines, and probably also of U.S. military aviation. During the Vietnam war, this system said to have been the principal navigational aid for U.S. bombers. In early 1960, the United States requested Sweden to permit calibration of the system, with one aircraft carrying gauging equipment to be

parked at Bromma airport Stockholm and Torslanda airport

Gothenburg, respectively. Loran C was described in general terms as a navigational aid for ships and aircraft, with no -reference made to military applications. At the same time, similar requests were made to number of other West European states. The Swedish Government a granted the request, and calibrations were made later that year. These calibrations have contributed to U.S. Air Force capabilities for may precision navigation the Baltic region. Documents submitted to the Cabinet prior to the decision showed that Loran C could be used for navigation by submarines equipped with the nuclear ballistic missile system Polaris. The calibrations made in Sweden could, however, hardly

Summary 27

be seen in this context, since the Polaris submarines unlikely to were operate in the Baltic Sea. Nothing has been divulged indicating that the issue of U.S. Air Force utilization of Loran C was discussed in contacts between the defence authorities and the Government at that time. Swedish combat aircraft were comparably light-weight and their requirements for runway load capacity and length at Swedish airbases were moderate. At the same time, the focus of Western interest was on heavy offensive bombers with heavy payloads and ranges which, from the mid-1950s, made possible return flights from the United States to the Soviet Union without refuelling stops. Also, fighter escort of bombers, in use at least until the mid-1950s, was generally provided by aircraft larger and heavier than Sweden’s. By Swedish standards, then, Western bombers, as well as fighters, made great demands on base capacity. Evidently, therefore, cooperation with Western air forces involving the use of Swedish bases to the extent this was contemplated raised the — issue of whether their capacity was adequate. The significance of air bases for cooperation with the Western Powers was realized early on. Reportedly, Erlander explained in 1948 that he would task the Defence Staff with a continued study of the feasibility of basing U.S. air assets in Sweden. According to the then Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, one additional motive for the expansion of Swedish airbases in the 1950s was to create a capability for receiving possible allied aircraft. In 1960, the intelligence section of the Air Staff requested, from the Swedish air attaché London, data on landing gear ground pressure, etc. of certain British aircraft, some of which were bombers intended to carry nuclear weapons. In this context, notable that the Swedish base structure, composed of a multitude of small and scattered bases, in effect complicated cooperation with foreign air forces. Furthermore, the interests of commercial aviation affected the capacity afforded to many airfields. The Commission has studied the main runway capacity of the Swedish airbase system the 1950s and 1960s, in terms of runway length, width, and load capacity, and compared this with the requirements of the Swedish Air Force and those of commercial aviation. In the process, has been possible to establish that the majority of Swedish airbases can be viewed as having been constructed according to national requirements. A few runways, primarily located close to the Swedish East Coast, were, however, during the period in question, of a length and width that to a certain extent exceeded strictly national requirements. The expansion of these bases can be seen as a means to create freedom of action, in a technical sense, to facilitate takeoffs and landings of heavy Western military aircraft. The Swedish Air Force converted to high-pressure refuelling and

28 Summary

switched types of aviation fuel about 1960, and this was in effect an adjustment to NATO standards. These measures appear, however, to

have been motivated primarily by national requirements. This does not rule out the possibility of a desire to improve technical preconditions for cooperation with the Western Powers also having contributed to the

decision.

Nothing has been found indicating that on—base maintenance and repair facilities of the Swedish Air Force were of such capacity as to permit

foreign air forces to conduct larger-scale operations from Swedish airbases.

Preparations for wartime procurement equipment and supplies

In the course of a longer war, the endurance of the Swedish National

Defence would be dependent imports of military equipment and other

on essential supplies, primarily fuel. The United States and the United war

Kingdom were the principal suppliers anticipated.

Whether Sweden would receive any deliveries in war was uncertain. In 1949 at least, the Western Powers were reluctant to provide any accommodating to Swedish requests in this matter. In 1954, the answers Swedish Defence Staff made request to the NATO Standing Group, a

apparently with the objective of securing deliveries of supplies to Sweden in the event of a threatening contingency.

The Defence Staff was charged with the plarming of imports to meet

the requirements of the armed forces. During the first half of the 1950s, lists of wartime import requirements were compiled. The purpose of these lists that, in the event of outbreak of war, they were to be

was an

presented to relevant authorities of the prospective export countries. Designated trade delegations to travel to the United States and the

were United Kingdom to assist the Swedish missions in managing these issues. The lists kept updated for a few years, but seem to have lost their were thereafter. In 1969, however, the Defence Staff resumed this currency

planning, with the consent of the Government. The Swedish shipping industry maintained a certain preparedness to

coordinate Swedish transport resources with those of the Western Powers

in Such coordination hoped could contribute to a favour-

war. — was -

able Western position permitting Swedish merchantmen with cargo

on destined for Sweden to join their convoys across the Atlantic and the

North Sea. Swedish commercial aviation maintained similar prepared-

ness.

Summary 29

Preparations for resistance in the event of occupation

The plarming directives included assumptions to the effect that the regular defence could collapse, and that all or part of Sweden might come under enemy control. In such a contingency, the population was expected to actively or passively resist the intruder, thereby helping to force him out of the country, and ultimately, to restore legal a government. In peacetime, steps could be taken to recruit reliable people who, in the event of occupation, could form the core of a resistance movement. Communications equipment and weapons could be acquired and certain training conducted. A network of this kind often called a stay-behind organization. A resistance movement is, more often than not, dependent on external assistance. A stay-behind organization could thus have reasons to cultivate contacts with possible foreign providers of assistance in peacetime. More or less far—reaching joint planning could also be carried out. There have been reports in books and newspapers of Swedish staybehind organizations. This kind of activity of interest to the Commission only to the extent that has involved preparations for receiving military assistance from a foreign power. A CIA officer, stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm in the early 1950s, has asserted that he was tasked to establish stay-behind networks inter alia in Sweden. Reports on how extensive his Swedish network was have differed. This activity was gradually discontinued and seems to have ceased completely at about 1960. Concurrently with this activity there existed at least since the early 1950s, the core of a Swedish resistance movement, with connections to trade unions, industry, and the National Defence. This activity, run entirely by Swedes, was placed under Government supervision in 1958. Contacts did occur between representatives of this organization and foreign officials. Their prime purpose appears to have been to enable a Swedish resistance movement to obtain material assistance from the Western Powers. Apart from the acquisition of certain radio equipment, few any concrete measures to have been implemented. seem

Concluding assessment of military preparations for cooperation with the

Western Powers

The military measures taken for cooperation with the West can mainly be categorized as related either to organization and personnel, or to equipment.

30 Summary

The most significant of the first kind was the actual preparedmeasure

for establishing military cooperation with Western Powers signifi-

ness cant to Sweden. Reception of direct assistance from, and cooperation with, Western armed forces would have required extensive advance

preparations. The designated liaison groups were not sufficient for this

purpose.

Measures involving equipment can, for all practical purposes, be

referred to the sphere of air operations and communications for

operational command and control. Measures taken relating to air operations involving primarily systems for communications, identifi-

— cation, and navigation, as well as airbases may be deemed limited, but — nevertheless significant. Measures in the field of communications in the form of swift and —

links with Denmark and Norway, and with the U.S. Air Force in

secure

West Germany also entailed consequences for the preconditions for

-

operational command and control. They provided the technical possibilities for consultation and coordination in general, mainly in a strategic They however, completely inadequate for far-reaching

sense. were,

direct cooperation with the armed forces of the Western Powers. The memorandum by the secretariat of the 1955 Defence Committee,

referred to in chapter discussed inter alia what could be done to further Western wartime assistance to Sweden. The focus was set on direct assistance of a kind effectively bordering on indirect assistance, i.e., limited employment of strike and bomber air units. In this context,

primarily the following types of measures were mentioned personal contacts which were to have the potential for expansion,

should war threaten; and sufficient means of communication; - secure

general coordination of air operations;

- a some coordination of air surveillance; ~ exchange of air defence intelligence and general intelligence. - There indications of this fundamental view on external assistance are no having changed later No comprehensive assessment on this issue has on. been found dated later than 1956. The Commission concludes that the measures referred to in the mem-

orandum correspond closely to what was actually accomplished. In the sphere of personal contacts, peacetime high-level military contacts maintained with key Western states. Also, there were plans

were

for dispatching delegations of highly qualified operations officers to these

states in the event of a crisis.

The significance of the radio—relay links established has already been

commented Furthermore, the communications facilities should upon. have made possible the overall coordination of air operations, in the

Summary 31

sense that was technically feasible to flights of Western

manage bombers traversing Swedish airspace on their approach to the Soviet

Union, without the aircraft being inadvertently fired by Swedish air

upon defences. The construction of extended runways close to the Swedish East Coast, as well as IFF measures taken, should, in the mind of the Commission, be viewed in the context of bombers returning from the East. The most plausible explanation for the extended thus runways

that these were to facilitate emergency landings by bombers damaged in

the course of their mission. The IFF system would also have been very

important in this context for identifying and directing the returning aircraft, and forestalling accidental fire they were intercepted by the

Swedish air defences.

As regards certain coordination of air surveillance and exchange of air

defence intelligence, the technical prerequisites at hand, in the form were

of a Swedish signals intelligence service primarily directed eastwards,

as

well as opportunities of trading general information with various Western

Powers. Also, the permission to calibrate Loran C might have contributed to an increased effectiveness in Western bombing of Soviet targets. As far as has been established, however, such considerations influenced the no Government’s decision. In conclusion, the Commission has found that the measures taken,

aimed primarily at creating freedom of action threatening, vaguely

- a

defined, contingency permitting the rapid reception of mainly indirect

-

assistance, primarily from the United States, were a decision made to

this effect at the political level. Nothing has been found, however, to

indicate that any plans for combined operations made in conjunc-

were

tion with other states, nor that any formal security guarantee offered

was

to Sweden by any of the Western great

powers.

In all likelihood, only a very small group within the military leadership had a complete picture of measures actually taken, and of their overarching motives.

Chapter 7 How much did the Government know

Tage Erlander was Prime Minister of Sweden throughout the period studied by the Commission. He was personally interested in and had

a

thorough understanding of security policy issues, and took an active part in the making of foreign and defence policies.

Osten Undén served Minister of Foreign Affairs 1945-62. He

as

32 Summary

the leading ideologist and interpreter of the official Swedish policy was of neutrality. succeeded Torsten Nilsson, who held office He was until 1971. Allan Vougt served as Minister of Defence in 1945-51, Torsten Nilsson in 1951-57, and Sven Andersson in 1957-73. Contrary to Vougt, Nilsson and Andersson belonged to the inner cabinet, and must be assumed to have had the authority and to act independently within power the confines of what they perceived to be general government policy. Both of them had good relations with the Military High Command and kept themselves well—informed on military affairs. Within the Cabinet, in—depth discussions on security policy more issues most probably kept within a smaller group. Deliberations on were what should be done, Sweden to be attacked by the Soviet Union were

the policy of neutrality thus having failed appear to have taken place

— within limited circle. Other Cabinet members’ knowledge an even more

of security—policy and military issues be assumed to have been of a

can fairly general nature. Constitutionally, the Cabinet body, collectively responsible for one decisions made. Officials representing subordinate government authorities must have to doubt that each Cabinet member charged with never reason issue represents the authority of the entire Cabinet; and likewise, that an information submitted by subordinate authority to a Cabinet member a will be forwarded to all ministers concerned.

Partial Scandinavian dc ence cooperation

has not been possible to establish fully the content of Scandinavian

defence cooperation Cf chapter 6. Nor does available documentation

permit definitive assessment of the extent to which the Cabinet was any informed of these activities in detail. clear, however, that the Military High Command did not act completely on its own initiative; and nothing indicates that the Military High Command would have exceeded

its authority. that the Cabinet, in its view on Scandinavian contacts, was appears influenced by two partly conflicting interests. On the one hand, there that the contacts might compromise Swedish security policy, was concern without yielding material benefits to Sweden. On the other hand, the any Cabinet apparently believed that these contacts could help in establishing links with the Western Powers, something deemed valuable.

The expansion of Sweden’s contacts with the United States the early

half of the 1950s coincided with the waning of Cabinet interest in

Scandinavian defence cooperation. the Commission’s opinion that

there good to infer from this coincidence that the main are reasons

Summary 33

concern of the Cabinet was to secure assistance from the Western great powers in the event of a Soviet attack on Sweden.

Contacts with the Western great powers soon became clear, at least to Erlander, that the Swedish National

Defence was dependent on military assistance from the Western great

powers to resist a Soviet attack. Following the 1949 breakdown of the negotiations on a Scandinavian defence union, Erlander said to have approved of the Americans being informed of the weaknesses and capabilities of the Swedish National Defence. Erlander also played a part when the British, in 1951, were handed a memorandum from the Swedish Minister of Defence, Vougt, on the Swedish armed forces and defence planning, the contents of which must

be considered to have been top secret. The ensuing British preliminaries for enhanced military cooperation between the United Kingdom and

Sweden, however, met with a reserved from Erlander and other response

Cabinet members. The memorandum obviously transgressed the

constraints on Swedish freedom of action drawn up in the Government Declaration to Parliament the previous year. The memorandum not

only most remarkable but, as far as we know, also without parallel in the

post-war era.

Erlander does not seem to have objected to a military-political analysis made by the Military High Command in 1953, the gist of which was that the most significant military assistance Sweden could receive from the

Western Powers would be air strikes from Western bases against enemy attacks. At the same time, was concluded that cooperation involving

simultaneous use of an airbase by Swedish and foreign aircraft would be difficult to improvise. Nevertheless, was deemed possible to rapidly place certain Swedish airbases at the full disposal of the Western Powers,

an idea which Erlander had floated as early as 1948.

As noted above Cf chapter 3, the memorandum drawn up within the

1955 Defence Committee must be viewed as reflecting the view of the

Minister of Defence, Nilsson, and consequently that of the Cabinet, on Sweden’s possibilities of receiving assistance from the Western Powers,

and how such assistance could be furthered. As established earlier by the

Commission Cf chapter 6, the measures listed in the memorandum

closely corresponded to what was actually accomplished.

evident that the Minister of Defence, Andersson, was informed

of the preparations to dispatch high-level military personnel to the NATO

states, most significant to Sweden a crisis. He was also privy to the communication links established with Denmark, Norway, and the U.S.

34 Summary

Air Force in West Germany as well as their significance for general

coordination of air operations. He was also aware of the extension of certain airbase runways beyond the minimum requirements for Swedish aircraft. On the other hand, nothing has been found indicating that the Cabinet, or any of its members, was informed of the thought of a certain harmonization of IFF systems with those the Western Powers, or of the

significance of Loran C for aircraft navigation.

The aforementioned measures were, as has been established earlier,

key elements of Swedish preparations for receiving assistance from the

Western Powers.

The extent to which knowledge of the existing cooperation with the

Western Powers was shared within the Cabinet unknown.

probable that the majority of the Cabinet members had no comprehensive

awareness of the ongoing preparations for receiving external assistance.

practically inconceivable that key Cabinet members would have been

unaware of the expectations that the defence of Sweden would be

supported by the Western Powers, primarily through U.S. Air Force bombing missions.

Chapter 8 Concluding assessment

From the late 1940s, and long thereafter, a considerable risk of a major

in Europe was felt in Sweden. The policy of neutrality, in combina-

war tion with the maintenance of a potent Swedish National Defence, aimed

at permitting Sweden to avoid being automatically drawn into a greatpower conflict. Notwithstanding, the risk that the policy of neutrality

would fail had to be calculated with, and that the country most -

probably in the course of a major would be attacked by the Soviet

war —

Union. The prevailing opinion was that Sweden, on its own, would not

be able to withstand an attack for any length of time. The aim was for

the country to be capable of defending itself until help arrived, i.e. until

the Western Powers were able to provide assistance. The general assumption was that lending such assistance was in the interests of the Western Powers themselves.

The types of Western assistance primarily to be hoped for, were air

bombing missions against airbases and embarkation ports across the

Baltic Sea, as well as the provision of supplies. Such assistance required only limited peacetime preparations, to be made unilaterally. The most significant measures taken were the planning for the dispatch of liaison

to foreign headquarters, the establishment of secure communicagroups

Summary 35

tion links with Denmark and Norway which could be further connected

within the NATO system, and the expansion of extended runways for

heavy great-power aviation close to the Swedish East Coast. The IFF

measures also fit into this picture. As far as has been established, no guarantees of assistance were given by the Western Powers. The United States appears, however, to have been fully intent on assisting Sweden. Whether this intent was perceived in Sweden has not been possible to establish.

In the opinion of this Commission, would have been irreconcilable with the responsibilities resting with Sweden’s political and military leadership had no measures been taken to facilitate the reception of

assistance from the Western great powers.

Our findings lead us to conclude that Swedish preparations for receiving military assistance from the Western Powers in the event of a Soviet

attack were fully compatible with international law. The preparations involved no ties or obligations to act in a certain manner in war, and did not diminish the prospects of remaining outside a major war, not

directly attacked. Thus, Sweden’s freedom of action was not restricted.

difficult to assess what effect the Swedish preparations might have had on the Soviet view of Sweden. In all likelihood, Moscow suspected

that Sweden was collaborating with the Western Powers on operational

issues. therefore uncertain whether possible Soviet awareness of

preparations made would have affected the Soviet impression of Sweden substantial degree. Had the Soviets been certain that operational

to any

cooperation was occurring, they might, on the one hand, have been less inclined to respect Sweden’s territorial integrity; on the other hand, the notion of the Western Powers rapidly taking counteraction in the event

of an attack on Sweden, might have served as a deterrent, and thus helped preserve the peace.

There were two particular occasions during the period in question when the Govermnent publicly discussed the issue of preparations for military cooperation with other states. The first was the 1950 Government Foreign Policy Declaration. In the Government rejected preparations bordering on a defence union, e.g. combined staff talks and

combined defence plans. This, however, did not preclude unilateral Swedish measures to facilitate wartime cooperation with other states. The extensive exchange of information with the Western Powers and the

measures actually taken in the 1950s must with the obvious exception

— of Vougt’s memorandum of 1951 be deemed to come within these limits.

In 1959, replying to a question in Parliament, the Prime Minister categorically ruled out preparations for and consultations on military cooperation with members of a great-power alliance. must have been

36 Summary

evident to the Cabinet, however, that unilateral preparations had been

made for cooperation involving the reception of primarily indirect

assistance from the United States or the United Kingdom; and that

consultations and other contacts on military cooperation andor the reception of wartime assistance had occurred with Denmark, Norway,

the United Kingdom, and the United States. The statement thus

deliberately conveyed a erroneous picture of what had actually taken

place. There were occasional instances of discrepancies between declared policy and actions actually taken, the most remarkable being Vougt’s memorandum, handed to the British in 1951. As a rule, the

Government’s officially stated positions provided leeway for national,

unilateral preparations to receive assistance from, and cooperate with, the Western Powers in the event of a Soviet attack on Sweden. As far as has been disclosed, Swedish war preparations did not transgress these

limits. must be concluded that by and large, these preparations had

Cabinet approval.

Introduction 37

1 Introduction

1.1 The Commission’s remit

The Commission’s remit Appendix 1 to establish as far as possible the preparations possibly made for receiving military assistance in the decades following the formation of the two East-West blocs in the late 1940s, until the actual beginning of détente with the start of the SALT negotiations in November 1969. The Commission also, as far as possible, to explore the preparations that might have been made, as well as to describe and evaluate the assessments made by the political and military leadership during these decades. The Commission has understood its mandate to mean that all forms of preparations for receiving support in the form of war operations as well as provision of equipment and supplies, and for military cooperation with the Western Powers, including Denmark and Norway, are to be explored to the extent possible. In our opinion, however, a more detailed examination of intelligence cooperation falls beyond the mandate. The Commission has acted on the desire stated in the remit for its work to be conducted with all possible dispatch and, possible, presented before the end of 1993. This has affected the extent and direction of the Commission’s research efforts. For example, the foreign policy background has only been subjected to a general overview, no systematic examination of the extensive diplomatic reporting being possible within the time at the Commission’s disposal. In the light of the vigorous debate on Western cooperation which preceded the appointment of the Commission, we have chosen to give an exhaustive account [in this report] of the facts emerging on contacts between Sweden and the Western Powers in these matters which we have been directed to study. We wish, however, to emphasize that there are gaps in the sources available to us. Therefore, we do not exclude the possibility of new information modifying and amplifying the picture conveyed in this report, especially for the latter part of the period examined. The Commission has also been instructed to recommend what parts of its sources can be made public as soon as its mission has been completed.

38 Introduction

In reporting its findings, the Commission has exercised the greatest

possible candour. The report includes a great amount of previously

classified information, some of top secret. In several cases, such information has been found in Swedish documents which also include

data that should remain classified for national security reasons. has not

been possible for us to make recommendations on the classification of entire documents in individual cases. Concerning foreign sources the following situation applies. Information from Norwegian archives has been handed over to the Commission on condition of continued secrecy. As to British information, to be

noted that the British Government has copyright. Such sources are quoted and referred to in this report with permission from the relevant British authority, the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.

Persons wishing to quote from or copy a British text should contact the British Public Record Office. No such restrictions apply to other interna-

tional, mainly U.S., sources. Many of the interviewees have also provided information still to be

regarded defence secrets, e. data of a pronounced technical characas ter. Notes from talks with Norwegian citizens have been taken on condition of secrecy.

In these circumstances not generally possible to make the extensive sources used publicly accessible. The Commission therefore finds that issues of public access to its sources are best managed according to the standard security procedures of the archives concerned.

The Commission’s report has been translated into English, except for appendices and footnotes.

The Commission would like to express its gratitude to various Swedish and foreign authorities, institutions, and other sources which graciously

facilitated its work.

1.2 The Commission’s sources

As emphasized in the Commission’s remit, information of significance to the Commission’s work may be found in vast amounts of archive material in Sweden and abroad. has been left to the Commission to determine how extensive a survey can be made within the confines of its

task, and what parts will have to be left to future research Cf section

1.3. The Commission has conducted research in a great number of Swedish archives of importance for its task, public as well as private; and also in

foreign archives deemed especially important. The Commission has also

Introduction 39

used diaries, memoirs, and other printed sources. Archives and other printed sources examined by the Commission are listed in Appendix The Commission has also interviewed a great number of persons. A list of persons who have supplied information to the Commission found in Appendix Furthermore, a research symposium has been conducted, and foreign researchers have appeared before the Commission on a couple of occasions.

1.2.1 Archive sources

Swedish authority archives By special resolution, the Government has decreed, pursuant to Chap. 14, Section 8 of the Secrecy Act, that information from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Transport, as well as from authorities attached to these ministries, can be supplied to the Commission in derogation of normal secrecy. Exemptions have also applied to top secret documents, i.e. those deemed of the utmost importance for national security.

Swedish Cabinet and Ministry archives Files deemed to be of special importance to the work of the Commission have been examined in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The top secret archives of the Ministry of Defence for 1949-69 have been systematically examined, as well as certain secret documents deemed of special interest.

The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs The formal minutes of Council meetings deemed of possible interest have been made available to the Commission, starting with meeting agendas. After studying these minutes, the Commission requested access to excerpts from minutes of Council meetings from 1951 onwards. This request granted. The latter minutes proved, however, to contain was nothing of interest for the Commission’s purposes.

40 Introduction

Defence Committee reports

Documentation from the Defence Committees during the years 1949-62

has been systematically examined. The same applies to the records of the Scandinavian Defence Committee. The most important documents in

connection with the 1968 Defence Decision have also been examined.

Defence authority documents

The top secret archives of the Defence Staff and the service staffs have

constituted a key source, examined full with respect to the period in

question. Many documents, however, have been weeded out or otherwise

removed from these archives, especially documents from the earlier part

of the period. Other documents which could have been of interest in this

context have with certainty not been registered or filed. The Navy Staff

archive appears to have been less thoroughly weeded out than the rest of the afore-mentioned archives. This may have contributed to the

impression that the Navy during certain periods was especially active in

preparing for Western cooperation. No consistent distinction between

secret and top secret documents seems to have been made in the early

part of the period. Some secret files deemed to contain information of interest have been examined. The top secret files for the period in question at the Defence Materiel

Agency and its predecessors the Army, Navy, and Air Materiel Administrations, as well as the National Defence Research Establish-

ment, and the National Defence Radio Institute have been examined in

full. The yield of these examinations has been very limited, possibly due to thorough weeding out some places. Certain regional and local military authority archives have also been examined, some cases fully with respect to top secret documents. Only the top secret archive of Naval Command West has yielded anything

substantial. The First Archivist of the War Archives, Lars Ericson, has made a more extensive examination, on the Commission’s behalf, of some secret documents kept there.

The Commission wished to point out that research in the archives of the Defence Staff and also other military authority archives hampered by the fact that consistently created and up-dated files so far as they

-

ever existed have often been cannibalized and that the documents if

-

not weeded out have been moved to new chronological files without specific sectioning. The Commission therefore aware that has only studied quantitatively very limited parts of defence authority archives.

Severe restraint has also been necessary for of time. reasons

Introduction 41

Miscellaneous The sections of the preliminary investigative minutes from the Wennerstrom files, classified until the autumn of 1992, have been studied on behalf of the Commission by Lieutenant-General ret. Bengt Lehander and Air Commodore ret. Gunnar Unell. This information has proved of limited interest in the present connection.

Foreign authority archives Denmark The Commission has been informed that Danish laws of secrecy debar foreigners from access to Danish authority archives. Senior Archivist Otto Schepelern at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, personally conducted an extensive search of relevant files in the ministry archives, with particular emphasis on Bornholm, but he found nothing to report to the Commission. Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Clemmesen, a security policy research officer who well-acquainted with the military archives, has explained to the Commission that these should not contain any information casting light on issues of concern to the Commission.

Norway By kind permission of the Norwegian Government, the Commission was enable to study minutes of the Defence Council and the Government Security Committee as well as certain files in the Foreign Ministry archives, from which information was retrieved mainly illustrating

Norwegian-Swedish defence cooperation in the late 1940s and the early

1950s.

The Commission has ‘been told that the archives of the Ministry of

Defence and the Defence Staff have been largely weeded out and destroyed.

Russia Soviet archives are not organized in satisfactory and even their a manner personnel have difficulty in finding their way in them. The archives of the President and the Security Ministry have not been available to the Commission. Certain files in the former Soviet Foreign Ministry archives have been examined. Nothing of immediate interest for the work of the Commission has been found.

42 Introduction

The United Kingdom Extensive searcher have been conducted at the Public Record Office of unclassified documents from the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff to and including 1962. Starting with indices and textual references the up

Commission requested access to still classified documents seemingly of

interest for its work. These requests first led to our being given detailed summaries of the documents, prepared for the Commission within the

Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, and later to the majority of

the documents in which had expressed interest being declassified. we

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence has examined still classified docu-

ments from Chiefs of Staff meetings in the 1963-69 without finding years

anything in particular to report to the Commission.

extensive British documentation has offered valuable insights The very

not only concerning defence cooperation between the United Kingdom

and Sweden but also concerning inter-Scandinavian contacts.

Germany Relevant files in the German Foreign Office, Auswéirtiges Amt, have

been examined. No military reporting on Sweden was found, although the regulations required any such reports deemed to be of particular

interest to be forwarded to the Foreign Office.

The United States

Extensive searches have been conducted especially in the National Archives including the Presidential Archives and also other public

archives. Much of value work has been found in these archives. to our

Furthermore, an extensive collection of documents was presented to the

Commission by Dr. Paul Cole. A significant part of U.S. documentation still classified, even

though some documents have been declassified fully or in part following requests by the Commission. Above all, documentation from the 1960s

still available only to a minor extent. This being can be expected that additional information casting light on Swedish-U.S. military relations over time will become available. Such information may quite well to modify somewhat the picture the Commission has formed

come

of defence contacts between the countries, especially in the latter part of

the period.

Introduction 43

NATO The Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Norwegian Defence Ministry, Chris Prebensen, who formerly held an administrative managerial position at NATO headquarters Brussels, has had the archives of NATO in Brussels, SHAPE, and AFNORTH in Kolsas,

Norway examined on the Commission’s behalf, but without anything of

interest to the Commission emerging.

Archives of organizations and private individuals

Swedish archives Certain political party archives and archives of leading politicians have

been studied, as well as the collections of a few high-ranking military officers. The Swedish Shipowners’ Association has permitted the Commission to study its secret archives, and the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken has lent correspondence of Marcus Wallenberg with a number

of persons of significance in this context. No information of real

significance has been found in these collections. The Commission has had access to a number of diaries kept by key

in this context. Prime Minister Tage Erlander’s children have persons

very kindly placed their father’s diaries at the Commission’s disposal.

These notes have been of great value to the work of the Commission.

Foreign Minister Osten Undén’s diaries have been examined on behalf

of the Commission by Ms Louise Hugemark. Defence Minister Sven Andersson’s diaries have yielded information of relevance to the

Commission’s work. Kent Zetterberg, Assistant Professor at the Armed Forces Staff and

War College MHS Department of History has, on behalf of the Commission, studied the day-to—day notes made by Supreme Commanders Helge Jung and Nils Swedlund, the Chief of the Navy, Stig

Hzson Ericson, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Richard Akerman.

The three latter officers have kept on—duty diaries in which moot points are often recorded daily. These notes have apparently served as an aide-

mémoire, and basis for referring back to certain matters. Jung’s as a

notes are more freely written.

Admiral Ake Lindemalm allowed the Commission to read the diaries

he kept while Chief of the Navy. These diaries include a considerable

amount of interesting information.

The former Supreme Commander, the late General Torsten Rapp, did not wish to make his notes available to the Commission. He explained that they did not contain anything shedding light upon the issues included

in the Commission’s remit. General Carl Eric Almgren, Chief of the

44 Introduction

Defence Staff during most of the 1960s, has explained that his archives for the moment are not organized a manner fit for study by the Commission. Reportedly, the late General Bengt Nordenskiold, Chief of the Air Force 1942-54, burnt his papers and also removed documents from certain authority archives. Diary notes are usually written down soon after the events described, which facilitates accurate recall. At the same time, they are often highly subjective, and the information must therefore be interpreted with great care so far as cannot be double—checked against other sources.

Foreign archives Denmark Certain collections in the Danish Labour Movement archives have been studied.

1.2.2 Written sources

Comprehensive works on the matter studied by the Commission exist only to a very limited extent and are listed in the bibliography, Appendix Of special interest in this context The United States and the Cold War in the High North by Rolf Tamnes. A number of books discussing Swedish intelligence and security service also exist. The 1974 Intelligence Committee report Military Intelligence Service [Den militéira underréittelsetjiinsten] deserves special mention. Certain information and assessments of interest have been found in the memoirs of politicians, military officers, and civil servants, as well as biographies. Certain newspaper and journal articles on special some issues have also been used. A systematic literature search of this latter kind has been beyond the means of the Commission.

1.2.3 Interviews

The Commission has collected information from more than 200 people, mostly Swedish citizens who during the period in question or shortly thereafter, served in capacities deemed of possible interest in this context. Mostly, they were key politicians, diplomats and ministry civil servants, military officers and others serving with the Swedish National Defence. Some Norwegian citizens high civilian and military positions

Introduction 45

during the period have been interviewed.

Several telephone interviews have been conducted, and often the interviewee has either stated that he or she had no knowledge of issues

studied by the Commission, or has provided unclassified information. Some persons contacted by the Commission explained that, for health

or

other reasons, they did not wish to assist the Commission. Notes

were

made of telephone conversations. Whenever telephone conversations

were deemed to call for additional questions, the interviewee was invited to meetings where classified issues could be discussed. Well over a hundred interviews were conducted at meetings. Some

thirty interviews took place before the full Commission. These interviews

were recorded and the tapes transcribed. In some cases, the interviewee has checked the transcript, and made editorial changes. The remainder of the interviews were conducted one or more members andor representatives of the secretariat. For these interviews, records were prepared afterwards, based on notes from the meetings. Some such

records were checked and approved by the interviewees. Certain

persons

have been interviewed on two or more occasions, often first by the

secretariat, and then before the full Commission either several once or times. On occasion, persons contacted have submitted written information. The Commission has the general impression that who have persons

been interviewed or other ways provided information have generally wished to provide complete and correct accounts of what they knew of

the issues examined by the Commission. All in all, the interviews have

substantially contributed towards completing and nuancing the picture provided by the written sources. The Commission has of taken

course

into account that the majority of the people providing information of

are

advanced age and that some are failing health, added to which the

events discussed took place many years ago.

also notable that many of the individuals who played a key part in shaping Swedish security policy during the 1950s and 1960s

are now deceased. Others are too ill to be interviewed. Some others were

unwilling to assist the Commission. Due to time constraints, the Commission has had only limited

very

opportunities of interviewing foreign nationals.

In this report, the Commission has found appropriate, with few exceptions, not to attribute verbal information to individual interviewees. With the odd exception, however, the opening of each section has been

provided with a footnote showing who provided information underlying

the account which follows. The complete records tapes, - as any - are now the Commission archives. In January 1993, the Commission conducted a research seminar

46 Introduction

entitled Sweden, the Nordic region, and NATO during the Cold War.

Some Nordic security policy researchers participated. Further-

twenty

the American researcher, Dr. Paul Cole has presented his views

more, U.S. archival material in meeting with the Commission. And at on a another meeting the Danish research officer, Lieutenant—Colonel Michael

Clemmesen, presented the Danish view on Swedish security policy

during the Cold War. Other contacts also occurred with Swedish and foreign researchers, senior archivists, and others deemed to be able to contribute. Both Assistant Professor Wilhelm Agrell and News Editor

Christer Larsson, of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, declared that

they did wish to be interviewed by the Commission, for reasons of not

principle.

1.3 On future research

The number of published works on Swedish post—war security policy, based thorough of most limited. No larger—scale

on use sources,

systematic research projects appear to have been started. Consequently,

shown above Cf section 1.2, the Commission’s report based on

as

its extensive research with few references to previous studies.

own

There surely several for the paucity of research activities

are reasons

in this For example, laws of secrecy make access to primary

area.

in various authority archives difficult. Furthermore, appears

sources

that security and foreign policy has had difficulty in asserting itself against other of higher priority in the tough competition for

areas

research funding and positions. However all this may be, advanced research Swedish post—war security policy appears regrettably

on understrength.

This especially clear comparison to the situation in our neighbouring countries Finland and Norway. Lately, interesting works on the security policy deliberations and decisions of Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen have been published Finland. Several studies on Norwegian political and military affairs and on Norway’s post—war position in great politics have been published in Norway. To a large degree, these

power

studies made possible by defence history institute, established by

were a

authorities and provided with funding and research positions.

the state This research has created broad and foundation for current a secure

Norwegian debate, and the debate has also been enriched by the participation of large number of researchers with a thorough know-

a

ledge of Norwegian security policy. Their scientific works are to a fairly

large extent written in English and have attracted much attention abroad.

Introduction 47

Opportunities have thus been created for perceptive evaluation of a Norwegian policy and Norwegian affairs in international research and in the well~informed international media, on the basis of research reports. Furthermore, can be mentioned that a large~scale project The - History of Norwegian Foreign Policy, comprising six parts of which the last three will cover the period after 1940 was started recently. The authors have been promised access to all sources except those covering the past very few years. In Sweden, then, the post-war field of research considerably less cultivated than in Finland and Norway, and much remains to be done. Appropriate areas for study are the external environment, i.e. preconditions and constraints of Swedish security policy, dictated by our surroundings and the international situation at different points in time; and key decisionmakers’ perception of this environment, goals formulated and means whereby they trusted to achieve those ends. Against this background, foreign and defence policy measures actually implemented must be analysed. Studies must carefully take into account changes in circumstances with the passing of time. The Commission as shown by its report of the opinion that — own national security and Sweden’s relations with foreign powers no longer require the same secrecy as could be demanded before the end of the Cold War. Much archival material from the early post-war in fact era now publicly available, and although secrecy requirements still figure prominently, especially concerning military documents, more liberal standards in granting access to highly qualified researchers could improve availability without necessarily harming national security and foreign relations. In the light of its own experiences, the Commission would like to stress the significance of research being based on open debate on complicated technical matters with civilian and military experts in this area. The Commission would also like to point out that to foster knowledge and hopefully understanding of Swedish security policy - abroad, important that more significant Swedish works in this field should be published in any major language. The Commission hopes that its report will help to improve conditions for research on post-war security policy. For current and future debate and decision-making, of the utmost importance to build positive on knowledge and broad perspectives on Swedish security policy hitherto.

Neutrality and policy of neutrality 49

Neutrality and policy of neutrality

2.1 Starting points in international law

Neutrality, as defined by international law, can exist only times of war. Its core and will remain non-participation between other war states. The laws of neutrality initially evolved out of common law, but they were formally codified during the 19th and the early 20th century. With the Paris Declaration of 1856, neutrality rules for naval warfare - — were drawn up for the first time. Additional rules codified in the were socalled Washington Agreement of 1871. Most of the codification work was carried out in the Hague Conventions, number V and XIII, 1907. These conventions covered neutrality during land and naval warfare, respectively. Corresponding neutrality laws regarding air warfare have not been codified. According to the Hague Conventions, the fundamental duty of a neutral state to refrain from participating between other states. war In return, the warring states are obliged to respect the neutrality of that neutral state. A neutral state has the right and obligation military to use force to counter violations of its territory. In such the perpetrator a case, cannot be considered a victim of hostile action. The declared intention of a state to remain neutral in future does wars not entail any rights or obligations in peacetime. A state can, however, already peacetime commit itself to remain neutral all future wars. This called permanent neutrality. legally binding, either by a treaty in which neutrality internationally guaranteed, as in the case of Switzerland, by national legislation, or as with Austria. In wartime, a permanently neutral state obliged to adhere to the laws of neutrality stated in the Hague Conventions. In addition, in peacetime a permanently neutral state bound by so-called some secondary obligations; the neutral state shall refrain from peacetime actions that could lead to its engagement in future thereby a war, vitiating its neutrality. The most obvious such action would be to join a military alliance. On the other hand, should also be legitimate for permanently a neutral state to plan for the contingencies that could arise the state

50 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

were attacked and the policy of neutrality thus had failed. Not even staff talks with other states, or with a military alliance, on defence issues should be considered incompatible with the secondary obligations, provided that they do not involve binding agreements on joint actions in future wars. In short, then, the permanently neutral state obliged to follow some form of neutrality policy also peacetime. The guidelines for such a policy nevertheless no more precise than those discussed above. are Thus, for the state itself to decide upon the details of what is, or not, consistent with its permanent neutrality status. In the of Sweden, the declared intention to maintain neutrality in case the event of war has been a purely unilateral statement of will. A deliberate policy has been to avoid formal security policy ties. Thus, Sweden not bound by any secondary obligations in peacetime. And so the restrictions that adhered to during the period studied by this were - Commission to enhance the credibility of Sweden’s neutrality policy, — were self—imposed. In conclusion, neutrality in war to a great extent codified in the Hague Conventions. Neutrality in peacetime, however, does not have a corresponding basis in international law. Its substance determined by the states themselves. Only for permanently neutral states Sweden not one of them do certain guidelines exist which do not, however, offer any explicit guidance.

2.2 Government declarations

During the Cold War, Sweden’s security policy was most often characterized non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at as neutrality in war. This was often abbreviated the Swedish neutrality policy. Throughout the period forming the subject of this Commission’s analysis, official statements described Swedish security policy in somewhat differing terms. Major statements of this kind were made, for example, in conjunction with the regularly recurring parliamentary defence decisions. These are discussed in Chapter below. This section discusses the Swedish Government’s foreign policy declarations in Parliament and certain other official statements regarding foreign policy. In of the foreign policy declarations, positions taken on security some policy elaborate than in others of which dealt with the were more - some issue very briefly, or not at all. The following description will highlight the when they were especially substantive 1949, 1950, 1962, and years

Neutrality and policy of neutrality 51

1968. Using other sources, 1956 and 1959 will also be discussed.

After the failure to create a Scandinavian defence union in early 1949,

the Govermnent briefed the Riksdag the Swedish Parliament. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, and the Foreign Minister, Gsten Undén,

delivered literally identical statements in the First and Second Chamber of the Riksdag, respectively Besides, neutrality a term referring to conditions in wartime. When discussing neutrality in peacetime, one can only mean that a state, striving to remain outside a conflict in war, does not in peacetime restrict its freedom of action by entering alliance agreements that would render wartime neutrality impossible.

These statements did not exclude a certain degree of military cooperation with other states in peacetime. An alliance treaty was judged as the sole form of cooperation to be beyond the boundaries of the neutrality policy in peacetime.

The wording in the Swedish Government foreign policy declaration of 1950 somewhat different The foreign policy that Sweden wishes to pursue also in the future, aimed at rendering neutrality possible in the event of an all-European conflict breaking out, in spite of everything.

was also laid down that declarations stating that Sweden would pursue a policy of neutrality biased any particular direction would appear to be divorced from reality. Had Sweden been a great military power, and also geographically distant from the fronts of war, perhaps the policy of neutrality could be superseded by the more arbitrary policy of the nonbelligerent. The Government continued Our experience from both world wars should have taught us how little freedom of choice a neutral country has in adverse circumstances between different policies within the framework of maintaining a policy of neutrality. No responsible Govermnent can in peacetime believe itself capable of more closely defining the policy of neutrality a future Government would have to pursue during external conditions still unknown. Neither can anyone require that we should venture into predictions of the correct policy for different hypothetical situations in a future war. We would not do ourselves, or our country, any service by such conjecturing.

In this context, the Government also raised the issue whether or not

52 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

peacetime technical military cooperation with Denmark and Norway was consistent with Swedish security policy Sometimes the question has been raised, whether or not a policy of non—alignment aiming at neutrality in the event of an all-European war, can be consistent with technical military cooperation in peacetime between Sweden and our Scandinavian neighbours. On several occasions, the Government has responded that we cannot enter into any such cooperation having the effect of compromising our declared policy of neutrality. Those who advocate technical military cooperation may mean totally different things, which public debate shows. But each and every one knows that when technical military cooperation discussed, one thinks foremost of cooperation such as combined staff talks and combined defence planning and implications thereof, e. exactly the kind of cooperation that in its political purport comes close to a defence union and which accepted in Sweden vis-a-vis - Denmark and Norway would to a great extent have the effect of compromising Sweden’s stated policy of neutrality. Since Denmark and Norway have acceded to the Atlantic Pact, technical military cooperation with them would be tantamount to an indirect engagement in the greater compact created by the Atlantic Pact. The Swedish Government therefore finds such technical cooperation inconsistent with the policy adopted by Parliament and the Government.

The statement. gives the impression that the Government considered that the policy of neutrality rendered military technical cooperation with Denmark and Norway impossible. All that wars expressly excluded however, was the kind of cooperation whose political substance came close to the defence union, i.e. joint staff talks and combined defence planning. Here, the Government did not state whether other, less farreaching forms of cooperation with other countries on defence issues were possible in view of the Swedish policy of neutrality. The chairman of the Liberal Party, Bertil Ohlin, responded to the above as follows Many among others the Supreme Commander have advocated some - — technical military cooperation, and rightly so. Military contacts between the Scandinavian countries, without concomitant political

obligations of any kind on the part of one country to assist another in

the event of war, are consistent with the Swedish objective of keeping our country out of war as long as possible. Such a policy not of the kind the Foreign Minister referred to when he discussed cooperation with a political content similar to that of the defence union. The cooperation I espouse on the contrary clearly delineated and of a different nature from that of the defence union, the most important feature of which a political obligation to assist the other party in certain situations.

Undén did not respond to this contribution. should be interjected that, according to his diary, prior to the debate Undén had discussed the

Neutrality and policy of neutrality 53

wordings in the Government declaration with Ohlin, among others. The Government statements of 1950 should be viewed in the context of the discussion regarding partial defence cooperation with Denmark and Norway, where among others Ohlin and the leader of the — - Conservative Party, Jarl Hjalmarson, advocated some form of military cooperation between the Scandinavian countries, while Government representatives indicated a certain scepticism and warned that less even far-reaching forms of military cooperation could raise doubts as to the policy being conducted. During the 1950s, certain disagreements on this issue surfaced

between, on the one hand, the Government which at times included the

Agrarian Party, and on the other, the Liberal and the Conservative parties.

On account of a bill introduced by the Communist Party to give the Swedish policy of neutrality legal foundation, in part through a an international guarantee, and in part through declaration of neutrality by a the Government, the Committee Foreign Affairs stated on There could be no doubt, neither Sweden nor abroad, that the state authorities intend to adhere to their chosen policy of not, by joining either of the great-power blocs, diminishing chances of avoiding our being drawn into a prospective great-power conflict.

The Parliament followed the Committee’s recommendation and did not pass the bill. The Social Democratic Party and the three non-socialist parties concurred on this matter. Later the same year, the Government elected to use a somewhat different wording The Government will safeguard the non-alignment policy peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime. There must be doubt to no as our determination to remain outside the military alliances of the great powers, while at the same time, we are committed to fiercely defending our freedom and our independence against any aggressor.

In 1959, a sharp disagreement arose regarding the policy of neutrality. The catalyst was the summer-time Government decision to exclude the leader of the Conservative Party, Jarl Hjalmarson, from the Swedish delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. This taken in view step was of Hjalmarson’s public criticism of the Governments decision to invite the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Sweden. Khrushchev’s visit was later cancelled by the Soviets; the official explanation referred to the

54 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

campaign against him and the weak response thereto from the Swedish Government. As these events were debated in Parliament, principal aspects of the

Swedish policy of neutrality were also raised. notable that there had been earlier public accounts of disagreements regarding the policy of neutrality between the Government and the opposition, especially Jarl Hjalmarson. But the Government had not previously confronted the opposition fiercely on this issue.

so In the Second Chamber, Prime Minister Erlander replied to a parliamentarian question. A key paragraph stated Swedish foreign policy, shaped during the years since World War as II, often characterized in some short formulae. Above all, we emphasize the aim of remaining neutral the event of a third world

war and, therefore, non-participation in alliances in peacetime. Sweden has stayed outside the great alliance groupings into which the world divided. We have done this to avoid possible being

- drawn into due to alignment. But we have also chosen this nona war

alignment vis-a-vis the great power blocs because we believe that by doing have greater possibilities of maintaining good relations

so we

with other states in peacetime, irrespective of whether they belong to or the other alliance system, or whether they remain outside.

one

According to Erlander, Hjalmarson had failed to observe the latter part

of the policy. Unrestrained attacks by influential politicians on the policy of other states counteract the policy of neutrality that we officially

adhere to, stated. Erlander also addressed what the Swedish was

policy of neutrality would, or would not, permit The policy of neutrality that we aim at the advantage of

means

avoiding immediately being drawn into a future world war. However, also carries obligations and requirements for firmness and consist~ The policy of neutrality presupposes that other countries can

ency.

have confidence in will to steadfastly adhere to our chosen foreign

our policy. must not be made dependent on temporary factors but should be the expression of a lasting programme. Others should be

able to trust our assurances that non-participation in alliances peacetime that will maintain neutrality the event of war.

means we

Thus, the policy of neutrality must neither give rise to distrust on the

part of superpower nor to expectations on the part of another one

regarding deviations from the chosen policy. does not allow for

freedom of action in the that Sweden, following the outbreak of sense major without being attacked, can choose even in a precaria war, situation and under external pressure to side with one of the ous -

warring parties. Furthermore, other states must be assured that Swedish territory and Swedish will not be used for acts of

resources aggression. We cannot refrain from resisting each aggressor or refrain

from opposing each violation of the country’s neutrality. In today’s world, defence an indispensable support for our foreign policy.

our

shall create respect for willingness to maintain neutrality in all

our

Neutrality and policy of neutrality 55

directions and for our capability to defend ourselves, nonetheless attacked. But a Swedish defence for Swedish territory. Preparations and discussions regarding military cooperation with members of a great power military alliance are therefore categorically out of the question we wish to uphold trust in our foreign and defence policy.

The freedom of action indicated in the statements previously referred to by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in 1949 and 1950 and the Committee’s on Foreign Affairs wording from 1956 was now circumscribed. had earlier been out of the question that Sweden would enter into a great power military alliance or enter such military cooperation which in its political purport was similar to that of the defence union, i.e. joint staff talks and joint defence plans with members of such an alliance. A new self-assumed code of conduct was now added, i.e. that preparations and discussions concerning military cooperation with individual members of such an alliance were out of the question. In addition, the Govermnent made a declaration regarding the absence of freedom of action after the outbreak of a great-power war. was ruled out that Sweden, before being attacked, could join any belligerent side. This conjecturing had been deemed inappropriate the foreign policy declaration of 1950. By quoting views expressed by Hjalmarson at different occasions during the 1950s, Erlander sought to demonstrate why the Conservative Party leader was unfit to represent Sweden’s foreign policy abroad. Erlander referred, for example, to Hjalmarson’s statements concerning the Government’s invitation to Khrushchev; his idea, voiced in 1952, that Sweden should cooperate with Denmark regarding the defence of Bornholm; his statement that the Swedish policy of non-participation alliances was conditioned by current political and strategic circumstances; and, last but not least, his statements that even a strong Swedish defence would have to build upon the presupposition of Western military assistance. When Hjalmarson responded in Parliament, he quoted, e.g. the wording of the Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1956. He also outlined his own and the Conservative Party’s view on prepared assistance unrealistic and against our own vital interests not to admit openly that the objective for our defence ’to check an attack long enough so that we can receive external support before large parts of the country have been conquered or resistance may be given up.’ The quotation official. the basis for our defence planning, which, according to another official declaration, aimed at ’ensuring our defence enough endurance to make external support effective.’ External support What does that in plain Swedish mean - Our Communists may have their doubts but does anyone else this

56 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

Chamber Does anyone have the slightest doubt that the military and political leadership in Moscow wouldn’t read the words the way we do A small democracy, attacked a superpower and fighting for its life, hopes for and counts on the great democracies for support and assistance. To say this clearly does not change our non-participation in alliances. On the contrary, by laying the cards the table on we create respect and trust. A non-aligned country such as ours, has the freedom and should also make use of to purchase defence equipment on commercial terms, already in peacetime, wherever chooses, and to take all steps necessary for an effective defence. This also entails facilitating, already in peacetime and based on our own objective judgments, outside assistance, once an attack has been launched against us. self-evident that non-alignment becomes defunct when we have been attacked by a great power and when all our strength must be directed — towards using all means at our disposal in fighting for every inch of our soil. Our country does then become a theatre of war, and our only hope that does not become a non-aligned theatre but, the words of the Prime Minister, staging area for another, non-hostile great power grouping.’

During the parliamentary foreign policy debate of 1959, the rift seemed deep between the Social Democratic and Conservative interpretations of the policy of neutrality. One could, however, see these different interpretations as limited to only certain aspects of the policy, and this did not necessarily preclude agreement regarding the fundamental policy stance.

In the 1962 parliamentary foreign policy debate, the Government commented on the previous year’s international drama the Berlin Crisis and the Note Crisis between Finland and the Soviet Union. After having outlined some background facts, Erlander turned to the Swedish policy of neutrality There no reason to once again offer a more detailed account of the meaning of our policy of neutrality. But should be pointed out that we, the hardening international climate, less than ever can afford to let any doubt arise regarding the consistency and firmness of the line we have chosen in our external affairs. Through this posture, we believe we contribute to the stability of the Nordic region and of Europe. At the same time, by maintaining what according to our means a strong defence, we show that we are steadfastly determined to follow a straight political course peacetime; and case of conflict and war, to resist all attempts from the great powers to use Swedish territory for military purposes.

This was nothing new, but rather a confirmation of the policy laid down

Neutrality and policy of neutrality 57

earlier. However, the Prime Minister then touched the Note Crisis upon between the Soviet Union and Finland the previous autumn, and

cautiously alluded to the fact that Sweden’s security policy posture was

not independent of changes in its immediate surroundings If the Soviet note on 30 October caused concern in Finland and the other Nordic countries, was because of the apprehension that Moscow would call in question the very basis for this Finnish policy. For our part, we did not, however, believe this to be a likely hypothesis for the Russian intent. We could not believe that Moscow were unaware of the significance for Nordic stability of Finland’s foreign and defence policy status being preserved. What has happened since then between Finland and the Soviet Union has not caused to us change this view.

Later the same year, when Torsten Nilsson took office as Foreign Minister, he pointed to the existing unanimous fundamental views on

Swedish security policy There great and gratifying unity Sweden on Swedish foreign policy. Of course, differences of opinion can arise about how the sails

should be set and where the shoals are, but everyone agrees on the course.

In the 1968 foreign policy declaration, Prime Minister Erlander addressed the Swedish policy of neutrality against the backdrop of

criticism of the Government had been either too active too passive — or in its reactions, particular on the Vietnam War. He stressed that the term neutrality in Swedish foreign policy had never implied passivity or the avoidance by Sweden of taking positions on controversial issues. When expressing opinions on controversial issues, Sweden not was neutral. Swedish positions had sometimes irritated the other of one or

the superpowers, this did not mean that the policy of neutrality itself had

changed. The policy of neutrality would be weakened Sweden such on occasions had budged from its independent position. This statement addressed the issue of what profile neutral state a

should have in the foreign policy context, i.e. a different dimension of the policy of neutrality from that on which the earlier discussion had

focused. The statement, however, revealed the fact that those restrictions

the Swedish Government felt had to observe because of the neutrality

policy, had a next to self—imposed character. These restrictions could

change over time, as was shown by how differently the Government saw the opportunities to forcefully criticize the U.S. warfare in Vietnam

compared to its polemics against Hjalmarson in 1959 for his exorbitant

criticism of the policies of other states. A corresponding inconsistency

58 Neutrality and policy of neutrality

can be traced in the position of the Conservative and Liberal parties. Their spokesmen now complained about emotional wordings in foreign policy and warned of biases in the criticism of the great power blocs. Here of interest that Erlander, in the statements referred to above, set out by quoting the Committee statement from 1956 as well as his own response to the parliamentary question in 1959, referred to above. In the case of the latter, he stopped quoting after the sentence saying that the Swedish policy of neutrality did not permit freedom of action in the sense that Sweden could make common cause with one of the warring parties after the outbreak of a European war, without being attacked itself. Thus, he did not repeat the statement that preparations and discussions regarding military cooperation with members of a military alliance were out of the question Sweden sought to retain credibility for its foreign and security policies. Even the 1968 declaration did not touch upon the military aspects of security policy, Erlander’s cutting the quotation short worth noting. also possible that the Government considered the response to the parliamentary question of 1959 too far—reaching its repudiation of peacetime preparations for military cooperation with other states, a consideration that could possibly be explained by the inflamed domestic climate at the time. The 1968 declaration thus appears to mark a retreat to the pre-1959 position.

Relevant defence decisions 59

3 Relevant defence decisions

3.1 Security background

The period studied by this Commission from the late 1940s until the

— end of the 1960s coincides with the first half of the Cold War. In —

Europe, the first decade of this period especially was characterized by manifold uncertainty about the future. Immediately after World War II, there poverty and even starvation many countries, industry and

was

infrastructure had been wrecked by the war or were in need of largescale modernization, and political stability was threatened by internal

unrest.

Turning to security policy, relatively soon after the war became obvious that the alliance had been held together only out of the necessity created by the against Germany and Japan. The Yalta Agreement of

war

February 1945 between Stalin and the Western allies could be variously

interpreted. became apparent that Stalin, step-by-step, was tightening

Soviet control of the East European states occupied by the Soviet Army.

At the time, was evident that the, at the time, large Communist same

parties of Western Europe were strongly influenced by Moscow.

Moscow’s determination to maintain internal control within the Eastern bloc demonstrated in various concrete ways during this was

period, viz. the Prague coup of 1948; the suppression of the uprisings in Berlin 1953 and in Hungary 1956; the construction of the Berlin

Wall 1961; and the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968. In addition, the first attempt to cut off Berlin from contacts with the West, during

1948-49, threatened to develop into a military confrontation with the

Western Powers.

The Korean War 1950-53 and the Cuba Crisis in 1962 held particularly serious implications for East-West relations. Many the West

— also in Sweden perceived the Korean War as but one step in a general - Communist expansion, which could soon enough turn into open war,

also Europe. This had a decisive influence on the Western political

and military posture for many years to come. The Soviet attempt to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba triggered a very

strong American reaction. For few weeks 1962 the world seemed on a

the brink of nuclear The resolution of the crisis, mainly through

war.

60 Relevant defence decisions

Soviet retreat, paved the way, however, for a lasting, more stable relationship between the East and the West. While the fundamental ideological differences remained, the parties were in agreement on preventing the Cold War from turning into armed conflict. has already been suggested that the West over the years took various actions to strengthen its positions economically, politically, and militarily. The first momentous decision was the U.S. Marshall Plan of 1947 for U.S. support of the economic and political reconstruction of Europe. In March 1948, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty on a common defence. In April 1949, the Atlantic Treaty was concluded as a security alliance between North America and a number of states in Western Europe, including Denmark and Norway. Two years later, was endowed with a more permanent organization and a combined military command under the designation NATO. A few years later, the Federal Republic of Germany was integrated into the Western defence commun-

ities. From 1949, the Atlantic TreatyNATO assumed the dominant role

of these two alliances, while the Brussels Treaty and its successor, the Western European Union WEU, for a long time led a quiet life. During the 1950s, Western military strategy rested predominantly on U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons, believed to serve as a counterpoise to Eastern supremacy, particularly in ground forces. Over time, conventional capabilities were enhanced, so that the 1960s there were hopes that Western conventional forces could withstand a conventional attack from the East, at least in the early phases of a war. Accordingly, the strategy of the late 1960s was characterized by the doctrine of flexible response, in contrast to that of massive retaliation in the 1950s. Swedish security policy perspectives were of course affected by international developments, but also coloured by our particular historical experience, and by our geopolitical position in the immediate vicinity of a Soviet Union perceived as threatening. Perceptions of our security policy situation will be addressed in the following examination of the parliamentary defence policy decisions. In this context, should be noted that Swedish-Soviet relations during this period were strained by a number of acute crises the shooting-down of a Swedish DC3 and a Catalina in 1952; several spy affairs the 1950s; and finally, the Wennerstrom spy affair, revealed 1963. Finland’s position was also of key interest to Sweden. In the early phases of the period, Swedish assessments on Finland’s future were quite pessimistic. Finland was under heavy Soviet pressure, both politically and militarily as illustrated by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that Finland had to enter into in 1948. The Soviets retained the military base Porkkala until 1955, and the so-

Relevant defence decisions 61

called Night Frost cast shadows over the latter part of the 1950s. Finally, the Finnish-Soviet Note Crisis in 1961, followed closely was Sweden.

3.2 Scandinavian defence 1948-49

negotiations

This section discusses assessments made and positions taken in connection with the defence union negotiations between Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1948-1949. This extensive account should be viewed in light of the official report, written in association with the negotiations, being surrounded by the utmost secrecy, and until very recently classified. Thus, only the principal findings have been made public. In addition, a special statement will be touched upon, made by the Swedish committee members to the Swedish Defence Minister at the time when the negotiations were discontinued. Up to now, probably only select a very group has been privy to this document.

3.2.1 Background

After the end of World War and the resignation of the multi-party

Government in the summer of 1945, the new Govermnent with Osten

- Undén as Foreign Minister was hoping that the victorious allies would — continue their cooperation, especially within the United Nations. The U.N. Charter gave the great powers in the U.N. Security Council special authority and responsibility to unite in effectively countering any act of aggression. As a member of the United Nations, Sweden under was an obligation to participate actions agreed upon by the Security Council barring a veto from any of the great powers. At the time, the Government did not label its foreign policy as neutrality policy. Such a wording could give the impression that Sweden was anticipating new conflicts between the great and did powers not acknowledge the true meaning of its U.N. membership, i.e., that Sweden had to some, for the time being unknown, extent abstained from the possibility of being neutral. At the same time, the Government emphasized that contrary to expectations, a tendency towards division of the great powers into two blocs should arise, Sweden’s policy was to avoid being drawn into any such grouping or bloc. When the antagonism between the great powers early 1948, grew the Government declared Parliament on 4 February 1948 that Sweden did not wish to join any of the great power blocs through advance or,

62 Relevant defence decisions

commitments, forego the right and the opportunity to remain outside a In March 1948, U.S.-British contacts were initiated which, new war. the next few months, laid the groundwork for the Atlantic Treaty. over In April 1948, the Government began seriously considering the prospects of closer Scandinavian defence cooperation. This was inspired primarily by Norway which in the first post-war years had assumed roughly the foreign policy stance as Sweden now searching more same and more noticeably for some new form of linkage to the Western Powers, Norway’s World War allies. To prevent the foreign policies of the Scandinavian countries from diverging, the Government was prepared to hazard a Nordic defence union. was part of the picture that Sweden at this time was the dominant military of Scandinavia. Norway’s defence was fairly weak, even power though could draw on wartime experience from participating on the allied side, and favoured by military geography. Denmark’s military was position was highly unfavourable. After deliberations in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, Undén suggested to the governments in Oslo and Copenhagen, in early May 1948, a joint exploration of the prospects for a defence union outside any grouping of non—Scandinavian states. The Norwegians preferred an openended inquiry, not precluding various forms of association with the West. Agreement was not reached until the end of August 1948 on how to publicly describe the mandate of the joint committee. The mandate made public in communiqué from the Scandinavian foreignwas a minister meeting on 9 September. The aim of a joint security policy was not specified; instead, was stated that there existed between the three countries a certain difference of opinion regarding the security problems. The communique also stated that its work would concern the issue of military cooperation between the three countries, i.e., that other, less far-reaching options than a full defence union would also be explored. The specific, secret directives to the Committee were agreed more at Scandinavian defence-minister meeting on 15 October 1948. upon a A precondition for the defence-union option was that none of the states previously should have entered into military treaties with other states. For the option of partial defence cooperation, the directives set no corresponding condition. For both options applied that the Committee would clarify what needs the three countries have regarding supplies and military assistance during the various phasesof a defence struggle against a potential aggressor. County Governor Carl Hamilton appointed chairman of the was Swedish delegation. The other Swedish members were Members of

Parliament Elon Andersson Liberal, Sven Andersson Social Demo-

Relevant defence decisions 63

crat, and major general Nils Swedlund Chief of the Defence Staff. Sven Andersson was later appointed Member of the Cabinet and was then replaced by Fridolf Tapper Social Democrat. The Committee presented its findings almost 400 pages on 14 - - January 1949, after three months’ work. The report written alternately in the three Scandinavian languages and divided into three main sections, A-C. Section A covers the directives, etc. and section B, which dominates volume appr. 300 pages, consists of various reports by

both civilian and military experts. Section C 34 pages consists of the

full Committee’s assessment, and reproduced with the Committee directives in Appendix 4.

3.2.2 The expert reports of section B

View of the strategic environment

The section opened by comparing The economic resources and economic war preparedness of the United States and the Soviet Union. The description reflects how the early post-war thinking was dominated by the notion of the significance of the long-term economic potential. The following section on the military balance showed the Soviet supremacy in ground forces in Europe appr. 1,700,000 men distributed among appr. 140 divisions, compared to appr. 800,000 men for the West, a smaller share of which was organized appr. 15 divisions.

Certain forces on the American continent were to be added. The

comparison showed, however, the West to be stronger in naval and air forces. In the Soviet Union, ground forces were predominant; in the United States, the Navy and Air Force, at least in peacetime. The Soviet Union was judged to rely on invasion as the primary means of military coercion, while the United States relied mainly on strategic bombers and the atomic bomb, whereby fierce blows could initially be dealt to the opponent’s military and civilian war machine. Land power was thus pitted against naval and air power. the strongly superior Soviet Army, deployed in the heart of Europe, were to attack, the Western Powers had, according to the Committee, only the slightest chances of checking the onslaught before reached the Atlantic coast. Soviet capabilities for military action against Scandinavia were also discussed. notable that the focus was on an attack against Northern and southern Scandinavia, respectively, whereas a coastal invasion across the Baltic Sea proper were deemed less likely. These assessments are emphasized a section on Scandinavia’s Military geography and communications which concludes

64 Relevant defence decisions

In relation to the territories dominated by the Soviet Union, Scandinavia situated within an open pair of pincers which could be shut from the North by combined operations against the militarily weak Northernmost areas, and from the South by combined operations across areas in Denmark and Sweden, largely favourable to the attacker. But, the large area of Scandinavia and its wide extension to the North and South render coordination between two such operations difficult, and offer possibilities for drawn-out defence aimed at gaining time and keeping the lines of communication to the West open. One condition for such defence in depth that the central areas of Scandinavia can be defended against air strikes and air- and seaborne invasion.

Scandinavia defence prospects

This section focused on a number of key issues concerning the strategic objectives of potential Soviet aggression against Scandinavia, the aggressor’s plan of attack and forces, Scandinavian principles for defence, including the need for cooperation between the three states, the need for further development of the three national defences, and

Required and preferred assistance from the Western Powers.

The discussion was divided into nine attack scenarios, of which the first eight were all assumed to take place within the context of an all- European war, and the ninth was assumed to take place in a situation when such a war had not yet broken out, and the Soviet Union sought to, by means of a surprise attack on Scandinavia, secure its Northern flank in preparation for the anticipated outbreak of major war. The assumed strategic objective behind attacking in the Scandinavian direction was that the Soviet Union sought to extend its cordon sanitaire to the Atlantic coast for the dual purpose of preempting Western actions from or via Scandinavia, and to use Scandinavian staging areas for offensive naval- and air interdiction against Western lines of communications. The Committee argued that such an interest probably existed, but that there were doubts as to whether the Soviet Union, considering the general political situation and the correlation of military forces, dared or wished to initiate a new war. Nonetheless, the Committee assumed that the Soviet Union, under certain conditions, would believe to be advantageous to resort to war. The Scandinavian Defence Committee then listed some general prerequisites for the defence of Scandinavia, including the need for intra- Scandinavian cooperation. First, was stated and this was an assessment which applied

regardless of whether or not a defence union existed that would be

impossible to resist the attack without Western assistance for any length of time. Defence preparations peacetime and strategy in war,

Relevant defence decisions 65

therefore, had to be shaped so as to create conditions for receiving military support as well as for assistance with vital supplies. The main strategy, therefore, had to be to gain time, i.e. to hold out long enough

to make Western supportive actions possible. A strategic defensive aimed

at delaying the enemy had to be implemented. Over time, the course of

the war could lead to large areas of Scandinavia having to be surrendered and remaining forces to be concentrated in areas which, due to their ports and airfields, were of particular significance for communications

with the West, or otherwise of strategic importance.

How, then, was the future need for cooperation between the three

states assessed In some aspect, primarily regarding the defence of

Oresund [the strait between Denmark and Sweden], cooperation

was

viewed as a fundamentally symmetrical mission for the two littoral

states. Apart from this, however, Sweden was perceived as the assisting

party to an overwhelming extent, which was only natural considering the military resources of the three states of that time. A number of concrete

examples were given in the report The defence of Oresund shall be a combined Danish-Swedish mission for forces of all services. Swedish naval forces shall cooperate with Danish naval forces to prevent invasion of Bornholm and passage

through the Kattegat. Swedish air forces shall participate offensively

in the areas of Bornholm, Zealand, the Great and the Little Belts, and

in the Kattegat. Swedish naval and air forces shall participate in the defence of the Oslo area. Swedish naval and air forces shall participate

in the defence of the lines of communication to the West through the Skagerrak. Swedish air and ground forces shall cooperate with Norwegian forces in the defence of the Trondheim area.

Swedish bases and the rest of Sweden’s territory shall, when

needed, be made available to Danish and Norwegian forces. Norwegian bases shall be available to Swedish forces. In addition to these combined tasks there are also, for all states, those which cover coast guard duties and air surveillance, intelligence,

transportation, signals, and rear services.

Against this general backdrop, the Committee then discussed cooperation

between individual services. Of special interest what said about was

the air forces, considering that they, more than ground and naval forces, can be quickly concentrated against air, ground, and sea targets in various parts of the area. The need for cooperation was clearly stressed.

Thus, was pointed out that air surveillance and fighter control [shall]

be organized effectively within each state and interlinked, that the

so

requirements of each individual state as well as those of Scandinavia as a whole are met. was also deemed important that air assets could be transferred between bases in the different states. Above all, the capability

to transfer Danish and Norwegian air units to Swedish bases in certain

66 Relevant defence decisions

contingencies was deemed to be most important. In two following sections Prospects of accomplishing the missions —

with existing defence forces and Preferred and anticipated improvements as well as potential restrictions of missions the basing issue was

again brought up. Thus in the sub-section on Sweden, was argued that between six and nine bases could be made available to Danish and Norwegian air force units, subject to the shaping of combined planning in detail. In general, the need to strengthen the air defence was stressed, and, in doing so, to expand modern air surveillance and tighter control. This sub-section also touched upon certain weaknesses in overall Swedish operational capabilities, which rendered Sweden dependent on

various forms of Western operations against targets outside Scandinavia

for an effective overall defence. This discussed below.

Required and preferred assistance from the Western Powers

Headline quoted from the report.

The preceding section of the report had discussed the need for Western

operations as indirect assistance the defence of Scandinavia. In relation

to the defence of Scania the southernmost province of Sweden, was

stressed inter alia that heavy air pressure from Russian air based Northern Germany could jeopardize the mobility of Swedish army reserves. Therefore, was stressed that actions by the Western Powers against the Soviet air bases play a decisive role. Another shortcoming concerned the capability to protect the westward sea-lines of

communication. The Swedish naval forces on the [Swedish] West Coast carmot, except

for very short periods, assume the full responsibility for both offensive warfare and protection of merchant shipping. Considerable coopera

-

tion with Danish and Norwegian naval forces required. such cooperation cannot be counted on, the need for westward lines of

communication also arises in Scandinavian waters.

Finally, this section emphasized

None of the three states can except to a very limited extent assume - -

the important air strategic task of attacking Russian bases from which air forces, invasion forces, and guided missiles could be launched. This will become especially serious in areas within close range of

Soviet air bases, i.e. in Denmark and Southern Sweden, and in the

waters south of Sweden, and Norrland [Northern Sweden]. will

also be difficult to lay mines off the enemy coast, rendering defence against a seaborne invasion more difficult, especially in Denmark and

southern Sweden. In all circumstances, therefore, Western assistance required for attacks on Russian bases and lines of communication along the Russian coast.

Relevant defence decisions 67

Against this background, the for Western assistance then

need was

summarized in the section under the headline quoted above. Denmark and Norway were both deemed to have serious equipment deficiencies. Significant shortcomings were also noted for Sweden. Some types of

equipment short supply e.g. for the Air Force were, however, on

order and in the process of being delivered. The following section, under the sub—heading Armed as.si.stazce at the

outbreak of war and thereafter comprises less than two pages just over

— half the text quoted in extenso the following Since Russian air forces can operate from bases in Finland and Northern Germany, close to Scandinavian territory, the warfare of the

Scandinavian states will be greatly affected by the considerable air

power that the Russians can project against civilian targets and forces of all three services Therefore, important from the very first day of war that Western air forces interdict Russian airfields and missile bases. also important that the Western air forces attack Russian naval bases, embarkation ports, and lines of communication; and at sea, by means of minelaying in Russian waters and sea areas beyond the reach of Scandinavian forces, obstruct the activities of Russian war ships and transports. Of equal importance that the lines of communication to the West, vital for the staying power of the Scandinavian countries, are protected by Western naval and air forces. Such activities can and should be carried out by the Western Powers as part of their own operations. In addition, the current situation requires that units of the Western allies are deployed to Scandinavia to take part in the Nordic countries’ own defence struggle. Such Western intervention would presumably aim at lending assistance of the types needed by the Scandinavian armed forces to resist or, at least, delay a Russian invasion. To achieve this objective, the following assistance preferable from a Scandinavian viewpoint. For the Air Force, day and night fighters are required to strengthen air defence. To render this assistance effective, necessary that the air surveillance and fighter control systems be expanded, and adapted to Western standards. For the strengthening of the anti—invasion defence, strike units are required. A considerable expansion of the air base system required to make possible the deployment of these various kinds of air units. Until the Scandinavian naval forces have been built up, the foremost requirement for the Western Powers to expand their operations in the Skagerrak by minelaying and anti—submarine warfare; should the

Danish—Norwegian—Swedish naval forces be strongly engaged in

defensive missions the Kattegat, off the Swedish West Coast and the Norwegian South Coast, Western protection of merchant shipping ‘might need to be extended all the way up to the territories of the Scandinavian countries. In Northern Norway, desirable that the

Western Powers expand their operations, employing both surface combatants aircraft carriers and submarines; and, off the Norwegian

68 Relevant defence decisions

West Coast, by anti-submarine warfare. would be desirable light naval forces were based in the Kiel area prior to the outbreak of war.

not possible to determine how long would take to deploy operational relief units to Scandinavia. The time highly dependent on to what extent advance preparations have been made. The following calculations can be used as guidance for the assessment. Ground forces. The required time for transport 3-4 weeks. If assistance not prepared in advance, considerable time will be needed before embarkation can commence. Naval forces. from bases in Great Britain within a couple of days. Air forces. units are available in the United States for support from bases in Scandinavia, and advance preparations have not been made, may take up to 8-9 weeks before they can become operational. advance preparations have been made and units are available in Europe, that time may be reduced to just a few days.

The following sub-section discussed the wartime provision of supplies. very short and of limited interest relation to the Commission’s scope of inquiry. As pointed out earlier, the main body of expert assessments of the Committee report assumed a simultaneous Soviet attack on Denmark, Norway, and Sweden the course of a European war. The report, however, also gives an account of specific circumstances pertaining to an attack which initially, in a situation when the great-power war was yet to come, would be concentrated on Scandinavia. The following assessments are of interest Combined missions should be of the same kind as stated war scenario ADNS. These [missions], however, must be secondary, as

the securing restitution of the integrity of each state’s military

dispositions of prime importance. As to air defence, air reconnaissance, air- and coastal surveillance, and weather service, combined missions should, however, be executed as soon as possible.

Wartime assistance required and preferred from the Western Powers. In the presumption made, a situation has been outlined wherein the readiness of the Western Powers so low, that a quick, large-scale military response hardly can be expected. What assistance could possibly be received, would comprise naval forces and strategic air; in Jutland, however, possibly also ground forces from the Western zone of occupation in Germany. Naval and air forces should primarily be used against Russian invasion ports, and sea and air transportation. To the extent that the Scandinavian countries possibly with the above mentioned assistance would succeed organizing their defence and offer resistance, the prospects of also getting assistance by other means would improve.

Relevant defence decisions 69

3.2.3 The deliberations and conclusions of the Scandinavian Defence Committee in section C

The full Committee opened the concluding main section of the report by restating the directives the primary task was to clarify the military capability to collectively meet certain types of aggression, and the requirements for supplies and military assistance during the various phases of a defensive struggle against a possible aggressor. Furthermore, the Committee observed that its task was also in. view of the option of defence cooperation in peacetime without a defence union to attempt to clarify in what areas such cooperation could be carried out and what forms should take. After having largely concurred with the expert assessments, the full Committee gave an account of certain general assessments, valid irrespective of the form of cooperation. was concluded that the defence of Scandinavia included missions which should be carried out jointly by the armed forces of the different countries. One condition for the satisfactory accomplishment of the cooperative missions in some cases, e.g., regarding air surveillance, to facilitate timely cooperation in the first place was that considerable technical and organizational prepara- tions had been made, and combined exercises already carried out in peacetime. Cooperation could be prepared within the framework of a defence union. Cooperation could also be prepared without such a binding treaty, but in such a case the preparations could not be as far-reaching as within a defence union. Preparations should primarily aim for smooth cooperation between the military high commands of the three countries, based on a unified strategic view. To accomplish wide and uniform foundation for as military decisions as possible, intelligence agencies of the three countries should cooperate closely. Preparations for direct tactical cooperation should include the application of various rules of procedure terminology, communications procedures, codes and ciphers, geographic references for positioning, alert levels, etc. Since was assumed that Scandinavia could not resist in the longer term without external military assistance, and since the expansion of the Scandinavian armed forces had to be based on external supplies, was necessary, as to equipment, to strive for the greatest possible compatibility with the states from which assistance and equipment would arrive. For coast guard and air surveillance as well as for weather service, actions should be taken making possible the timely and collective use of these branches at any point in time; the same applied to air force search-

70 Relevant defence decisions

and-rescue. Telecommunications should be expanded to make cooper-

ation possible between the military high commands of the respective

armed forces. This was also necessary considering the need to coordinate coast guards and air surveillance, and to make possible combined command and control of air operations in certain areas. Once again, should be stressed that the assessments referred to above were deemed valid irrespective of whether or not a defence union were to be created.

Defence union

The Committee then stated six significant principles for defence union. a Somewhat abbreviated, they are

Obligation of military cooperation solidarity in the event of attack.

Coordination of the foreign policies of member states.

Ensuring unconditional and instantaneous release of defence obliga-

tions.

Expansion of the armed forces of member states with regard to the

requirements of combined defence.

Coordination of military high commands.

Coordination of some international law statutes, etc.

The combined activities in peace should be characterized by the

following

Coordination between military high commands. Coordinated intelligence activities. Standardization, primarily of equipment.

4 Coordination of armaments production and of storage of war

supplies. Coordination of research activities, etc. Combined exercises. Coordinated air surveillance and coast guard, weather service, and air force search-and-rescue. Improvement of inter-Scandinavian telecommunications.

Improvement of certain inter-Scandinavian lines of transportation. 10. Preparations for the collective use of air transport capacity. 11. Revision of peacetime rules of admittance for military units.

Relevant defence decisions 71

Peacetime military cooperation without a defence union

In its opening statements, the Committee recommended that, even without a defence union, the aim should be to implement peacetime cooperation in areas as possible of those listed in items 1-11

as many above. Such cooperation could in aspects attain great significance some

in the event of the states simultaneously being at war. In addition, peacetime cooperation could constitute a step in preparing for a possible

defence union. At the time, obvious to the Committee that without a same was

defence union, peacetime practical cooperation must of necessity be of

limited extent. The Committee then commented the eleven items above, relating on to situation without defence union. Somewhat abbreviated, the a a conclusions were as follows

Cooperation between the armed forces’ military high commands

could not be taken as far as the case of a defence union.

Intelligence activities could to a certain extent be coordinated along

the lines in the case of a defence union. same as Standardization of equipment etc. could be carried out in many

significant respects. 4. Any more significant cooperation on production of military equipment could hardly be accomplished without a defence union.

Good prospects for coordinating research still existed. The assessment was made that combined exercises could not be carried out to the same extent and on the same scale as with a defence union.

7. Coordination of air surveillance and coast guard, weather service, and air force search-and-rescue could be established largely as in

of defence union. the case a

The inter-Scandinavian telecommunications could be expanded to

the same extent as there were a defence union.

The applied to inter-Scandinavian lines of transportation.

same

10. The creation of Scandinavian Airlines System SAS made possible certain collective of air transport capacity even without a

a use defense union. 11. The rules of admittance for [foreign] troops could be revised even without a defence union.

Scandinavia defence capabilities. Preconditions for a defence union and for partial military cooperation

The Scandinavian Committee was not directed to offer general recommendations concerning Scandinavian defence cooperation, but only to

72 Relevant defence decisions

carry out an investigation for the Govermnents of the three states

regarding the possibilities of and preconditions for a defence union and partial defence cooperation, respectively. In the Committee’s final text, certain differences of opinion emerged between, on the one hand, Denmark and Norway, and on the other, Sweden, in their views on the defence union. These presaged the breakdown of the negotiations a few weeks later. In its opening statement, the Committee again stated its unanimous assessments regarding the significance for Scandinavia as a whole, of each state being effectively defended, and the significance of assistance from abroad The Committee therefore of the opinion that each and every one of the states, by taking up and conducting a defence struggle for as long as possible, contributes to the defence of the two others. To accomplish an unbroken system of defence in areas where the states’ peripheral defences meet, and to employ the central defence in the tactically most effective way, cooperation between the Scandinavian forces ought to be entered into in certain spheres. This not possible without advance peacetime preparations. But through interaction, such preparations also serve to streamline military technological development in each state, and facilitate the supply of external assistance.

The necessity of assistance from other states restated in the final pages Altogether, has to be strongly emphasized that a defence union, cooperation otherwise prepared in advance between the three Scandinavian states, does not eliminate the necessity of external assistance. In peacetime, cooperation necessary for the build—up and modernization of the armed forces. Were they to be attacked, external armed assistance would be required already in an initial stage. The time expected to pass before such more comprehensive assistance can be received and put to use, no peacetime preparations have been made, difficult to state exactly, but could be several months. This time factor must, in different respects, affect the balancing of Scandinavian defence preparations.

The Danish and Norwegian members stressed the preventive factor that would exist ... to the extent that an aggressor will have to reckon with an active response by the other great powers, since the aggressor will then have to take into account that an attack on Scandinavia will trigger countermeasures involving the combined economic and military strength of the Western Powers. Not even in the longer term would Scandinavia be able to defend itself over any extended period. In such a situation, will be necessary to gain military assistance from the Western Powers. Rapid and effective assistance will only be made possible peacetime preparations have been made.

Relevant defence decisions 73

The Swedish members, however, restricted themselves to a general observation to the effect that ...the prospects of receiving external assistance in the event of an attack would probably be better were the three states united in a [defence] union, than had they not entered into any mutual obligations of solidarity. The Committee was thus agreement on the need for Western assistance in the event of an attack. The Swedes did not wish to underwrite explicitly that assistance should be prepared in peacetime. But as shown above, Sweden was prepared to acknowledge that, first, armed assistance from other states was required already in the initial phase of a defensive war, and second, that would take several months for such assistance to arrive had no peacetime preparations been made. The final pages were also dominated by another discussion, on how the parties should act in different scenarios when not all of Scandinavia, but only one or two of its states, were attacked the Soviet Union. This discussion has no immediate bearing on the Commission’s work but seems to be of considerable general interest in bringing perspective to the breakdown of the defence union negotiations. Opinions on one of the attack scenarios studied, an attack initially limited to Denmark, diverged to such an extent that the Danish and Norwegian Committee members gave one assessment, the Swedish members another. In substance, the difference of opinion was that the Danish and Norwegian Committee members believed that an attack limited to Denmark was but the overture of an operation against all of Scandinavia, and that collective action was thus required from the outset. The Swedes, on the other hand, argued that Denmark could not be effectively defended and that Swedish and Norwegian intervention would be more or less in vain. Therefore, could not militarily be an unequivocal benefit to Norway and Sweden to pledge assistance to Denmark in all circumstances, the Swedish members maintained. worth noting that the Swedish representatives did not show any similar unease at the thought of intervening in the event of an initially isolated attack on Norway. In their positions, the group was divided as follows. The parties agreed to collective action should Norway only, or, for that matter, Sweden only be attacked. an attack was restricted to Denmark, the Norwegians were prepared to intervene; on the other hand, the Swedes were not, at least not until Denmark’s defences had been built up.

74 Relevant defence decisions

3.2.4 The separate statement

On the same day as the Committee submitted its report, the four Swedish members Hamilton, Elon Andersson, Thapper, and Swedlund submitted a separate and strictly confidential statement counter-signed by the -

Swedish Secretary of the Committee, Sverker Astrom to the Swedish

- Minister of Defence. That statement reproduced Appendix The opening paragraphs pointed out that certain Swedish views on Danish and Norwegian participation in collective defence cooperation [in the Committee report] have become less prominent. This hesitation primarily concerned the Danish National Defence Since the future shape of its defence organization uncertain, Danish assessments of the possibilities to defend Denmark and to cooperate with the other Scandinavian states have acquired the character of general theoretical statements, which are not and in many cases never will be reflected in the Danish defence organization. This leads the Swedish Committee members to conclude that 1arge—scale Western support required to cover the shortcomings.

Against this background, the concluding assessment of interest the delegation’s opinion that a build-up of the defences of Denmark and Norway of fundamental import to the possibilities to defend Scandinavia. Were a defence union to build upon foreign policy preconditions, by their nature precluding peacetime Western support for the build-up of the defences of Denmark and Norway, membership of such union must be rejected. Were a defence union, a however, to build upon preconditions allowing for the provision of sufficiently large supplies of equipment from the Western Powers, should be created.

The Swedish Supreme Commander, Helge Jung, supported these views in a statement dated 21 January, see Appendix He thus concurred most of the Committees conclusions and the separate statement made by its Swedish members. He emphasized the need for rapid military buildof Denmark and Norway, and made the usefulness of a defence union up conditional upon that. Were the rapid military build-up not possible, peacetime defence cooperation between the three states should still be carried out. Jung stressed, in addition, that not even a well-armed defence union could in the longer term withstand aggression from a great power. Western great-power assistance was, therefore, decisive, and such assistance could be made more effective and employed more rapidly, had mutual peacetime preparations been made.

Relevant defence decisions 75

3.2.5 What happened next

Conclusion of negotiations, January 1949

The continued process was already initiated a few days before the Scandinavian Committee submitted its report, by meeting of the prime, foreign, and defence ministers of the three states in Karlstad on 5-6 January 1949. The issue of collective defence of Denmark was resolved that Sweden declared itself prepared to enter immediately into a binding defence union, without awaiting a build-up of the defences of Denmark and Norway. worth noting that the statement quoted above, made about a week later by the Swedish members of the Scandinavian Committee, showed them to be of a different opinion. Clear differences of opinion remained between Norway and Sweden on the defence union’s relations with the West. The Norwegians did not wish to forgo the possibility of some form of association with the West concerning both peacetime equipment supplies and wartime cooperation, although Norway showed great flexibility as to the forms. The Swedish Government representatives, for their part, held on to their fundamental view that the defence union should remain independent of the great powers and aim at neutrality war. But they agreed to sound out the leading Western Powers for their opinion on such a Scandinavian union. The Swedish Governments report in Parliament on 9 February 1949 the impression that the discussions Karlstad solely dealt with conveys the issue of creating a binding defence union, i.e. the first part of the mandate to the Scandinavian Committee. The second part, partial defence cooperation, was not commented on. A few days later, the Norwegian Government briefed the so-called Special Committee [Spesialkomiteen] closely corresponding in function

to the Swedish Advisory Council Foreign Affairs on the Karlstad

on negotiations. The outcome was, more or less, a retreat to the previous, uncompromising, stance on the need for linkages to the West. At the time, the Swedish position remained unchanged after the Advisory same Council had been briefed. At the following meeting in Copenhagen on 22 January, the delegations consisting of members of Government and Parliament realized - that the differences fundamental positions remained. As a conseon the concluding meeting of delegations in Oslo on 29 and 30 quence, January became almost a mere formality.

76 Relevant defence decisions

The debate in the Swedish Parliament on the Government 3 report on 9 February 1949

On 9 February, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs

reported on the negotiations in the First and Second Chamber of

Parliament, respectively. A rather extensive debate followed. In these

identical accounts, one starting point was the Government’s conviction

that an overwhelming majority of the Swedish people did not wish to

join any great-power bloc, either through an explicit alliance treaty or

through any tacit agreement on collective military action in case of

conflict.

In the opening statements by the Government, there were no explicit

comments on the future of partial defence cooperation in a situation

where a mutually binding alliance no longer remained an option. In the

debate, several speakers stated their hope that the failure of the defence union should not render other forms of Scandinavian or Nordic

cooperation more difficult. Two of the contributions, interestingly enough by the Scandinavian Committees two Swedish parliamentarians,

Elon Andersson Liberal and Fridolf Thapper Social Democrat more

directly addressed military cooperation. Speaking the First Chamber,

Andersson stressed that the option of peacetime defence cooperation without binding defence union found in the Committee’s mandate a - -

should not be totally forgotten. All could not be gained via this option; but much could be won which could prove valuable the peoples of the

Nordic countries had to muster their strength in a collective defence

struggle. Although Thapper, in the Second Chamber, was far more

cautious, appears as he did not interpret the outcome of the

negotiations to be any unequivocal repudiation of more limited cooper-

ation.

In its opening declaration, the Government did not express any opinion of its own regarding the need for Western great-power assist-

ance. The issue was, however, raised in the debates. In the First

Chamber, Elon Andersson a member of the Scandinavian Defence

Committee as mentioned above said

The central issue in this discussion of course, whether a Nordic defence union in all circumstances sufficient to guarantee the

security of the Nordic countries and in the event of aggression, to protect their integrity. Personally, I do not hesitate to answer this

question in the negative.

He then commented on the Prime Minister’s above quoted reference to

the Scandinavian Committee I am of the impression that this a very vague account which does

lend justice the pivotal character of this objection in

not to the

assessment made by the Scandinavian Committee, as to the precondi-

Relevant defence decisions 77

tions and prospects for a defence union.

In the Second Chamber, Gunnar Hedlund Agrarian and Bertil Ohlin

Liberal touched upon Western assistance. Hedlund stressed that the prospects of the Scandinavian states holding out until external assistance might possibly arrive ought to be better all three joined forces. This knowledge should have a certain deterrent effect on anyone intending to

attack Scandinavia.

Ohlin focused more directly on the prospects for defence the event

of an attack. was obvious that any Scandinavian cooperation, to a certain extent, would increase the risks for Sweden; but, the other on hand, would also increase our chances of not being attacked, and

would create better prospects for an effective defence, and thus for

receiving assistance from other states in the event of great-power attack a

before all of Scandinavia was occupied. Our security, Ohlin stressed, was inextricably linked to the possibilities of maintaining contact with the

West in wartime.

Towards the end of the debates, both ministers again took the floor. This time, Erlander went far albeit in the context of commenting the

— on

need for a strong Swedish defence showing readiness to receive

assistance andor to offer strongholds for the West in the event Sweden was attacked. At the same time, be emphasized the interconnection between a strong Swedish National Defence and the prospects of cooperation with the West. He believed that the Swedish people were prepared to strengthen efforts to secure peace in the during same way as

World War i.e. by making defence strong, that would take

our so

time for an aggressor to subjugate us, sufficiently long for the bases coveted by him to be transformed into bases for the other party in the

war. He then continued

Let us together transform Scandinavia into a stronghold so strongly defended, that an attack on us means that our territory transformed into a staging area for another, non—aggressive great-power grouping.

His choice of words demonstrated the obvious, that Sweden would accept assistance attacked. But in addition, he expressed willingness to take a

peacetime actions in order to strengthen the National Defence; a significant partial aim of which being to make the reception of assistance possible. Actually, Erlander’s comments almost explicitly stated a further line of thought we were attacked, the other i.e. Western great-power grouping would have the use of our territory as a staging area.

78 Relevant defence decisions

3.3 The 195 8 Defence Decision and its preliminaries

3.3.1 Background

The 1958 parliamentary Defence Decision FB 58. was the hitherto most far—reaching of the post-war era. was prepared during a period characterized by major international events. The decision itself was strongly influenced by debate the future posture and resources of a on the Swedish National Defence. The four largest political parties were agreement and decided inter alia to give priority to the Air Force at the of, primarily, the Navy; general technological modernization expense a of the defence; and real annual increase of the defence budget by 2.5 a cent. The decision to shape the structure of the Swedish National per was Defence, its equipment, and its operational strength well into the 1970s. On weighty issue, that of a Swedish nuclear capability, the political one parties not, however, able to reach an agreement, and the issue was were resolved only by postponing the final decision. - The security policy environment, in the years prior to the Defence Decision, still characterized by the events of 1948 in was Czechoslovakia, the Berlin crisis 1948-49, and the Korean War 1950-53. While the death of Stalin in 1953 had given rise to hopes of a fundamental shift in Soviet policy, these were quenched when the Hungarian uprising was crushed in 1956. In the West, the consolidation which had begun in 1947 with the Marshall Plan continued in 1949 when the Atlantic Treaty was formally concluded, and in 1951, when the collective defence organization, NATO, established. During the first half of the 1950s, the United was States still certain extent together with the United Kingdom - to a provided by far the greater part of the Western military might, while the continental NATO states still militarily weak, as were Norway and were Denmark. In light of the quantitatively massive Soviet military capability, NATO initially 1951-52 formulated plans for a substantial build-up of conventional forces. To a certain extent, these plans were gradually implemented the Federal Republic of Germany admitted to NATO as was and its rearmament begun. The overall plans for conventional was rearmament had already, however, been shelved when the Eisenhower administration took office 1953. Instead, the West would put its trust in its superiority in nuclear and their delivery systems under the weapons doctrine of massive retaliation. Another important factor influencing the international security policy environment was developments in military technology. The great powers carried large-scale build-up, especially of nuclear and out a weapons, delivery with longer deployed first aircraft, systems ever ranges were -

Relevant defence decisions 79

then eventually ballistic missiles. Conventional armaments also

were

rapidly developed. Partly against this background, the Swedish Supreme Commander already wanted in the autumn of 1953 to introduce a more long-term planning system for the Swedish National Defence as to finances,

organizational development, and procurement. The Supreme Commander submitted the full results of studies in these matters two occasions, in on 1954 and 1957. The Government decided that would not be possible to bring a bill before Parliament already at the 1955 session based the on recommendations from 1954, instead advocating that a parliamentary

decision be preceded by in-depth deliberations. The most significant step

to this end was the appointment of the 1955 Defence Committee. Its task

was to assist the Ministry of Defence under the direction of the

-

Minister in reviewing the recommendations of the Supreme Com-

-

mander on the future development of the armed forces. The Committee had three representatives from each of the four largest political parties.

In addition to the Minister of Defence Torsten Nilsson, chairman two - of the non-socialist party leaders, J arl Hjalmarson and Bertil Ohlin, were members.

should be noted that the Committee not parliamentary defence

was a committee of the kind characteristic of the late 1960s and the decades thereafter. The more recent committees have had the mandate to

independently assess the international security situation as well as defence planning. The 1955 Defence Committee, however, had in effect

almost a top-level consultative role regarding the Government’s review

of the recommendations submitted by the Supreme Commander. Cf

section 3.3.7

Against this background, hardly surprising that the final decision, as stated in the 1958 Defence Bill and in the ensuing parliamentary

process gave an extensive account of the Supreme Commander’s assess-

ments, while the Committee’s assessment of the general security situation was not given prominence. The Committee, however, reached quite

fundamental conclusions planning issues. on

3.3.2 The Supreme Commander’s 1954 Planning Document

Starting points for security policy

The Supreme Commander’s 1954 Planning Document CB 54 contains

security assessments strikingly parallel to those made by the Scandina-

vian Defence Committee in 1948-49, while at the time also same

focusing on new circumstances. The two most important of these were

80 Relevant defence decisions

the increasing significance of nuclear weapons and strategic air warfare, and the establishment of NATO and its integrated military structure.

The following quotations show the general assessment of the international strategic environment The army- and air forces of the Eastern bloc are superior in quantity.

The strength of the Western bloc lies its above all, the United -

States’ superior economic and industrial capacity, in its superior

-

naval forces and stronger strategic aviation, and its leading position as

to atomic weapons.

The task to set up military forces for a strategic offensive fall upon the

United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, the United States especially has given priority to strategic aviation.

Statements made by the Western Powers indicate the view that a war

likely with relatively short phase of strategic atomic

to commence a warfare.

The great powers’ wartime interests concerning the Nordic area were,

to large extent, assumed to be linked, first, to the air strategic a

conditions, and second, to the presumed Soviet requirement of passage

through Oresund and the Belts.

By conquering Scandinavia, the East would force the West to vacate the airbases already existing peacetime, and also otherwise prevent

Western basing there. The East would win, for its own use, an

important submarine base the Norwegian coast and free

area on for its naval forces between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic. passage

Scandinavian territory could also be used by the air forces of the East.

For the West, important to prevent the East, for as long as

possible, from gaining these advantages, and therefore to preserve its positions in Norway and Denmark. Also, must be deemed advanthe West to be capable of intervening with naval and air

tageous to

forces from Scandinavian territory against the East’s flank and lines

of communication the continent, in the Baltic Sea, and in the Arctic on Ocean.

The Supreme Commander then discussed the preconditions for the

defence of Norway and Denmark. He concluded that the prospects of

successful defence over a longer period of time were heavily dependent reinforcements from other states. External support could initially

upon

be provided by air and naval forces, while substantial army forces hardly

could be counted upon.

The Supreme Commander gave an assessment of Soviet military options in Finland, and then turned to discussing Sweden’s situation. In

this he stressed that the flight routes for strategic air warfare context,

Relevant defence decisions 81

passed over Sweden, and also that Sweden and Norway constituted an inseparable entity as far as defence was concerned Our countrys strategic significance, and thereby the risks of us being drawn into war, stem from being part of Scandinavia. Sweden lies in the midst of the flight routes likely to be used by the West from bases in, e. g., Iceland and Greenland for strategic air warfare against the East. Similarly, the obvious flight routes for the East against, e.g., these bases, and against bases in Norway will cross Swedish territory. Our long common border with Norway that means Norway could not without great difficulties be defended by the West, had Sweden fallen into the hands of the East. Swedish-Norwegian land lines of communications are furthermore so inter-linked, that a largerscale invasion of Norway from the East cannot be accomplished without access to Swedish roads and railroads. Finally, Sweden controls the coastline of one of the Baltic Approaches.

The view on external assistance

Partly against this background, the Supreme Commander deemed an isolated war against Sweden less likely. The need for external assistance in event of a great-power war was evident irrespective of whether Sweden was drawn in. The reasoning was largely parallel to that of the Scandinavian Defence Committee a few years earlier. A significant nuance was, however, that the Scandinavian Defence Committee had emphasized the need for assistance already in the initial phases of a war. This absent from CB 54, instead the made urgency was assessment was that Sweden would be dependent on external assistance in the longer term. The Supreme Commander then returned to strategic issues. Initially, different means of coercion were described, focusing on air and longrange missile attacks, not least against the capital. Here, the risk of nuclear weapons being used had to be reckoned with. Also, the risk of classic invasion was briefly discussed; but with a similar reservation as that of the Scandinavian Defence Committee, that inter alia geography as well as the lack of shipping and appropriately located airbases constituted considerable restrictions for the aggressor. The Supreme Commander then gave his assessment of how strong Sweden’s National Defence should be, i.e., strong enough to make the stakes in attacking Sweden seem disproportionately high when compared to possible gains. He also articulated certain principles for the conduct of defence preventing a seaborne aggressor from getting a firm foothold on Swedish soil, and a tenacious defensive against an attack across the land border. The Supreme Commander then, again, turned to the need for external assistance

82 Relevant defence decisions

Our resources are not sufficient to permit prolonged resistance of an

attack by a great power without external economic and military assistance. Hence, our strategy must focus on creating preconditions,

such that we in war could be supported by states in whose interests would be to assist us.

Even the wording explicit in CB 54, its basic line of thought not on Swedish defence and on the need for external assistance can be summed up in the formula national defence until assistance can arrive. The classified version of the text also underscored that assistance could

not be expected rapidly, except for strategic bombing sorties, or, in the

words of the Supreme Commander

that no direct assistance can be provided to us by the Western

Powers until quite long after the outbreak of war. We could benefit, however, from Western strategic bombing, even though the issue of

such operations obviously would be determined primarily consider-

ation of what would be deemed appropriate to the Western Powers.

3.3.3 The 1955 Defence Committee preliminaries

- Starting points When the 1955 Defence Committee submitted its final recommendations

in early 1958, interest was focused as mentioned earlier on the

- - Committee’s view of the structure and finances of the Swedish National Defence. These issues had also been the focal point of the Committee’s work in 1957. Until then, just after its formation, the Committee had

carried out an internal review of certain starting points for security and strategic policy, a review plarmed during the two months preceding a Committee meeting on 16 February 1956.

Before going any further, we should remind ourselves of the

Committee’s status. Its task within the Ministry of Defence, and under

-

the direction of the Minister was to assist in reviewing the Supreme

-

Commanders recommendations guidelines for the continued

on

development of the armed forces. The Minister of Defence, Torsten Nilsson, was thus appointed chairman, and the under-secretary, Olle Karleby, secretary general of the Committee. The agenda of the 16 February meeting had thus been discussed within

the secretariat several occasions during the preceding months; and on

draft agendas, and draft policy papers on important aspects, had been prepared. One of the Committee members, staff captain Olof Stroh, had already in early January presented a memorandum within the secretariat

on External assistance. When the secretariat, before the meeting, and in its own name, distributed memorandum, Draft speech before the a

Relevant defence decisions 83

1955 Defence Committee Sweden’s geographical position and strategic — significance in between East and West, addressing the issue of a war external assistance, the members of the secretariat had thus obviously had ample time to consider the wordings. The difference between the two documents in characterizing external assistance minor and mostly editorial.

The view on external assistance External assistance was a major item in the briefing memorandum for the meeting on 16 February 1956 Appendix 7. Already before that, however, a general strategic assessment had been presented, in part also touching upon external assistance. Initially, by way of introduction, the continued and increasing significance of nuclear weapons and air warfare emphasized. The probability that Sweden could receive direct was assistance from the West in the fierce opening stage of a major war was judged low. In a conceivable later stage of the war, the prospects for such assistance could possibly be better. Consequently, Sweden had to proceed the assumption that initially had to defend itself without on getting direct assistance, and that would always remain uncertain whether such assistance could be obtained; assistance in the form of war

supplies and air strikes with or without nuclear weapons seemed the

most likely. Indirect assistance was assessed to be of greater import The indirect assistance provided by Western military operations reduces the Soviet Unions opportunities to direct force against us, and likely to be more significant to us than direct assistance.

A following section of the briefing addressed inter alia the air operational significance of Sweden to the great-power blocs Swedish air defences prompt the East to avoid overflights of Sweden concentration of Western air defences facilitated. A strong Swedish air defence system thus advantageous to the West. The possibility to base Western air Sweden in the initial stages to enhance this threat [against the East] or to exert real pressure does not seem to be at hand without extensive prior preparations.

Generally speaking, the West can gain quite a number of advantages without directly pressuring us. Some problems in connection with overflights be anticipated; but assumedly, they would not be of can such significance as to give the West reasons for taking any actions which might reduce our power or our inclination to join the proper side following the outbreak of war.

Swedish air defences are certainly a disadvantage to the East. A

crippling attack on the Swedish air defence system especially air surveillance cannot be carried out swiftly and successfully without —

84 Relevant defence decisions

massive use of force. The key question, however, whether the power to be projected against the primary objectives beyond Sweden fragmented more by the strains of overflying or alternatively

-

avoiding Swedish airspace, or by the efforts required for effective

-

suppression of our air defences.

Of particular interest in these quotations how clearly the asymmetry

emerges between the presumed Western and Eastern views on our air defences. The substantial advantages to the West were believed to have corresponding disadvantages to the East; and, for the West, overflights

of Sweden would hardly lead to any significant problems. was thus

assumed in the memorandum that there existed a common interest in

Western overflights not leading to a serious conflict between the parties.

Attrition of Swedish air defences was thus not allowed to be the

consequence; and, under no circumstances were overflight problems to result in Sweden ending up on the Eastern side in a war.

In the last section of the briefing, the secretariat once again focused external assistance. The fundamental ideas, referred to above, were on concretized inter alia as examples of direct and indirect assistance As examples of direct assistance, the following can be mentioned

a Air strikes with atomic weapons against a sealift concentration

during a seaborne invasion.

b Interdiction of lines of communication during ground operations,

in the rear of Russian forces attacking Norrbotten Northerne. , most Sweden.

Making available, supplying with, ordnance fuel.

c or us or

d Convoy protection of Swedish shipping.

Indirect assistance can be provided various ways and can be just

as important as direct assistance. In effect, indirect assistance likely

to be the most significant to us in war. As examples of indirect assistance, the following can be mentioned Interdiction of airbases, naval bases, and embarkation

a ports

whence attacks can be also launched on us, as well as their land

lines of communication. Interdiction of, e.g., the Murmansk

railway line supplying the Murmansk-Kandalaksha staging area,

-

and Russian forces operating against Northern Scandinavia could

be of great significance, also to us.

b A key component of indirect support operations tying down

enemy forces which otherwise could have been employed against us; or even forcing the enemy to withdraw forces already engaging

us in combat.

c Indirect support, in the broadest sense, encompasses all those

actions leading to Western gains, since what matters most to us that the longer-term outcome of the major war renders possible

our continued existence as a free nation.

Despite the above accounted assessment, that indirect assistance was likely to be of greater significance than direct assistance, the remainder

Relevant defence decisions 85

of the briefing memorandum dealt with the latter. An observation, however, called for in this context. The above examples show that the difference between the various forms of assistance quite subtle in several cases, a fact also explicitly stated in the text. The requirement for combined planning, however, was judged to be less in the case of indirect assistance. Against this background, obvious that moves discussed below intended to promote direct assistance, would to an even greater extent create opportunities for receiving indirect assistance. In what ways then could direct assistance be encouraged According to the memorandum, all kinds of direct cooperation presup-

posed [personal] contacts. These were exemplified by foreign service

contacts, including those arranged by defence attaches; other international contacts; as well as studies, etc., abroad by Swedish military personnel. was emphasized that in war, or a state of alert i.e. when war threatens is both desirable and necessary to expand these contacts, either by building on those already established in peacetime or by dispatching special delegations. The persons entrusted with these contacts should be given adequate authority both in Sweden and abroad and access to tele-communications equipment of sufficient speed, capacity, and secrecy. was observed that integrating foreign interceptor units into the Swedish air defence system would require extensive preparations. A more general coordination of air operations as well as a more limited utilization of strike bomber units for specific missions were deemed or feasible, however, should the necessary preparations in Swedish planning be made in peacetime. A certain level of coordination of the air surveillance was highly desirable and was also seen as feasible. Also, certain naval cooperation on operations in coastal waters was considered feasible, while the opportunities for ground force coordination by and large seemed remote. Concerning operational intelligence, the value of air defence intelligence was emphasized, and, in addition intelligence on the enemy situation as to operational resources, equipment, morale, tactics, and indicators of preparations for attack, or changed dispositions general... Especially important intelligence making possible for us to increase our readiness prior to an outbreak of war. The significance of direct as well as indirect assistance was summed

up in the concluding paragraph of the memorandum; also, notice was

rather succinctly given that certain actions to prepare for direct cooperation had already been taken In conclusion, should be emphasized that no state can be assured of getting direct assistance after the outbreak of war, and that one’s own military capability the best guarantee of obtaining assistance, should

86 Relevant defence decisions

such be possible. As a rule, indirect assistance the most significant

prior preparations are required to utilize direct assistance. Some such preparations have been made already, and others could be made. Some preparations, however, are such that they cannot be implemented in advance, because they would require combined planning and the

mutual disclosure of Western and Swedish planning.

On the whole, a very pragmatic approach was chosen regarding preparations for assistance. Preparations were required, some had

already been made, others could be. The last sentence of the quotation,

however, held a restriction in principle. Activities involving combined operational planning, or information on existing operational plans, were not to be discussed in advance. Incidentally, these restrictions were

close to what the Government had laid down in the 1950 foreign policy

debate, as described in section 2.2. In section 3.3.7 below, the Commission returns to the subject and offers a comprehensive assessment of the above recapitulated secretariat memorandum and its political status.

3.3.4 The Supreme Commander’s 1957 Planning Document

In March 1957, the Minister of Defence instructed the Supreme Commander to produce certain complementary planning documents on

the long-term development of the armed forces. The results were

submitted the following October OB 57. In this context, the Supreme

Commander presented a modified security-policystrategy assessment, including inter alia some interesting nuances in the view on external assistance. The most important were the following.

More clearly than before, the most likely scenario for the course of a major war was that would commence with short nuclear exchanges

between the great powers. Western nuclear weapons were assumed to constitute indirect assistance to Sweden, as Soviet bases, ports, etc., and

its war potential in general were attacked. One alternative scenario would, however, put especially great strains on Sweden. In this scenario,

there were no nuclear attacks; Sweden was brought into the war, and the Soviet Union could detail relatively larger forces against Sweden. We will then be restricted to our own might only, and the limited external

assistance which otherwise can be provided.

In the ensuing text, the Supreme Commander stressed even more

forcefully than in OB 54 the significance of prior peacetime preparations

of such assistance. Alliance membership was not considered a decisive

factor for receiving such assistance. At the same time, was made even more clear than in the earlier text that preparations were precluded

Relevant defence decisions 87

for all [attack] scenarios that the prospects of a country such goes receiving external military assistance in the event of an attack as ours depends, primarily, whether the great power in question considers on such assistance warranted in light of the general war situation. A country’s alliance membership can certainly be a political factor strongly influencing a decision to provide assistance; but for the military assistance to be effective, general strategic concerns and opportunities will in the end be decisive. an obvious advantage, however, the assistance has been prepared already in peacetime. Since our policy of non-participation in alliances inter alia means that such preparations be made, we must adapt accordingly so that no can we can make do without this advantage.

unclassified document CB 57 the effect The explicit wording of the to that preparations for receiving assistance could not be made, thus new information. The position in marked contrast to the fundamental ideas of the classified discussions within the 1955 Defence Committee, referred to in the previous section. The Commission has had no access to information explaining the motives behind the new wordings. any The following quotation shows that the fundamental idea, of defence until external assistance could arrive, persisted In those parts of the country, of considerable importance to an aggressor or to our defence capabilities, the National Defence has to be strong that the aggressor’s gains are not reasonably proportionso ate to his inputs; or that the attack so time-consuming that intervention by other states on our behalf will have time to be effective.

we carmot secure such endurance for our National Defence that

external assistance will have time to take effect, our chances of resisting will be significantly reduced.

Another fundamental idea of the last quotation was that a strong and tenacious Swedish defence and external assistance were mutually reinforcing. Thus, external assistance was not an alternative to an adequate domestic defence capability. This point resurfaces when the Supreme Commander later reports on different budget scenarios. With reference to one such scenario Adam, i.e., Alpha involving a

certain initial budget reduction later implemented, was emphasized

that the significance of external assistance arriving rapidly would grow. But the assessment also made that the possibilities and the willingwas ness for rapid assistance would diminish.

88 Relevant defence decisions

3.3.5 The 1955 Defence Committee concluding work

—

The Defence Committee submitted its report 18 February 1958 thus,

on

report to Sven Andersson in his capacity as Minister of Defence, from

a

Sven Andersson in his capacity Committee chairman; the change of

as

defence ministers had taken place in 1957. The report was reproduced

practically in extenso formal changes only, part of the 195 8 Defence

as

Bill govt. bill 1958 1 10. Following the opening half page on the current international security situation, the Committee’s short text was dominated completely by budgetary, planning, and organizational issues.

The text of relevance to the task of this Commission. There are, no references whatsoever to the briefings before the Committee e.g., no conducted in the spring of 1956, touched upon in section 3.3.3 above.

3.3.6 The 1958 Defence Bill and Defence Decision

The bill reported quite extensively on the most significant official

document, i.e., CB 57. The fundamental ideas discussed in preparatory

section 3.3.4 above were thus reproduced accurately and in full. The minister did not, however, provide any comprehensive analysis of the international security environment, of the aim and direction of

or

security and defence policy, of the kind that later became established practice. While the text mainly focused on planning, some assessments

however, be found throughout. Discussing the ministers preferred can,

scenario, Adam, he emphasized that the budget could finance a military defence, only meeting the most immediate and essential requirements, whereby endurance partly would have to be neglected. Gaps would be found in the air defence system. Concerning anti-invasion defence, large geographical which might under threat could

areas come

initially be guarded only; furthermore, was assessed that Sweden

would be forced to weaken the anti-invasion defence in at least one main

direction. Furthermore, anticipated that naval protection of

was

merchant shipping was gradually to be given less resources. Finally, the preserving capability of the National Defence,

on peace the minister stressed Our National Defence preserve the peace has such strength can and readiness that an attack appears uncertain and strenuous. In

addition, will then have prospects of resisting aggression until

we changes in international conditions affect also

decisive

may our situation.

The last sentence directly brings to mind the discussion on indirect assistance, touched upon above. The full paragraph shows considerable

Relevant defence decisions 89

similarities in reasoning to the second quotation in section 3.3.4 above, from CB 57.

The very wordings above were discussed in detail by the then under-

secretary Olle Karleby when interviewed by this Commission. Quotation

the 1955 Defence Committee briefings by staffs and the

National Defence Research Establishment FOA what could on

practicably be done so that we would be somewhat better prepared in

the event of an isolated Soviet attack What kind of assistance on us. from the West could to better withstand the attack and we prepare to get such assistance as soon as possible So much for the Defence Committee.

What, then, did the minister say Well, he wasn’t exactly explicit,

but since I wrote the statement, I know approximately how the

reasoning went, and on page 99 in the bill. I read out the can

paragraph [Here follows the paragraph concluding with the two

sentences quoted above.] The reasoning behind the somewhat vague wording of the last sentence, I would that argue, we can

endure until the West able to provide military assistance,

our position can improve and we will have chances of survival. But this

general wording covers both this reasoning and other changes in the

general situation.

3 Concluding assessment

In conclusion, the various documents discussed above. differ markedly

on

the issue of preparations for receiving external assistance. The unclassi-

fied version of CB 54 touched the issue of upon support in general

terms, without entering more closely into what preparations

were required for this. As mentioned above, the 1955 Defence Committee

concluded that preparations were required, that had already been

some

made, and that yet others could be made. According to the unclassified

document DB 57, such

preparations were viewed as being obviously advantageous; at the same time, non-participation in alliances

was

assessed to imply that they could not be carried out. The bill preceding the Defence Decision, finally, contained only veiled allusions to external

assistance. A decisive issue for the Commission, in light of the above, what

significance should be given to the positions of the 1955 Defence

Decision. First, would like to point out that memorandum presented we a

within a committee cannot of be formally perceived

course as a government position that of the Defence Minister. or even as At the same time, should be taken into account that the Committee

had an exceptional composition, since led by the Minister of

was Defence, two non~socialist party leaders members, and the underwere

90 Relevant defence decisions

secretary at the Ministry of Defence was its general secretary. In reality, the Committee thus constituted a forum for a high-level inter-party negotiation. The weight of this forum was finally confirmed when Parliament by large majority passed the bill submitted by the Governa ment in 1958, based proposal by an unanimous Committee. on a We concluded above that the Committee meeting 16 February 1956 on preceded by several months’ planning. In January, draft briefing was a memorandum external support prepared. This draft was re-edited on was several times, and presented in the name of the secretariat prior to the meeting. Against this background, seems certain that the final memorandum did indeed reflect the views of the under-secretary. In view of the significance of the matter this was an issue of key importance to - Sweden’s security the under-secretary must all likelihood have obtained support in substance for the memorandum from his superior, the Minister of Defence, also chairman of the Committee. Before this Commission, J arl Hjalmarson recalled that the memorandum presented personal statement from Olof Stroh, and pushed aside; this, was a however, does not change the Commission’s view. As the real import of the secretariat memorandum, a certain signifito should be attached to well the earlier draft by Stroh cance — as as being filed in the archives. Had the documents been considered working only, unlikely that the general secretary, Olle Karleby,

papers seems

would have preserved them for posterity. Finally, worth noting that the then Minister of Defence, Torsten Nilsson, well the then under-secretary, Olle Karleby, have largely as as agreed with the account of the assessments and standpoints presented above in connection with the 1958 Defence Decision. In conclusion, the secretariat memorandum presented at the meeting 16 February 1956 be considered expressing the view of the on can as Minister of Defence external assistance, well as on how such on as assistance had been prepared, and could be prepared. The position taken in the memorandum offered the Supreme Commander a considerable mandate to realize and further develop various military measures.

3 .4 The 1968 Defence Decision and its preliminaries

3.4.1 Background

Section 3.3 above shows that the 1958 Defence Decision determined the development of the Swedish National Defence during most of the 1960s, regards both its fundamental direction and the size of its budget. as While defence decisions were formally passed in 1961 and 1963, new

Relevant defence decisions 91

they should be viewed extensions, with technical more as some adjustments, within the framework largely laid down in 1958. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Government again wished, for several reasons, to carry out comprehensive review of the a more National Defence, i.e., comprehensive defence decision. a new Preparations for the 1968 Defence Decision FB 68, just like those

of 1958, included the Supreme Commander being tasked to undertake

certain studies, the findings from which reported the Governwere to

ment in the spring of 1965. Even beforehand, however, the Government

had appointed a parliamentary committee to analyse and submit recommendations on the general direction, size, and costs of the armed forces and the civilian defence for the period following the fiscal year

196667. The Committee given broad mandate in security policy.

was a To this should be added the issue of Swedish nuclear which weapons, now, after almost a decade of freedom of action, deemed ready was for final settlement.

Not until early 1968, later than initially intended, did the

one year Committee submit its report. One month earlier, the non—socialist members had resigned due to differences of opinion to the size of the as budget. Government and Parliament later followed the Committee’s recommendations to all intents and purposes.

3.4.2 General remarks external assistance in FB 68 on

The absence of any explicit discussion whatsoever on external assistance the 1965 Defence Committee and the 1968 Defence Bill most conspicuous. should be noted, however, that the extensive discussion

led by the Committee and to extent, separately, by its chairman,

some

Karl Frithiofson on Swedish nuclear also touched indirectly

weapons upon the issue of intervention by other states the event of Sweden

being attacked with or without nuclear weapons. This will be discussed

below. In the initial work GB 65, the Supreme Commander preparatory

discussed external assistance, albeit briefly.

3.4.3 The view external assistance in GB 65 on

On the issue of Sweden’s

dependence upon external assistance, the

Supreme Commander emphasized OB 65 As a non—aligned state, have to bring about balanced defence we a system, since unlike pact members we cannot count external - — on

92 Relevant defence decisions

assistance. Our cannot become sufficient for in all circumstances resources us, and for length of time, to repel great-power attack without any a

political, economic, and military support from other states. In light of Scandinavia’s and thus Sweden’s strategic significance to both

- great-power blocs, should be in the interest of other great powers

to provide such assistance. An important prerequisite for assistance that National Defence should have the capacity to resist an attack

our

for such long period, and that this defence can be conducted in such

a that various kinds of intervention on our behalf can take effect a way, worthwhile for the intervening and seem party.

Thus remained the fundamental idea found in the Scandinavian defence

negotiations in 1948-49 and in connection with FB 58, that some form

of external assistance would be required in certain situations.

evident, however, that in 1965, the requirement assessed to be less was

categorical and immediate the were not deemed sufficient for

- resources

Sweden persist its in all circumstances and over a long

to on own

period. This assessment should be compared to especially the one made

in 1949, where immediate need for assistance discussed. The an was

likely behind this partial shift in views will be discussed further

reasons in section 3.4.7, below.

3.4.4 External assistance in the 1965 Defence Committee

In its submitted in 1968 SOU 1968210 the 1965 Defence report - - 65 chose, when covering CB 65, not to recount the Committee FU

Supreme Commander’s assessments the need for external assistance,

on to offer comments of its own on this matter. or any

The Committee, however, provided exhaustive assessment of the

an

starting points of Swedish security policy. Under the heading Aims and direction of Swedish security policy, FU 65 discussed the ultimate objectives for Swedish security policy FU 65 in italics

Our security policy objectives should be in all circumstances own -

and choosing national freedom of

in forms of our own - to secure

action that, within borders, according to our own values, we so our

and develop our society politically, economically,

can preserve socially, culturally, and in other aspect and in connection any -

therewith externally work for international détente and peacefid

developments.

These well-known wordings, later repeated number of defence

are a decisions; and they refer to the freedom of action that we, ourselves,

shall be able determine Sweden’s domestic development. The to

interesting paragraph however, the next where the words

one,

Relevant defence decisions 93

freedom of action used in totally different external

are a context, on conditions and contingencies

not possible advance to fully pinpoint what policy

a govern-

ment in some future may be obliged to implement under still unknown external conditions. The aim of security policy and defence

our

plarming must be to create freedom of action for future contingencies.

Actually, this text almost identical in substance and partly also in

-

wording to a section of the Govermnent’s account in the foreign policy

debate 18 years earlier, 22 March 1950. The Minister of Foreign on Affairs then said, inter alia

No responsible government can peacetime believe itself capable of more closely defining the policy of neutrality future government

a may have to implement in still unknown external conditions.

No one can demand of that should venture into predictions us we

on the correct policy in different hypothetical contingencies in future

a war...

The language of the 1965 Defence Committee thus indicated continu-

a

ation of the views of Erlander and Undén the early 1950s, meaning

inter alia less categorically binding statements to the future of

as course action in an emergency than had been expressed in Government

declarations in the autumn of 1959, discussed section 2.2. The last

mentioned statement implied that Sweden did not enjoy freedom of action; in the sense that our country following the outbreak of

- a greatpower war could not choose to join forces with of the warring - any

parties without being attacked, in critical situation when under

even a external pressure.

FU 65, however, also stressed that foreign suspicion of Sweden

preparing reception of external assistance had to be counteracted For our policy to gain trust, there must, the hand, be

on one no obvious deficiencies total defence which could raise our concern

that we have, already peacetime, secured external assistance

to cover any weaknesses a tense situation. On the other hand, our

National Defence should not be shaped such to technology

a way as

and equipment, that our resources evidently to be of particular

appear use for cooperation with another state.

3.4.5 The issue of Swedish nuclear and its

weapons linkages

to external assistance

As mentioned above, the issue of Swedish nuclear finally

weapons was

settled in FB 68. In discussing this matter, the Defence Committee

94 Relevant defence decisions

stressed that the issue had to be evaluated light of Sweden’s general strategic and security situation. In this, great significance had to be

accorded the nuclear states’ view on the role of nuclear weapons. own

FU 65 assumed that military aggression against Sweden would be only

stage within the larger context of war. one

Considering this, reasonable to assume that whoever contemplating attack country has to reckon with the main

an on our

opponents reaction and possibilities for counter-action. This

with the risk of nuclear attack, evident the

especially the case

aggressor himself employs nuclear weapons.

The Committee further sharpened this argumentation a few lines below

This natural great-power restraint the use of nuclear weapons on

makes likely that nuclear weapons would not be used against our until nuclear fact following a nuclear attack

country a war were a

against other targets than Swedish ones. Whoever contemplating attack against Sweden, with without nuclear weapons in that

an or

particular operation, has to take into account the risk that nuclear could be employed against that operation even Sweden

weapons does not possess any such weapons. The conclusion that Sweden to all intents and purposes under

the nuclear umbrella in much the same way as our neighbouring

countries be said to be, matter what power bloc or great-power can no

sphere of influence they belong to.

The last quotation three thoughts. The first that was hardly

conveys

that nuclear would be employed in isolated attack on likely weapons an Sweden, and that conventional defence therefore meaningful. The

a was

second that contemplating attack on Sweden, with or

someone an without nuclear had to take into account the risk of greatweapons, intervention with nuclear against the. attack on Sweden. power weapons

The last of the assessment implies that Sweden’s situation was in no

part

unique, but shared at least by all Nordic states, or even by all

way smaller European states within well as outside the great-power as

alliances. The second thought thus constituted specific assessment of

a

Sweden’s situation, the last a more general one. that the United States was providing the nuclear

apparent umbrella for Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. From the Commission’s

knowledge of Swedish security policy analysis and concrete military

discussed in chapter there to believe that the measures, no reason assessments different concerning Sweden. were any

In this particular context, i.e., in connection with the rejection of a Swedish nuclear capability, FU 65 did thus not refrain from concluding

that Sweden implicitly under the in reality U.S. nuclear umbrella.

was

In this quote from article by the chairman of

context, a a newspaper the Defence Committee, Karl Fritiofson, deserves recounting. The article

Relevant defence decisions 95

included the text on the nuclear umbrella just quoted; in the conclusion

followed by these sentences Our non-alignment or aim of neutrality little, anything

war means

at all, in this context. And chances to implement such policy

our a are

not diminished by this.

The article then closed with plea for maintained conventional a a defence and with conclusions the issue of Swedish nuclear some on weapons.

3.4.6 The 1968 Defence Bill

The Defence Bill itself did not add views external assistance. any new on Like the 1965 Defence Committee its report, the Government

refrained from recounting the CB 65 section mentioned above. Also,

the bill did not mention freedom of action in future external circumstances

as discussed by the Committee. The issue of Swedish nuclear

weapons -

dealt with quite exhaustively by the Committee and discussed in its background reports was dismissed by the minister in stating that he

shared the Defence Committee’s assessment that, at the time, present

was not in the security interests of Sweden nuclear

to procure weapons.

has been observed earlier, that the security policy of

assessments

1948-49 and those in connection with FB 58, respectively,

were

presented in a pragmatic, Realpolitik note which, to certain extent,

a

contrasted with the more normative style of 1959. The language of the 1968 Defence Bill the impression of

conveys a return to older appearances, in that the classic international-law

concentration on wartime obligations of neutral state in

a was once more

focus. The need to create confidence in the declared policy indeed

was also emphasized, but in this without particular reference case any to

demands on peacetime policy. The note thus considerably low-

more

key compared to that of 1959, which the following quotation shows The best-known expression of security policy the principle of

our

’non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war.’ This principle has occasionally been mentioned the objective

as

of Swedish security policy, but primarily points to the in

means which the country has chosen to put its trust in two different contingencies, i.e. in peacetime and when has broken around war out us. The Swedish posture in these two contingencies constitutes coherent a

whole, namely ‘the traditional Swedish security policy.’ Sweden’s policy of neutrality that the defence policy

presupposes

guided inter alia by the obligations enter into when declaring

we ourselves neutral in conflict between other states. Sweden a must

create confidence in the declared policy of neutrality, in the ability and

96 Relevant defence decisions

the will to uphold neutrality. Presumed or proven inability to repel operations against territory could otherwise prompt another our warring party to seek out to Swedish territory in self-defence. occupy Confidence in ’armed neutrality’ thus builds upon Swedish defensive appearing sufficient to uphold strict neutrality. measures In this confidence also lies firm belief in domestic political stability a in Sweden, such that the foundations of security policy remain firm.

3.4.7 Comparison of 1968 with 1949 and 1958 concluding

— assessment

Worth noting concerning the 1968 Defence Decision as shown by the preceding text first, certain return to an earlier, more pragmatic ~ a description of the neutrality policy; and, second, a further reduced

emphasis external assistance in security policy assessments to such on extent that the issue was touched upon only very indirectly. The reasons

for this will be briefly discussed below. The return to pragmatic presentation of the policy of neutrality a more made especially clear by the pointed reference to continuity with the — Government’s view of the 1950 foreign policy debate be viewed in - can the following perspective. In response to the parliamentary question in

1959 section 2.2, the Cabinet had restricted the for military

Cf scope

cooperation with other states. The language in 1959 originated from a

time at least partly marked by domestic polemics and inter-party confrontation, whereas the first half of the 1960s was characterized by principal agreement foreign policy issues. Prior to the 1968 Defence on Decision, that the parties were striving to preserve the appears traditional concord the of the security policy, characteristic of on core Sweden since World War II. would obviously have signified a defeat for Swedish security policy the parties had not been able, before the

Swedish people and the world, to on fundamental security policy agree assessments. The discussion these assessments’ was thus most likely on characterized in connection with later defence decisions by a - as sincere desire for unity where elements of thought associated with the

party confrontation were pushed aside. That the non-socialist members left the Committee when the work was

almost completed due to differences of opinion on future defence was budgets. Furthermore, at that time January 1968 the security policy

assessments already completed. The unity on security policy issues were finally confirmed in the parliamentary debate connection with the was defence bill 22 May 1968. on That external support discussed to lesser extent than in 1958 was a and, noticeably, than in 1949 probably be attributed to even more can

Relevant defence decisions 97

a considerable number of These be attributed the internareasons. can to

tional security enviromnent and the threat scenario, the of the

status

Swedish National Defence, and domestic policy. The latter have been discussed in Chapter 2 and not further discussed here.

are

As to the international security environment, the period following the

end of World War II, and most of the 1950s, characterized by the was perception of an imminent threat of In the West, the Soviet war. system

was judged to be aggressive in foreign policy, and militarily

even

expansionist, especially during the Stalin No real balance in

era.

conventional armed forces existed in Europe, the Soviet Union by

was

a wide margin predominant, but its forces balanced by U.S.

were

superiority the air and nuclear weapons. In reality, only other

one

naval power existed in the Baltic Sea besides Sweden, namely the Soviet Union. Denmark was weakly defended, albeit politically member of the

a Atlantic Pact NATO.

In the period 1955-65, much of this gradually changed. Already in 1951, NATO had established an integrated military command. The U.S. military presence in Europe was expanded. The defences of Norway and

Denmark were strengthened with the support of the Western great

powers. West Germany was admitted to NATO and gradually

was rearmed, so that toward the end of the 1960s the country appeared as

militarily the strongest state within NATO save for the United States. In addition, towards the end of the 1950s, NATO started discussing the establishment of a special military command for the Danish isles and the

southern Baltic Sea, BALTAP, in which the Federal German

Navy would play a significant role. The two-power situation in the Baltic Sea was thus replaced by a three-power situation. In addition, Soviet naval developments, meant inter alia considerable

a shift of emphasis away from the Baltic Sea and towards the Northern Fleet, based on the Kola peninsula.

Furthermore, the overall security relations between

the superpowers

improved, as described by FU 65. Especially after the Cuba Crisis, the

superpowers entered a period of stable relations, where caution,

ultimately to avoid a nuclear war, and status quo were viewed to be key

components. The perceptions of acute risks of war in Europe thus were

considerably moderated. Also, the developments within the Swedish National Defence initiated after the 1958 Defence Decision ought objectively have improved

to

Swedish self-confidence. This assessment still clouded by certain

-

inter-party differences of opinion becomes very clear the 1965

-

Defence Committee report, and in bill 1968110. The developments

as

to equipment and organization were characterized inter alia by forceful

expansion of the Air Force strike command and establishment of modem

98 Relevant defence decisions

armoured brigades. The interplay between considerable number of factors thus made

a

Sweden able to perceive the combination of the international security environment, threat picture, and Swedish defence capabilities as more

favourable than during the 1950s. The need for external assistance should therefore have seemed less manifest than before, as seen above in CB 65. To this should be added the situation in concrete assistance

planning. Sweden had already, in conjunction with Swedlund’s petitions

in 1949 and via the discussion in the 1955 Defence Committee and by of number of concrete reached a position which could means a measures,

probably be termed quite satisfactory, especially considering its less

exposed position. None of the actors could have had any strong interest in further dealing with these issues. To this should be added certain conditions stemming from the forms

of defence committee procedures. The 1955 Defence Committee had

consisted of exclusive top-level among others the Minister of

an group Defence and two non-socialist party leaders. The 1965 Defence

Committee, the other hand, was characterized by wider participation,

on

which most probably diminished inclination to initiate a discussion

any such sensitive issue external assistance. on a as In conclusion, the Commission has established that in connection with the 1968 Defence Committee report, language still occurs which

certainly than before, but nevertheless hard to

even more vague

interpret anything but references to the issue of external assistance.

as

The Commission has not found information indicating review of

any any the assessments of the assistance issue made in connection with the 1958 Defence Decision. In later documents, the Commission has not come

comprehensive assessment similar to the one in the 1956

across any memorandum the issue of external assistance, be in the documents on of the 1965 Defence Committee or in any other context.

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 99

4 U.S. vis—a—vis

policy Sweden

4.1 Background

In chapters 2 and 3 the Commission discussed basic Swedish

some

assessments regarding security policy, with emphasis the issue of

on assistance from the Western Powers the defence of Sweden. Their view of course of great interest. In this regard, the British and the

U.S. perspectives of immediate interest, while the particular Nor-

are

wegian perspectives were partly discussed section 3.2 and will be

further commented in chapters 5 and Referring to the United on Kingdom has the Commission had access to just comprehenone more sive assessment regarding security relations with Sweden. made was 1952 and accounted for in section 6.1.2. In the of the United case

States, which according to analyses of the 1950s the most likely

- - was

supplier to Sweden of military support war, a different source material situation applies. The policy that the United States planned to out, vis-a-vis

carry e.g., a particular country or group of countries, has thus from time to time

been set out by the President in a policy document following discussions in the National Security Council NSC, key departments, intelligence agencies, and the military leadership participating. These policy docu-

ments covering the period until the mid-1960s and accessible in - now

U.S. archives hold unique position they authoritative

— a as are express-

ions of overall U.S. interests and policy intentions. Once certain policy

a

was adopted, was transmitted to the relevant departments and

govern-

ment agencies including, presumably, embassies for implementation.

Documents concerning Scandinavia, including Sweden, and Finland were secret or top secret when written. Today, documents covering the period up to and including 1960 are declassified, except for occasional passages. This chapter relates the three key documents from 1948 to

1960 NSC 281 The position of the United States with respect to Scandinavia, 1948 NSC 121 The position of the United States with respect to Scandinavia and Finland, 1952

NSC 60061 U.S. policy toward Scandinavia Denmark, Norway and

100 U. S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden

Sweden, 1960. The documents broad spectrum of policy interests, seem to cover a

including security policy, foreign policy, and trade policy meaning East- West trade. An important limitation that U.S. war planning was not dealt with in other than general terms, nor were intelligence issues. Another limitation that the documents expressed manifestation of

a

will, while the practical implementation of specific policies could be delayed limited for different In some regards, therefore,

or reasons. information which could complete the picture given in these documents still not available. No policy document concerning Scandinavia seems to have been new

prepared during the 1960s. This does not preclude NSC 60061 governing the U.S. position towards Sweden in all respects during the

latter part of the decade.

4.2 NSC 281, 1948

The of 1948 in NSC 28 1 developed during the

policy established was

influenced by the initial discussions regarding a Scandinavian

summer,

defence union. The international context set by the Prague Coup, the

was

unfolding Berlin crisis, the newly concluded Brussels Treaty later to become the Western European Union, and the similarly initial dis-

cussions the creation of transatlantic security alliance later the

on a

Atlantic Treaty and its organization NATO. In several ways, NSC 281

reflected these developments.

initially stated that the fundamental U.S. objective in

was Scandinavia that Norway, Denmark, and Sweden remained was to ensure

independent and democratic, and their willingness and capability to

participate effectively in resisting Soviet aggression.

Scandinavia considered to be of strategic significance for both the was United States and the Soviet Union. situated along the shortest flight between the United States and the Western part of the Soviet route

Union, and the Scandinavian states could control the Baltic Approaches. Scandinavia controlled by the Soviet Union, important air,

were missile, and submarine bases would be in Soviet hands. In addition,

Sweden had large uranium deposits. The main threat to the Scandinavian states was Soviet diplomatic ultimately, military attack. Norway and Denmark had

pressure or, a

already, informal basis, requested U.S. military-technological

on an assistance in view of the in Prague. Sweden, on the other hand, coup

still adhered policy of neutrality quotation marks in the U.S.

to a

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 101

text. Sweden was seen to be convinced that neutrality could be maintained one way the other in the event of The policy of or war. neutrality did not, however, prevent the Swedish Government from forcefully distancing itself from domestic communism. The three Scandinavian countries not capable of withstanding were Soviet military aggression for length of time, but provided with any limited amounts of equipment and external assistance, they could create a certain deterrent against attack. Against this background, the United States should a. strengthen the present tendency of Norway and Denmark to align themselves with the West. b. make clear to Sweden its dissatisfaction with Swedens apparent failure to distinguish in its mind between the West and the own Soviet Union, and influence Sweden towards eventual alignment with the Western Powers, this policy should be carried out in a way which would not be unnecessarily provocative towards the Soviet Union.

As to military assistance equipment, etc., the United States should follow the priorities set by the Vandenberg Resolution decision

a policy

by the United States Senate. Sweden’s requirements should be considered only after meeting the needs of those countries which had signalled their intention to cooperate with the United States or were signatories to the Brussels Treaty. With minor adjustments, President Truman approved these policies on

4 September 1948 in NSC 281 Cf Appendix 8.

4.3 NSC 121, 1952

Another policy drafted at the beginning of 1952. The situation paper was had now changed several significant aspects. Norway and Denmark had joined NATO, and the United States had reappraised its policy towards Sweden and was for the time being accepting the Swedish policy of non-alignment. The Korean War was on. According to the new policy document, was in the interest of the United States that Norway, Denmark, and Sweden should be in the best possible position to resist Soviet pressure or aggression. Sweden seemed absolutely determined to defend its national independence and integrity. However, the country associated with the was concept of neutrality. Although Sweden traditionally anti-Russian was and ideologically anti-Communist, had not joined NATO. would be

102 U. S. policy vis-51-vis Sweden

in the U.S. interest to have Sweden join NATO, primarily because this

would facilitate joint Scandinavian defence organization. But for the a

foreseeable future, the United States had to accept as a political fact

Sweden’s policy of remaining outside military alliances and calculate

accordingly those and methods best designed to increase Sweden’s

means contribution to Western defence. The general attitude towards Sweden, therefore, should reflect the that, without formal Swedish membership of NATO, assessment even Europe’s defence would benefit from closer Swedish association and cooperation with its NATO neighbours and with the United States. The

significance of sufficient Swedish military capability for the defence of

Norway and Denmark also noted here. was Sweden already cooperating substantially with the Westthe was

United States. Therefore, the United States should favourably review

Swedish requests for assistance. Sweden should be allowed to purchase military equipment etc. the same basis as other nations whose ability on defend themselves important to the United States. In addition, the to was

United States should license strategic items for export to Sweden according to the standards governing the licensing of strategic items to

the COCOM countries Cf 5.2. Sweden’s military establishment would

be strengthened by increased exchange of military information, and expansion of of inviting Swedish military officers to

the programme

attend technical schools in the United States. Finally, Norway, Demnark and Sweden would be encouraged to cooperate in coordinating Scandina-

vian planning and strategy. This policy approved by President Truman 17 January 1952

was on

NSC 121 Cf Appendix 9.

as

The NSC staff prepared background on which the President

a paper

did take formal position. somewhat more detailed than the

not a

approved policy paper and thus of interest. In addition to the conclusions quoted above, the paper clearly

the U.S. interest in assisting Sweden in the event of war. expresses

Underlying this appraisal of the strategic significance of

was an

Scandinavia, largely concomitant with that of 1948. It would be

incumbent the United States member of the United Nations to on as a assist Sweden should be the victim of aggression, whether in an isolated attack in all-European Sweden’s strategic, economic, or an war. and political significance comparable with that of the NATO was members Norway and Denmark. The situation for these two countries

would be made considerably difficult in the event of successful

more

Soviet aggression against Sweden. Therefore, the United States had a clear interest Sweden’s independence, and relevant action should be

taken prevent Sweden from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union. to

U.S. Policy vis-ia-vis Sweden 103

The United States firmly believed that Sweden would not willingly submit and give in in neutrality situation. to pressure a was conceivable that Sweden would come out of a European war relatively unscathed. In the event of what was deemed to be a more probable scenario, namely Sweden being attacked or subjected to pressure, Sweden would resist with all the at its disposal. From Western means a perspective, the stronger Sweden’s defence, the better. Therefore, a militarily capable Sweden was in the direct U.S. interest. Apparently, there one, but crucial, reservation regarding peacetime military assistance to Sweden. The United States could not afford to create the impression, in Sweden or among NATO allies, that Sweden could reap all the benefits of a NATO membership without accepting corresponding obligations. should be noted that some paragraphs in this background paper are still classified.

4.4 NSC 60061, 1960

The need for a new policy paper

The decision-making process of the policy adopted in 1960 underpinned by a considerable number of documents available in the archives. This makes possible to follow the decision-making quite well process despite the fact that some passages remain blanked out. An NSC Plarming Board briefing memorandum from December 1959, stated that NSC 121 primarily dealt with Norway, Demnark, Sweden, Finland blank. Finland was now treated separately and dealt was with in a separate document. NSC 121 as now stands deals primarily with..., and provides for friendly military and other relations with that country. The policy reconciled with continued formal neutrality by Sweden. The document had become somewhat outdated. Although now the United States did not have any great problems relating to these countries, some issues ought to be addressed. These were primarily found five areas. The first issue still classified. seems probable, in light of the text

that follows We probably can’t do much about this. that the text

deals with Sweden and Swedish persistence in adhering to a policy of neutrality. Another problem was the potential Swedish procurement of nuclear weapons. When a later briefing memo was presented early in March 1960, there was obviously a draft policy paper at hand. was pointed out that, compared to NSC 121 of 1952, a paragraph has been added dealing

104 U. S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden

specifically with the U.S. role in the defence of Sweden. Paragraph 26,

defending Sweden, in its specific reference to Sweden. In

on new

this context, pointed out that another, general NSC policy paper

was 59061 contained statement which was relevant to the issue To a strengthen the deterrent to limited aggression and to reduce the danger

of limited aggression expanding into general war, the United States should, in appropriate make timely communication of its

cases, intentions.

A comprehensive draft policy paper NSC 6006

In mid-March 1960, final draft policy was available for

a paper discussion within the NSC a few weeks later. opened with some general considerations background information and concluded with on

policy recommendations. The political analysis was most positive. First,

the Scandinavian countries prime examples of political democracy. were

Second, there were strong cultural, emotional and family ties between

Scandinavia and the United States. Third, the Scandinavian countries

enjoyed considerable prestige in the international community, and their support of U.S. policy valuable asset to the United States. Finally,

was a

any Soviet threat to Scandinavian security would create severe apprehen-

sion among other North European NATO allies.

Norway and Denmark were firmly committed to NATO, was stressed, and extremely unlikely that Sweden would wish NATO

was to be weakened by their withdrawal. All three countries were firm in rejecting efforts [of the Soviet Bloc] to make the Baltic Sea a mare clausum or a nuclear weapons free zone.

Strategically, Scandinavia important both to NATO and the Soviet

was

Bloc. constituted the Northern flank of NATO and its position made possible to control the exits from the Baltic and Barents Seas. But the potential of Scandinavia as a base for Western retaliatory operations

use

restricted by Sweden’s neutrality and the unwillingness of Denmark

was

and Norway to permit such use. The United States held the Swedish armed forces, particularly the Air Force, relatively high regard. Sweden had S,candinavia’s most effective military force by far, financed with a relatively large defence

budget. Swedish NATO membership was not deemed necessary for the defence. of significance that Sweden maintained

Western was greater

up~to-date defence and procured early warning, air command and

an

control, and advanced weapons systems not nuclear, though compatible with and complementary to those planned for procurement U.S.

allies.

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 105

Against this backdrop, the document then proceeded to discuss general policy objectives and recommendations. The main policy objectives for the United States in Scandinavia were that these countries, first, had democratic institutions; second, had stable, prosperous economies oriented toward the non-Communist world; third, were friendly toward the United States and actively. opposing Communist influence in the Baltic and Scandinavian particularly in Finland; area, and fourth, supported U.S. positions on major international issues. Continuing Danish and Norwegian membership of NATO, of course, was of central importance, the continuing availability of military as was facilities on Danish and Norwegian territory, including Greenland, and denial of these military facilities to the Soviet Bloc. Finally, was important that Sweden should have the will and capability to withstand Soviet political and military pressure. The following policy recommendations outlined in paragraphs 27-41 are of interest in their entirety to understand the U.S. policy position adopted in 1960. Paragraph 27 emphasized the U.S. commitments through NATO regarding the security of Denmark and Norway. Paragraph 28 touched directly upon the issue of assistance to Sweden in the event of a European war Be prepared to come to the defense of Sweden against Soviet Bloc aggression, possible in cooperation with appropriate NATO countries.

This wording categorical and therefore noteworthy. would become the subject of much discussion and rephrasing prior to the adoption of the policy paper in the autumn of 1960. Finland was apparently significant to the United States. Consequently, the Scandinavian countries should, according to paragraph 30, be encouraged to cooperate in assisting Finland in order to counteract Soviet pressure and to maintain its Western ties. A similar but somewhat vaguer objective was formulated in paragraph 32 regarding Poland. Paragraph 35 discussed ongoing military cooperation with Sweden. No grant military assistance was to be provided. However, the United States should be prepared to sell military equipment to Sweden, and to provide associated training. With due regard to NATO requirements, the United States should also be prepared to sell modern systems to weapons Sweden or to authorize licensing arrangements for manufacture in Sweden. Nuclear warheads not to be provided, and Sweden should were be discouraged from procuring its own nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States should Sweden to encourage procure early warning, air command and control, and advance weapons systems,

106 U. S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden

as stated in the analysis referred to above.

In of the final paragraphs 41, was pointed out that the United one

States should the Scandinavian countries here meaning

encourage

Norway and Sweden to undertake projects for improving the economic viability of the regions of Northernmost Scandinavia.

Assistance to Sweden demands for additional information

-

When the draft policy presented to the NSC on 1 April 1960,

paper was

the presenter Mr. Gray stressed that the paper mainly was meant to codify the current policy [towards Denmark, Norway, and Sweden]. The discussion lively regarding the above mentioned paragraph 28. Cf

was Appendix 10 for an account of the discussion. Secretary of State Herter

especially critical and questioned how the United States could

was cooperate in the defence of Sweden without informing Sweden and the NATO members of its intention in advance. on the other hand, the United States to inform this, the issue of the defence of other was on

Austria, would immediately be raised. President Eisenhower

states, e.

believed that the issue had to be raised within NATO. By doing so, bases

for cooperation with Sweden could be established necessary Without such bases established through NATO cooperation, we would have of assisting Sweden unless we made general war against no way the USSR from bases in the U.S.

The presenter of the draft pointed out that paragraph 28 was oriented towards planning aiming at the creation of contingency plans for action

in the event of attack Sweden. He also stated that at the present an on

time there existed alliance with Sweden, nor any automatic provision

no or commitment to assist Sweden in the event of an attack.

Herter pointed out that paragraph 28 conferred great benefits on

Sweden without compensation to the United States. The President any asked the Council to think of the position of the other Scandinavian

countries Sweden invaded by the Soviet Union. He asked what

were actions the other Western European countries would take in such a

situation and pointed out that Sweden could not afford any policy but neutrality. The President convinced that the USSR attacked

was

Sweden, war would in the centre of Europe. After this

occur

exchange, the President decided that Paragraph 28 should be excluded from NSC 6006 for the time being, pending further in-depth analysis. The Council also discussed paragraph 35, dealing with equipment sales to Sweden. had earlier been pointed out that Sweden was perhaps the only non-allied country to which the United States was prepared to sell

modern systems. The President concluded that the United States weapons

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 107

should be prepared to sell modern weapons to Sweden following a caseby-case approval of the Departments of State and Defense. The document was thus adopted by President Eisenhower, with a temporary exclusion of paragraph 28, as NSC 60061 on 6 April 1960.

New policy guidelines regarding assistance to Sweden final adoption — The U.S. State Department reported back to the Council in October 1960 with further analysis as to the issues relating to the temporarily excluded paragraph 28. The issue as to whether the question of assisting the defence of Sweden in war should be raised in NATO was of particular concern. State Department believed that would be consistent and logical some kind of guidance were to be included in the document to cover the contingency of aggression against Sweden. Three contingencies

should be covered a Soviet Bloc aggression against Sweden alone, b

a general war in which Sweden remained neutral, and c a general war

in which Sweden was attacked by the Soviet Bloc.

According to State Department, case a was such a remote possibility

that meaningful policy guidance was deemed futile. However, Finland would fall under Communist control, the threat against Sweden would become real. Such a development, however, would undoubtedly call for a fundamental policy review the United States, NATO, and Sweden itself. The outcome of such a review could not be meaningfully anticipated in the policy document. If, as in case b an all-European war broke out in which Sweden remained neutral, the United States would use every means to prevent or

limit Swedish assistance to the Soviet Bloc The next line still

classified. In the event of Sweden being attacked within the framework of an all-

European war c was assumed that the United States would encourage

and assist Swedish resistance all means, military means included,

consistent with U.S. prior obligations to NATO. Cl his followed by

almost a full page of still classified text. In State Department’s summary of the analysis, the conclusions are to a certain extent still classified. The available part of the text reads as follows

In the event of general war with the Soviet bloc a seek to prevent

Sweden, as long as remains neutral, from giving any assistance to the Soviet Bloc, and b encourage and assist Sweden, within the limitations of U.S. commitments to NATO, to resist Soviet Bloc attack against Sweden. In the case of Communist domination of Finland, consider promoting Sweden’s membership NATO. Here follows 3 or 4 lines that still are classified.

108 U. S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden

The State Department paper was subsequently discussed within the NSC Planning Board in preparation for meeting with the full NSC chaired a

by the President. The officer in charge at the Planning Board had no

reservations against the policy text presented by the State Department but

offered his Chairman also the Executive Secretary of the NSC the

following commentary

On 4 part of the still classified text] of this official report by

page the State Department in response to a Presidential request, the war

planning with respect to Sweden assumed. Doesn’t the State Department i what the facts are In my opinion, the last sentence

of the first paragraph should have read ’U.S. and NATO war plans

take into account the possibility of Swedish involvement in a general

war.’ Underlinings original.

Also, the Executive Secretary did not fully accept State Department’s suggestions and proposed the following changes strike-throughs and

underlinings from the original; the latter refer to new text

In the event of general with the Soviet Bloc a seek to prevent

war Sweden, as long as remains neutral, from giving any assistance to

the Soviet Bloc, and b encourage and assist Sweden, with-in-the

without prejudice to U.S. commitments to NATO, to resist Soviet Bloc attack against Sweden. In the event of Soviet Bloc

aggression against Sweden alone, be prepared to come to the assistof Sweden as part of NATO or UN response to the aggression.

ance

In the event of Communist domination of Finland, consider promoting

Sweden’s membership in NATO. Maintain and encourage other

selected NATO powers individually to maintain discreet liaison with the Swedish military establishment as the basis for possible future active military cooperation.

He recommended that the measures delineated in the underlined full

sentence above should be understood to provide guidance for unilateral U.S. planning only, and not for planning within NATO. The last sentence also worth noting. apparently suggested only a minor change in the State Department’s draft and acknowledged the already

established role of certain NATO states meaning Norway and Denmark

as links for Sweden’s military contacts with the West.

At the concluding meeting within the NSC on this issue the basis was the Plarming Board’s above quoted text. In addition, there was a more far-reaching alternative to the above underlined full sentence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff In the event of Soviet Bloc aggression against Sweden alone, be

prepared to provide timely assistance for the defence of Sweden consistent with U.S. treaty obligations, preferably as a part of a

NATO or UN response, but unilaterally necessary.

President Eisenhower, however, opted for the text suggested by the

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 109

Planning Board, and the policy its revised form adopted paper was on

10 November 1960 as NSC 60061 Rev.. The final text will be found

in Appendix 11.

4.5 Summary and conclusions

The documents from 1948, 1952, and 1960 show similarities well as as differences. Thus, the general military-strategic analysis characterized by a marked continuity. The political judgments, however, undergo crucial changes, and the view on military assistance to Sweden expressed fully for the first time in the 1960 document. In the military-strategic sense, Scandinavia was already regarded in 1948 as important for both the United States and the Soviet Union, primarily in an air operations perspective. Soviet’s access to Scandinavia would have grave implications for the West. The 1952 strategic analysis concurred largely with its predecessor. The fundamental analysis held good in 1960, but with some additional dimensions The NATO perspective and the interest in the waters North of Scandinavia. From the NATO perspective, focused on Central Europe, Scandinavia was an important flank area. In addition, Scandinavia commanded the exits from the Baltic as well as the Barents Seas. In 1960, Scandinavia was discussed as a base for Western retaliatory operations Eastward. This aspect hardly noticeable in the 1948 and 1952 documents. Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean a considerable change in the U.S. position, in view of what known from other sources concerning active U.S. planning in the 1940s and ’50s. The political dimension of the security policy analysis stands out in the 1948 document, which permenated by U.S. dissatisfaction with Swedish neutrality policy. The intent thus to demonstrate dissatisfacwas tion with Sweden’s apparent inability to distinguish between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union; and the United States intended to supply military equipment to Sweden only after its own allies’ needs were satisfied. Four years later, the Swedish non—aligned position had been accepted as a political fact, although was still desirable that Sweden join NATO. At the same time, however, was noted that Sweden was by tradition anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Thus, the view on providing Sweden with military aid primarily equipment in peacetime had changed; Swedish requests should be looked upon favourably. In addition, would be beneficial Sweden’s cooperation with its Scandinavian neighbours and the United States were to be intensified.

110 U. S. policy vis-a-vis Sweden

In 1960, the United States fully accepted the Swedish security policy [Sweden] could not afford policy but neutrality, according to

any President Eisenhower, and there indications whatsoever that the are no United States intended to attempt to change this policy. Swedish NATO

membership only mentioned possible countermeasure in the

was as a event of Russian takeover of Finland. NATO membership was not a

the central tenet was that Sweden’s military system,

necessary, as

technologically and organizationally, facilitated cooperation with the

West. However, the United States valued general orientation towards a the West all the Scandinavian countries.

In 1960, the U.S. goodwill toward Sweden also became more obvious in the of military equipment. After an exhaustive discussion, briefly

area dealt with above, the President himself decided that the United States

should be prepared to sell modern to Sweden on an ad-hoc

weapons basis.

The only further reference to bilateral military cooperation in peacetime the few lines concerning discreet liaison via, in effect,

was

Norway and Denmark. In light of what was said initially this chapter regarding the absence of references to war planning and intelligence,

however, possible for the Commission to examine whether NSC not

60061 offered complete picture of Sweden’s military relations with the

a

United States they interpreted from the U.S. side during this

- as were -

period. The U.S. view wartime assistance to Sweden of course the key

on

issue in the perspective of the Commission. In 1948, was only stated

that external assistance would improve the conditions for Scandinavian

defence. Already in 1952, there was a clear reference to Sweden and to the importance almost commitment provide assistance Sweden

or to

attacked. The only reservation dealt with the possible reaction from

were

the NATO allies the commitments were too far-reaching. This matter, however, discussed far greater detail the policy

was of 1960. While only eleven lines out of the main text of ten pages paper devoted to this matter, clear from the full documentation that are

these eleven lines focal point of the analytical work preceding the

were a

policy’s adoption. The central the final policy was as follows

message In the event of with Sweden remaining neutral, the United States war,

would seek to prevent Sweden from providing assistance to the East.

any

Sweden attacked in Europe-wide the United States would

were a war,

and assist Sweden. This position, with the sole reservation

encourage

that the actions should be taken without prejudice for NATO, obviously the of the paragraph. Considering the deliberations

core recounted earlier that free Sweden of central interest to the North — a was

European NATO members can assume that the prejudices

- one

U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Sweden 111

primarily referred to political conditions within NATO in peacetime.

can be assumed that these referred to negative reaction NATO a among

allies, should Sweden receive some kind of security guarantees without

assuming the obligations of NATO membership.

The final picture, then, that the United States in its internal policy in 1960 expressed itself fairly categorically in favour of assisting Sweden

that country were attacked as a step in a major should be noted war.

that this does not read .be prepared to assist Sweden. , but succinctly

. . . ...assist Sweden. . .

The paragraph also contains a policy position for the event of

an

isolated attack on Sweden, i.e., the contingency that had earlier been judged highly unlikely. concluded with the afore-mentioned intention of retaining discreet liaison with the Swedish military establishment

as

a basis for possible future active military cooperation. The complete text

of the paragraph reads as follows one footnote deleted

28. In the event of general with the Soviet Bloc seek

war a to

prevent Sweden, as long as remains neutral, from giving any

assistance to the Soviet Bloc, and b and assist Sweden,

encourage

without prejudice to U.S. commitments to NATO, to resist Soviet

Bloc attack against Sweden. In the event of Soviet Bloc aggression against Sweden alone, be prepared to come to the assistance of Sweden as part of a NATO or UN to the aggression. In the response

event of Communist domination of Finland, consider promoting Sweden’s membership in NATO. Maintain and selected

encourage

NATO powers individually to maintain discreet liaison with the Swedish military establishment the basis for possible future active

as

military cooperation.

Peacetime contacts 113

5 Peacetime with contacts the Western

Powers

5.1 International contacts

The Swedish policy of neutrality has not constituted impediment to

any

frequent international contacts. For a small country like Sweden, international contacts have been judged particularly significant. This also

the case with the armed forces. Officers and others service with the National Defence require, as do professionals in other fields, contacts

with foreign colleagues to avoid national isolation in their thinking and expertise. In addition, such contacts have been considered as helping to create respect for and understanding of the Swedish National Defence. International military contacts have been of various types. In day—today contacts, defence attachés played a significant role. Also, an extensive exchange of visits took place at different levels. Officers and

technicians in service with the armed forces often travelled abroad for

purchasing and educational purposes. A considerable number of Swedish

officers received advanced training in other countries, and foreign

officers studied at military schools in Sweden. Duty exchange

programmes between Swedish and foreign officers carried out to were a

non-negligible extent. These kinds of contacts took place primarily with

Western Europe and North America. In this context, not possible to provide a complete picture of the very extensive international contacts that Swedish officers and others

the service of the armed forces had from the end of the 1940s through November 1969. The of the following account only to provide

purpose

a general understanding of the frequency and character of these contacts. Contacts dealing with intelligence exchange described in section 5.4.

are

Defence attachés

At that time, one or sometimes several defence attaches served at the

larger Swedish embassies. Their main duties military advisors to the

— as chief of mission were to establish good contacts with the armed forces, -

and, where applicable, the defence industry, of the host country; to assist the procurement of military equipment; and and facilitate

to prepare

114 Peacetime contacts

visits from Sweden of military character. Their duties also included

a

intelligence activities. Correspondingly, number of foreign

overt a missions in Stockholm used defence attaches. Their contacts with the

Swedish armed forces facilitated by the Defence Orders Office

were

Kommandoexpedition the Ministry of Defence.

Forsvarets at

The largest contingent of Swedish defence attaches based in

was

Washington. Their chances of effectively carrying out their duties varied considerably time and reflected the state of Swedish-U.S. relations.

over Until mid-1952, U.S. servicemen distrusted Sweden,and was difficult for the attaches to extract information of value. After that, the U.S.

attitude gradually became more positive. But willingness to provide the

Swedish attaches with classified information still limited. was very Towards the end of the 1950s, however, the U.S. posture vis-a-vis

Sweden shifted significantly. Thereafter, the U.S. military establishment

showed considerable towards the Swedish attaches, who openness

perceived themselves to be in favoured position concerning informa-

a tion. In the end of the 1960s, consequence of the Swedish Governas a ment’s criticism of the U.S. warfare in Vietnam, relations once again

cooled down. However, the cooperation on equipment of such great

importance to Sweden was not discontinued. -

Visits to other states

Previously, official travels by defence personnel required special permission by the Swedish Government. The ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs handled such issues jointly. While the ministers of

defence generally positively inclined towardssuch applications, the

were

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Unden, clearly took more restrictive

a

approach, at least during the first half of the 1950s. In particular, Unden objected to high-level visits. This attitude seems have been shaped largely out of for how such visits would be perceived in the

concern

Soviet Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also quite restrictive in its views visits by foreign military officers to Sweden.

on

The number of applications for travel permits in the archives of the Ministry of Defence gives general impression of the extent of the travel

a

activities. During 1949-51, the armual average number of applications 18. During the following three—year-period, 1952-54, the number of

was

applications increased to, 58, of which just over 30 per cent

on average,

concerned applications from the Swedish National Defence Research

Establishment FOA, and just 20 per cent were from the Air Force over and the Air Materiel Administration. During the latter part of the 1950s

the number of journeys abroad increased rapidly. Thus in the fiscal years of 196667, 196768, and 196869, the numbers of such trips were 326,

Peacetime contacts 115 . . .

473, and 519, respectively. In the Army Staff archives alone, there are approximately 600 travel reports from the period 1949-69. Primary destinations were the Nordic countries, Western Europe, and North America. The travel reports in the Army Staff archives show that approximately 500 concern travels to NATO countries, while the remainder primarily deal with trips to neutral states such as Finland, Switzerland, and Austria. Only a few reports concern visits to Eastern Europe. Out of the total of 473 trips made by staff from defence authorities in the fiscal year of 196768, 110 concerned Great Britain, 92 the United States and Canada, 65 France, 56 West Germany, 29 Norway, 26 Demnark, 18 Finland, and 18 Switzerland. The most frequent travellers, also at this time, were personnel from FOA, the Air Force, and the Air Materiel Administration.

Flag—ofl‘icer exchanges

Exchanges between the Swedish military leadership and its counterparts of foreign states should be of particular interest. Nails Swedlund, Chief of the Defence Staff, 1947-51, and Supreme Commander, 1951-61, was frequently in contact with Danish and Norwegian military officers and politicians, and often visited these two countries. In the autumn of 1955, he also visited the United States. Axel Ljungdahl, while serving Chief as of the Air Force, 1954-60, visited twelve Western countries including the United States, and hosted a number of foreign air-force chiefs in turn. Stig Hzson Ericson, Chief of the Navy, 1953-61, was an ardent proponent of international contacts. While Chief of the Navy, he made several travels for purposes of study to Great Britain and France, and one to the United States. In the early 1960s, rolling long-term planning was prepared for toplevel military visits to and from the Nordic countries, Great Britain, and the United States. These plans were adopted by the Government. In these plans, the reasons for visits to and from Denmark, Finland, and Norway were assigned primarily to good neighbourship, mutual goodwill, and the significance of personal acquaintances as well as to the exchange of primarily organizational and training experience stemming from the similar conditions of the four countries. The opportunities for contacts as well as for the exchange of experiences within the framework of each country’s particular foreign policy should be seized. The plans explained the exchange of visits with Great Britain and the United States by their key position in procurement, the goodwill and increased understanding of Swedish determination and capabilities for self- defence generated by the visits, and the knowledge that could be obtained from visiting these countries.

116 Peacetime contacts

Actual military top-level visits and return visits in 1962-65, and planned military top-level visits and return visits in 1966-69

Norway Denmark Finland Great Britain United States

To From To From To From To From To From

SC 1967 1966 1966 1965 1968 1967 1963 1964 1965 1969 1968 1968 J CDS 1964 1966 1966 1969 1966

CA 1964 1968 1967 1968 1967 1968 1966 1966 1965 1963 1965 1969 ‘ 1969 1967

CN 1966 1965 1967 1966 1968 1969 1962 1965 1963 1964 1969 1968 1968 1968 1969

CAF 1965 1966 1968 1964 1966 1968 1964 1967 1962 1962 1969 1968 1969 1967 1966

The left column shows who travelled, with SC standing for the Supreme Commander; CDS, the Chief of the Defence Staff; and CA, CN, and CAF the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively, or their foreign counterparts. The remaining columns show, respectively, in which years visits took place, to what countries, and when visits were received from these countries.

The Chief of the Defence Staff visited the Soviet Union 1965, the

Chief of the Army, Switzerland 1966, the Chief of the Navy, Italy

1965 and France 1966 and the Chief of the Air Force, Italy 1966. The Supreme Commander planned to visit the Soviet Union 1967 and the Chief of the Air Force planned visit to France 1969.

a

The distribution of actual planned visits to Sweden from other

or

countries, beyond those in the table, was as follows’ the French Chief of the Navy 1967, the Italian Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force 1967,

the West German Inspector General of the Air Force 1968, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 1967, and the Polish Chief of Defence Staff 1967.

In most the visits probably courtesy visits, including visits

cases, were

for the of study. The principal significance of these visits was

purpose

probably the establishment of personal contacts. The Commission will

return to these in other contexts well as to other high—level contacts, as

Peacetime contacts 117

to the extent they are of interest with respect to the subject that the Commission studying. On a regional level, visitor exchanges took place periodically, between Swedish military-district commanders, especially those in Kristianstad and Boden, and their counterparts in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. According to unanimous information provided by people informed of these activities, no issues pertaining to operational cooperation dealt were with. On the other hand, other issues of interest discussed, common were such as organization, equipment, training, and air-safety cooperation. The emphasis seems to have been social activities and developing on personal contacts. A couple of visits by Swedish military-district commanders to Norwegian military exercises constitute exceptions to the above. Thus, in 1954, the military-district commander in Boden, Nails Bjork, was given access to operational plaiming for north Norway in conjunction with the exercise Blatind in 1954. On another occasion, Bjiirk and a Norwegian commander agreed to exchange liaison units in wartime Cf

section 6.4. In 1958, Rickard Akerman, the military-district commander

in Skovde, was present when the Norwegian Army Command discussed issues of a political and operational nature during the exercise Dovre. Section 6.4 certain discussions, directed by the military-district covers commander in Kristianstad, between Danish and Swedish officers.

Further contacts

During World War II, the Swedish National Defence had limited opportunity of following military developments in other states. After the war, was desirable to be informed of foreign wartime experiences as well as of the significant technical advances made. During the latter half of the 1940s, Swedish officers and technicians began travelling abroad for study purposes. The United States and Great Britain by far the were most popular destinations. The visits to have focused primarily seem on issues pertaining to technology, training, and organization. A few examples of these early visits deserve mentioning. In 1949, U.S. Air Force flight training in the United States studied, and was a study visit was made to USAF’s facilities in West Germany. Information was also obtained in England the training of fighter ground on controllers as well as on the selection of Royal Air Force air process crews. Also in 1949, a high-ranking. naval officer visited Great Britain to study tactics and methods for operative command and control of naval forces. In England in 1950, Swedish Air Force officer studied a armaments for fighter aircraft and related issues. Other visits in 1950 concerned cooperation between naval and air forces, and RAF activities

118 Peacetime contacts

in the British Zone Germany. In 1951, army officer studied an paratroop training in England, France, and Belgium. In all, the Swedish visitors to have been well received and shown considerable seem even on classified matters. openness Swedish officers also underwent training abroad. This had also happened before World War II, and was thus nothing new principle. Swedish officers served with foreign units; they participated in shorter in the most diverse subjects intelligence, fighter control, courses — telecommunications equipment; and some officers also attended military colleges in other countries for entire academic year or more. In an addition, Swedish test pilots trained Western countries. were After World War II, the first Swedish national to have studied at a

military college abroad to have been the future Major—General

seems Sigmund Ahnfelt. During the 194950 academic year, he studied at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Several non—U.S. officers participated the course, mainly from other

NATO countries and Latin America, but also from Switzerland. Three other Swedish officers graduated from USACGSC up to 1969, among them, the future Supreme Commander, Lennart Ljung. Already in the early 1950s, Swedish officers were also being offered advanced training at other colleges, for example the Air and Command Staff School in the United States; the Staff College, RAF Staff College, and School of LandAir Warfare Great Britain; and the Norwegian Naval War College. Opportunities to study at military colleges were later opened at the Naval War College and the Marine Corps School up e.g. in the United States, at the Naval Staff Course in England, and at Ecole Supérieure de Guerre Navale France. The explanation to why the Western Powers this way provided as the Swedish National Defence with opportunities for personnel to participate in advanced training probably to be found in their interest Swedish officers keeping to international standards. Sweden would up then be better prepared to resist Soviet aggression and contribute to the defence of the West. The exchange not lop—sided. Already in 1949, a U.S. officer was to have participated in Swedish winter training. Also in 1949, the seems

Royal Air Force offered to dispatch two officers to Sweden to provide

information, fighter control and certain air safety services. on e. g. Foreign students also attended courses at Swedish military schools. Between 1949 and 1969, approximately 90 foreign officers studied in the Army War Collegethe department of the Armed Forces Staff and army War College MHS and approximately 50 at the Naval War Collegethe department of MHS. The great majority were from Norway, but navy also included students from Danmark, F inland, Great Britain, were

Peacetime contacts 119 . . .

Austria, Thailand, and Colombia. There were no students from Warsaw Pact countries. There were no foreign students at the Air Force War

College the air force department of MHS or at the National Defence

College.

Some exchange duty took place involving officers from Sweden and

certain NATO countries. In 1953, three Swedish Air Force officers were

assigned to three months’ service with the RAF West Germany while

three British officers served in the Swedish Air Force. A similar exchange took place also in subsequent years. In. 1957, a Swedish Air Force officer was assigned to the RAF in England for three months, and studied British procedures for fighter control, while a British fighter controller at about the same time served with a Swedish wing, and on a

few occasions also guided Swedish fighters. On the army side, similarly, there existed a so-called exchange au pair system. In the mid-1950s,

four Swedish junior officers served for four weeks with British units, and four British officers served with Swedish units. The programme was

considered valuable, primarily as a general motivator. In the early

1960s, a similar exchange programme was started with the United States.

Swedish officers then served with U.S. units in West Germany.

To sum up, one finds that during this period Sweden had international

contacts which gradually increased in scope. The exchange of visits as well as travel were mostly geared toward the Western Powers. Many officers who attended foreign military schools later reached top positions within the Swedish defence. Through this training they acquired thorough knowledge of the organization, tactics, and technology of the

Western Powers. At the same time, valuable contacts were established

with prominent officers from, primarily, NATO countries contacts

which in many cases developed into lasting friendships.

5.2 Peacetime procurement of equipment and supplies, and technical cooperation

Introduction

During World War 11, Sweden had expanded its National Defence substantially, and at the end of the war the Swedish armed forces were on a considerable footing. The Swedish defence war industry had been

established, and corporations such as SAAB and Bofors were major suppliers to the Swedish armed forces. During the latter part of the

1940s, large-scale purchases of less sophisticated equipment were also

made from U.S. surplus stocks.

In terms of quality, however, Sweden was worse off. During the war,

120 Peacetime contacts

Sweden had largely been cut off from international technological developments. Much of its equipment was therefore obsolete. Only about after the ended, Swedish officers and defence technicians a year war began travelling abroad for study purposes, especially to the United States and Great Britain, to gain access e. to technological developments there. would take several years, however, before the experience gained could be put into practice in Swedish industry. Therefore, there were substantial needs for imports of technically advanced equipment. These needs could only be satisfied by the Western Powers. Sweden’s extensive and sparsely populated territory, the in certain quite distinctive terrain, and, not least, the fact that the armed areas forces mainly consisted of conscripts with limited training, often put particular requirements on equipment. Over time, therefore, a Swedish profile was successfully - developed in military technology. In many aspects, solutions to technical problems were different from those chosen by the great powers, and the intention was to force a potential main opponent to commit resources against a uniquely Swedish technology. In addition, Sweden’s security policy stance made desirous a domestic defence industry, capable of meeting most peacetime procurement requirements as well as providing wartime munition production and equipment maintenance. Though the Swedish National Defence over time could purchase equipment domestically to a greater extent, extensive cooperation with other states was still necessary. The National Defence wanted the latest and most effective equipment, at the lowest possible cost. Sweden had neither the financial nor the staff resources to single-handedly remain at the forefront of developments in all areas of military technology. Among other things, Swedish aircraft projects were dependent on an influx of foreign technology. And Sweden’s defence industry could not possibly produce, at competitive prices, all the equipment required. Though Sweden’s defence industry primarily aimed at meeting Swedish military requirements, international standards were met. Considering the predominant position of the large NATO countries on the world market, this meant effect that Swedish defence industry followed NATO standards. One reason for this adaptation was the Swedish defence industry’s desire to export equipment and thereby be able to spread out development costs over more large-scale production series. Another that the Swedish National Defence, when reason was purchasing artillery for example, insisted that the calibre be of international standard. In this way, domestic munition makers could be exposed to international competition. Imports of defence equipment from the West as well as the adaptation to Western standards which thus to a certain extent took place within the

Peacetime contacts 121 . . .

Swedish defence industry, could of course make easier for Sweden, in the event of war, to receive assistance from, and cooperate with, the Atlantic Alliance. In light of the great efforts made to develop a Swedish profile, however, this can hardly be termed governing interest. a was more in the nature of an added benefit. The expansion of the Swedish Air Force and the relatively extensive mechanization of the Army led to a pronounced need for lubricants, fuel, and certain other raw materials that could not be obtained on the domestic market. Likewise, imports of rubber tires and other equipment were required. Large stocks of strategically important equipment were accumulated. However, these could not be sufficiently large to secure Sweden’s needs the event of a prolonged blockade or war.

Imports of defence equipment and technical cooperation

During the closing years of the 1940s, Sweden made great efforts to import high-technology equipment ground radar stations from the - e. - United States and United Kingdom. For a long time, however, export permits were denied. There were several reasons for this. Primarily, the United States sought to demonstrate its displeasure with the Swedish policy of neutrality. Furthermore, deemed urgent to satisfy was more the needs of the allied states first. In addition, a certain uneasiness was

expressed regarding the risk of Sweden ending up on the wrong side

of a war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, and of the equipment then being used against the armed forces of the supplier states. Gradually, however, U.S. and British authorities changed their attitude concerning exports of defence equipment to Sweden. The expectation that a restrictive policy in these matters would persuade Sweden to join NATO was written off. Simultaneously, their confidence in Sweden’s will to defend itself against Soviet aggression increased, and was deemed important to strengthen the Swedish armed forces. This change in attitudes seems to have been based, part, Norwegian initiative. on was in the interest of Norway that effective Swedish defence could an absorb the first blow in the event of an attack from the East. In September 1950, Sweden was thus given the opportunity to purchase military aircraft from the United Kingdom. And in May 1951, the United States granted export permits for number of Bendix radar a stations, meant to supplement radar stations Sweden had already earlier received permission to purchase from the United Kingdom. During 1951 and 1952, intensive diplomatic activity took place to facilitate Swedish imports of modern defence equipment favourable on terms from the United States. The Western Powers wanted Sweden to

122 Peacetime contacts

join the system of export restrictions directed against the Soviet Union and other communist states, aiming at preventing the Soviet bloc from importing goods which could strengthen their war—making potential. The cooperation carried out within the framework of a special committee was the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade, Cocom. These wishes resulted, in the spring of 1951, in a number of discussions between Sweden and the United States on Swedish trade with the East. The negotiations were surrounded by the utmost secrecy. Sweden stressed that would reserve the right to shape its trade policy autonomously. Sweden’s trade policy characterized by non—discrimination of any was country of countries. Sweden did, nevertheless, take its own or group security into consideration when exporting goods and equipment. By tradition, export of defence equipment to the Eastern bloc did not take place, and would not be permitted. Exports to the East of other strategically important goods insignificant. These exports could be were the trade policy price Sweden had to pay for the continued seen as import of vital supplies from the East, and would not be permitted to increase. By tradition, there re-exportation to Eastern bloc was no countries of strategically important goods imported from the United States other Cocom-countries. The implementation of these principles or meant, other things, that Sweden did not take commercial among advantage at the of the Coco—countries of the trade policy - expense tension between East and West, and therefore could not be seen as sabotaging Coco efforts regarding East-West trade. The United States found that Sweden’s declared policy did not preclude reaching agreement. Once Sweden undertook to inform the an United States of possible departures from this policy, the United any States accepted the Swedish policy stance. That same year, the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm described the outcome of the negotiations as being such that Sweden had accepted to implement a trade policy equivalent to that of the NATO countries, and was described as the greatest departure thus far from the policy of neutrality. Several years later, a U.S. Government report stated that Sweden was cooperating inofficially and to a limited extent to uphold the Coco-system. As a result, U.S. for treating Sweden less favourably than the Coco reasons countries when granting export permits, due to its East-West trade policy, cleared when granting export licences. were away In February 1952, the President of the United States declared, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, that Sweden in principle entitled to purchase military equipment from the was U.S. Government. U.S. legislation dictated, however, as a precondition for deliveries, that the recipient country must provide the United States

Peacetime contacts 123 . . .

with certain reassurances. Sweden judged that such reassurances were

to include references to U.S. legislation, they might compromise Sweden’s policy of non-alignment. Eventually, the United States

approved of the Swedish position.

On 30 June and 1 July 1952, through exchange of diplomatic notes,

an agreement was reached on the terms on which Sweden would be allowed

to purchase military equipment, materials, or services from the U.S.

Government. Sweden undertook to adhere to the Charter of the United Nations, conduct peaceful policies and refrain from attacking other states, avoid re—exporting classified U.S. equipment without prior U.S.

permission and, in addition, implement necessary security measures to protect purchased equipment, materials, services, and information. At the

request of the Swedish Government, this exchange of notes was not

made public until couple of later SO 195474.

a years

The agreement did not immediately lead to any extensive import of defence equipment from the United States. The United States did not initially provide Sweden with classified technical information to any

appreciable degree. In the next few years, other countries than the United States were the main suppliers to the Swedish armed forces.

Sweden thus continued to purchase military aircraft from United Kingdom. Also from the United Kingdom, Sweden imported e.g. aircraft engines, navigation systems and tanks, and from France, artillery.

Towards the end of the 1950s, the United States assumed a more

favourable attitude to Sweden. The Americans increasingly

were open on

issues concerning developments in military technology vis—a-vis the Swedish defence attachés in Washington as well as visiting Swedish officers, defence technicians, and industry representatives. In January

1958, a group of Swedish officers from the three services visited the United States. The group was led the deputy head of the Air Materiel Administration, Torsten Rapp. The possibilities were discussed of Sweden purchasing advanced missiles from the United States. For

several years, this issue had repeatedly been broached by the Swedish

ambassador to the United States but without any result. Now, the United

States was, in principle, positive to this export. No political conditions

seem to have been set. The U.S. side, however, requested that a radar station be set up for strategic air surveillance in the Western part of

Sweden. Sweden did not approve, however, and the issue was dropped.

In February 1959, after further negotiations, Sweden procured a number of air~to-air missiles. Shortly thereafter, Rapp returned to the United States with another group of officers to continue discussing the

procurement of missiles. The United States still took a positive attitude

towards the Swedish requests, on condition that Sweden could provide satisfactory security protection for the U.S. high—technology products.

124 Peacetime contacts

The Swedish military counter-intelligence was tasked to organize industry security, thereby guaranteeing security at the companies receiving U.S. technology. At this time, both states deemed desirable to expand the 1952 agreement, far security measures were concerned, to include all as as information, all equipment and materials, and all services of a classified nature, connected with the National Defence and transferred between the states. A ministerial exchange of notes on this subject took place on 30 January 1961. This exchange was published in 1961251. On 31 August 1962, in connection with this agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Technical Information was drawn up between the U.S. Department of Defence and the Swedish army—, navy-,

and air materiel administrations amended on 6 November 1963. Within

the framework of this memorandum, the parties negotiated classified appendices technology exchange in a large number of subject areas. on This body of treaties was the starting point for close and comprehensive cooperation between Sweden and the United States in military technology. Sweden was no doubt the main beneficiary of this cooperation, but not exclusively The United States was interested in making use so. of the knowledge of Swedish researchers, e. g. at the National Research Defence Establishment and the materiel administrations. At the end of the 1960s, Swedish Government criticism of the U.S. warfare in Vietnam, and Swedish support of North Vietnam, led to vigorous U.S. political reactions. High-level military contacts were throttled. But technological cooperation and defence equipment trade were uninterrupted. Agreements the exchange of information on military technology, on etc. subsequently also concluded with other states, e. the United were Kingdom SC 196715 and Norway 19694.

The Trondheim stockpiles As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Sweden was dependent on importing certain key war supplies, such as oil and other petroleum products. During the 1950s, for reasons of preparedness, Sweden stored fuels equivalent to approximately three months’ consumption. In the event of major involving Scandinavia, the replenishment of a war supplies from abroad would be necessary within a relatively short time. The Baltic Approaches were assessed as one of the most important Soviet objectives in Northern Europe. Denmark were occupied by the Soviet Union, was highly uncertain whether enough supplies could be transported via the Skagerrak through Oresund the sound between

Denmark and Sweden or even to the Swedish West Coast. Therefore,

Peacetime contacts 125 . . .

Sweden searched for alternative ports the Norwegian West on coast,

especially in Fjord of Trondheim [Trondheimsfjorden], which

was open in winter. was assumed that merchant vessels, protected by Western convoys, could reach the Fjord, from where the goods could be transported overland to Sweden.

The initiative to create an umbilical cord to the West probably

came

from the military. Peacetime readinesss, however, also to have

seems

played its part. During harsh ice conditions, the Gulf of Bothnia could not be kept open to shipping, and complicated to transport oil

was from the Swedish West Coast to Norrland. After initial some contacts,

Sweden and Norway began negotiating in 1954 for the construction of

a port with storage facilities for oil at the Fjord of Trondheim. An agreement was reached in 1956. A Norwegian airfield, Vaernes, located close to the plarmed was

facility. At the end of the 1950s, plans were raised for this airfield to be reconstructed and expanded into a military NATO airbase. The Swedish authorities do not to have been informed of these plans. The

seem

proximity to a military airfield threatened to make the area a prime bombing target in war. However, this planning did not lead

to any

reassessment of the project. Norway had also alluded to the fact that was interested in letting the airfield make of the projected Swedish

use

facility. In view of this, Sweden stressed, the fundamental Swedish interest that the Swedish oil facility [should] solely Swedish

serve as a

preparedness facility and that confusion with other interests of

any

readiness will have to be avoided. Norway accepted this position.

The National Board for Economic Defence Preparedness built the oil

storage facility, finished in 1962. consisted of metal tanks cast into the bedrock with a total storage capacity of 50,000 m’; rock shelter for the

a

storage of dry goods; a port of discharge for tankers, etc. in Murvik; and a distribution facility Hell. The facilities linked by under-

were an

ground oil pipeline. The facility managed by the government—owned

was

Oljetransit AB which the director-general of the National Board was

managing director. Road connections between the Trondheim and area

the central parts of Jamtland Swedish province immediately the

across

border were improved. Also, the rail connections were reinforced.

Initially, the plans called for a pipeline from Trondheim to a receiving

facility in Ostersund, but built.

was never

The facility turned out to be bad investment. used for storing

a was aviation fuel and other supplies for the needs of the Swedish National

Defence. But after only a couple of became clear to the Air

years,

Materiel Administration that the cost of storing large quantities of fuel there was too high. There also risk that in the connections

was a war,

with Sweden would be easily cut off. In addition, possible that

was

126 Peacetime contacts

NATO in tight situation would claim the facility for its own use. In

a

addition, Denmark’s strategic position improved through the establish-

of NATO’s Baltic Approaches Command BALTAP, which ment

improved the prospects of keeping imports to the Swedish West Coast

up in At the time, the threat against the Norwegian West Coast war. same increased, due to the Soviet build-up of the Murmansk naval base. Attempts made to interest the Swedish oil companies in utilizing were

of the facility. These unsuccessful, for several reasons. The

parts were

oil companies not allowed to include oil stored at the Norwegian

were

in the stocks of oil they obliged to keep for the of facility were purpose preparedness. The transportation capacity to Sweden was low as the plans for pipeline materialized. And Jiimtland, with its weak

a never did constitute market of significance to the oil economy, not a any

companies. Instead, Norwegian oil companies were offered the use of the and they later leased two-thirds of The remainder used facility, was Swedish defence establishment. Today, the facility Norwegian by the

property.

5.3 Air safety collaboration

Air safety collaboration

During the first half of the 1950s, the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish air forces initiated collaboration air safety issues in the border areas.

on

This collaboration aimed at facilitating navigation in order to guide

aircraft in emergencies, either to their home base or to emergency landing sites in the neighbouring country, in order to provide more

geographical references for positioning in or over clouds when

accurate

flying in border thus preventing border violations. The three

areas,

countries agreed procedures, frequencies, etc. for communications

on between aircraft and ground stations in connection with radio-location

and emergency landings. This collaboration to have emanated from few incidents when seems a

military pilots got into difficulties because of bad weather. The weather often changes suddenly and unexpectedly in the mountain areas of

very Northern Scandinavia. At the time, there were few airbases the Northern parts of Norway and Sweden, and aircraft were of short range.

therefore important, in sudden storm, that pilots could land at

was a the closest available airfield where weather conditions were more

favourable. Similarly, local mist in Denmark the South of Sweden

or

could preclude landing at an airbase in the home country. This collaboration considered highly sensitive and was therefore

was

Peacetime contacts 127 . . .

initially kept secret. In 1960, the collaboration was formalized and identical regulations were adopted Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. To avoid the impression that any ulterior motives were behind this activity, was now made public. The collaboration was called SVE-

NORDA.

The guidelines regulated certain cooperation between the air—safety and

rescue agencies of the three countries, with the aim of achieving the

highest air safety possible. In addition, involuntary overflight of borders

should be avoided, possible. To this end, Danish, Norwegian, and

Swedish military aircraft should

a be surveilled in flight over international waters with heavy air-

traffic, primarily to avoid collisions;

b when necessary receive navigational assistance and weather reports

from the most conveniently located radio stations in the three

countries;

c in emergency situations be allowed to make emergency landings at

the most conveniently located airbase for emergency landings, or receive assistance from the most conveniently located air

rescue agency within the three countries. Information necessary to keep the collaboration running smoothly, e.g., local weather forecasts, would be exchanged on a routine basis.

The participating air safety agencies were a number of regional air

defence centres or the equivalent in each country, in Sweden, air

defence centres for Scania, the West Coast, and Upper Norrland, and

also 4. Air Wing, F 4 later the air defence centre for Central Norrland.

The airfields to be used for emergency landings in Sweden were primarily those of F 17 in Ronneby, F 5 in Ljungbyhed, F 10 in

Angelholm, F 14 Halmstad, F 9 in Save, F 7 in Satenas, F 4 in

Ostersund, F 21 in Lulea, and Kiruna Airport.

Communications between the ground controls were maintained initially

via telephone and telex, and radio was used to communicate with aircraft

in flight. As a consequence of the agreement, cable and radio communi-

cations were established between air defence centres in the three

countries. The network of permanent radio relay stations also

was expanded. In the process, Swedish equipment, different from NATO standards, was used all countries. was possible, however, to connect calls from Sweden via this network to NATO’s European network. The

Commission will return to the significance of these radio-relay

connec-

tions for the possibilities of cooperation in other contexts Cf sections

6.2.2 and 6.6.2. Radio communications between aircraft and ground controls, or

between aircraft from different countries, were carried out in English. Detailed regnilations existed as to call signs, frequencies, etc. well

as as

128 Peacetime contacts

exhaustive examples. This Swedish Air Force personnel training in gave English terminology.

The regulations made possible to conduct exercises in search-and-

and emergency landings. For emergency landing exercises, rescue,

permission required from each country’s Ministry of Foreign

was Affairs. The number of Danish and Norwegian landings Sweden was to equal the number of Swedish landings in Denmark and Norway,

respectively. These training flights not to be part of air sorties

were

integrated into ongoing military manoeuvres. Emergency landings were practised to limited extent. In actual emergency situations, the regula-

a

tions used only occasions during the 19603. An aircraft

were on rare

landing at an airfield in another country was provided by that airbase

- with fuel and other supplies. necessary In compliance with the regulations, quite frequent personnel contacts

took place between Air Force officers of the three countries, usually at

the level of air commander wing commander. On such group or

occasions, the officers reviewed the regulations and compared notes from

exercises and actual incidents. This cooperation enabled Swedish pilots and Air Force officers to obtain knowledge of terrain, facilities, airfields and communication

routines in the two Scandinavian NATO states. Correspondingly, Danish and Norwegian Air Force officers obtained valuable information on Swedish airbases. Swedish military air traffic controllers also gained experience from NATO routines on air traffic control.

Sea rescue service

Regarding there long-standing Swedish cooperation with

sea rescue, other countries, Denmark and Norway. In Sweden, the National e.g.

Maritime Administration the responsible authority. In Denmark and Norway too, civilian authorities are responsible for these activities. The

National Maritime Administration Swedish Telecom’s coastal radio uses

stations well the Navy’s radio stations in Karlskrona and Tingstade

as as stations. The naval forces of each country make resources as sea rescue available when needed for While sea rescue administered sea rescue.

by civilian authorities, its services of course be used also for military

can purposes.

Peacetime contacts 129

5.4 Intelligence

Introduction

The term intelligence usually refers to activities aimed at monitoring the activities and conditions of foreign states. Military intelligence intelligence activities organizationally linked state’s armed forces.

to a

Swedish Military Intelligence has been the subject of several studies. An extensive study was carried out by the 1974 Intelligence Committee. Its report Military Intelligence [Den militara underr2ittelsetjiinsten]

SOU 1976 19 includes an exhaustive account of the organization and

activities of Swedish military intelligence. The activities of Swedish military intelligence of interest to this

are

Commission primarily so far as their purpose was to prepare for military

assistance from the Western Powers. In war, necessary to make quick and accurate decisions, and so the need for current and reliable

information on which to base those decisions particularly pronounced.

Intelligence assistance from other states might well, in the event of war, have been decisive for the successful outcome of operations. our

also within the scope of inquiry of this Commission to review the

general extent and character of potential peacetime collaboration between

Swedish Military Intelligence and Western intelligence organizations. There are several reasons for this. Intelligence collaboration in peacetime could constitute a prerequisite for rapidly establishing efficient

cooperation in war. Such cooperation dependent on mutual trust, also on a personal basis. made easier both sides know each other’s organization and administrative routines. Also, technical installations used in peacetime, e.g., telecommunications, can be of value in war.

Such cooperation could also irrespective of any formal ties create

- -

mutual expectations of cooperation war.

Intelligence missions and organization

In war, the main mission of the intelligence service to provide support for military operations the form of information, i.e. when and how the armed forces should be deployed and used. In peacetime, the of

purpose intelligence to provide information on which to base decisions concerning armed forces readiness, war planning, the-structure and longterm development of the armed forces, and actions against border

violations. In this context, primarily the two first mentioned peacetime

missions are relevant. Intelligence should thus serve as an alarm clock, and provide the

Government and the Military High Command with the advance notice

130 Peacetime contacts

needed for conscript—based defence to be mobilized and readied in our time. To accomplish this mission, the intelligence service must, on a continuous basis, monitor and assess developments in our international environment which could indicate that the country may become subject to an attack. War planning presupposes considerable knowledge of potential adversaries’ military conditions such as resources, organization, tactics, and equipment. To this end, also necessary to be familiar with the military geography of other countries, the location of military units e.g., and permanent defence facilities. To calculate the speed of troop movements, needs detailed knowledge concerning, for example, the one capacity of various forms of means of transportation. Intelligence activities include establishing intelligence requirements and directing they also include gathering, analysis, and disseminasources; tion of intelligence. Intelligence gathering takes place, to a great extent, by studying various publications, e.g. professional journals. Other means of intelligence gathering are attaches, clandestine agents, signal intelligence, air reconnaissance, naval reconnaissance, and in war - — battlefield reconnaissance, as well as information to be obtained by cooperation with intelligence agencies of other countries. Only in exceptional cases does collected intelligence immediately, completely, and correctly explain a certain circumstance or future developments. Generally, therefore to analyze the information first. necessary The Supreme Commander commands the Swedish Military Intelligenand issues of relevance to intelligence are dealt with within the ce, Defence Staff. During the period which the Commission studying,

general intelligence handled by Section 2 the Defence Stafi‘. That

was section consisted of an international department comprising an intelligence bureau and an attaché bureau, a domestic department, and a photo department. When the Military High Command was reorganized, effective 1 October 1961, the section reorganized into three was departments the Intelligence, Attache, and Domestic departments. From 1965, the Domestic Department was renamed the Security Department. The head of Section 2 directed and coordinated military intelligence, and reported to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The international intelligence department was the key body of Swedish Military Intelligence. Its responsibilities included preparing instructions, orders, and directives for the intelligence service and also for training of the intelligence personnel. This department also had the main responsibility for analyzing and disseminating information in peacetime. A special unit, whose duty to gather intelligence by non-official was through agents, was also subordinate to the head of Section means, e. Following reorganization after the end of World War this unit a

Peacetime contacts 131 . . .

was called T-ofiice. Its main mission was to gather intelligence in

Sweden’s vicinity, e.g., by continuosly monitoring shipping in the Baltic

Sea, but the office should also assist in the gathering of technical

intelligence. To a limited extent, the office also analyzed intelligence.

In 1957, a unit was established within the Defence Staffs domestic department within Sweden and in certain other countries gather and to - -

analyze security intelligence, i.e. intelligence on activities threatening national security. In 1961, this unit separated from the domestic

was department and acquired an independent position. was named Bbureau. In 1965, T-office and B—bureau were amalgamated. The new organization, IB, was subordinate to the Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1968, the

bureau was tied directly to the Supreme Commander, and thus

was no

longer part of the Defence Staff. Another key body for active intelligence gathering the National

Defence Radio Institute, FRA. an independent Government body

within the Ministry of Defence. The institute tasked to engage in intelligence activities in the telecommunications area. In doing so, should gather signal intelligence, and analyze collected intelligence, and follow developments within areas which are, anticipated to

or are

become, significant to the signal intelligence gathering and analysis. FRA

also obliged inter alia to develop the technical equipment and methods

necessary for its own intelligence activities. Notwithstanding that FRA an independent Government body, its

intelligence activities have been supervised by the Chief of the Defence

Staff until 1952, and since then, by the Supreme Commander. According

to the instructions laid down 1960, the Supreme Commander to

was set guidelines as to the aim of these activities. A directive from 1952 stated that FRA should keep the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence informed ‘of the concentration of the intelligence activities as well as providing general status reports.

Signal intelligence activities were conducted from Swedish territory,

international waters, or international airspace. was mostly geared towards the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union. Activities were

primarily directed towards communications intelligence and technical

intelligence. Communications intelligence was geared towards foreign

radio communications. Of prime importance not what actually

was was

said, but that unit deployments, readiness, etc. could be determined. Technical signals intelligence concerned radio transmissions, not primarily of a communications character, e.g., identification and

recognition signals from ships, aircraft, radio beacons, etc. These

fingerprints made possible inter alia to chart technical performance

and to watch the movements of individual units.

132 Peacetime contacts

Intelligence activities also carried out within other staffs and

were was government bodies, the service staffs and FOA. These activities, e.g., however, to be of limited interest in this context. seem

Cooperation with foreign intelligence organizations, liaison

Within the framework of frequent official interaction between representatives of Sweden and other states, an exchange of information naturally took place by which Swedish intelligence could profit. Collaboration within international organizations, such the United Nations, and as contacts with representatives of foreign civilian and military government bodies could provide important intelligence. In this context, the military attaches played a significant role. Part of their task was to gather intelligence military—political conditions and on military and militaryon technology developments through public channels. Other significant sources of knowledge were officers and other defence representatives who had made study tours or received training abroad. In comparison to other countries, Sweden’s intelligence organization small. Certain foreign intelligence organizations had also access to was such technical equipment that their means of intelligence gathering and advanced analysis were superior to ours. Also by geographical position, another country could be favoured from an intelligence point of more view. On the other hand, Sweden was in an excellent geographical position to gather certain types of intelligence from the Western Soviet Union. By collaborating with other states in the field of intelligence, Sweden privy to information the gathering of which required special was resources, etc. that we were lacking. The 1974 Intelligence Committee, based the information provided such collaboration, reached the on on conclusion that participation in such collaboration was mostly very beneficial to Sweden.

Main features of international intelligence exchanges I949-1969

Defence Stafi‘ contacts

During the latter part of the 1940s, Sweden entered into intelligence collaboration with Norway, and to a certain extent with Denmark. The Scandinavian Defence Committee had recommended that even a defence union not established, peacetime collaboration should be was realized, e. g. the field of intelligence. In February 1949, a memorandum prepared the Chief of the Defence Staff, Nails Swedlund concerning the planning of certain military cooperation with Denmark

Peacetime contacts 133 . . .

and Norway stated that the collaboration which already exists on intelligence should continue and also include planning of these activities

in war, e. regarding coordination of air- and sea reconnaissance Cf

section 6.1.1. In practice, these ideas seem to have resulted in continued collaboration primarily with Norway. Initially, this took‘ the form of ad hoc contacts between intelligence department personnel and individual officials of Norwegian intelligence, whereby information on the armed forces of the Soviet Union was exchanged. Joint intelligence gathering, however, was not discussed with the Norwegians. Intelligence collaboration with Denmark was insignificant in the early 1950s. seems as the intelligence exchange with Norway and Denmark ceased completely during a few years in the mid-1950s. During the latter part of World War II, Swedish intelligence had provided the United Kingdom with information. This collaboration continued after the end of the war, initially only on naval issues. Gradually, the contacts with the United Kingdom were expanded to include also cooperation on army and air force issues. Collaboration occurred early on also with the U.S. air and army forces in Europe. From January 1948 until the spring of 1949, the International Department and U.S. army intelligence Heidelberg were in frequent contact. Once became clear to the U.S. Government that Sweden did not intend to accede to the Atlantic Pact, however, directives were issued to the military authorities concerning relations with their Swedish counterparts. These directives led to the collaboration on army issues being put on ice. U.S. Air Force intelligence in Wiesbaden, however, chose not to follow the directives and instead intensified their intelligence exchange with Sweden, as they apparently found be of substantial utility. Little by little, contacts with the Americans in Heidelberg were resumed, and gradually an exchange of intelligence began also on naval issues. Towards the end of the 1950s, an exchange of intelligence occurred between the International Department of the Defence Staff and all military services of Norway, Denmark, the UK, and the United States. The exchange was, at this time, carried out by a couple of officers from each service who visited each other for a few days each year. Information was exchanged concerning the Warsaw Pact order of battle, potential deployment, railroad capacity, cargo ships, and ports, and also new technology and equipment. Joint analysis of the information was also carried out. Matters concerning the Swedish National Defence or NATO were not discussed. The exchange was bilateral. was deemed desirable to use as many sources as possible, as they were complementary to each other.

134 Peacetime contacts

During the 1960s, a certain degree of collaboration with French intelligence was also begun. No written agreements or other understandings on intelligence exchanges to have existed. And, no settlement seems to have been seem reached concerning whether the collaboration was to continue after a possible outbreak of war. On the other hand, the Defence Staff had analyzed how to collaborate with foreign intelligence services in war, in case the Government were to decide in favour of such collaboration. A memorandum from 1952 thus emphasized the significance of being able to rapidly dispatch liaison officers to establish connections with foreign intelligence in critical circumstances. The so—called Wiesbaden—connec—

tion Cf section 6.3.2 could also be viewed as a means to communicate

with foreign cooperation partners in times of crisis and war.

Secret intelligence service contacts The secret intelligence service, i.e. T-office and B—bureau and their successor, IB, also had close contacts with foreign counterparts, e.g. in several NATO countries. Even though was assumed that this collabora-

tion would continue in war, no specific preparations were made initially.

During the 1960s, however, the Swedish National Defence was directed towards defending against an attack involving short advance notice and

a fierce initial phase. The secret intelligence service was especially greatly affected by this view, since had particularly stringent require-

ments for a high readiness. IB and intelligence organizations of some NATO countries were prepared for the exchange of liaison officers in

crisis contingencies. In such a twilight situation, Swedish officers would discreetly travel to each foreign sister organization; foreign

officers would arrive Sweden and be taken care of and briefed by IB.

Such exchanges do not seem to have been realized in the period that the

Commission tasked to study.

Contacts the National Defence Radio Institute

The training of a Danish and a Norwegian brigade in Sweden at the end of World War laid the foundations of close collaboration between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on signal intelligence. At the end of the

1940s, the National Defence Radio Institute FRA trained Norwegian and Danish nationals in the gathering, deciphering, technology, and analysis of signal intelligence exchange for German communications

equipment left behind. Norwegians and Danes visited the FRA, and FRA staff served at signal intelligence stations in Denmark and Norway. Also during the next few decades Sweden collaborated with certain

Peacetime contacts 135 . . .

states on signals intelligence. The FRA’s signals intelligence operations

were primarily geared towards meeting Swedish intelligence needs. If

later they could prove valuable in an exchange of intelligence with other countries, that would be an added benefit.

During the latter part of the 1940s, a certain amount of plarming seems to have been carried out concerning the eventuality of Sweden

becoming engaged in war with the Soviet Union. A top-level group from the FRA would then travel to England. Swedish operations would then be supervised from England, and the group would prepare to receive signals intelligence units these as a consequence of enemy advances were forced to leave Sweden. This planning does not seem to have been

particularly thorough and gradually lost relevance. At this time,

rumours circulated among FRA personnel that the management in the

event of war would be evacuated to the United States, since they were privy to so much sensitive information. The leading perception during the period that the Commission studying, was that the FRA had its key missions in peacetime and in times of crisis. Its wartime missions were not of particularly strong

interest, as was assumed that the permanent facilities would be put out of action at an early stage. No preparations exclusively for war had been

made, according to sources. Similarly, according to information conveyed to this Commission, there were no agreements or prior

commitments vis-a-vis other states concerning cooperation in war.

PreparationsContacts operational issues 137 on

6 Preparations for the reception of

assistance

6.1 Contacts

on operational issues

6.1.1 Partial Scandinavian defence cooperation

Introduction

Shortly after the breakdown of the negotiations on a Scandinavian defence union, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Nils Swedlund, submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, on plarming of certain military cooperation with Denmark and Norway. [The memorandum attached to the report Appendix 12.] In the as memorandum, Swedlund wrote that even though the attempt to coordinate defence preparations of the three Scandinavian countries in defence a union had for the time being not succeeded, still desirable to was initiate some common planning. Such planning should best be carried out by a number of smaller working groups of staff officers from the military command authorities of the three countries, and could be accomplished without necessarily making public. According to Swedlund, the immediate task should be to develop the following twelve plans A plan to establish wire and radio communications between authorities of the three states, signalling procedures, and the of codes use common

and ciphers item 1;

plans to coordinate air surveillance, air defence command and control, air force search and rescue, and the military weather service items 2-5; plans for army cooperation in the area around Treriksroset [the area where the borders of Norway, Sweden, and Finland meet] along

Malmbanan [The Iron Ore Railway, between Kiruna Sweden and

Narvik in Norway], in the Téirna-Mo i Rana and in [the Norwegian area,

province of] Tmndelag items 6-9;

plans for naval cooperation with Denmark in the Southern Baltic Sea,

Oresund [the sound between Sweden and Denmark], and the Kattegat-

Skagerrak especially on minelaying, and with Norway in the Skagerrak

especially on protection of merchant shipping items 10 and 11; and,

a plan to coordinate terminology, reporting and identification procedures

133 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

in general item 12. The intelligence work already under way should

continue and also comprise planning of activities in war, inter alia

coordination of air and naval reconnaissance. When the Swedish Prime Minister, Erlander, was briefed on 10 February 1949, he was, according to Swedlund, hesitant to take action right now, but, in principle, he was positively inclined toward preparation of at least the technical plans. On 20 May 1949, Swedlund briefed the Cabinet inter alia his memorandum but was not given any on instructions. In June 1949, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Jens—Christian Hauge, visited his Swedish counterpart, Allan Vougt. According to what Vougt told Swedlund, Hauge claiming that he was also speaking for -

Demnark expressed wish for combined planning, e. of air surveil-

- a

lance, and for purchases of military equipment from Sweden. Vougt and

the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Osten Undén, had been non-

committal to the wish for combined planning, but had, in principle, as favoured exports of military equipment.

On 6 September 1949, Swedlund again briefed the Cabinet on his

memorandum. Apparently, he divided the twelve issue areas into three where group 1 comprised items 1-5, group items 6-9, and groups, items 10-12. About week later, Undén gave Swedlund an group a

account of the position taken the Cabinet on the proposal. According to Swedlund, Undén had said that the Cabinet’s view was generally

favourable, and had decided that the items listed in group 1 of the

memorandum could be raised at once, while groups 2 Erlander hesitant

but not negative in substance and 3 were deferred with the exception that conveying accepted. Undén also gave an account of a meeting

was of foreign ministers in Copenhagen, where he had reported on the

Swedish position that military equipment could certainly be procured

from Sweden, and that exchange of technical findings and certain an

technical preparations could be carried out——of course without commit-

ments. The Danish and Norwegian Foreign Ministers had declared that

they fully appreciated the Swedish position. The Swedish Advisory

Council Foreign Affairs had also examined the issue and had no on

objection to the military cooperation proposed. Finally, Undén stated that Swedlund could act within these guidelines, and that everything was to

be classified on military grounds.

Swedlund understood this to mean that he was instructed the

Cabinet to plan, with the Danish and Norwegian military high com-

mands, for certain amount of cooperation. At a meeting of the Swedish a

Military High Command in October 1949, he explained that all cooperation with Denmark and Norway to go through the Defence

was Staff.

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 139

Already earlier the Danish and Norwegian national defences had been contacted to this end, as shown, for example, by reports from the British Embassy in Stockholm to the Foreign Office. With the consent of the Cabinet, far-reaching cooperation

more

occurred early on between the Air Command Ostlandet [Norway] and the 2nd Air Group in Gothenburg. In January 1949, the Swedish embassy in Oslo requested to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs give

to the Swedish Air Force the of Norwegian radar station. use a

Shortly thereafter, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the Ministry of Defence, after consulting with the Chief of the Norwegian Air Force, did not object to lending radar station Ames

a 21 for a shorter period, to be used inter alia in combined exercises between the two countries’ air forces. understood that the two air was

forces would communicate directly the time and terms of the transac-

on tion. On 15 March 1949, contract drawn between the Norwea was up

gian and Swedish air forces the loan of the radar station for period

on a

of three months. The contract signed Norway’s behalf by the

was on

Chief of the Air Force after authorization by the Ministry of Defence.

The loan was conditional the station being placed the Swedish on on West Coast within the framework of combined technical exercises in air

surveillance. Aircraft from both states to participate in these

were

exercises. To extract the best possible result from the exercises,

was

desirable for aircraft to be given permission to overfly the other state’s territory, to the extent required. In May 1949, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence agreed that, during the exercises, Swedish military aircraft could overfly a closely defined in Norway. The specific planning of

area these exercises was delegated to the Chief of the Air Command

Ostlandet, Major-General Georg Bull, and the Chief of the 2nd Air

Group in Gothenburg, Major- General Folke Ramstrom.

The exercises commenced May 1949. Norwegian air units attacked

the Gothenburg and Swedish air units attacked Norway, and in this

area,

way they practised defending an urban area. The contract, initially valid for 15 March—l5 June, later extended to 15 July of the

was same year,

after which the radar station returned to Norway. In September

was

1949, the Swedish Embassy in Oslo requested according instruc-

to an

tion received, that the contract be extended for the period 15 Septem-

ber-15 December 1949. When the made, however, the issue request was

of extending the contract had already been resolved informally by Norwegian and Swedish military authorities. This cooperation not

was kept secret.

No documents, such as studies plans, the forms of Scandinavian

or on cooperation have been found. For written the Commission has sources,

therefore had to rely largely short diary entries made primarily by

on

140 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

Swedlund but also by the Supreme Commander, Helge Jung, and by

Rickard Akerman, who in 1951 succeeded Swedlund as Chief of the Defence Staff. Already earlier, Akerman appears to have had a key role

in the combined planning. Jung’s diary entries refer only to the spring of 1950. He notes that the

Danish Minister of Defence visited Sweden in January 1950 and raised

with Vougt coordination of radar, mining, and coast artillery batteries,

other things. The Defence Staff to prepare a memorandum among was this. Furthermore, Jung mentions meeting with Prime Minister on a Erlander, and a meeting in Erlander’s office at which Undén, Hammarskjold, Vougt, and Swedlund were also present. At the first meeting, Erlander said to have informed him of a meeting of

Scandinavian prime ministers in Halmstad and how little had been accomplished there on the Scandinavian front. Hauge to have said that, should Sweden want practical military cooperation, Norway was of prepared. At the second meeting, Jung with Hammarskjold and

course - Vougt concurring had said that this Nordic cooperation did not amount —

to than natural between friendly, kindred nations. Swedlund

more was

had briefed the covered cooperation, then the Oresund

on areas now

mg, postponed for the time being. After a brief discussion, was

decided that the cooperation should continue hitherto. The Oresund

as

issue should be temporarily deferred.

Swedlund’s and Akerman’s diaries contain information this issue, on

and extended period. Their diaries convey the following picture

cover an of contacts with Norway and Denmark.

Cooperation with Norway When visiting Oslo in November 1949, Swedlund informed the Chiefs of the Norwegian Defence Staff, Air Force, and Navy how he envisaged

the work being organized. Liaison officers were to be appointed on

as botl1 sides. The discussions also ranged for example, over the defence of

Treriksroset, radar deliveries from the United States to Sweden a matter

of interest also to the Norwegian Air Force, and the wish of the

Norwegian Chief of the Navy to meet his Danish and Swedish counter-

parts to discuss issues of minelaying which Swedlund advised against.

Possibly, Swedlund brought an outline of a work plan for signals

cooperation. In May 1950, Swedlund again visited Oslo. On this occasion, the [Norwegian] Chief of the Defence Staff, Berg, approved the signal and

weather plans. As to the other plans, Berg was urged forward. At the

meeting, Swedlund stressed that the Swedish Military High Command entirely supportive of the Government policy, and that was not

was

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 141

meaningful to speculate on expanded military cooperation. In September 1950, Swedlund wrote Berg coordination of geographical

on reference

systems . In March 1951, Swedlund again went to Oslo. In preparation for this visit, a plan for coordination of air surveillance to have been seems prepared by the Swedish Defence Staff. In Oslo, Swedlund also met with the Minister of Defence, Hauge, who proved to be informed of the

ongoing Norwegian—Swedish military planning. Swedlund pointed out

that what has now taken place this regard pretty much what could also be done in different political circumstances. Also, he stressed the significance for Sweden to be informed of certain fundamental features of Atlantic Pact plans. In conversation, Swedlund and Berg agreed that a local border commanders were to be informed of the existence of

combined Norwegian—Swedish planning, to prevent undesirable local

initiatives. They also discussed inter alia continued cooperation, in the context of which the Swedish Defence Staff should complete its work on

air defence command and control. Swedlund also put to Berg that

Sweden needed to be informed of Atlantic Pact staff planning, which Berg acknowledged and said he would Together with Berg, pass on. Swedlund also met the Norwegian Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force.

They discussed inter alia the reconnoitering of a sea transport route

South of Norway; Swedlund accepted in principle that Swedish officer a

would participate. In addition, the expansion of airfields in Southern

Norway was discussed.

In September 1951, Swedlund now Supreme Commander again met

with Berg. NATO’s Northern Command AFNORTH, with headquarters in Kolsas, outside Oslo, was established that same month. Most of the Norwegian forces were put under the command of the British Admiral Brind, as were the Danish forces. Swedlund observed, concerning the cooperation permitted between Norway and Sweden, that [was] now uncertain whether our plans could be implemented since Brind, and not Berg, was now in charge of these issues At a meeting in December 1951 with the Norwegian Prime Minister, Torp, Swedlund requested that Torp instruct Berg Atlantic Pact to ease secrecy concerning defence plans for Scandinavia. Torp promised to do so. Swedlund briefed Torp on plans already made on technical cooperation and the organization thereof between both states’ Defence Staff chiefs, but told him that this approach seemed less useful that now Brind’s staff had taken Torp stated that Norwegian authorities in over. any case would be charge of measures Norway, and concluded that the plans should therefore remain force.

In 1949-51, Akerman had contacts with Norwegian military officers

on several occasions. When in Oslo December 1949, he visited

142 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

command and control facilities and discussed radar. His work seems to

have focused radar specifically and plans for air surveillance

on on

cooperation.

Cooperation with Denmark

Already 5 September 1949, i.e. the day before Swedlund briefed the on Swedish Cabinet, he and the Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to set up

joint committee the Oresund issue. This so-called Oresund Commit-

a on

tee mentioned repeatedly in his diary over the next few months. According to of the Committee members, they had no contacts with

one the Danish National Defence. In February 1950, the Committee

submitted its findings to the Government. Shortly thereafter, Vougt told

Swedlund that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be in charge of

Denmark regarding mining of Oresund. the Oresund

contacts with On

Committee, cf 5.4.

In 1950 and 1951, Swedlund met high-level Danish civilian and military officials on various occasions when visiting Copenhagen. The

diaries do not reveal whether issues relating to Scandinavian defence

cooperation discussed. After meeting with the Danish Chief of the

were a

Army in September 1951, however, Swedlund noted that they had agreed

that nothing could be done for the time being with regard to closer

cooperation. Akerman also had some contacts with the Danish National

Defence. His diary notes, however, do not reveal what was then

discussed. The Commission has not had access to official Danish

archives. Reportedly, those archives do not contain any information on

Danish-Swedish defence cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s.

Continued contacts

From 1952 Swedlund’s diary contains only a few remarks on

on,

Scandinavian defence cooperation. In the spring of 1952, Berg told the Norwegian Defence Council that contacts with Sweden were taking

some place but that these not intimate Norway would have wished. were as as

When visiting Oslo in the spring of 1954, Swedlund briefed the newly appointed Norwegian Minister of Defence on the cooperation between Swedish and Norwegian military staffs approved by the Swedish

Government, and also emphasized its limited character.

After 1952, the issue of combined planning with Denmark and Norway not mentioned other documents. In the minutes from

any meeting of the Swedish Military High Command in December 1956 a there observation that the cohesion within NATO was not up to an

expectations and that divisive tendencies within the Alliance in the longer

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 143

term could possibly sway public opinion in Norway and Denmark

towards a more positive attitude to Scandinavian defence cooperation.

Foreign reporting

British diplomatic reports secondary this cooperation. are a source on

British diplomats closely followed the ongoing contacts between the Scandinavian military high commands. The reports sent by the British Embassy in Stockholm to the Foreign Office in London reveal that such contacts were made already before the Swedish Government, in September 1949, authorized certain technical-military cooperation with Denmark and Norway.

In April 1949, the British Embassy reported that the Swedish service

chiefs, firstly, wished to keep closely in touch with the Western

as

Powers as Sweden’s neutrality allowed, and, secondly, that they wished to continue the staff talks with the Norwegians that had been temporarily

discontinued. A plausible explanation for the latter that referred to the expert discussions in connection with the Scandinavian defence union negotiations. Also in April, the British naval attache reported on a

meeting with the Swedish Chief of the Navy, Helge Strombéick. Strombéick had said that he intended before long talks with his

to resume

Danish counterpart on combined planning with Denmark, primarily

concerning Oresund Cf section 6.5. Strombéick

also said that he was interested in similar talks with the Norwegians. In May 1949, the air attaché reported on a meeting with the Swedish Chief of the Air Force,

Bengt Nordenskiold. Among other things, Nordenskiold had said that

cooperation between the three Scandinavian states had been better, never

that staff talks were proceeding continuously, and that certain agreements had been reached concerning the air forces. Thus, had been agreed

with the Norwegians, first, how to link the radar chains of the on two

states to the best benefit of both air forces, and, second, rights

on access

to each other’s airspace. Nordenskiold had offered to lend the Danes

a few Vampire aircraft, to assist them in building up their air force. own

The three states had recently agreed that Soviet attack would in all

a likelihood come from the southwest through Denmark. Nordenskiold had

agreed to deploy the main part of the Swedish Air Force that could

so

repel such an attack. The Norwegian Air Force would the main

assume

responsibility for the Northern defences. In August 1949, a British Embassy official reported that Swedish staff

contacts with Danes and Norwegians were continuing, albeit to limited a

extent, without any more detailed instructions from the Cabinet beyond the tacit understanding that these talks could take place only long

as as the Government was not involved. Certain had been made with progress

144 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

Denmark naval issues as to the defence of Oresund, and as far as air

on issues concerned, with Norway. The situation concerning army were

less encouraging. Cooperation between the Swedish services

issues was was said to be unsatisfactory.

In January 1950, the British naval attaché in Stockholm reported that

the Swedish Chief of the Navy anxious to establish as close contacts was possible with the Danish and Norwegian navies. Negotiations with the as

Danish the defence of Oresund had recently ground to a halt. The dis-

on cussions with Norway directed towards establishing a combined were organization for the reporting of ship movements, to the Skagerrak cover and the Kattegat. In April 1950, the Foreign Office concluded that was known that Scandinavian defence cooperation under way, at least in was

its planning stages. In June 1951, the British Embassy in Oslo reported

meeting with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Lange, who had on a

acknowledged that some contacts had occurred between high-ranking

Norwegian and Swedish officers, but that the Norwegians had not

pursued far. Lange had stated that he believed Sweden would

them very

become accommodating towards the United Kingdom. The better

more the British Government succeeded in developing such contacts, the more pleased the Norwegian Government would be. In May 1952, the British ambassador reported that the Swedish

Defence Staff had apparently been authorized by the Govermnent to establish form of plarming link with AF NORTH via the Danish and

some Norwegian defence staffs. Swedish plans were to be forwarded to Brind

for opinions and requests. Shortly thereafter, Brind confirmed that such plaiming link had been established via the Danish and Norwegian

a defence staffs, which he fully supported. The Swedish Government was thus not deemed to be interested corresponding bilateral contacts, but Brind’s opinion the exchanges of intelligence between Sweden and the United Kingdom both could and should continue. At the end of September 1952, the British ambassador to Norway reported that Swedlund had recently suggested to Berg that he should

dispatch small of Norwegian officers to Sweden to discuss

a group army

certain aspects of possible combined Norwegian-Swedish planning.

Swedlund did not object to the including officers from Brind’s group staff. None of the officers to be above the rank of major. Berg had was

readily accepted the proposition, and four Norwegian majors, one of

them from AFNORTH, to travel to Sweden at the end of Septemwere ber. expected that the defence of Trondelag would feature was

prominently in the talks. We do not know whether the visit took place. According to of still classified archive material prepared

a summary by the Foreign Office for this Commission, the British ambassador in

Stockholm informed his counterparts Copenhagen and Oslo at a

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 145

meeting in the early summer of 1954 that the Swedish Prime and Foreign Ministers had recently agreed to secret discussions with Norway and Denmark on defence. The British took this to that Sweden in mean saw this as much an opportunity to discuss a Scandinavian defence union as a way to develop closer contacts with NATO. The issue of Scandinavian cooperation also appeared in U.S. diplomatic reports. In May 1951, the U.S. charge d’affaires in Stockholm pointed out that one weakness of the Swedish National Defence was the lack of coordinated planning with its neighbour states. And less than a year later, the U.S. air attache wrote that, far he knew, military as as cooperation between Norway and Sweden any was only in the most — — primitive and formulative stage. According to a report by the U.S. ambassador to Sweden in January 1953, the Swedish Chief of the Air Staff had raised, in the autumn of 1952, the possibility of an exchange of information between Sweden and Norway on air defence planning. Similar initiatives had been taken by some high-level officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Towards the end of 1952, the U.S. Air Force USAF headquarters had pointed out to State Department that was desirable for action to be taken to increase Swedish-Norwegian defence cooperation. State Department replied June 1953 that the impression that certain such cooperation already existed or was being planned appeared confirmed. Therefore, was likely that Norway would support the idea of integrating the air surveillance systems of the two states. Subject to approval by the U.S. Department of Defense, State Department did not object to the U.S. position on such integration being communicated to Swedish and Norwegian authorities to fulfil this limited objective as soon as possible. The British and, later, U.S. interest Scandinavian cooperation best explained by the hopes of thus tying Sweden more closely to NATO. This can be exemplified April 1952 report from ambassaan dor Butterworth. He stressed that highly desirable that Sweden was coordinated its defence planning with the Western Powers as a basis for cooperation the event of war. Such cooperation should be carried out secretly and with the tacit agreement of the Swedish Government. There were many reasons why common planning efforts by Sweden and NATO should be handled via Norway. Thus, cooperation between Sweden and a Scandinavian neighbouring state, revealed, would be much more palatable to the Swedish people than would cooperation with other NATO states or the organization as such. Furthermore, certain military cooperation was already under way between Norway and Sweden, and as the Russians believed that the cooperation was more extensive than actually was, this offered some scope for manoeuvre. Direct involvement of the United Kingdom and the United States could be counterproductive.

146 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

According to Butterworth, on coordinating Swedish and progress

Western Power defence planning had slowed down since early 1951,

probably because of Swedish assessments that the risk of war had been

considerably reduced. For the moment, the best to be hoped for was for

the Swedes to be prepared to cautiously expand the cooperation. To

achieve this, however, had to be made clear to the Swedes that they would not be tied to NATO. Therefore, the specifics of the

any way should be left the The

Norwegian-Swedish cooperation to two states.

Norwegians could be expected to do their best to advance cooperation as in their interest, too. When the Swedes then realized that they

was

could expand cooperation with Norway without leaks occurring, they would stop worrying about dealing with Norway in its capacity as a

representative of NATO. In October 1953, Swedlund reported to the Prime, Defence, and

Interior Ministers that his closest Norwegian counterpart, Berg, had informed him of the decision taken by the Atlantic Pact commanders.

They had agreed that all contacts with Sweden should be made via Norway and that the Norwegians had been ordered to provide the

Swedes with all information without restrictions and without any

demands for reciprocity.

Interviews Through interviews, the Commission has sought to supplement the

picture of the Scandinavian cooperation efforts. Curt Goransson, who

served in the Defence Staff 1948-53 has told the Commission that officers from the defence staffs of the three states continued to meet on

bilateral basis after me negotiations Scandinavian defence union

a on a had broken down. Such meetings, between heads of departments, for

example, signals and logistics, could take place a couple of times per

In accordance with Swedish Government instructions, contacts year.

bilateral only, and operational issues were never discussed.

were

Norwegian officials with good knowledge of how defence issues

a

managed during these have stated that no direct combined

were years staff planning between Norway and Sweden occurred. The Swedish side,

however, wished for certain Norwegian airfields to be expanded as alternative landing sites for Swedish air, for air surveillance cooperation, and for of Norwegian radar equipment. Already in the early

the use

1950s, agreed to cooperate air force search and rescue Cf

was on

section 5.3. Some cooperation did also take place on air surveillance and early warning systems. There to have been no closer

on appears

cooperation between the ground and naval forces of the two states. British NATO officers in Norway had appreciation of the Norwegian

no

PreparationsContacts operational issues 147 on

interest in contacts with Sweden, but did not interfere.

Summary In conclusion, the sources show that on Sweden’s initiative, some combined planning was conducted with Norway and Denmark, beginning in early 1949 and lasting into the early 1950s. The results achieved cannot be exactly determined. After only a few years, Swedish Military High Command interest inter-Scandinavian contacts appears to have abated. In April 1957, however, the British ambassador to Sweden reported that Sweden’s military relations with Norway and Demnark had improved during the preceding five years. No basis for this assessment was provided, and thus difficult to evaluate. The cooperation with the Norwegians concerned signalling procedures, air surveillance, air defence command and control, air force search and rescue expansion of airfields in Southern Norway, weather service, protection of merchant shipping, and geographical reference systems. The cooperation was thus closely linked to items 1-5, 11 and 12 in Swedlund’s February 1949 memorandum. Norwegian interest in this cooperation appears, at least initially, to have been quite weak, and whatever was accomplished does not seem to have been especially farreaching. Contacts with the Danes appear mainly to have concerned the

defence of Cresund and would thus have been limited to item 10 in

Swedlund’s memorandum. One reason why the Swedish Military High Command seems to have gradually given less priority to Scandinavian cooperation probably that their Danish and Norwegian colleagues, with the establishment of AFNORTH, no longer had full operational responsibility for their respective countries. Another, and perhaps more significant reason was probably that direct contacts were established with NATO and its predominant military power, the United States.

148 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

6.1.2 Contacts with the United Kingdom, the United States

and NATO

The Swedish Military High Command soon realized that Sweden would

be dependent assistance from the Western Powers to defend itself on

successfully against Soviet attack. As mentioned above, this view was

a

reflected by the position of the Swedish delegation during the Scandina-

vian defence union negotiations.

When proved impossible to create a Scandinavian defence union, the Swedish Embassy Washington and the Military High Command sought to instill the Americans better appreciation of the Swedish security

a

policy stance, and to convey a favourable impression of the strength of

the Swedish National Defence. On 7 February 1949, the Swedish ambassador‘ to the United States, Erik Boheman, met with State Department official, McClintock. a According to U.S. minutes, Boheman explained that‘Sweden would not

be able to remain neutral in future He agreed with McClintock,

a war. that Sweden did not formally accede to the Atlantic Treaty, even

Sweden could, through secret staff talks, reach a position from which

could act in its own and our behalf.

A few days later, Boheman met with the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Acheson asked It my understanding that you fear an attack only from one direction, and expect assistance only from one direction. Would a Scandinavian Pact preclude potential secret staff cooperation to enable the implementation of assistance Boheman responded that regular staff cooperation seemed out of the question from a Swedish standpoint, first, because could hardly be kept secret, and

second, because would be contrary to the very idea of non—a1ignment. But, Boheman added, could not be too difficult for the Amercians to general idea of where and how assistance could and should be get a

implemented. Furthermore, assistance to the military build-up of

were

Scandinavia to be provided, could not be that difficult for the

Americans to realize what the deficiencies were in this respect.

Shortly thereafter, high-ranking USAF officer demanded of a

a subordinate showing the positions of airfields Norway and a map Sweden, and information on each and every one of these airfields as to what types of aircraft could be operated from them, and resources

required to prepare of these airfields for receiving Strategic Air

Command aircraft, well other types of aircraft. as as In March 1949, two first secretaries at the Swedish Embassy in Washington discussed the issue of Sweden and the Atlantic Pact with a Northern European desk officer at State Department. According to the

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 149

U.S. minutes, one of the Swedish representatives had said inter alia that

the Swedish Government, at the moment, only objected to formal staff talks and formal military links. A Soviet thrust in Finland Northern

or

Norway would probably lead to some form of mobilization in Sweden

and closer alignment with the Western Powers. Furthermore, both Swedish representatives assumed that Sweden, at the outbreak of very war, would be drawn in on the Western side. In the event of Sweden

remaining non-belligerent for a certain period, they believed that allied aircraft could use Swedish airspace. Allied planes would be waved

on through. One of them said that he convinced that this the was was

carefully considered position of the Swedish Government.

About a week later in the Pentagon, the Swedish defence attaché in Washington briefed a group of U.S. officers of all services. He explained Sweden’s strategic position and defence plans. These plans

reflected common Scandinavian planning, which U.S. military assistance to Norway and Demnark in accordance with the Atlantic Treaty was emphasized as the decisive factor. According to the source,

this appeared a legitimate attempt to convince those present of Sweden’s

sincere will and capability to, in cooperation with the Western Powers,

resist a Soviet attack.

In Stockholm too, there was a certain amount of activity going In

on.

February 1949, Swedlund hosted a dinner for, among others, the three U.S. defence attaches in Stockholm. The Deputy Chief of the Defence

Staff, Thord Bonde, reported on Defence Staff assessments of Sweden’s capabilities of defending itself against Soviet invasion. In this, Sweden a

was assumed to be dependent on Western long—range bombers being employed from bases outside Sweden against Soviet depots and

operational command centres, i.e. indirect assistance. While the U.S. guests believed that the presentation overestimated Sweden’s defence

capabilities, they perceived that its main objective was to stress Sweden’s

neutral position as well as the significance of Sweden to the Western Powers.

In May 1949, similar information was passed by the Swedish

on

military attaché in London to two high-ranking British officers. He stressed that even though Sweden was convinced that had

non-

negligible prospects of withstanding a Soviet attack for length of

some time, the Swedish National Defence would become dependent soon on various forms of Western assistance. The assistance required was

strategic bombing of Russian airfields, embarkation ports, and troop

concentration areas as well as associated lines of communications, mine-

laying outside embarkation ports in the Baltic Sea and possibly off Demnark, and mine-laying at least in the Belts, preferably also in

Dresund, and timely provision of considerable quantities of petrol as well

150 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

vehicles, ammunition, and explosives. as

Minister Vougt memorandum the British Government and its

Defence to

consequences

In January 1951, the British Air Minister, Henderson, visited Sweden.

He asked Erlander and Vougt, with whom he was personally acquainted, would be of value have assistance prepared, in the event of

not to Sweden being attacked. They replied that Swedish requirements were for counteractions in other and important theatres of war. Henderson more

wanted to know how Sweden would act attacked; the Swedes explained

that Sweden would defend itself by all the means at its disposal, known

all well British and that didn’t take much fantasy

to Russians as as

imagine how intend to the Swedish armed forces——. They

to we use added that were additional information required on the strength, and

perhaps also weaknesses, of our National Defence, we are ready to provide it. Henderson wanted government-level talks on these matters,

which would be of great value for Great Britain and America. The

Swedes, however, had turned down this request, albeit perhaps vaguely.

In March 1951, Vougt sent memorandum the Swedish armed a on forces Henderson. No of the document has been found in to copy Swedish archives. The memorandum described the organization,

strength, and equipment of the armed forces, and the preparations made

for defence against Soviet attack. set out various Soviet directions of a invasion and overview of how the Swedish forces were to be gave an

deployed counter such attack. A British of the memorandum

to an copy

attached this Appendix 13. In view of inter alia the

to report as detailed data the number of calibres, etc. and the informaon weapons,

tion planning, the content of the memorandum must be deemed

on war

to have been top secret at the time. According to Vougt’s cover letter,

the aim to give the British Government better idea of Sweden’s was a

defence plans and how they hope to resist aggression with the forces

an that their disposal. Erlander had read the memorandum before are at

sent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed of the

was

delivery of the memorandum, and neither Undén nor the Deputy Foreign Minister Dag Hammarskjold had read Undén had, however, agreed that Henderson’s proposition on talks should be met with a memoran-

dum of informative character. We have not been able to establish whether the Military High Command informed of the memorandum. was

Vougt’s memorandum led to the British Minister of Defence,

Shinwell, inviting him to visit Great Britain the autumn of 1951. One

of such visit to create opportunities for a follow—up on the

purpose a was

PreparationsContacts operational issues 151 on

talks with Henderson and to hand over a commentary on the memorandum prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff. In this commentary, was pointed out inter alia that Sweden’s chances of defending itself were dependent the coordination of its defence planning with that of the on Western Powers already peacetime. Secret, informal, bilateral talks between Sweden and the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark, respectively, would be of value to attain a certain measure of coordination between Sweden and the Western Powers. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR, General Eisenhower, was kept personally informed of developments. Vougt, who had privately declared his interest in an invitation, declined the invitation, pleading lack of time, however. In a conversation with the British naval attache Stockholm a few weeks later, however, Vougt said to have explained You must realize that while we are prepared to go on giving you information, and we want to convince you that Sweden will fight attacked, we cannot go further than that. I am afraid that when Mr. Henderson was here he got a slightly misleading impression of what we are prepared to do.

The British decided instead to use the Foreign Secretary’s, Morrison

forthcoming holiday trip to Sweden in an attempt to influence the Swedish Government. Morrison would then meet with Erlander and point out that unlikely that Sweden could receive any effective was assistance from the Western Powers, drawn into war, unless defence planning had been coordinated peacetime. was hoped that the Swedish Government would permit secret and informal talks between the military authorities concerned. This could take place quietly without jeopardizing official Swedish Government policy. The British did not wish, however, to create false impression that the Swedes were to a receive rapid and effective wartime assistance, they were prepared to coordinate their plans with the British. In early September 1951, Morrison and Erlander already good — friends met in Halmstad [on the Swedish West Coast]. Morrison raised ~ inter alia the issue of defence cooperation according to the guidelines drawn up before the trip. He explained that he could not state in detail what information the Chiefs of Staff wanted in addition to that already provided in the memorandum, and asked whether would not be better to leave to the military to determine what additional information the respective parties wanted from each other. Erlander promised to consider the matter, but was actually intent on avoiding technical discussions with the military on our technical defence problems Shortly thereafter, the memorandum was brought to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Hammarskjold, the tactical~strategic deliberations the memorandum were dangerous, as

152 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

they invited the British to further discussions. Morrison’s suggestion, made in Halmstad, for talks was consequently a natural reaction, as

Hammarskjold saw it.

In late September 1951, the Agrarian Party entered into a coalition

government with the Social Democrats under Erlander. Vougt resigned

as Minister of Defence, but according to British impression informed

— his successor, Torsten Nilsson, on what had taken place. Nilsson was then presumed not to have had any objections to Vougt’s memorandum. In the autumn of 1951, the British Labour Cabinet was succeeded by a Conservative Cabinet under Winston Churchill. Sweden’s ambassador in London, Gunnar Hagglof, reported in November 1951 that a conversation with the next British Ambassador to Sweden, Roger Stevens, he, had explained that Sweden viewed the discussions between

Morrison and Erlander as a purely private conversation; a view shared by the Foreign Office, according to Stevens. In December 1951, Héigglof paid a visit to the new British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Héigglof said inter alia that the British no doubt had a fairly complete picture of

the Swedish National Defence, but he wanted to inform Eden that the Swedish Government now believed that Sweden had good prospects of

defending itself effectively, need be. Notwithstanding the policy of neutrality, Sweden would always be prepared to discuss all European

issues with the British, and to convey all information at Sweden’s

disposal.

In a British comment on the conversation, was observed that

unfortunately, there were no grounds for believing that the Swedish

Government had become more willing to develop closer relations with

the British. Thus, Erlander had proved himself less accommodating in

his conversation with Morrison, and during the last six months, the

Swedish Government’s overall attitude to developing closer relations with the Western Powers seemed to have hardened considerably. Hagglof had told a Foreign Office representative that he was of the impression that

the British had access to all information needed on the Swedish National

Defence and its planning, and that he did not doubt that additional

information could be provided need be. The British view was that lack of information was not the problem. The British wished to make clear to the Swedes that present defence arrangements were insufficient.

In December 1951, Sevens and Hammarskjold discussed the Swedish policy of neutrality. Sevens asked how the Swedish Government viewed the possibilities of quite informally coordinating Swedish defence plarming with the British. Hammarskjold replied that this was totally out

of the question. Even the most informal staff talks would become known within NATO and lead to misreadings which could put the Swedish

Government in an ambiguous position. On the other hand, would be

PreparationsContacts operational issues 153 on

of value to Sweden to gain knowledge of parts of Western planning for a Soviet invasion of Scandinavia. Sweden would then be able to act

autonomously and take them into account when developing and

revising national plans. Hammarskjold explained that the Swedes would not refuse to accept a British reply to Vougt’s memorandum. Sevens

was, however, doubtful as to whether a reply should be conveyed, partly

because no one expected one to be.

In March 1952, Foreign Secretary Eden presented to his Cabinet a memorandum on the British view on Swedish security and defence policy. The main points were as follows. was desirable for Sweden in

peacetime to coordinate its defence planning with that of the Western Powers, with a view to effective cooperation in a war against the Soviet Union, in which Sweden in all likelihood would be drawn in. As

Swedish NATO membership was not on the agenda, the best to at

way

least partly meet the British requirements probably informal

was some arrangements with Sweden. Two main conditions had to be met, viz.

discretion and tacit consent by the Swedish Government. The Swedish Military High Command was more keen on cooperating with the Western Powers than was the Government, and might conceivably seek to develop planning contacts without the knowledge of its Government.

Were this to become known to the Government, would be detrimental to British-Swedish relations. The best solution, according to the memorandum, would be frequent

contacts through established military channels. Another possible solution

would be a direct link between Sweden and NATO. An additional

possibility was for the Swedes to establish a link to the Western Powers through the Danes and Norwegians. For various reasons, secrecy among

them, the British had so far deemed most appropriate to start out with

British-Swedish discussions. The Norwegians shared this view. In early 1951, some progress through personal contacts at the

ministerial level had been hoped for, but the Swedish Government had then assumed a more dismissive position closer ties with the Western on Powers. In such circumstances, was not on the agenda to contact the

Swedish Government directly. The on-going military contacts should be maintained and developed, but these appeared to develop towards

a

common Swedish-British planning they were not to be carried further

without political authorization and the consent of the Foreign Office. At

the same time, the possibility should not be ruled out of the Swedes establishing connections with NATO, primarily through the Norwegians

or the Danes. The British Government supported the contents of the memorandum, and the U.S. State Department was informed of the British position. The reaction of State was that the Swedish willingness for cooperation

154 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

fluctuated with the international political climate. State encouraged the

British to develop military contacts with the Swedish as far as possible with the tacit consent of the Swedish Government, and declared that the Americans themselves intent on doing likewise. were Following almost two of discussions and repeated revisions of years

the reply by the British Chiefs of Staff to Vougt’s memorandum, the

sent to the British Embassy Stockholm in February 1953 report was

for presentation to Swedish Government and military officials. The

document has not been found in Swedish archives. was to be pres-

ented, not a reply to Vougt’s memorandum, but as a paper prepared

as

for purely internal reasons and including British views only. The Swedes

however, to be told that SACEUR had been informed of these were,

views. A slightly modified version of the report was handed over to

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SHAPE in the summer of 1953. The report consisted of two sections, the first of which discussed a

likely of in Scandinavia, while the second included commen-

course war

taries the organization of the Swedish armed forces and proposals for

on measures to increase defensive capabilities. In the first section, initially observed that the war scenario of was

prime interest to Sweden Soviet attack within the context of a

was a

major An attack Scandinavia would aim at creating a defence in

war. on depth against air strikes, to gain control over the Baltic Approaches, to acquire naval and air bases for attacking Great Britain and the Atlantic lines of communication and to prevent a NATO build-up in the area. sea

The significance of reaching these objectives made probable that a campaign against Scandinavia could be expected in the initial phases of

the Assessments then followed of the strategy the Soviet Union war. would follow in an attack.

The second section of the report opened with a statement that Sweden, despite the efforts made to strengthen its National Defence, most likely

could not resist attack for length of time, unless a Swedish

an any

defence planning effectively coordinated with that of the Western

were

Powers, b Sweden prepared to enter the war as soon as there were

was

indications of imminent invasion of part of Scandinavia, and c

an any

taken to remedy certain major deficiencies in the Swedish

steps were defence arrangements. Then followed certain overall views on Swedish

planning well detailed remarks equipment and training,

as as more on etc.

received by the Swedish Military High The report was enthusiastically Command, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Westring, explained to the British air attaché that the contents exactly what the Swedish

were

military had for been trying to make the politicians understand.

years

PreparationsContacts operational issues 155 on

Whether the report was also presented to Swedish civilian officials we do not know. On the other hand, conversation with the Swedish a

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arne Lundberg, March 1953, Sevens gave an account of the British military view on Sweden’s strategic position closely connected to the first section of the report. Lundberg strongly objected to the reasoning. Sevens also mentioned that

could be of value to exchange such information, that for example mining of the Baltic Sea and its approaches could be prepared in a coherent way, whereupon Lundberg changed the subject.

At this time, Eisenhower had been succeeded as SACEUR by the U.S.

General Gruenther. Gruenther’s reaction to the report was that he found desirable for Swedish defence plans as far as possible to be in consonance with those of NATO. He observed that one way of accomplishing this was through the contacts of the British Chiefs of Staff with Swedish

military authorities. In the longer run, was desirable to establish some form of clearing—house, preferably under CINCNORTH, where those

NATO states which contemplated contacting Swedish authorities on

military planning could assure themselves that the outcome of such contacts would be fully compatible with NATO plans.

Other contacts with the United Kingdom

Already before Vougt had forwarded his memorandum to Henderson, Swedish military representatives had supplied information to the British, and limited cooperation between military authorities of the two states

existed. According to British views, these contacts were not known to the Swedish Government. In a June 1950 report, Hagglof, however, mentioned that in conversation with a civil servant of the Foreign Office he had pointed out the extensive information on Swedish defence forces

that had to be available various British military staffs. He had also referred to what could be found in Danish and Norwegian military staffs following the Scandinavian defence negotiations. The British official had explained that what was primarily lacking was knowledge of Swedish military intentions and plans for action. Also this context Héigglof had

referred to information from the Scandinavian defence negotiations in Danish and Norwegian staffs. In June 1951, a British naval visit was paid to Stockholm under the Commander Home Fleet. In connection herewith, he met high-ranking Swedish officers. Swedlund had regretted that he did not have the

opportunity to discuss war planning with the British admiral, but said

that of course he would do so prior to the outbreak of war. He had explained that at the moment was impossible for him to meet with Eisenhower or CINCNORTH, Admiral Brind, or to even visit any

156 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

NATO country. The Chief of the Navy, Strombéick, had pointed to the

importance of obtaining information British mining policy in the

on

Baltic Sea. He had also shown locations and plans for rock shelters already constructed and planned for naval ships. The Chief of the Air Force, Nordenskiold, had been fully prepared for the Swedish Air Force fight alongside the RAF, and emphasized the significance he attached

to

to his personnel having a good knowledge of English.

In the late autumn of 1951, there were several indications that the Swedish Military High Command was interested in establishing

cooperation with NATO, preferably through Norway. Certain prelimi-

contacts between Nordenskiold and the U.S. commander of NATO nary

air forces in Northern Europe at Kolsas were to have been made. Shortly

thereafter, within the Foreign Office observations were made that caution

should be exercised so as not to infer too much from statements by highranking Swedish military officers military cooperation with the

on

Western Powers. They succeeded in anchoring their ideas with the

never

Government, and they always fell into line when the Government insisted. At the time, noted that the British thus far had only

same was

informally exchanged views with the Swedish, and consequently there

not much to inform NATO about. Eisenhower was also aware of was this. As mentioned in section 6.1.1 above, the contacts established in the of 1952 between the Swedish Defence Staff and AFNORTH summer

through the Danish and Norwegian defence staffs led the British to

conclude that the Swedish Government was not interested in corresponding bilateral links, which did not prevent that the exchange of intelli-

between Sweden and the United Kingdom could and should

gence continue.

In March 1953, Sevens reported that AFNORTH through the Norwe-

gians had suggested that its deputy commander, the British general Mansergh, and the commander of the air forces, the U.S. general Carter,

should private visit to Sweden. The intention was for Mansergh

pay a

and the Chief of the Swedish Defence Staff, Akerman, to discuss how

best to create links between the Swedish Defence Staff and the

AFNORTH planning newly appointed to study Swedish defence

group

requirements. The Swedes had welcomed the proposal and Mansergh

invited in mid-March. Akerman supposed to have men-

was to come

tioned this to Hammarskjold just before the latter took over as Secretary

General of the United Nations. Swedlund was to inform the Minister of Defence the minutiae of the visit had been settled. as soon as

Later that month, Sevens attended dinner hosted by Akerman,

same a

together with Swedlund and af Klint, head of section of the Defence Staff, i.e. head of intelligence. Swedlund had stressed the importance the

PreparationsContacts operational issues 157 on

Swedes attached to the defence of Denmark. He had also explained that an effective defence of Scandinavia presupposed certain exchange of a

information with the Western Powers. only remained to find suitable

procedures for such an exchange. For the time being, the Norwegians and the Danes were the best channel, but evident that he viewed was

them as a link to NATO rather than as a terminal point. Akerman

was eager to meet with Mansergh at the end of May in June. af Klint said or

that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given the military practically

a free hand to arrange those visits by foreign officers deemed necessary, but at the same time given instructions that all precautions should be

taken to prevent such visits causing harmful publicity. Carter unofficially visited Stockholm in March, to look

at some civilian aviation facilities and perhaps meet with two Air Force one or officers. No detailed discussions defence cooperation planned on were for his part. The visit was not approved of U.S. authorities

Washington having apparently indicated that contacts of this kind could be hazardous as they might well embarrass the Swedish.

In the summer of 1953, Sevens reported that there little prospect was

of Mansergh visiting Sweden the near future. Akerman had explained

that the situation with respect to the Government had become more

sensitive than that of only a few months and that the Swedish

ago,

Military High Command believed that for the time being would have

to assume a more cautious stance concerning contacts with AFNORTH. An initiated observer explained the shift in Swedish attitudes with the

negative U.S. reaction to Carter’s visit to Stockholm. Interest in meeting

Mansergh, however, remained unaffected. At the time, General same

Gruenther had expressed substantial doubts to Mansergh about permitting the Norwegian defence headquarters to establish a link to the Swedish

without the consent of the North Atlantic Council.

At the meeting between Mansergh and Gruenther, mentioned above,

however, Gruenther seems to have delegated the issue of cooperation with the Swedes to Mansergh and authorized his naval superior, the British vice-admiral Evans—Lombe, to initiate combined naval planning with the Swedes, on condition that was not carried out in Oslo and that

the admiral’s subordinate NATO officers did not participate. In the light

of this, Evans—Lombe contacted the Commander of the Swedish Fleet,

Stig Hzson Ericson, in connection with a Swedish naval visit to London

in the summer of 1953. Ericson had earlier expressed wishes for such contacts. The admirals first held a general discussion naval plans for on the Baltic Sea, and then proceeded to the issue of how to create

preconditions for coordination of naval planning. Ericson explained

war that he believed possible to dispatch captain to London for such a navy discussions early in the autumn but that he had to obtain Strombiick’s

158 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

consent. Ericson had emphasized that the Swedish politicians were to

hear of this contact, they would in all likelihood put an end to the

cooperation.

meeting between British military officers and Foreign Office civil At a

in September 1953, air marshal said that was not possible

servants an initiate planning with the Swedish Air Force, unless to any common

integrated with the RAF. The only Swedish concern was, however,

was defend themselves attacked. They were aware that in such a case to

they would receive assistance from British aircraft. The same

not any

ground forces. The Swedes prepared to inform the applied to were British of their planning, provided that nothing reported to the

was

Americans to NATO. A Foreign Office representative confirmed this

or view but also pointed out that the Swedes were no fools but well

understood that the information they provided for the British would be

forwarded SACEUR. agreed that was unlikely that the to was

Swedes would prefer using Norwegians and Danes for contacts with

NATO. Relations between the Swedish and Danish air forces were

particularly bad, and Danish security deemed the worst in all

was Europe. At meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff October 1953, was a

observed that SACEUR had accepted continued British contacts with

Sweden and that he wished be kept informed of them. For the future to

he had wanted rule out CINCNORTH playing a part in this

not to What SACEUR did not know that Mansergh, now having context. was succeeded Brind CINCNORTH, already in control of contacts as was with the Swedes. In October 1953 Akerman’s initiative, the Swedish ambassador in on

Oslo, Ahlmarm, invited Mansergh private visit to Sweden for

to pay a

sightseeing, etc. Ahlmann hardly thought that the Swedish Government had been informed. Whether Mansergh actually visited Sweden not

known to us. In June 1954, the Foreign Office observed that the United Kingdom had valuable with the Swedish National Defence, that the contacts existence of these contacts had not been disclosed to other NATO states,

and that the Swedish Government only recently had agreed to them. A senior British intelligence officer paid formal visit to Stockholm

a

in 1955. The Swedish military representatives had then apparently

-

without the Government’s knowledge raised planning issues beyond the

-

ongoing military information exchange between the two states approved

British Government. The idea did however, meet with

by the not, in London, and avoid futile speculations decided that approval to was visits Sweden by senior officers to be few and far between.

to were very In later the British Chiefs of Staff did not devote years, appears as

PreparationsContacts operational issues 159 on

themselves to any thorough deliberations the Swedish National

on

Defence. Nor do any more significant military contacts with Sweden

seem to have occurred apart from the visit exchanges between senior

officers, sales of military equipment, and scientific cooperation.

The British Foreign Office observed in the summer of 1959 that defence planning with the Western Powers prohibited in Sweden. was

Contacts with the United States

The early 1950s

The activities of 1949 did not lead immediate change in the to any official U.S. position vis-a-vis Sweden. For another couple of years,

U.S. policy this respect was characterized by efforts to make Sweden accede to the Atlantic Treaty. As leverage, applications for export licences for military equipment to Sweden refused.

were

Gradually, the United States assumed a more accommodating position towards Sweden. This was probably due to Sweden, during the spring of 1951, agreeing to partly adapt its trade policy vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc to U.S. wishes Cf section 5.2. The U.S. policy shift officially

was

sanctioned when the President in early 1952 approved guidelines for

new

U.S. policy towards Scandinavia and Finland Cf section 4.3. has been publicly argued that Prime Minister Erlander, when visiting the United States a private capacity the spring of 1952, held

discussions with the U.S. administration other issues, on, among

Swedish imports of U.S. war supplies. Erlander’s diary notes clearly

show that he was concerned that the visit should not be of political a nature, and that he did not wish to discuss the issue of U.S deliveries of

military equipment. Furthermore, no information has been found indicating that any such discussions took place.

Prior to Erlander’s visit to the United States, the U.S. ambassador to Sweden sent a letter to the head of European affairs at the State Depart-

ment in which, among other things, he referred to notes taken by

a

colleague from a discussion with Sverker Astrom, then head of the

political department at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Astrom

was to have said that, for the time being, one could not say anything as

to what position Sweden would take Denmark and Norway, but not

Sweden, were to be attacked. Apparently, Sweden’s position would

depend on a number of factors. According to Astrom, the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs had carefully considered making statement to this

a effect. However, had been decided that such statement could have a negative internal repercussions, and could lead to speculations on

Sweden’s new position. The Western Powers might that

assume

160 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

Sweden’s neutral position possible to change, which in turn could

was result in Western offers and feelers towards Sweden. According to

Astrom, Sweden satisfied with its current policy and did not wish

was incur lots of debate and attention feelers from the West. Secret to or

strategic connections with the West did certainly exist, and they could be developed further to certain extent. But only so far, since at some point

a the secrets would become widely known, at least threaten to become or

known. Secret cooperation would have to cease before this point was

reached.

The ambassador observed that this discussion quite accurately reflected the current mood, especially considering how two recently disclosed of Soviet espionage against Sweden had affected Swedish public

cases opinion. As mentioned above, in the summer of 1952 an agreement was reached between Sweden and the United States on the terms on which Sweden could purchase military equipment etc. from the United States

Cf section 5.2.

Already in the autumn of 1951, Swedlund was lobbying through Berg,

the Norwegian Chief of the Defence Staff, Marcus Wallenberg, the industrialist, and Collins, the US. Chief of Staff of the Army, for the

United States appoint highly qualified military attache to Stockholm

to a

for businesslike talks. According to Swedlund, this was the only way in which for wartime cooperation. According to what Swedlund

to prepare

told Erlander, all that had been done by the Swedish military was to the that such attache ought to be dispatched. In

convey message an

October 1952, meeting at Wallenberg’s between Swedlund and the

at a

future U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Dulles instead suggested detailing highly qualified officer from SHAPE, who would

a

visit Sweden for the exchange of information. Swedlund emphasized that

such contacts, made secretly, would not conflict with Government

intentions, and that continuity such contacts important. With the

was U.S. ambassador Swedlund raised the issue that the United States too,

ought to keep highly qualified military representative Sweden to

a

facilitate discussion of Sweden’s defence planning and associated issues, with to the requisite These efforts seem only to have led to

access maps.

the deputy of the Pentagon operational department, on a visit to Frankfurt in March 1953, being prepared to receive and brief a specially dispatched Swedish officer. Colonel Bonde most likely appointed for

was this mission. Whether Bonde travelled, and so, what was discussed, not known. In December 1952, Swedlund met, through Wallenberg, with the U.S.

admiral Johnson, who visiting Sweden to develop contacts and—

was obtain information. According to Johnson, there interest among the was

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 161

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in exchanging information and views on

strategic conditions in Scandinavia. The Swedes emphasized the import-

ance of imports from the West, and of NATO planning not blocking the

possibilities for such imports, the Swedish West Coast could

even not be used. The arrangements for possible visit Bonde the United a to States were also discussed.

In May 1953, Bonde visited the United States together with naval

one and one Air Force officer. In August that U.S. delegation same year, a visited Sweden. At the meetings, the Swedish delegation reported the on

difficulties Sweden likely to encounter the of attack by

was event an

the Soviet Union. The need for logistical primarily fuel

support - was discussed. In this context, procedures for protecting transports necessary were discussed with respect to cooperation between naval and air forces, and to between what command authorities liaison officers would be

exchanged. The meetings did not result in any exchange of concrete plans, only in general conclusions. The discussions apparently quite

were

general, and the U.S. counterpart, General Eddleman, apparently

was almost surprised that the Swedes did not present substantial and more

concrete demands. To our knowledge, these discussions

were not

followed by any other meetings.

Q‘

A discussion of Swedish-U.S. contacts during the early 1950s carmot totally ignore efforts of Norwegian-born Colonel Bernt Balchen, USAF, to inter-link the defences of Norway and Sweden. In the of 1951,

autumn he visited Oslo and discussed this issue with Norwegian Cabinet members. He also visited Stockholm, and discussed the isssue with same the Chief of the Air Force, Nordenskiold, and his Chief of Staff,

Westring. Supposedly, Nordenskiéild agreed with Balchen in that Northernmost Norway could be effectively defended only with the participation of Swedish ground and air forces. According to Balchen, Nordenskiold emphasized that the single most important that could

move

be implemented quickly to strengthen the defence of Scandinavia

was to create resources on all Swedish airbases for the reception of large numbers of NATO aircraft might

that arrive for the defence of

Scandinavia. These resources should include lubricants, aviation fuel,

and munitions etc., to support large-scale air operations. According to

Nordenskiold, such preparations could be made in secret. an acute crisis situation to arise, Swedish airfields could be made were seven accessible to NATO fighters at short notice. Nordenskiold believed that

Sweden did not stand even the slightest chance of remaining neutral in a future conflict, and that Sweden would obviously fight alongside the Western allies. In July 1952 Balchen again met with Nordenskiold, and in August 1954 he discussed the storage of supplies with the deputy head

of the Air Materiel Administration, Major-General Jakobsson.

162 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

Balchen’s position, however, remains somewhat unclear. In the spring

of 1952, the U.S. air attaché Stockholm was somewhat doubtful as to Balchen’s optimistic predictions based on Balchen’s discussion with —

Nordenskiold concerning a Norwegian-Swedish defence union.

- According to the air attache, such union could only be established a and when the Swedish Government approved. While Nordenskiold

clearly had his sympathies with the West, he was at the same time a loyal Swede obeying his Government’s orders. Balchen developed a

number of ambitious plans and scenarios as to how Swedens defences would be integrated into those of NATO in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. Nothing indicates that these documents were ever officially sanctioned. Some Swedish reports from discussions with officers from the Western Powers in 1952 and 1953 illustrate how NATO then looked upon the prospects for wartime cooperation with Sweden. No plans existed to assist Sweden with armed forces in the event of war. The issue was too

delicate in view of Sweden’s neutral position, and NATO was seriously

short of Furthermore, staff contacts between AFNORTH and manpower.

Sweden not permitted Cf above on contacts between Sweden and

were

Norway. A British NATO officer had emphasized that within NATO

there deep conviction that Sweden, in the event of a major war, was a could not remain neutral but would join forces with the West. However,

the establishment of military cooperation would encounter great and serious difficulties, such cooperation had in no way been

very as

prepared. A U.S. NATO officer believed that Sweden, in building up

its Air Force, did not have to procure heavy bombers since this kind of warfare could well be conducted by USAF and RAF with atomic bombs,

from remote bases. notable that these opinions were voiced in private conversations, and cannot be characterized as messages officially

sanctioned the NATO leadership. .

That the Swedish Military High Command reasoned along the same lines shown by briefing held in May 1953 by the Supreme Com-

a mander and the Chief of the Defence Staff before ministers Erlander, Undén, Torsten Nilsson, Hedlund, and party chairmen Ohlin and Hjalmarson. In this, Swedlund pointed out that Sweden, embroiled in

simultaneously with the rest of the world, could receive assistance

a war

through Western strategic bombing, perhaps later also in the form of

tactical air strikes, against Nordkalotten and the Danish isles. e.g.

Furthermore, would be a relief that in this case only parts of the

Warsaw Pact forces could be directed against Sweden. In other aspects,

however, the Swedes would most likely have to fend for themselves. Not

Denmark and Norway could expect assistance in the form of even

ground forces until after three months, at the earliest. Were Sweden to

PreparationsContacts on operational issues 163

be subject to an isolated attack by the Soviet Union, its chances would depend on Swedish readiness and the time required for Western mobilization. The view that the assistance Sweden could expect from the West following a Soviet attack would be restricted to so-called indirect

assistance was also reflected the working of the 1955 defence

papers decision.

The years 1955-69

In the spring of 1955, the Swedish ambassador to Norway, Hans

Ahlmarm, told Swedlund that the U.S. ambassador to Norway had

recently explained that the United States well understood Sweden’s situation and that staff talks could not take place. However, the United States wished to be told what Sweden itself believed to be the weak points in its National Defence, so that assistance could be prepared. The British ambassador had expressed similar views. Ahlmann believed that

this was following top-level orders likely, the initiative of

or, more on AFNORTH. Either way, the U.S. did not lead to immediate move any action. In March the same year, two Swedish officers visited Washington to

discuss issues of military communications, and to visit certain installations and laboratories, apparently follow-up to the 1953 discussions.

as a

The Swedish request for such discussions, however, rejected.

was was

explained that the request partly concerned issues that the United States believed went beyond what could be discussed. possible that the Swedish visitors still had the opportunity to discuss most of these matters

all the same.

In April 1955, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Akerman, met with

a

high-ranking NATO officer who explained that NATO’s Standing Group was very unappreciative of Sweden’s foreign policy stance. Whether NATO would employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, in the event of an attack on Sweden, would depend the overall situation.

on Preparations for joint actions were and NATO necessary, as a nonmember, Sweden remained outside such preparations.

At a meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1955, General Clyde Eddleman, then deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, briefed on the secret military talks conducted with Swedish representatives. was decided to continue secret military contacts with Sweden,

to designate a new contact succeeding Eddleman to the representatives

of the Swedish Supreme Commander, and to issue instructions to

new this contact.

In the U.S. view, the Swedes ultimately had to establish contact with

NATO, as all planning for their area had to be coordinated with NATO

164 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

commanders. Until the Swedes prepared to establish such contacts, were however, was very important that the JCS maintained secret contacts

with the Swedish Supreme Commander through the latter’s representative. These contacts should be managed by the Commander USAEUR

who in charge of the valuable intelligence exchange with the was Swedish armed forces.

The designated contact, guided by the overall policy according to NSC

121 Cf section 4.3, was to secretly conduct such military discussions

with the representative of the Swedish Supreme Commander as were

required to expand on the secret talks held earlier between U.S. and

Swedish military officers and to create a more thorough understanding of issues of mutual military interest. The main purpose of such discussions would be to further the military relations and cooperation between Sweden and the United States and to expand the military

intelligence exchange. The ultimate objective would be to make Sweden prepared to contribute, far possible, to the defence of Scandinavia as as

in the event of Soviet attack and to strengthen Sweden’s capabilities

a and determination to resist Soviet pressure. The designated contact was

to have the authority to discuss U.S. overall strategy but not to disclose specific details of U.S. or NATO war planning, or to make any military

commitments behalf of the United States. To accommodate Sweden’s on wishes to avoid outward signs of Sweden having abandoned its tradi-

tional policy of neutrality, all contacts with Swedish military representatives to be kept secret. The designated contact was to keep the

were

JCS informed requirements arose for further military discussions with

the Swedish armed forces and furnish the JCS with suggestions for

agendas. need be, he was to obtain additional guidance from the JCS

and inform them additional personnel required to complete his were task. not known to us whether contacts of the kind envisioned by the JCS except for exchanges of intelligence on the Warsaw Pact were - established. In November the Swedlund paid an unofficial visit to the same year,

United States for almost four weeks. The visit was apparently organized by U.S. military authorities and Swedlund visited, among other organizations, the Pentagon. The Swedish Government had approved the

visit. According to what the Chief of the Defence Staff, Akerman, later

told the U.S. ambassador to Sweden, the visit had been very useful, and

Swedlund had been shown than expected, e.g. a Nike missile

more launcher. In the autumn of 1957, the head of the National Defence College, the former Chief of the Air Staff, G. A. Westring, made a study trip to the

United States, other countries. On his return, he reported that

among

PreparationsContacts operational issues 165 on

were Sweden to be subjected to an isolated attack by the Soviet Union,

the United States and the other Western allies likely to respond

were

with military intervention. Such intervention, however, required

decisions at the top political level of the United States and, other allies were to be engaged as well, in the NATO Council. difficult to was estimate how long would take to reach such decision. For rapid a

deployment of tactical air forces in a local conflict, was deemed important that target information and command and control resources should be in position. Modern weapons had increased the requirement

for advance planning and coordination prior to an attack operation. The

possibilities of quickly supporting Swedish armed forces had therefore

diminished.

In 1960, the guidelines for U.S. policy on Sweden updated. Cf

were section 4.4

has been shown above that peacetime cooperation between the

Swedish and the U.S. armed forces continued and expanded during was

the 1960s Cf chapter 5. From 1960, there indication of contact

a on

operational issues. No archival information has been found indicating

that overall discussions took place on operational cooperation, how or on the United States could assist Sweden in the event of attack from the an East. The Commission wishes, however, to point again that, out once due to classification, we have had only limited to U.S. docuvery access ments from this decade.

The Commission conducted interviews with a large number of officers holding key positions in the 1960s, without records of operational

any contacts existing. At the same time, many of these officers pointed out

the importance of Sweden, attacked by the Soviet Union, receiving

some form of assistance from the United States and NATO, and in some

cases they assumed that preparations for this were being made at a higher level.

NATO overflights

A particular issue in this context whether the Western Powers could count on Sweden, neutral in a great-power not taking action war, against their possible violations of Swedish airspace. The shortest route

for U.S. and British bombers to and from key targets in the Soviet

Union passed over Sweden; this issue, then, of significance to the was United States and its allies.

In a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee from the spring of 1949, was determined that current strategic plans envisage overflight

over [inter alia Sweden’s] territories by combatant aircraft. The U.S.

national and military leadership thus prepared, in future to

were a war,

166 PreparationsContacts on operational issues

neglect key component of the declared Swedish policy of neutrality.

a In the spring of 1949, mentioned above, aSwedish diplomat in as Washington declared that he was convinced that the Swedish Government position that Sweden would not prevent the Western allies from was using Swedish airspace such situation. Shortly before, however, the a

Swedish Minister of Defence, Vougt, had spoken publicly in a manner suggesting that in his belief Sweden would fire on Western aircraft

violating Swedish territory. The statement caught attention in both U.S. and British diplomatic reports. At least the British seem to have been

calmed high—level Swedish officials that would

by reassurances from

be mistake to take Vougt too seriously. Thus, the British Chief of Staff

a of the RAF, Lord Tedder, explained at Chiefs of Staff meeting a few a weeks later that he was convinced that Sweden would not prevent

Western allied aircraft from flying over its territory.

High—level Norwegian officials a former under—secretary of state of

the Ministry of Defence, and retired generals interviewed by the

some Commission have stated that Norway counted upon Sweden not firing on

NATO bombers overflying Sweden route to from the Soviet

en or

Union. One for this Norwegian assessment was their experience

reason of how Sweden, during the last few of World War II, acted very years

half-heartedly against allied overflights. Another reason was that Sweden, until the early 1960s, when the Bloodhound missiles and the

fighter aircraft J 35 Draken became operative, lacked effective means to intervene against high-altitude overflights. From time to time, according to the Norwegian view, NATO to have assumed that the Swedish seems National Defence would not intervene at all against violations of its airspace, neither from the East the West, long targets in nor as as Sweden not attacked. This strategy would prevent the Swedish Air were

Force from being prematurely depleted. When the Norwegian Chief of

the Air Force during the 1960s raised with his Swedish counterpart the

issue of whether Sweden would intervene against Western allied overflights, the latter said to have responded only You know that we

are there.

In 1952, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Undén, explained

to question from Swedlund whether we would shoot down response a

Western pilots that Sweden had to clarify that could not concern itself with altitudes above a certain level, the so-called neutrality ceiling. The possibilities of the Swedish air defences intercepting high-altitude over-

flights limited for long time, mentioned above. In were very a as addition, Swedish radar stations for air surveillance were mostly directed

Eastwards. Against this background, not surprising that the issue

does not to have been comprehensively discussed Sweden.

seem more The issue however, touched the briefing memorandum was, upon

PreparationsContacts operational issues 167 on

prepared by the secretariat of the 1955 Defence Committee, discussed in

section 3.3 above. A U.S. researcher, Dr. Paul Cole, has told the Commission that at least during 1955-60, the U.S. high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, U-2, routinely overflew Swedish territory. The overflights were purportedly authorized by the Swedish authorities. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force said to have obtained such authorization from his Swedish counterpart by telephone, and also to have agreed on the

practicalities for the overflights. According to Cole, he obtained this

information in interviews with former U—2 pilots and program man-

agers.

Dr. Rolf Tamnes, a Norwegian researcher, has exhaustively covered the U—2 overflights in his well—documented dissertation. Tamnes’s description includes the following main points of interest in this context.

The U-2 was a joint CIA and USAF project. The aircraft became

operational in 1956. Until the downing of the U-2 pilot Gary Powers at Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1960, the U—2 planes were used for highly-

qualified air reconnaissance over the Soviet Union. Only a few months later, the first U.S. photo reconnaissance satellite was taken into service.

Although for a considerable length of time had the U-2 an unsurpassed capability for high resolution recording, the political situation following the downing precluded continued deep penetrations into Soviet territory.

During 1956-60, 25 deep penetrations into Soviet airspace were made,

in addition to an undisclosed number of shallow penetrations. Most deep penetrations seem to have been carried out up until early 1958. Most of

the overflights made the Southern Soviet Union, with take-off were over

and landing on a base in Eastern Turkey. In 1956-57, seven overflights

were made over the European part of the Soviet Union, starting from

West Germany, overflights of the Moscow and Leningrad areas,and return flights over the Baltic republics.

The first U-2 flights the Northern areas took place in October over

1957, starting in West Germany, passing over Norway and the Barents Sea, and returning to the point of departure. Norway does not seem to have been informed of these overflights. In the autumn of 1958, during

period of less than two months, couple of flights a week were made a a

from Norwegian Bodo. Initially, training-flights were made, which did

not affect Soviet territory. Nor seemingly, did the majority of the

following operational flights entering from the Barents and Kara seas affect Soviet territory. The final flight proceeded along the Finnish- Soviet border, south towards West Germany, and then on to the base in

Eastern Turkey. The main Norwegian contact seems to have been the head of intelligence, Evang. These flights were known to only a handful

of Norwegians.

168 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

From 1958 on, President Eisenhower’s attitude to the deep-penetration

flights became increasingly restrictive. In April 1960, however,

he was persuaded to authorize additional overflights. An overflight of the

Southern Soviet Union was thus carried out from Turkey. In addition,

he authorized an extensive overflight from Turkey to Bode. This was the flight during which Powers was shot down.

The U—2 seems to have been used also for atmospheric sampling of

radioactive dust from nuclear testing, in 1957-58 and again, beginning in 1961. Nothing in Tamnes’s account indicates that this information

implied penetrations of Soviet or Scandinavian airspace. The only Swedish connection to be found in Tamnes’s description of U-2 operations that Powers, the event of an emergency situation, had permission to fly the shortest route from the Northern Soviet Union

to Bode and, necessary, to make an emergency landing in Finland or Sweden.

The Commission has interviewed a couple of people who held key positions in Swedish military intelligence during the years of the U~2

flights over the European parts of the Soviet Union. They have explained that they did not know of any overflights of Swedish airspace. The then chiefs of the Air Force and Air Staff are now either dead or due to poor health could not be interviewed. The Commission has not found any information, either in interviews

or in Swedish or foreign sources, pointing to the existence of Swedish authorization of U—2 overflights of Swedish airspace or emergency

landings on Swedish airbases.

Contacts with the United States in the context of nuclear weapons

Another issue connected with to Swedish—U.S. relations was that of

Swedish acquisition of nuclear weapons. Swedish military interest in Sweden procuring nuclear weapons was strong the mid-1950s, especially within the Defence Staff and the Air Force. was argued that

such weapons were a prerequisite for deterring the Soviet Union from

attacking Sweden. In 1956, however, the Military High Command judged that was impossible for Sweden to purchase atomic weapons or uranium for the production of weapon-grade plutonium from other

countries. Considerable effort was devoted to Swedish research in this field.

In 1957, U.S. military representatives communicated that was

deemed doubtful whether Sweden had sufficient resources to produce the atomic weapons required. Easier would be for Sweden to, through diplomatic channels, seek to obtain the same privileges as the U.S. allies

in regard to nuclear weapons. Such a request would most likely be

PreparationsContacts operational issues 169 on

favourably received by the U.S. military. Sweden could modify strike

aircraft to carry tactical atomic bombs and have certain personnel trained. An alternative would be to request the purchase of smaller a number of U.S. attack aircraft carrying all the necessary equipment for

launching tactical atomic bombs. A senior official in the Air Materiel

Administration ascertained that the Swedish strike aircraft A 32 Lansen would be able to carry the type of tactical atomic bomb with use NATO forces in Europe. In 1959, a similar statement made senior U.S. air officer. was a According to this source, should not be impossible for Sweden to procure weapons platforms and reach an agreement with the United States that the weapons themselves would be handed to Sweden in over the event of a serious crisis. Still according to the officer, the same

possibility should be excluded of storing U.S. in Sweden under

weapons

U.S. custody. Considering Sweden’s position, this should be arranged in full discretion under plain—clothes and Swedish-speaking surveillance.

The Swedish representative countered that the Swedish Government was

unlikely that to agree to this arrangement. The American responded that he believed that the appreciation of the need for atomic would

weapons

come to grow, which might affect the Swedish Government’s position. While some U.S. military officers thus displayed great interest in

providing Sweden with atomic weapons, the position within the State Department was the opposite. In 1958 and 1959, in connection with negotiations on the purchase of Bomarc and other missiles, the U.S. side

considered whether Sweden would equip these with nuclear

weapons warheads. Sweden had not made requests for to U.S. atomic any access warheads. But nuclear disarmament negotiations did not conclude in

an agreement, was deemed likely that Sweden would procure nuclear weapons eventually. Such a decision might be hastened Sweden gained

access to missiles which could be used to nuclear warheads. carry Pitched against each other the hand, the interest that were, on one Sweden should have an effective defence, and the other, the on disinclination towards additional states becoming members of the nuclear club. Against this background, recommended that the was

United States should inform Sweden that prepared to supply

was Bomarc and other missiles with conventional warheads, but at the same time, make clear that would be unwise for Sweden to hold any

illusions of the United States future supplying Sweden with nuclear

warheads for these missiles. The issue lost urgency that Sweden decided not to Bomarc procure

missiles. In the U.S. policy guidelines for Scandinavia, laid down in 1960, was emphasized that the United States should not supply Sweden with nuclear and that should try to discourage Sweden from

weapons

170 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

acquiring such weapons. The report from the so-called nuclear warhead study, conducted within

the Defence Staff and presented in the autumn of 1962, stated that

several advantages could be obtained by purchasing nuclear warheads from other states. For example, Sweden could begin by purchasing

foreign weapons platforms, and later, should the opportunity arise,

nuclear warheads for these systems. In comparison to a domestic such procurement could take place sooner and faster, the programme,

costs would be considerably lower, and the design of the warheads

would be advanced. In the foreseeable future, imports were not more

deemed possible due to the declared policy and legislation in potential supplier states. was also of significance that these countries primarily sought to fill their own needs. imports were possible, the seller would most likely place certain constraints on the buyer, which could possibly diminish the credibility of the Swedish non-alignment policy. By procuring appropriate weapons systems Sweden would hypotheti-

cally be capable of receiving foreign nuclear warheads with little

preparation should the foreign policy situation allow this. This could not, however, take place rapidly enough to permit Sweden in the course of to make of foreign nuclear warheads without having personnel

a war use

pre-trained to handle the weapons system. The prospective supplier of

warheads would have to provide information for such training, such as data storage, overhaul, transport, and the priming of warheads, on

including data on safety devices, and problems of cooling. The credibility of Sweden’s non-alignment would be unlikely to survive the making

of such preparations.

In the situation at hand, was thus deemed unrealistic to rely upon the possibility to import weapon systems equipped with nuclear

warheads. Therefore, the study concluded that the Swedish National Defence were to be equipped with nuclear warheads, these would have

to be domestically produced. In the 1960s, Sweden carried out protection research on nuclear Only in the 1968 Defence Decision was the issue of procuring

weapons. nuclear weapons dismissed from the agenda.

Conclusion In conclusion, during the 1950s and 1960s, common view within the a Swedish National Defence was that Sweden could not withstand a Warsaw Pact attack for any length of time without some kind of

assistance from the Western Powers. This view had already been expressed in connection with the negotiations on a Scandinavian defence union, and was later confirmed during the preparations for the 1958

PreparationsContacts operational issues 171 on

Defence Decision. was also clear that the Swedish military realized

that preparations were required to render direct assistance in the form of

tactical action effective early on. Likewise, was realized that the requirement for such preparations increased as weapons systems became

more complicated. In the first half of the 1950s, high-ranking Swedish officers had, on

numerous occasions, contacts with officers from the United Kingdom,

the United States and NATO, aiming at a certain coordination of defence preparations for a Soviet attack. however, uncertain whether these

contacts led to any common defence planning. As far as has been established, they never went beyond an exchange of information enabling

both parties to take into account each other’s considerations and resources their own planning. The most remarkable example of information exchange however, Defence Minister Vougt’s memorandum on the Swedish armed forces and defence planning, handed over to the British Government in 1951.

The presentation of the memorandum was perceived by the British as

indicating the existence of a political will in Sweden for certain peacetime coordination of defence planning between Sweden and the Western Powers. The reserved Swedish reactions to British invitations

to informal military talks between the states, however, led to these hopes fairly soon having to be shelved. That this did not prevent the British

from working for almost two preparing commentary the years on a on

memorandum shows what significance they attached to the defence of

Sweden. This chain of events raises a number of questions which the now available sources cannot help to answer. This concerns the Government processing in important aspects, inter alia Vougt’s planned visit to Great

Britain. Nor have we been able to establish whether the Swedish Military High Command participated in preparing Vougt’s memorandum, or was at all informed of the memorandum by the Government, or possibly through British military sources. Knowledge of Vougt’s memorandum might have affected the view of the Swedish Military High Command on

the openness possible contacts with the British, but this cannot be established with the sources now available. In section 7.3, we will return to an evaluation of the presentation of Vougt’s memorandum. , In the latter part of the period examined, the Swedes appear to have adopted a more cautious attitude to operational contacts with the Western Powers and NATO. There however, reason to emphasize that the

Commission only has had limited to U.S. archives from the

very access

period after 1952; therefore, the Commission’s picture may be incom-

plete.

172 PreparationsContacts operational issues on

was not possible for the United States and its NATO allies to declare that they would assist Sweden irrespective of its security policy less to prepare such actions together with Sweden. This or - even -

would torpedo the idea of collective defence and risk—sharing which was

a cornerstone of NATO. Even so, the United States as well as the United Kingdom showed tangible interest in information exchanges with Sweden.

Finally, no available information indicates that Sweden considered procuring nuclear weapons from the United States, or that the United

States was prepared to make nuclear weapons available to Sweden.

PreparationsWar planning 173

6.2 War

planning and studies

Plans and studies

General introduction

Swedish military planning based defence decisions passed by

war on

Parliament. These decisions lay down the ambitions and the budget for the military defence. In parallel with and integral part of the

as an

political process defence committee, drafting of bills, and parliamentary

processing, the Supreme Commander conducts studies the long-term on development of the National Defence, including inter—service priorities, procurement, tactics, etc.

Heritage i.e. existing planning and organization naturally plays

— —

a significant part in the war planning process. The fundamental preconditions of operational planning remain unchanged long period

can over a of time, spanning several defence decisions. When defence a new decision has materialized, the executive operational commander

until the

autumn of 1961, the Supreme Commander, the chiefs of the Navy and Air Force, since then the Supreme Commander only charged with

analysing what changes are called for the decision. He then translates

the parliamentary decision into directives and orders to his subordinate commanders for operational planning. Within this framework,

comman-

ders at various levels are charged with preparing their plans, issuing

own orders, and taking actions, for example, practical exercises. At least during the period studied this Commission, there should

not, apart from exceptional cases, have been for regional

room any or

local planning beside from that ordered by the operational commander. During the period when the chiefs of the Navy and Air Force had operational command, their overall planning through the naval and

was

air force departments of the Defence Staff, anchored with the Supreme

Commander, who was charged with coordination. The Commission has

been informed that this did not necessarily imply that the Supreme Commander approved the planning detail.

every

At least during the 1960s, planning anchored, to certain

war was a extent, at the political level. Once the Supreme Commander had been informed of the results of the defence committee work, he briefed the

Minister of Defence the principal of the proposals for

on consequences

focus of military plarming. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Swedish military planning almost completely focused on defending against an attack from the Soviet Union

the Warsaw Pact. During the latter part of the 1960s, however, a

couple of minor studies were made with other scenarios, viz. attack an

from a reunited Germany outside NATO, and NATO’s capabilities for

174 PreparationsWar planning

intervention against Sweden, and Swedish defence preparations against

such an attack. There are no indications, neither the war planning nor

in the operational orders of cooperation having been prepared with the Western Powers. Nor do the comprehensive studies forming the basis of national plans and orders include allusions to actual preparations for cooperation the reception of Western assistance. On the contrary, or these studies often than not dealt with the prospects of Sweden more

receiving non-prepared military assistance from the Western Powers attacked by the Soviet Union.

Assistance from the Western Powers

In strategic study by the Defence Staff in 1960, was observed that a

Swedish territory in itself hardly was of strategic significance to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Sweden was important as a staging and

basing area for operations against Norway, for the defence of Norway following its and for the control of Cresund. The risks of capture

Sweden being drawn into therefore closely interlinked with

a war were

those of Denmark and, especially, Norway. In view of the significance

of Sweden for the defence of Norway and the Baltic Approaches, was

deemed highly unlikely that the Western Powers would remain in-

different to an isolated Soviet attack on our country. The risks of such an attack were therefore seen to have diminished.

The study also stated that Sweden’s peacetime defence preparations and its wartime strategy had to be such that military and economic

support from the Western Powers could be effective, in the event of a

with the Soviet Union, and thus viewed by the Western Powers as

war possible and advantageous.

The assistance supplied early in a war, might include air strikes

against ports of embarkation, communications, airbases and missile

bases, etc., convoy protection in the North Sea toward the Skagerrak, minelaying by air, well temporary direct support from air and

as as naval forces based Norway. No guarantee exists of direct assistance in wartime. As assistance from the Western Powers carmot be prepared in peacetime, cannot arrive rapidly, and will also be less effective. These factors will influence any decision on providing assistance. If the Western Powers are given grounds to believe that

supplies cannot be put to use timely and effectively, they will hardly

provide assistance. Our defence must therefore have such strength --and endurance that the Western Powers will find advantageous to assist with reasonable effort despite the disadvantages of preparaus tions not having been made.

As discussed above, several of the ideas of the 1950 strategic study were reiterated in the 1954 proposal by the Supreme Commander on guideli-

PreparationsWar planning 175

nes for the continued development of the armed forces, which constituted

background material for the 1955 Defence Committee. In 1960, the Defence Staff conducted new strategic studies. They

emphasized, among other things, the significance of our national willingness and capability for defending ourselves. If conflicts of interest are sharpened in the Baltic Sea area, we have to reckon with Western forces operating in Denmark and Norway, and Soviet forces operating Finland. In such situation, Sweden will be a

an object of closer attention, which especially serious we are militarily weak. We can expect military as well as other kinds of pressure against us. Our possibilities of contributing to the preserva-

tion of peace and war breaks out of remaining outside a conflict - -

might depend on whether both parties trust our will and capability to defend our territory with prospects of succeeding, and to take actions against violations wherever our territory subject to such.

The idea of external assistance had not been dropped, however, as shown inter alia by the following quotation To prevent such a situation from arising, a strong National Defence

necessary to support foreign policy efforts in maintaining our policy of neutrality or impossible to mobilize international forces to

- — our assistance. To the extent that a potential aggressor would have to

calculate with the risk of Sweden not being conquered quickly enough,

the risks of him attacking are diminished. we nevertheless become

involved in war, the defence has to provide enough respite, and be conducted in such a manner, as to render political and military action

in our assistance effective.

In connection with a discussion on a Soviet invasion across the [Arctic] border [with Finland], the studies observed that, were an attack to be carried out without preparatory build-up in Finland, little advance very warning would be given for possible coordination of activities with

NATO. A preparatory build-up in Finland, however, would offer the possibility of extended coordination of such cooperation. The following quotation shows that not even in the latter contingency did Sweden

appear to have counted on any direct assistance from NATO. NATO intervention presupposes that the attack on Sweden could not be confined to a limited war. The counteraction to a Soviet attack

through Northern Finland, possibly to be counted on, entirely

dependent on what actions NATO can or wishes to take against the potential targets in question. There should be doubt that the -—- no

targets of NATO air and nuclear strikes primarily are Soviet naval and air forces, their bases and land-lines of communications. Primarily,

the targets should be located east of Finland. Here, an interdiction

against the Murmansk railway will affect the operations against Sweden, but only in the longer term. Furthermore, NATO action will support the defence of Northern Norway and of NATO bases there.

176 PreparationsWar planning

In connection with a study of an amphibious invasion, was argued concerning Scania [the Southernmost province of Sweden], that the ability of NATO to support the anti—invasion defence favourable due to the proximity of the area to other NATO fronts in Northern Europe. A draft from 1962 of the Supreme Commanders fundamental view with joint instructions for regional commanders’ war planning has been made available to the Commission. Its section on guidelines for the conduct of defence in the event of a large-scale attack included the following quotation of interest in this context. we cannot check an aggressor from establishing a firm foothold on Swedish territory, the aggressor shall, on the orders of the Supreme Commander, be delayed and depleted. Areas of significance to continued warfare and where supplies can be delivered as well as where external military assistance can have the prospects of being effective shall, however, be defended as long as possible.

The directives laid down in 1964 by the Supreme Commander for the work for OB 65, i.e. the background inpreparatory preparatory formation for the 1965 Defence Committee, also included an allusion to dependence on external assistance. Concerning equipment endurance, the directives state that this has to permit, over time, remaining military units to maintain their combat value for a period deemed to be decisively longer than that within which an aggressor would want to reach its targets in Sweden. The period should be so long as to create necessary preconditions for external assistance. During 1963-67, the Chief of the Defence Staff directed a number of so-called joint studies. Their purpose was to lay the groundwork for assessments of long-term developments and thus issues of priority between the services. These studies paid little attention to NATO acting in support of Sweden. In the so-called SamS 3 study, NATO action was played down to include only the provision of supplies. SamS 4 and SamS 5 did not cover external assistance from the West at all. In conclusion, these studies suggest that, during the period studied by this Commission, the Defence Staff judged the risk of an isolated Soviet attack on Sweden to be remote. Were the Soviet Union to attack Sweden in the context of a superpower conflict, the assessment was made that the Western assistance possible was so-called indirect assistance. On the other hand, the prospects of Sweden receiving direct assistance early on seem to have been limited, partly because peacetime preparations could not be made. Such assistance was partly conditional on Sweden being capable of defending itself long enough to render NATO action effective. Another precondition was that NATO actually perceived a Soviet attack on Sweden as a real threat against its own interests. Over time, the studies played down the issue of Western assistance. One reason

PreparationsWar planning 177

might have been that the military leadership judged that the of

prospects

rapidly receiving such assistance were limited. Another could

reason have been that the issue was judged too sensitive to be discussed other

than within a highly select group.

Swedish intervention

Another issue discussed in some studies whether Sweden, certain circumstances, should join the Western side without first having a war

been attacked by the Soviet Union.

Strategic studies 1950 thus discussed Soviet operation against a Norway across Finland and Denmark without touching Sweden. was stated such an operation were successful, Sweden would be encircled.

Sweden would find itself in untenable position, militarily well

an as

as logistically, and without prospects of asserting its independence. The only way to counter such development for Sweden to

a

intervene actively with the aim of delaying the Soviet operation,

so that Western assistance be applied and take effect. can

The same idea recurred in 1954 report prepared within the Air Staff a as well as in the guidelines proposed by the Supreme Commander that same year for the continued development of the armed forces.

At least during the first half of the 1950s, the Military High Command was not foreign to the idea of Sweden taking military action the Soviet Union attempted to occupy Denmark and Norway, the

even aggressor,

for the time being, was honouring Swedish neutrality. By doing,

so

Sweden might possibly avoid becoming encircled. This be viewed in

can

the light of the interest partial Scandinavian defence cooperation

shown by the Military High Cormnand during these Cf section

years 6.1.1.

Games and exercises

War games and exercises are important parts of military education and training. To prepare personnel for their wartime tasks, advanced

games

and exercises are carried out at military academies and higher staffs. To the extent that external military assistance cooperation with potential

or

allies were deemed to be of high priority, could expect such issues

one

to be given due attention advanced and exercises. Against this

games background, the Commission has studied this kind of activities. The National Defence College was established in 1952 to train civilian

and military personnel from Government authorities, organizations, and

corporations for high-level positions within the overall Swedish defence.

178 PreparationsWar planning

Yearly, offers command classes where games are used to practise

wartime and crisis decision-making.

Until the early the strict policy of neutrality prevailed without

restraint. Thus, discussions took place Sweden receiving external no on assistance to repel attack, and student questions on this topic were an dismissed by the instructors. In later years, discussions took place on

Sweden, following Soviet attack, requesting assistance from the

a Western Powers, and occasions at least, exercises were carried on some dispatching and receiving liaison to and from the allies. out on groups

More often, however, students trained to decline proposals for

were

cooperation and offers for Western assistance prior to war breaking out

in Sweden. In other situations too, great caution was exercised in touching upon

issues of wartime cooperation with other states. At war games and

exercises, could be conjectured that Sweden, following a Soviet attack, would seek support from the West, but usually the issue was not carried

the length of thorough discussions. The 1964 joint staff exercise GSO

to

64 therefore exception, with personnel from, among other

appears as an institutions, the Government and ministries and the Defence Staff taking

The preconditions given for this exercise included that would

part. become for Sweden to cooperate with certain NATO countries necessary concerning, exchange of information. further assumed that a e. was service chief and his staff had been detached to a Western Power to secure deliveries of crucial military equipment. As part of the the Swedish National Defence Headquarters game,

made several requests for cooperation in various forms with allied military authorities, which, for their part, requested cooperation in a

number of The tasked during the exercise to cooperate with areas. group,

allied states and to study the activities of the National Defence Head-

contacts with the allies, criticized the way in which the quarters as to

Headquarters had resolved the task. The activities had been characterized by insufficient coordination and overview, and information concerning allied activities had been distributed irregularly and incompletely. The therefore proposed that activities should be implemented in

group

peacetime, for example, designating personnel and training them for cooperation, and listing issues which the Headquarters could possibly want to bring with prospective ally. After the exercise concluded,

up a

internal discussions within the Defence Staff took place on whether to act according to this proposal. The conclusion was reached to not follow the recommendations, as such actions would raise questions.

In this context, be mentioned that at the Naval War College on can few occasions the 1950s, there were games or examination one or a cooperation with the Western Powers in naval matters. papers on

PreparationsWar planning 179

Games and exercises touching upon cooperation with the Western Powers seem to have been rare. The awkwardness with which this task handled during G80 64 point having been something the was to

Headquarters lacked experience of. The experience from this exercise

does not seem to have led to any actions to improve preparedness in this regard.

180 PreparationsMilitary High Command

6.3 Measures taken within the Military High

Command

6.3.1 Organization of the National Defence Headquarters for

liaison

In military in other organizations, liaison has the important purpose as of ensuring concerted direction of the operations and efficient use of available Liaison required both with military and civilian resources. authorities. Preferably, such liaison should be based on personal

meetings between commanders. They can thus form their own opinions and exert influence person. When direct contact impossible or

personnel appointed to facilitate liaison. Especially unnecessary, are

the commanding officer not in continuous contact with the liaison personnel, obviously important for this personnel to be sufficiently

qualified and knowledgeable of the current situation to resolve the tasks

in the spirit of the commander. This applies not only to liaison within the country but also to liaison with foreign military organizations, to the

extent necessary.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Defence Staff analyzed how wartime cooperation with other states could be organized. These deliberations probably followed up with more detailed planning or with concrete

were

orders and actions only to a limited extent.

The 1950s In the autumn of 1950, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Nils Swedlund, sent the service chiefs memorandum on the organization of liaison a

agencies with prospective allies in the event Sweden became victim of aggression. These liaison agencies predicted to be of two kinds,

were i.e., out-going and in-bound.

The out-going to leave Sweden and liaise with the foreign high

were commands with which Sweden would cooperate, i.e., the high command of the Western Powers Washington, the European command Lon-

don, and the Norwegian and Danish high commands. was judged that the main task in Washington the acquisition of equipment and

was

other supplies, but a smaller, operational representation was also required. The main task London was assumed to be operational cooperation and protection of sea-lines of communication. The group

focus operational and tele-technical sent to Norway was to on cooper-

ation. The dispatched to Denmark was not assigned any specific

group task.

In all, at least 35 officers to be appointed to these groups, and,

were

in addition, there representatives of the service staffs and signals

were

PreparationsMilitary High Command 181

and administrative personnel. The heads of the in Washington

groups and London were to be of flag—rank, while the other two groups were to be under the command of colonels. All officers should have good a

knowledge of languages. was desirable that the officers should have previously served in the country they were sent to, and hade good

relations with The defence attaches to be included in the were groups.

Certain equipment could need to be brought, primarily for signals and

administrative services, and, at least to the neighbouring countries, motor vehicles.

The receiving units were liaison agencies which Swedish territory

on were to act as liaison between the headquarters and thereto arriving liaison staffs from the European command, the Norwegian and Danish

high commands, and possibly from the high command of the Western Powers. One specific staff from the Western air forces to be

were included as well. The task should be to provide for the visiting personnel and to organize necessary contacts. Direct cooperation between relevant

departments and chiefs was then to be established. In total, at least 19

officers were needed for these groups. For reasons of secrecy, was proposed that the liaison be groups

listed in the mobilization plans Headquarters officer reserves.

as was emphasized that the officers be designated for wartime assignment as

soon as possible. Considering how important that highly qualified

was

personnel be appointed to key positions, seemed unavoidable that personnel already assigned to key operational positions wartime would

be used. Furthermore, was mentioned that signals and administrative

activities for these groups were a subject of continued analysis. Finally,

service chiefs were asked to respond to the memorandum within one month and submit information the officers to be considered for on

wartime assignments. Only the Navy Chief’s comments on the memorandum have been

found. These mainly included information officers in all 19 who

on could be made available for the different liaison agencies. For the next

few years at least, the Navy Command regularly submitted suggestions for personnel changes.

The Commission has interviewed officers who served defence as attachés at the embassies in Washington and London in the 1950s. None

of these have acknowledged that they knew of plans concerning the

any

dispatch of the liaison groups.

The planning of 1960

A new memorandum, on liaison with other states in situation when a war was imminent or wartime, written within the Defence Staff in the was

182 PreparationsMilitary High Command

autumn of 1960. The need to staff the liaison groups was judged to have

increased considerably at this time. In addition to the defence attachés, approximately hundred people should be assigned to such duties.

one About half of these should be able to report for duty at the shortest possible notice. Others, personnel from the materiel administrations e. g., and civilian defence authorities, should be made available after a certain

period had passed. The intention to dispatch groups to other countries, primarily the

was United States, Great Britain, Norway, and Denmark. The mission was to act liaison with the highest national war command and with certain as NATO bodies the country question. Liaison should primarily relate to intelligence, communications, convoying, logistics, and procurement. But also purely operational liaison anticipated to be necessary and, was in certain the Swedish officers were to be prepared to serve on the cases, NATO staffs. A reception also organized. Its task was to take care of group was arriving foreign liaison bodies and make sure that the foreign personnel

established required contacts, primarily with the Defence Staff. In this context, the personnel situation was to be revised. Checks were to be made as to the capacity and availability of the assigned personnel,

and vacancies to be filled. was proposed that various departments were within the Defence Staff and the National Defence College were to be responsible for the continued management of the issue. Curt Goransson, then Chief of the Defence Staff wrote the document The Supreme on

Commander has this. Wants to pick civilians to be assigned for

seen us

wartime duty.

Goransson, who served Chief of the Defence Staff 1957-61, has as explained that he cannot recall this particular document. He does remember, however, that there was a preparedness to dispatch personnel to other states, in the event of Sweden being involved in war. This

personnel not trained specially for the task. The Swedish embassies

were in Washington and London probably had documents with enough information to begin such liaison communications with war, even Sweden were cut off.

has not been possible to determine to what extent the 1960 proposal followed with wartime assignments, mobilization plans, etc. At

was up

the time of the proposal, reasonably exhaustive personnel lists existed for

those assigned for rapid dispatch to the United States, Great groups

Britain, Denmark, and Norway, and for the receiving group. In several the heads retired generals. In other cases, they were defence

cases, were

attaches, retired serving. The lists included at least two prominent

or

of the private business sector who had excellent business contacts

men in other countries. According to the lists, the officers in the other groups

PreparationsMilitary High Command 183

included, however, only regular attaches. The Commission has as far as possible interviewed the people who were included in these personnel lists. The defence attaches do not seem to have been informed of the plans to reinforce the relevant embassies’ defence desks. Most of them understood, however, that in the event of war, they were to remain on station. A former attache had understood his wartime task to function as part of a team using contacts developed

in peacetime to attempt acquiring necessary equipment and supplies to

Sweden. A couple of officers also mentioned the personnel lists who had - —

taken early retirement, had the mid-1950s received wartime assignment orders stating that they would be at the Supreme

Commander’s disposal. At least one of the orders included notification

of service abroad. When they asked their superiors, they were gradually informed verbally of their wartime duties. One, who had previously worked with ammunition and related issues, and had served as deputy military attache in London, was to serve in the United States and manage the purchase of equipment and also work as liaison officer. The other,

who had established excellent contacts the Norwegian Defence Staff, was to be posted as liaison officer in Norway.

Planning 1962 and 1963 In the autumn of 1961, the Defence Staff was reorganized and put in charge of the central operational activities of the armed forces, and external assistance was once again considered. was observed that one

of the key requirements of the wartime organization of the National Defence Headquarters, was that could establish cooperation with prospective allied states. The newly established operational command conducted a study on requirements of and conditions for external assistance in times of war Swedish declared neutrality; and what

an

prospective preparations could be implemented already peacetime. The purpose was to create a foundation for longer-term actions. A 7 January

1963 memorandum described how preparations for cooperation with the

Western powers could be organized. Another memorandum, written about a month earlier by the head of Operational Command i.e., the unit responsible for war preparations, constituted background material for this memorandum. The January 1963 memorandum established that in the event of a war between the where Sweden remained uninvolved, Sweden great powers

must adhere to the policy of neutrality had always claimed. Military cooperation the true sense of the word could not reasonably be judged compatible with the policy of neutrality. The support that

as

184 PreparationsMilitary High Command

could be received from other states in such a situation should be seen as a continuation of peacetime trade, even the essential wartime require-

ments would have taken priority. An expanded military representation abroad might be to enable accelerated procurement of equip-

necessary

ment. Purchasing missions would be dispatched to negotiate such terms

of trade. According to the memorandum, measures to avoid border incidents should primarily be of a political character‘. A situation where Sweden, together with the Western Powers, would be involved in war against the Soviet Union put higher demands on a

preparations for cooperation. was initially emphasized that cooperation of military character presupposed agreements on the political level.

a

military cooperation were to be established, cooperative actions must simultaneously be taken within the political leadership of each state.

Military cooperation with other states’ headquarters was assumed to concern especially the United States, the United Kingdom, West

Germany, Denmark, and Norway as well as some of NATO’s command

authorities. In addition, liaison personnel could be required to facilitate contacts between regional commanders and their counterparts in the neighbouring Nordic countries. The tasks described for the groups to be dispatched to other states

mainly the as were outlined in the memorandum of 1960. The

were same

duties of the personnel would primarily include intelligence, communications, operational activities, procurement, and transportation. As to procurement and transportation, for example, close cooperation was

anticipated with trade missions and other bodies linked to Swedish

missions. was a natural task to watch and explain the Swedish fundamental view on problems arising

. 4

In principle, liaison agencies to build upon the peacetime defence

were

attache organization. Preparations for contacts possible in peacetime,

to be handled via the defence attachés. In any case, the defence were

attaches were those closest at hand for establishing cooperation when actually required. In a deteriorating situation, additional personnel would be needed. This concerned especially high-ranking commanders generals

and admirals heading the officers designated to serve on the

groups, staffs of observers relevant foreign headquarters, technical, or as industrial and economic experts, and personnel for signals and administrative duties. Sweden were drawn into a war on the Western side, could be

anticipated that allied states would dispatch military liaison groups to the Swedish headquarters. To ensure that this personnel rapidly would

establish the right contacts, a receiving organization was prepared. The memorandum also discussed the need for communications

equipment with the groups abroad. In a situation where Sweden remained

PreparationsMilitary High Command 185

neutral, these communication assumed to mainly the peacetime

were use public networks. however, Sweden was drawn into a major war on the Western side, all communications from the abroad would groups

presumably go over NATO networks and be transmitted to the Swedish

National Defence Headquarters via Norway and to a certain extent via

Denmark on Swedish Telecom’s cable and radio—relay network. Military

radio traffic between NATO authorities and the Swedish National Defence Headquarters could be used as a back-up. Prerequisites for such communications were not further analyzed. Another document stated that was necessary to acquire handbooks, etc. on such things as command organization and forces relevant to

cooperation, as well as maps and charts. Most could be acquired in

peacetime and be stored in the countries in question, so that as little as possible would need to be brought in. One year later, on 30 December 1963, the head of Operational

Command 2 issued a directive on the responsibility for the continued preparations for wartime cooperation contacts with other states; this responsibility was distributed among various commanders within the Defence Staff. Information on the preparations highly restricted.

was

Thus, only the commander of a liaison group privy to the duties of

was that particular group. In January 1964, the Chief of the Defence Staff distributed general a instruction for the defence attaches in wartime and comparable situations,

and also a document on preparations to be made by the defence attachés in countries designated to receive liaison groups. Both the instruction and

the document were directed to the relevant attachés but also sent were as

a briefing note to inter alia the political section of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. The general instruction listed the duties for the embassies’ defence sections, in a situation when orders hade been given for Swedish a

mobilization. In this context, the following duties of special interest.

are

Delivery and transport to Sweden of military equipment ordered earlier should be secured, and orders for certain other equipment should be placed according to instructions previously issued. The reception of some reinforcement personnel from Sweden should be prepared. The directives of the head of mission should be followed when political considerations could be expected to bear. He should also be kept informed of the

activities.

The document also stated that the defence attaché in question to

was

make necessary preparations to receive reinforcement personnel, especially concerning the office space, lodging, communications,

transportation, and logistics.

By interviewing those who were involved in these preparations, the

186 PreparationsMilitary High Command

Commission has attempted to find out whether this was concretized. Carl Eric Almgren Chief of the Defence Staff l961~67. can be was assumed the driving force behind the planning and could, in that he was all circumstances, be presumed to have had a clear grasp of it. He has stated as follows. Liaison were to be dispatched on the orders of the Supreme groups

Commander and after authorization by the Government or the Minister of Defence. Their main duty to attempt to achieve the most

was

advantageous position possible the country where they were stationed while awaiting additional measures concerning cooperation. Approximately 25-30 people from the officer reserves were to be sent to other states for this purpose. They were to have operational experience, language proficiency or experience of serving abroad, or other ways have established personal contacts there. The groups included recently

retired service chiefs. There were also a few technicians tasked to ensure

deliveries of equipment to Sweden. When needed, the groups could also

be reinforced with additional technical experts. The personnel never met,

and training not provided. Plans also existed to receive foreign

was attaches. Very limited work done for this planning and was was

accepted that was not one hundred per cent perfect.

According to Almgren, information on these groups was restricted to what absolutely Thus, not everyone in the officer was necessary.

had knowledge of their wartime duty. The possibility was

reserves

counted on of informing them, should such a contingency arise. The

countries to which the groups were to be dispatched had not been

informed either, as that could create problems. The same applied to

foreign military attachés in Stockholm.

On the other hand, according to Almgren, Defence Minister Sven Andersson well-informed. The Supreme Commander, Torsten Rapp, was

had probably around the turn of the year 196364 discussed with

- -

Andersson issuing general instructions for the military attachés

wartime and in situations close to war. The Defence Minister and the

Supreme Commander had apparently agreed that the preparations plarmed by the head of Operational Command 2 were too far—reaching.

The above mentioned instruction would therefore suffice.

The officer who had been assigned by the Chief of the Defence Staff to coordinate the planning only remembers that his duty had been to ponder wartime cooperation with other states. He was thus not responsible for transposing this thinking into orders and actions. was obvious to him that the Prime and Defence Ministers supported the idea

of analysing these issues.

The officer who, according to the December 1963 memorandum, was to have been responsible for the preparation of a special instruction for

PreparationsMilitary High Command 187

the various military attaches wartime, for organization of liaison

groups, equipment and transportation, briefing of heads of groups, etc. has said the following. He 98 per cent sure that no such duties were carried out during his tenure at the Defence Staff. On the other hand, he was responsible, in cooperation with the Chief of the Defence Staff, for

the Supreme Commander’s personnel reserves. They consisted of 30-35 retired high-ranking officers, assigned to carry out specific tasks in the event of war. Some of them would serve abroad for example in the

- United States, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway. He never informed these officers of their wartime assignments. The officer who, according to the above mentioned memorandum,

would have been responsible for a general instruction to the military attaches and for the collection of the intelligence, to be readily available for the wartime activities of the military attachés or the liaison groups

has explained that he was not privy to such planning. He was aware, however, of the existence of the liaison groups, their general make-up and intended geographical distribution. In his opinion, the heads should at least have been aware of their wartime assignment, while at the same time the defence attachés had not been informed. He also knew that preparations had been made to receive groups. One purpose of these

groups was to supply communications equipment for foreign liaison

groups that could arrive Sweden. In the general instruction for the defence attaches in war, mentioned earlier, this officer mentioned as

having managed the issue.

The officer who, according to the document, would have been in

charge of liaison with the liaison groups or with other states authorities

has said that he cannot recall being given this task and that he did not have any knowledge of planning for liaison groups. The Commission has also interviewed officers who served as defence

attaches in Washington, London, Copenhagen, and Oslo in 1964-69. With one exception only, they have explained that they were not briefed

on the arrival at their embassies of liaison groups. One former attaché

to Washington knew that the embassy’s defence section would wartime be reinforced by half a dozen people under the command of a retired

service chief. He was himself not involved in any planning for this group and did not therefore have any detailed knowledge of duties, etc. Stig Synnergren, who succeeded Almgren as Chief of the Defence Staff 1967-70, has explained that there were far-reaching plans in the

event of a coup-de-main. In the event of such an attack, personnel would be dispatched at least to the United States and Great Britain to reinforce

the Swedish embassies. The personnel were themselves not informed of their wartime assignment; was to be cabled to them. was not

considered that this personnel would serve as liaison officers in foreign

188 PreparationsMilitary High Command

headquarters. In the event of war, was expected to receive people from other states. No agreement existed with the United States or the United Kingdom that Sweden would dispatch personnel to their states, or that they would send people to Sweden. Synnergren had also himself made certain plans for establishing a Swedish National Defence Headquarters in exile. He only informed the person he had designated as commander of this force of these plans. A few other officers, most of whom held senior positions the Defence Staff during the first half of the 1960s, knew of and in some

cases themselves were responsible for parts of the planning to dispatch personnel to other states in the event of war. They have stated that one

group from the Supreme Commander’s officer reserves was designated

to serve abroad in an emergency situation or in war. consisted mainly of retired officers, some former service chiefs and military district com-

manders but also former defence attaches and others. also included a few reserve and conscript officers who, in civilian life, had good international business contacts. The countries to which plans were made

to dispatch personnel were primarily the United States and Great Britain

but at times Norway was also of interest. The accounts of the duties of this personnel sometimes diverge. One main task was to secure deliveries

of strategically important equipment to Sweden. Responsibility for

mutual briefings with other states and reinforcement of the defence

sections of the missions, especially regarding intelligence, have been mentioned among other duties. One source has said that operational

cooperation was excluded, but another source has stated that the purpose

was exactly to discuss operational issues. Information as to whether personnel were assigned for duty in a specific country, or constituted a

more general resource has also diverged. In some cases, however,

seems to be clear that a certain person was assigned to a specific state.

Conclusion

In conclusion, during the period examined by this Commission, some

preparedness existed within the Defence Staff to cooperate with the

Western Powers in the event Sweden was drawn into a war. Highly

qualified personnel were thus assigned to reinforce the defence sections

at specific Swedish missions in other states as well as to receive foreign

officers in the Swedish National Defence Headquarters. All in all, at

each point time, some thirty officers appear to have had such wartime assignments. The dispatch of personnel to other states required decisions by the political leadership. The countries to which liaison personnel could have been sent were primarily the United States and Great Britain. But at least during certain periods was deemed possible to dispatch

PreparationsMilitary High Command 189

such personnel also to Norway and Denmark, and certain other West

European states. In a crisis situation, one main duty would be to deliveries to secure

Sweden of equipment crucial to the conduct of This duty included

war.

both working towards fulfilling previous agreements for the sale of equipment, and acquiring additional equipment. An additional task in this

context was to secure transportation of the equipment to Sweden, i.e.,

convoying. These duties could already be required before Swedish

a

outbreak of war and would then, to a certain extent, be managed by

special purchasing missions. An attack on Sweden was assumed to lead to Sweden joining forces with the Western Powers. Against that background, the personnel

dispatched would be prepared to cooperate with foreign military agencies on a wide range of issues, also including purely operational cooperation. No detailed planning for this appears to have taken place. The attempts

made at such planning during the first half of the 1960s disconwere

tinued in early 1964 in consultation between the Minister of Defence and

the Supreme Commander. No information indicates that the Swedish planning carried out in was agreement with representatives for the prospective receiving countries,

or that were known there. The surrounding this planning

secrecy was

very high. Those within the Defence Staff, just below top level, working with these issues, thus had only limited knowledge of this thinking. And many of those who were given wartime assignments accordance with these plans were not even informed.

6.3.2 Signals connections with other states

Signals connection are of fundamental importance for. liaison that cannot

be carried out through direct contacts between commanders, liaison

officers, or via mail. Wire, radio, and radio relay the most important

are

means used within the Swedish National Defence. Of particular signifi-

cance in this context are the communication links with other states at the

disposal of the Government and of the National Defence Headquarters. During the 1950s, the primary of communications between

means higher staffs, air defence command and control centres, the wire etc. was network of Swedish Telecom, and for backup, shortwave radio. The civilian telephone network was deemed unreliable inter alia because

was completely unprotected against sabotage and other enemy action in

wartime. In addition, over time became quite insufficient for transmitting such large amounts of information required for efficient as were

command and control of the Air Force. In the early 1950s, primarily to

190 PreparationsMilitary High Command

satisfy the needs of the Air Force, a nation-wide exclusively military

radio—relay network was set up. consisted of broad-band primary links

between main nodes and secondary cross-links with lower capacity. This

system linked radar stations, peacetime and wartime air bases, air defence command and control centres, and higher staffs. — -

No archival information concerning emergency, and war signals

connections with other states, at the disposal of the Government in the 1950s and 1960s, has been found. Interviews have revealed the following

information. In addition to ordinary wire connections for telephone and

telex, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had at its disposal shortwave radios intended primarily for communications with Swedish embassies in situations of readiness and other emergencies. In addition, the Government’s wartime command and control centre was equipped with shortwave equipment for communications with telecom administrations worldwide well good wire connection with its own national centre as as in the Swedish Telecom network. Good wire connections also existed with the National Defence Headquarters.

In peacetime as well as in a possible war, the most important means

of communications for long-distance National Defence Headquarters communications were cable and short wave radio. The National Defence

Headquarters’ wartime command and control centre does not, however,

to have held telephone numbers, frequencies or call signs to seem foreign military staffs and authorities. not known whether the intention add such information in the event of In was to an emergency. addition, radio relay later added to the wire- and radio communicawas tions. Towards the end of the 1960s, a large number of radio stations

were procured for long—range communications on extremely high

frequencies.

During the 1950s and 1960s, referring to wartime air safety requirements, the military radio—relay network was expanded to include links

from air defence command and control centres Sweden to Denmark

and Norway Cf section 6.6.2. The equipment was of Swedish origin

and Swedish Telecom appears to have been responsible for installation and maintenance of at least parts of the system also in the neighbouring

countries.

The capacity of these communications allowed voice transmission only. The connections physically terminated at the Swedish terminal point, but possible, pending special authorization, to connect the

was communications further into the Swedish network. Likewise, in Denmark

and Norway possible to connect calls on this network to NATO’s

was European network. The National Defence Headquarters wartime command and control

centre connected via the radio—relay network to an air defence

was command and control centre, from which calls could be connected via

PreparationsMilitary High Command 191

the three Swedish air defence command and control centres directly

linked to Denmark and Norway. In the early 1960s, a quite extensive

expansion of the radio—relay network of the Swedish air defence

command and control centres to Denmark and Norway was con- - — sidered. Bo Westin, who was then head of section 2 of the Defence

Staff, has said that he looked favourably upon such expansion,

an because would improve the prospects of communicating with the

USAF in West Germany. For financial reasons, however, the expansion

plans seem to have been only partly realized, and in the end of the 1960s

the communications capacity was still very limited. According to

sources, connecting the Defence Staff to Denmark and Norway was not practised.

In the early 1960s, short wave radio telegraphy tests carried out

were

between the Defence Staff and Wiesbaden, West Germany, where the

USAFE had its headquarters. Regularly, oneway communications tests were carried out from Wiesbaden. They were encrypted according to Swedish standards to prevent the communications personnel from realizing from where the information was transmitted. The connection

was to be used for liaison activities Cf 5.4, and, when expanded, for

emergency and wartime communications.

This activity ceased after about A crypto-telex link

a year. was established from the Defence Staff headquarters building to the USAF in

Wiesbaden. The equipment probably still existed at the end of the 19603. No information indicates that corresponding equipment was installed in

the National Defence Headquarters’ wartime command-and-control

centre. These activities were kept highly secret.

This connection seems to have been installed following the 1962 Cuba

Crisis. According to sources, the purpose of the connection to

was use in emergency situations to transmit alert reports between continental

Europe and Sweden. Initially, the Defence Staff operations department

appears to have been responsible for the connection, but later seems

to have been used primarily by the intelligence department. The connection was tested weekly; U.S. signalist probably usually

a was responsible for the connection Wiesbaden. Apart from the above, no information has to light indicating that come the Defence Staff or the wartime National Defence Headquarters had any permanently connected communications links with other states. In addition to the above mentioned signals connections, Swedish

military intelligence agencies have had some permanent communication

links with other states Cf 4.4..

In conclusion, as far as the Commission has been able to establish,

permanent communication links with other states existed only to a very

limited extent. On the other hand, the possibilities to communicate with other states via Swedish Telecom’s network and radio, good. were

192 PreparationsGround operations

6.4 Measures relating to ground operations

During the entire period from the end of the 1940s until 1970, and

especially during the first 15 years, the Warsaw Pact was massively superior to NATO in ground forces. First, the Warsaw Pact superiority

considerable in standing forces deployed in Central Europe and the was Western Soviet Union; and second, was assumed that large army units could be moved forward rapidly on land from the Central Soviet Union. To withstand westward enemy offensive for any length of time, NATO a

dependent air and naval superiority and considerable supplies of

was on

personnel and equipment from the United States sea and air transportation routes. Therefore, would take months rather than weeks before NATO could reach full capacity on European battlefields.

In the initial stages of therefore, the European NATO countries a war,

would have to rely their ground forces. Gradually, as army units

on own

supplied the Atlantic, these could be expected to be deployed

were across the Central Front. In view of this, Sweden judged the prospects of on

rapidly receiving Western assistance from army forces as practically non-

existent. Plans to receive NATO forces have not been found, and army

most likely, did not exist. One particular issue whether Sweden had prepared any operational

cooperation with Denmark and Norway. The expert section of the army Scandinavian Defence Committee report deliberated on such direct

coordination between Norwegian and Swedish, and Danish and Swedish,

ground forces. The thinking cooperation between Norway and Sweden concerned

on the following. In the event of Swedish southbound retreat from the a Swedish-Finnish border while Norwegian forces held the Narvik area,

two Swedish reinforced infantry battalions were to secure the

one or lines of communication to Narvik from the East and Northeast. however, the Swedish defence along the Finnish border held while the

Norwegian forces in the Narvik area had to surrender their positions, a

couple of Norwegian field battalions were to retreat along the Ofot

railway to Swedish territory. Preparations for basing and supply should be made both countries. Such preparations should also be implemented in Trandelag, to enable the deployment of the equivalent of two Swedish

reinforced infantry regiments to protect the lines of communication from the East. Similar preparations should be made also the Rana area for smaller Swedish force. a

Discussions cooperation between Denmark and Sweden were more

on

general. proved impossible for Danish forces to defend all of Zealand, they to concentrate holding action so as to secure, for

were on

as long as possible, the operation of the coast artillery batteries defending Oresund. NorthEastern Zealand could be used bridge—head to

as a

PreparationsGround operations 193

transfer Swedish forces. Danish forces could also be evacuated from there to Sweden and reinforce the defence of the West coast of Scania. might seem obvious to those responsible for ground forces war planning no matter that the plans for a Scandinavian defence union -

never materialized to continue planning for cooperation, especially with

—

Norway. The military geographical situation remained unchanged. In his memorandum concerning planning of certain military cooperation with

Denmark and Norway, Swedlund had also recommended that plans should be developed for military cooperation in the area around

Treriksroset, along Malmbanan the Iron Ore railway, in the

area around Téirna-Mo i Rana, and Tmndelag. Even these recommendations did not get the Government support, the Commission has found reasons to study whether such planning took place. Existing documents in Swedish archives do not indicate that plans any

existed to employ Swedish army units on Norwegian territory to

or receive Norwegian troops Sweden. clear, however, that was a

high—priority mission of the commanders of Swedish military districts

bordering on Norway to keep the lines of communication through open Sweden to the Norwegian West Coast. Persons in charge of planning war

in these military district have denied that planning for cooperation

any between Swedish and Norwegian army units had taken place. One person has, nevertheless, informed the Commission on departures from this

strict policy. Thus 1952, the head of the international department of the Defence Staff and other officer at the department the Commission’s

one same

source visited Northern Norway on orders by the Supreme Commander.

The purpose was to establish contacts and also to study the terrain. The background to the latter task was the desirability of planning for

a

common defence with Norway, the event of the Soviet Union attacking Norway across Northernmost Sweden. This planning

was

managed at top level, and the military district commander Boden

was not involved. The source could not recall any further details concerning this planning.

The British report mentioned earlier Cf section 6.1.1, that Nor-

wegian army officers in the autumn of 1952 to visit Sweden to were

discuss some aspects of combined Norwegian—Swedish planning, possibly

concerning the defence of Trandelag, also indicates that certain common planning could have taken place.

In the summer of 1957, the military district commander in Boden

agreed with a commander in Northern Norway how Swedish forces on

would act the event of an attack against both countries, were they forced to retreat onto Norwegian territory. Both generals believed that such a situation required the exchange of liaison groups chief, deputy,

194 PreparationsGround operations

few signalists and cipher experts. a No thinking cooperation with Denmark can be traced in the on army

written planning; and, according to information supplied to the Commis-

sion, none existed. Beginning in 1953 and until the first years of the 1960s, annual meetings took place between Swedish and Danish officers. The background

to these meetings to have been the following. While officially

appears

visiting Sweden in 1953, the Chief of the Danish Army requested

Supreme Commander Swedlund for discussions on tactical and combat

principles for units in anti—invasion coastal defence. The Supreme

army Commander directed the military district commander Kristianstad to

participate in such discussions, the firm condition that classified

on information would not be a subject for discussion.

The meetings took place both Denmark and in Sweden, alternately. Meetings lasted for half-days and opening speeches were followed by a

general discussion, and there also some socializing. Topics for was discussion included primarily army unit grand and minor tactics. The

Danes also briefed the Swedes the development of the Danish military

on

organization. From the Swedish side at least, no secrets were up for

discussion. No concrete discussions operational cooperation took on

place. During the 1950s, the number of participants from each country

approximately 10-15, but later this diminished considerably. was Participants the Danish side included representatives of the Defence on and Army Staffs and the Eastern Province Command on Zealand, while most of the Swedish officers represented the Defence Staff and

Military District Staff. The secrecy surrounding the meetings was high.

No meeting notes were taken. The Commission’s conclusion that no preparations were made for

receiving military assistance to Swedish army forces. In the early 1950s,

however, preparations have been made for the planning of

some seem to

Swedish ground forces operations Northernmost Norway and possibly

also in Tmndelag. Planning of this kind would have been well compa-

tible with ideas during the 1950s within leading military circles that

Sweden, in the event of Soviet attack Finland and Norway, would a on have join forces with the Western Powers to avoid being encircled to

section 6.2. No documentation of such planning has been found,

Cf

however, and grounds exist for assumptions concerning its extent and no kind, well whether ceased, and so when. as as

PreparationsNaval operations 195

6.5 Measures

relating to naval operation

General

Contacts between the Swedish and Western navies had long since been

cultivated. The Swedish Navy Command, particular, had close contacts with their Royal Navy counterparts, also on a personal basis.

There were also frequent, in—depth discussions with Scandinavian

colleagues. Over time, collaboration evolved with the Dutch, French and U.S. navies. These contacts seem essentially to have concerned

exchanges of experience derived from technological developments, procurement, and training. In this context, the mutual candour seems to have been considerable. At times, senior Swedish officers discussed general strategic and operational issues with representatives of Western

states. They could fairly openly discuss Swedish resources, e.g.

organization and equipment, which was perceived as building confidence. has been denied, however, that any talks direct operational on cooperation with the Western naval forces took place.

The Navy Staff was of the opinion that unlikely that Sweden

was would be subjected to an isolated attack from the East. In terms of operations was, therefore, necessary to perceive Scandinavia as

indivisible. The mutual exchange of visits made by Danish, Norwegian,

and Swedish naval officers the mid-1950s be manifestacan seen as a tion of this thinking. On those occasions combat control systems, readiness, and storage procedures were studied; and general information

exchanged. In 1958, the Swedish Chief of the Navy and a Norwegian

admiral discussed the potential use of Swedish cruisers the defence of

Arctic Scandinavia. In the the Swedish Navy Command

same year, was

prepared to comply with [Danish] requests to explore the prospects for initiating closer collaboration uncertain what respects. And in the

1960s, happened that representatives of the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish navies briefed each other on matters, deemed essential that all parties had knowledge of. This could apply, e.g. to the operations of

their respective submarines. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Swedish Navy had two main wartime missions, i.e. to jointly repel with air and ground forces an across-the-

Baltic invasion of Sweden; and to protect imports from the West. Some anti-invasion tasks along the Swedish West Coast were also included in the beginning of the 1950s.

During most of the 1950s the Navy Command judged that reinfor-

no cements could be counted on in the Baltic Sea. was presumed that the Baltic Approaches would be closed, which case larger ships would not

be able to enter the Baltic Sea. Only small fast craft, such motor-

as

196 PreparationsNaval operations

torpedo boats and possibly submarines, would be able to do so. The

opinion was that NATO’s strength these types of units was so small that reinforcements of the Baltic Sea could not be anticipated. There might have been expectations of NATO detaching air assets for mine-

laying, for example at enemy embarkation ports.

In 1949 and 1950, the British naval attache in Stockholm received requests for information rendering possible to shape Swedish war-

planning for the Baltic Sea, making compatible with NATO concepts

in this aspect. These requests were met in June 1950, when a British naval officer in talks with Swedish officers discussed what measures necessary to ensure successful cooperation between the two navies were in the event of a war the Baltic.

Gradually, however, with the West German build-up of naval forces

in the Baltic Sea, and after the establishment of BALTAP in 1962, expectations of cooperation with NATO in the Southern Baltic Sea some seem to have been raised. The Swedish Navy Command thus foresaw that in a war where Sweden joined forces with NATO Western, - —

especially West German, naval ships would seek protected bases along the South Coast of Sweden, particularly the Blekinge archipelago. A geographical apportionment of areas of operations could also be necessary. There seem to have been no prospects, however, of carrying

out combined operations. To this end, a comprehensive coordination of inter alia communications procedures and identification, etc. would be required already in peacetime, which could not be accomplished

considering Sweden’s non-aligned position.

In 1962 1963, the Swedish naval attaché in Washington, in talks or

with U.S. military representatives, might have expressed himself so as to create the impression that Sweden was interested in ASW cooperation

with West German naval forces the Baltic.

Wartime imports, all-important to Sweden, would be dependent predominantly on sea transportation across the Atlantic and the North Sea. Considering the likelihood that the Baltic Approaches would be closed at an early stage, the limited discharging capacity of Swedish

west-coast ports, and the obvious risk of a blockade of the West Coast, or of disruptions of navigation and port-handling there, transit via Norway was deemed necessary to maintain Sweden’s overall defensive strength in most war contingencies. In the fjords of Western Norway, equipment would be transferred from ocean shipping to coastal vessels and then be brought to Sweden via the coastal navigation route. Those

imports which could not be readily reloaded, i.e. primarily liquid fuels, would be transported directly to ports in Western Sweden. The capacity

for land transportation of supplies from the Norwegian West Coast to Sweden was, even after the construction of the Trondheim route, rather

PreparationsNaval operations 197

modest. Talks were held early between Swedish and foreign naval officers about allowing ships en route to Sweden war to join Western convoys. However, no conclusive decisions seem to have been taken. In the first half of the 1950s, the Swedish Navy Command estimated that NATO had insufficient forces for convoy protection. Western aviation could,

however, conceivably assist by laying mines along sea lanes and by

bombing harbours. Later on the assessment was that the allied powers would provide convoy protection against submarine and air attacks to the

Skagerrak and Norwegian west—coast ports. Swedish shipping carrying imports would thus also enjoy direct or indirect protection. From there, the Swedish Navy would assume responsibility for those transports

intended for Sweden. In parts of the Skagerrak as well was conceivable that allied forces would provide some of the convoy protection. The Commission has in particular studied two regions where cooperation with the Western Powers can be assumed to have been of special pertinence, namely the Swedish West Coast, and Cresund.

The West Coast The highest naval authority on the Swedish West Coast was Comman-

ding Officer, West-Coast Naval District MDV from 1954 Naval

- Command West MKV. His prime task during the entire 1950s and —

1960s was to protect import shipping and sea lanes along the West Coast. As late as in the early 1960s, one of his principal tasks was stated to be cooperation with allied naval forces and preparations for the basing of such, following specific directives. This task was also a prerequisite for the protection of imports. Anti-invasion defence and closing of the

Baltic Approaches was secondary considering the limited resources

available.

The 1950s

According to the war plans of 1950, cooperation with Norwegian naval

forces would in the first place take the form of protection of shipping,

primarily along the Southern coast of Norway. possible, mine-laying

outside Swedish territorial waters the Skagerrak, as well as minesweeping and submarine operations, should be coordinated with the

Norwegians. Some coordination with Denmark mainly on mine-laying in the Kattegat, was also desirable. In the event of Soviet occupation of

Denmark, was conceivable that Danish naval units would seek refuge in Sweden, e.g. in MDV. These units were presumed to constitute a

reinforcement of Swedish naval forces and, possibly, be employed

198 PreparationsNaval operations

jointly. British naval forces could also conceivably be employed in the

area of operations, e. g. to prevent Soviet naval forces from establishing themselves at the Baltic Approaches. Cooperation could also be establis-

hed with the British. Demands for the basing of primarily light units in

MDV could not be ruled out. Issues arising from the basing of allied

naval forces in MDV were stated as being subject to separate analysis.

In 1952, the Chief of the Navy issued directives on the logistic

capacity of two operating bases located within the naval district. was

stated that these bases, according to current war plans, to some extent could also be utilized for the basing of an allied naval force and for the stationing of merchantmen. Logistic support to such a force should normally cover fuel, lubricants, water and food supplies, and limited repairs. Logistic support to merchantmen would, however, not be

provided by the base commander. With this mind, logistic services, including required transportation, within the two bases were to be planned to have a capacity exceeding 50% what was needed for the

naval and other forces subordinate to the Commanding Officer of the naval district.

In the 1953 war planning, was noted that, for the time being,

peacetime directives were lacking concerning the task of cooperating with NATO naval forces, and preparing for their basing. An assessment was made concerning NATO’s naval operational missions in the Kattegat and the Skagerrak; in this, rather extensive naval operations inter alia

minelaying, minesweeping, ASW and the escorting of convoys, were

held probable. As to the protection of merchant shipping, seemed probable that the naval command—and—control resources of MDV, in war, would be subordinated to the joint allied naval command within the

North-European group of NATO states. followed that measures had

to be taken to ensure the cooperation required all areas relevant to that

activity communications, liaison staff, convoy-duty regulations,

minesweeping, etc.. Also, combined command and control of other

naval operations e.g., surveillance, minelaying, ASW, and the

engagement of enemy naval forces, in these waters would be required. This made careful preparations necessary, such as certain combined training and formalized cooperation among command—and—control authorities. In these plans, more permanent basing of allied naval forces within

MDV was not held likely. However, should circumstances necessitate allied convoying along the Swedish West Coast, temporary or semi-

permanent basing there of allied naval vessels no larger than destroyers — were to be expected, primarily within one of the aforementioned operating bases. The logistic services would have to take this into consideration.

PreparationsNaval operations 199

In 1956, the Chief of the Navy ordered the Commanding Officer, MDV, to plan for the reception and basing of allied naval forces in war. The planning was to concern all operating elements of the Danish and

Norwegian navies a total of more than 100 units and, in addition, six

destroyers and twelve frigates. The officer then in charge of the Navy

Staff operations department who had countersigned the document has

— — not been able to explain the reasoning behind this order, nor did he have any idea of from what state the latter men-of—war were expected to arrive. Commanding Officer, MDV, promptly issued an order for special

planning in accordance with the document received from the Chief of the Navy. This order stated inter alia the following premises for planning.

Denmark and Norway were such a position that naval forces could not be supported from these countries. Sweden was under enemy pressure, or at war. The foreign naval forces were to be based in existing or, to

the extent possible, expanded bases. They were to remain under national

command, but Commanding Officer, MDV, were to exercise operational

command and control. To a certain degree, they were to be operationally

coordinated with MDV forces for routine tasks. According to a pencilled note on the document, all working papers have been incinerated. The officer then charge of the MDV operations

department who according to the order was to participate in the

planning has explained that he has no recollection of this planning. The outcome of the planning ordered thus unclear. The then chief of the operations department of the Navy Staff has estimated the time that would have been required to execute the plans ordered by the Chief of the Navy, e. to build basing sites and install rock moorings at two months on condition that unlimited resources could be requisitioned.

In the war plans of 1959, under the heading of Cooperation with Allied Units, only one remark could be found This chapter will be distributed when called for contingency following direct orders from

Commanding Officer, MKV. such chapter was ever developed a has not been found.

The 1960s

In the beginning of the 1960s, following orders from the Chief of the

Navy, Commanding Officer, MKV, conducted a strategic study on behalf of Naval Command West. A first version of the study was

available in the beginning of 1961, and the final version in the spring of

1962. In the study, the Commanding Officer accounted for his fundamental view of the strategic conditions within his area of operations. The

study was supposed to form the basis for war planning within MKV. The

200 PreparationsNaval operations

views expressed in the study would have been representative of those held by leading naval officers. The study depicted a potential chain of events, where the Soviet Union by force of arms sought to coerce Sweden into granting deployment of

forces, e.g., moveable submarine bases, within the MKV area. This could bring about NATO intervention and general Such NATO war. a intervention could entail the basing of NATO forces within the MKV area as well as cooperation. Therefore, military commanders in Western Sweden would have to be directed towards cooperation with NATO. At

the same time, was noted that required preparations for such coopera-

tion could not be carried out.

If the policy of neutrality were to fail, and Sweden be drawn into a

global conflict, Commanding Officer, MKV, envisaged that he would be

instantly tasked to cooperate with NATO. Norway’s naval defences were concentrated to Northern areas, Denmark and West Germany assumed

the defence of the Baltic Approaches in the Southern Baltic Sea. Sweden’s naval defences within the area of MKV could in conjunction with NATO naval forces bridge the gap between Norway and — Denmark, and form a rear defence of the Baltic Approaches, and also secure the sea lanes of the Kattegat and the Skagerrak.

Cooperation with Western states would primarily involve basing, combined operations, mine-planning, defence of shipping, and reconnaissance. Concerning defence of imports, cooperation, primarily with the Danish and Norwegian naval forces, had to be prepared as far as

possible and, in the case of war, he put into effect at once. Under the heading Defence in case of invasion means of defence the following -

was stated. The light NATO naval forces Danish and German, assigned to defending the Baltic Approaches will, the event of enemy advances, possibly look for a basing area on the Swedish West Coast. This will

enable their participation resistance of enemy landing operations and

in attacks on supply transports. In the study, was concluded that the establishment of BALTAP had considerably reduced the risks of an invasion of the West Coast while, at the same time, Sweden’s prospects of maintaining import shipping had

increased. was further stated that the operational of the Commanarea

ding Officer coincided with operational areas used by NATO in the

Kattegat and the Skagerrak. In the event of war, coordination between

adjacent NATO naval officers and the Commanding Officer would be

required, and basing of allied naval forces likely. No Swedish private

war could be conducted in the Kattegat or the Skagerrak.

Shortly before the Commanding Officer, MKV, issued the

war

contingency order that would apply from 1962, he wrote a letter to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, asking whether the strength of the

PreparationsNaval operations 201

Naval Forces, as specified by the Chief of the Navy in the statement of 1956, was still valid. The reason for the inquiry was stated to be that the plans for basing of foreign naval forces within MKV had to be moderni-

zed. At this time, the Defence Staff had just taken over operational

command of the Naval Forces from the Chief of the Navy. The officer

who had countersigned the statement of 1956 was now serving as Deputy

Chief. He has since declared that he does not recollect any such inquiry.

No reply to the letter has been found.

The war contingency order that was stipulated to come into effect in

1962 contained, like the war contingency order of 1959, only a brief

reference to Western cooperation. In the table of contents, under the

heading Operational tasks Cooperation was thus stated Foreign

—

allied armed forces. To be dispatched when required. In subsequent

war contingency orders, cooperation with foreign powers was not at all mentioned. In conclusion, can be established that at least a few years into the 1960s, a high mental preparedness for cooperation with NATO naval forces in the Kattegat and Skagerrak prevailed. There however, seems, to have been no common planning for such cooperation. Nor do any measures appear to have been taken in order to facilitate such coopera-

tion, for example by establishing lines of communications to Norway and Denmark for the military command.

Oresund

As long as the bulk of the naval forces of the Soviet Union were based

in the Baltic Sea, of vital interest to the Warsaw Pact, immediately

was preceding and during a war, to have free transit through the Baltic

Approaches, i.e. the Belts and Oresund, for access to the open sea. This,

for example, would enable Soviet submarines to combat Western Power transports across the Atlantic. For the Western Powers, was of course

equally important to prevent this from taking place. could therefore be anticipated that, in the event of an aggravated political-military situation,

both sides would make demands on Sweden, and Sweden would face the risk of being drawn into a conflict between the superpowers.

The Swedish Navy Command also considered the blocking of the Belts to be of the utmost importance for the Swedish strategy. The reason for

this was that the Navy, unlike the Army, judgedthat Swedish imports

during a war could only be shipped through Gothenburg and Oslo and the smaller ports in between, and thus longer along the Norwegian

no

West Coast. These imports would be severely threatened Soviet naval

forces could transit into the Kattegat and the Skagerrak.

Under an agreement from 1932, Oresund divided into Danish and

a

202 PreparationsNaval operations

Swedish part. In addition, there small area of open sea. According a a to international law, a sound connecting different areas of the open sea may not be blocked to foreign vessels, but must at all times remain open

to transit. Traffic between Oresund and the Belts regulated by a treaty

from 1857, under which transit may no circumstances be obstructed delayed. The treaties considered to apply both in peacetime and or are

wartime. Neither during World War I nor however, did Sweden fully respect the provisions of the treaty. cannot be explicitly discerned international conventions that a

neutral state must allow warships of belligerent parties to cross its territory, called harmless passage, but most states acknowledge so harmless passage as a right of the warring parties. believed, however, that the neutral state entitled to block parts of its territorial

waters by laying mines or other measures. Sweden also has to consider

the customary law that evolved during the two world wars, as well as the provisions of the treaty of 1857.

According to the regulation of neutrality 1938, warships of

belligerent states had the right to harmless passage through Oresund in Swedish territorial waters, i.e. all Swedish sea territory in Oresund

except harbours and their entrances. Submarines however, had to surface. Corresponding provisions were established in the proclamation of 1966, which superseded the 1938 declaration.

Danish and Swedish territorial waters thus connect directly with one

another in the main of Cresund. In the between Copenhagen parts area and Malmii, there are, due to the conditions of depth, only two passages navigable larger ships Drga’en on the Danish side, and Flintrdinnan

on the Swedish side. The very largest ships, such as battleships and

aircraft carriers, cannot through Oresund at all, and larger sub-

pass

marines can only sail on the surface. The depth and seabed conditions make the area well-suited for mining. These minefields can be effectively defended by coast artillery.

Among the Western Powers, as well as within the Swedish Navy,

there thus strong interest in being able to block Oresund even

was a before the outbreak of a war and prevent transit. For this to become effective, both sides considered cooperation between the Danish and the Swedish naval forces necessary. The Swedish Chief of the Navy, Helge Strombiick, was in the spring of 1949 supposed to have taken the initiative for such cooperation. According to a British source, Danish and Swedish naval officers then, the summer of 1949, drew up a plan to block Oresund. Thereafter, the discussions supposed have died are to down, since the Danes uncertain as to how far they could continue were after Denmark had acceded to the Atlantic Pact. The British, however, to have reassured the Danes on this matter. The Swedish Navy seem

PreparationsNaval operations 203

Command was to be told, on behalf of the United Kingdom, that every

kind of planning and preparation in the area of defence between Sweden

and Denmark, or any other member of NATO would be welcomed.

The Dresund Study

The Oresund issues did not solely concern the Navy. Consequently, in

1949 a civil servant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned, in

cooperation with a naval officer, to seek a formula of how to prepare, in peacetime, for blocking Flintrzinnan in a contingency where Sweden

would retain its neutrality. The Soviet submarines were considered to be

the major problem. The arrangement presupposed an alteration of the rules of neutrality, as well as cooperation with Denmark. The reasoning behind this was a wish to forestall a race between the superpowers for

Dresund, and, in this way, diminish the risk of Sweden becoming

involved in a war. The work was carried out close cooperation with

high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government was reportedly fully informed.

In the spring of 1950, the investigating officials presented the results

of their work, known as the Oresund Study. They established that

according to current rules, Sweden could not object to Soviet warships

passing through Oresund before the outbreak of war. After an outbreak

of war, where Denmark but not Sweden had been attacked, was expected that early on, the Belts and Drogden would come to be

controlled by the Soviet Union. The Western Powers could be presumed,

however, to have effectively blocked the Danish outlets of the Oresund,

through mining and the sinking of block-ships. This would, for a

considerable period, make these outlets non-navigable. Under these

circumstances, was anticipated that Sweden would be exposed to pressure from the Western side to block Flintréinnan, and from the

Soviet side to keep the passage open. Such demands could be backed by military force. In such a situation, Sweden, pleading the rules of neutrality, could as a justifiable emergency measure prohibit access to

Swedish territorial through Oresund. the Soviet Union waters were to attack Sweden, either later or at the same time as attacking Denmark,

blocking of the Dresund outlets would become of immediate common

interest to the Western allies and Sweden.

In the study, was stressed that mining of Flintrzlmzan would not be

effective, unless the Northern section of the mining was connected to an

equivalent mining on the Danish side. To completely block Dresund

during a war was considered to imply coordination of Danish and Swedish measures within several areas, for example mutual, but fairly brief, orientation of the initial deployment of the

-

204 PreparationsNaval operations

naval forces, planning of surveillance of common areas of operation, as well as forwarding of surveillance—reports,

mining of Cresund before and in connection with an outbreak of war

planning of mining, equipment etc.,

cooperation in the defence of Oresund by the coast and field-artillery,

establishing special communications lines between the two countries to be used by the military; codes and systems of signalling, IFF systems,

cooperation between the naval chiefs both sides of Oresund,

- on cooperation in minesweeping and ASW in waters of common interest, and a possible basing of Danish units within the naval area of the South Coast Naval District,

fighter control within the area.

-

In order to investigate and plan such measures, close cooperation between staff of both navies was required. was evident that Denmark large extent would be tied down directives from its allies, but to a still believed that of those measures could be coordinated with was many Sweden within the limits of these directives.

The investigating officials believed desirable that the Swedish Government should acquaint itself with the different contingencies that

could evolve around Oresund in connection with an aggravated situation

or a war. would also facilitate military planning were possible to draft certain general guiding principles for the military authorities.

would be of special significance the local authorities at Cresund

developed instructions, in accordance with the general guiding principles,

for their behaviour in certain contingencies. was also desirable own

that the Chief of the Navy be allowed to continue the planning of

defence in the Oresund in line with the principles set forth by

measures

the report. should also be considered to alter the rules of neutrality

from 1938, in order to prohibit transit of submarines of the warring parties already at the outbreak of hostilities. Finally, contacts with the Danish authorities should be maintained with the purpose of proper

obtaining information regarding Danish defence planning. was judged

and also preferable, to a reciprocal basis keep the relevant necessary on

Danish authorities informed of Swedish planning.’

The report presented to the Government in February 1950. At the was time criticism said to have been voiced of the‘ conclusions in the no

report. In memorandum written within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

a

March 1950, was, with reference to the Oresund Study, discussed whether was of interest to Sweden that Oresund should be blocked in

the event of crisis and The writer of this memorandum, who, war.

PreparationsNaval operations 205

judging by the wordings, might have been the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Undén, considered out of the question that Sweden, before the

outbreak of war, would yield under Western and close the pressures passage. The propositions of the report did not lead alteration of to any

the regulation of neutrality. The Minister of Defence, Vougt, had already raised the issue of naval

cooperation with the Danes with the Prime Minister month before a or so the report was submitted to the Government He then presented requests . from the Danish Minister of Defence that measures be taken in order to

coordinate radar monitoring both sides, that Swedish artillery

on a coast

battery be transferred to enable cooperation with a battery on the Danish

side, that a common code for the coastal defence be established, and that the countries inform another the positions of the mines laid in the one on

Southern part of Oresund and the naval to Bornholm, that

area up so Danish and Swedish ships would not risk being blown by mines up

because of inadequate knowledge of the minefields. Vougt also asked, among other things, whether Sweden while being neutral in could

a war,

permit Denmark belligerent to refuel and minor ship

as a carry out repairs in Swedish harbours. No suggestions have been found to what as answers Vougt may have received. The Defence Staff, however, was instructed to write memorandum the issue. a on

Further Developments

Whether Vougt’s initiative and the Oresund Study recommendations led

to any concrete measures within the Navy uncertain. In March 1950,

at a briefing before the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, the Supreme Commander and the Chief of the Defence Staff

asserted inter alia that the Danish had not been asked to state their

intentions and plans with regard to minelaying Oresund. About

a year later, however, the British ambassador in Stockholm could the reassure

Foreign Office that in regard to closing off Oresund, no entailed

gap was

by Swedish neutrality, at least the technical side.

not on In contacts between Swedish and British officers during 1952-53, Swedish concerns expressed for the weakness of NATO, and were

especially Danish, defences along the Southern Baltic. The British

were anxious that Sweden should make substantial preparations for more

military operations the event of preferably together with the

war, Western-power naval forces submarine operations and mining. In the on

British view, Sweden’s National Defence of great significance in

was

denying Soviet ships access to the Baltic Approaches. The British hoped

to be able to persuade the Swedes to cooperate with the Western Powers

in case of a Soviet attack Denmark, before Sweden itself had on even

206 PreparationsNaval operations

been attacked.

In 1952, the Chief of the Navy issued instructions which plans for

blocking Dresund were to be prepared for two alternative contingencies.

In state of alert owing to impending general peril of war, or war a

between Denmark the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, Swedish territorial waters only to be blocked off, so that shipping there

were could be controlled. Sweden also drawn into the war, blocking was to be taken in Swedish territorial waters, on the open sea, measures were

and in consultation with Danish W estern—power authorities, possibly in

Danish territorial waters, to accomplish complete closure in the area a East and South of the island of Saltholm.

The extensive plan for closing off Cresund included plans for

minelaying and minefields, authorized the Military District Comman-

der in Kristianstad in the spring of 1967, but there were no allusions to cooperation with foreign powers. Before the Commission, high—ranking naval officers have denied the existence of Swedish—Danish mining plans, as well as any common

of operational contacts regarding Oresund in the 1960s.

occurrence At least during the first few of the 1950s, some contacts took years

place between Danish military officials and the Commanding Officer,

Cresund Naval District as of 1952 Malmo Naval Surveillance Area

-

BOM6 who responsible for operations in Oresund. has not been

- was

possible to establish what these contacts concerned. has been sugges-

ted, however, that they might have concerned intelligence. At some stage of the 1950s, there probably direct telephone line between the was a Commanding Officer, BoMt, and his Danish counterpart. In the 1960s, according to reports, the Commanding Officer’s, BoM6, contacts with the Danish National Defence limited to matters of icebreaking and were

the Navy Cadet Corps. Swedish plans for mining Oresund were prepared

quite independently of corresponding Danish plans, and Sweden had no

insight into the latter. Furthermore, has been contended that coopera-

tion mining operations would not have been of any great value, as

on

Danish and Swedish waters in Oresund are physically separated by the

island of Saltholm.

has thus not been possible to clarify the character and extent of

cooperation between the Danish and Swedish navies concerning Dresund

in the 1950s. British reports from 1951 indicate that the plans for closing

off Dresund were somehow linked together. Also, some form of

cooperation in intelligence, presumably surveillance of East bloc ship

movements through the Baltic Approaches, might have taken place. In

the 19603, operational cooperation between the naval authorities on

no

the two sides of Oresund seems to have existed.

PreparationsNaval operations 207

Summary

Very elaborate preparations many areas would have been required to make the Swedish Navy capable of carrying out joint operations with

NATO naval forces. Equipment and logistics would have required

coordination, e.g., to facilitate rearming ammunition and missiles of

NATO ships at Swedish bases. Manuals on tactics, communications, and identification, etc., would have had to be streamlined, to avoid e.g.

friendly fire. would have been necessary to expand communications

between command and control centres, and to organize liaison groups. Not least, combined exercises would have been essential.

Preparations of this kind would inevitably have entailed large

a

number of people becoming privy to the activities. The Commission has

interviewed several naval officers who held key positions the Navy

during the 1950s and 1960s. They served national and regional staffs,

on and as unit commanders. No concrete information preparations for on operational cooperation with the Western Powers has not come forward in these interviews. Nor did the extensive that the Commission sources accounted for above, indicate that any such preparations made. were Stig Hson Ericson, Chief of the Navy 1953-61, wrote his memoirs, that in the important collaboration with the Western navies concerning

equipment and training, a sharp line drawn at operational issues

was -

which, for political not to be touched and that the

reasons, were upon;

state authorities showed all reasonable comprehension of the require-

ments for international contacts, restricted to which could not areas cast suspicion upon Sweden’s pronouncedly neutral stance. His succes-

sor, Ake Lindemalm, Chief of the Navy 1961-1970, has told the

Commission of frequent contacts inter alia with NATO officers responsible for the Baltic Approaches; those discussions not were

confined to the weather. Concurrently, he has declared that there

was no cooperation prepared with Western naval forces, in the form of e.g. combined communications systems and liaison officers. The above in contrast to certain information from the early 1950s,

concerning cooperation with Denmark on the closing of Oresund, as well

as information to the effect that Ericson 1953 probably discussed with

a British admiral how to create conditions for cooperation naval on war

planning Cf section 6.1. This restriction apart, there indications

are no of any common planning for combined operations by-the naval forces of Sweden and those of NATO, still less of concrete action to facilitate any

such cooperation.

A different issue the fact that deliberations how such cooperation on were to be executed the event Sweden was forced into the a war on

Western side following a Soviet attack, often made in national

were

208 PreparationsNaval operations

Swedish planning. be established that this planning seems to have can

been discontinued at about the time that operational responsibility for the

naval forces transferred from the Chief of the Navy to the Defence was Staff. The transfer formally made 1 October 1961, but in effect was on to have been rather drawn—out process. does not seem appears a

unlikely that naval planning was thereby adapted to that of the Army and

the Air Force.

PreparationsAir operations 209

6.6 Measures operations relating to air

6.6.1 General

During some periods of World War Sweden perceived itself exposed to an imminent threat of attack. Furtlnermore, Swedish neutrality was subjected to more or less severe straims. Most substantial of these were the German troop transits in 1940-43, amd the extensive allied overflights of Southern Sweden in 1943-45. The overflights illustrated the overall significance to the great powers that air warfare had acquired. In the following decades, this significance was to increase further. The advent of nuclear weapons towards the end of World War thus further highlighted air warfare within the framework of the totality of great-power strategies. Long-range ballistic missiles did not exist at that time. This held especially true for the United States, which initially had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and in time developed a strategy to the effect that a Soviet attack in Europe would be countered by means of massive nuclear retaliation. These circumstances in turn brought a further development of heavy bomber aviation. In the period of 1945-55, the United States still depended on airbases of European allies primarily the United Kingdom, but also Norway for strikes against the main opponent, the Soviet Union; but with the introduction of the B-52 aircraft in 1955, military aviation gained intercontinental range. Thus, the need for refuelling stops in Europe was eliminated. Against this background, evident that Western strategic interest in Sweden largely concerned its airspace, as witnessed by, inter alia, policy documents from the U.S. National Security Council NSC. This was above all the interest in opportunities of flying across Swedish airspace, and in the risks of the adversary attempting to do the same. The indirect effects on airspace control of a Soviet capture of Swedish territory were also acknowledged, however. Early on, these general conditions were observed in Swedish military analysis. was also clear that the assistance the Western Powers might conceivably detach to Sweden, was mainly in the form of air forces plus, possibly, certain naval forces. Behind this reasoning was the observation that Western strength primarily lay in these systems. Furthermore, aviation especially could rapidly be employed in areas widely separated, particularly certain preparations had been made in the area in question. In view of this, Swedish discussions of measures to facilitate the reception of external assistance mainly materialized in the field of air warfare. No plans for cooperation with foreign air forces have been found, however, neither in the Air Staff archives, nor in the Air Group archives. Also, according to information supplied to this Commission by

210 PreparationsAir operations

number of air officers who held important central and regional posts a in the 1950s and 19605, no such planning seems to have taken place.

6.6.2 Command, Control and Communications C3

Background Ever since World War II, technological developments have led to ever advanced systems for command and control of air forces from C2 more centres the ground. This has, at least, applied to the environment of on

military technology in Western and Northern Europe also North

America. From the beginning of the 1950s, Sweden also started to procure the kind of radar facilities which was one of the preconditions for modern combat control. In the 1960s, with the gradual introduction of the advanced STRIL 60 combat-control system, Sweden even acquired a leading position, internationally, within this field. The key components

of this system combat-control centres often blasted into the

were bedrock, radar stations and various communications systems. The latter to secure contact between the various ground facilities including were airbases, well between command-and—control centres and aircraft. as as Here, combat-control centres had the key command-and-control task, tactically, as well as in matters of search—and-rescue. Transmission of information put great demands on reliability, speed, security, and resilience against enemy action. In the light of this, starting in the 1950s, the Air Force built a separate permanent radio-relay network supplemented by permanent telephone links connecting key hub centres command-and-control centres, radar stations, and air bases. - Characteristic of technology at that time i.e., the 1950s and ’60s was that transmission of information from radar stations to combat-control centres required large transmission capacity, known as broad-band a very radio relay. Thus was not possible to transmit the collected information of radar images by means of less sophisticated technology, e. by narrow-band radio relay or by permanent telephone line. These circumstances essential in order to understand the character of possible are cooperation with the neighbouring countries.

The radio-relay network, including inter—Scandinavian tele-cooperation

The Commission has gathered information on the build-up of the permanent radio-relay network from various experts who have served with the Air Materiel Agency and the Air Force. The following what

PreparationsAir operations 211

has been reported and of interest to the Commission. has been confirmed that permanent tele-communications links with Norway and Denmark have been operable since the 1950s. The communications were established with reference to the inter—Scandinavian search-and-rescue cooperation SVENORDA. Initially, communications consisted of permanent telephone lines, but during the 1950s these were gradually replaced narrow-band radio relay communications. The first relay connection was established from a communications centre in Southern Sweden to Demnark. Connection could thereby be made from a suitably located command-and-control centre, alternately from an airbase in the South of Sweden, to corresponding a one on Zealand. The capacity of the relay connection, two voice charmels, remained unchanged when the relay equipment was modernized at the end of the 1960s. A corresponding connection between Western Sweden and Southern Norway was added somewhat later the 1950s and had the same capacity two voice channels. In the 1960s, this capacity was expanded in conjunction with a modernization to four charmels. Towards the end of the 1960s, an additional radio-relay connection

was established between north-central Sweden the provinces of

Hiirjedalen and J éimtland and central Norway. This facilitated communications between Swedish and Norwegian command-and-control centres and airbases this area, as well by further connection North as - between the equivalent functions Northern Sweden and Norway. Here also, total transmission capacity was four voice channels. When designing the communications, care had been taken that so would not be possible to gain automatic access from the Danish and Norwegian side, respectively, to the overall Swedish military network.

Connections were therefore physically terminated at the respective

terminal point on the Swedish side. was, however, possible by extraordinary decision to further connect into the Swedish network. - Equivalent or more immediate possibilities to further connect were - apparently at hand also on the Danish and Norwegian sides.

Yhe military view on inter-Scandinavian radio-relay communications The existence of the permanent radio-relay communications to Norway and Denmark, respectively, has been mentioned by a relatively large number of people with connections to the Air Force, Defence Staff, and political decisi0n—making system, interviewed by the Commission. Among these, individual technicians have referred only to reasons of search-and-rescue behind the relay communications, while the main body of people have been of the opinion that these also created scope for other

212 PreparationsAir operations

types of cooperation with Norway and Denmark; and, by further

connection, also with other Western states. Somewhat differing assessments have been given concerning the number of voice charmels required for SAR missions. One official was thus of the opinion that only a single charmel was needed, another that

two charmels were necessary for weather information and for communi-

cations in connection with true rescue missions and yet another thought that, at most, three or four charmels were required. A couple of the interviewees were specifically asked whether was feasible to transmit the basic information of radar stations, i.e. the true radar images, to Norway and Denmark. These people, with a very thorough knowledge of the matter, have both emphasized that this was totally out of the question, as there were no broad—band relay communications with the neighbouring countries.

Miscellaneous The Commission has examined the extent to which anything of interest, from our point of view, occurred between Sweden and other states, pertaining to landing- and navigational-aid systems, and also to communications between aircraft and ground control. has been established that in the 1960s Sweden gradually switched from VHF technology to UHF technology for these communications, and that NATO had earlier made a corresponding switch. Nothing has emerged indicating anything else, however, than that this was a routine measure, primarily motivated by technological developments in general. Concerning navigational aid, the Commission also wishes to refer to the text in section 6.6.4 below, on Loran C. So-called IFF systems are touched upon in section 6.6.3 below.

Conclusion The Commission finds that permanent tele-communications connections with Norway and Denmark have been operative since the 1950s; these have allowed transmission of voice information and crude data. Furthermore, the Commission finds that was totally impossible to transmit radar images means of these communications. Thus, preconditions for far-reaching integration of air defences e. the shape of combat -

control of Western fighter aircraft from C2 centres in NorwayDenmark

using Swedish radar images did not exist. - On the issue of transmission capacity, the Commission finds that this, in the case of Denmark and NorthCentral Norway, respectively, corresponded well to the requirements of SAR duty. In the case of

PreparationsAir operations 213

Southern Norway, a limited capacity noted two voice

excess charmels. At the same time, the Commission observes that relay stations were very seldom used for SAR duty, and that they, therefore simultaneously have provided capacity for the exchange of other, signalling-wise less complicated, data something the majority of interviewees have stated as a supplementary aim of preparations. An example of such uncomplicated data in the context of combat control, general data on the character of enemy strike missions, or information on ownallied plarmed air missions.

6.6.3 Identification Friend Foe IFF or Background

In the sphere of air warfare, World War brought radical changes. For the first time, air operations and air combat involving hundreds, or even thousands, of aircraft took place. Meanwhile, this period brought a conclusive break—through in air-combat control, with the introduction of radar. Thereby, interceptors as well as anti-aircraft fire could be directed from the ground, in order to neutralize attacking bombers. The complicated combat environment led to many targets being engaged in error leading to friendly losses; and efforts made to were counter this by introducing various identification aids. The idea for was friendly aircraft when painted by a specific radio signal from the ground, to automatically emit a response signal indicating that this was a friend, not a foe. Such systems are therefore termed IFF Identifica- tion Friend or Foe. In Swedish, the equivalent term IK-system, IK being short for IgenKarming. Naturally, the adversary tried to jam, or even imitate, the IFF system of a certain party. Thus, these systems were surrounded by gradually stricter secrecy, and concurrently the subject of intensive intelligence activities. A further step in this electronic warfarewas to attempt to encode transmissions, to reduce the risks of jamming. Coding and general secrecy aside, a contemporary military IFF system substantially resembles the systems used in civilian air-traffic control

today. Such a system consists of an attachment unit known as interrogator to a ground radar station, which in turn connected to a traffic-

control centre militarily a combat-control centre. Each aircraft carries a so-called transponder, which prior to flight tuned into an assigned frequency. With these aids, trafficcombat control can receive data on a subject aircraft position, altitude, and identity on its radar screens. - - In Sweden, studies of IFF systems initiated already before the were

214 PreparationsAir operations

end of World War and development thereafter continued under high secrecy.

IFF equipment in the Swedish National Defence

Immediately following World War 11, Sweden lacked the capability to manufacture its own IFF systems, and was therefore reduced to purchasing available surplus equipment from the Western Powers. An early Western-allied system, Mark IH, was indeed purchased to some extent, and to have been used at least for trials within the Air seems - - Force, and to some degree, in the Navy. Naturally, these systems entailed considerable dependency upon the West, i.e. the United States a and the United Kingdom. Sweden was also exposed to such potential

security leaks later proved actual between the great powers, that were

to limit but not entirely eliminate the wartime effectiveness of the IFF - systems. Towards the end of the 1940s, according to information supplied interviews by several officials of the Swedish Defence, studies were initiated with the aim of eventually acquiring a separate Swedish IFF system, independent of the great—power systems. In 1957, work had proceeded far, to allow for evaluating the performance of the so as Swedish prototype known project 535 and compare this to the - as properties of a Western system, Mark X, a further developed Mark III. The Commission has had access to documentation from inter alia the Air Staff and the Air Materiel Agency concerning systems evaluations in general of project 535 and Mark X, as well as the continued management of inter alia procurement issues.

A comprehensive stafi‘ assessment In the beginning of 1958, the Air Staff made an extensive systems evaluation of IFF equipment. This shows that neither the Swedish project 535 nor the U.S.British Mark X were deemed to meet all requirements. In view of the observation that IFF Mk X not accessible in its entirety to the Swedish AF, project 535 were seen as offering most

advantages. Another document shows that the restrictions on Mark X

referred to the United Kingdom, for the time being, not being prepared to provide certain encoding equipment for Mark X. The Chief of Air Staff judged, however, that one precondition for introducing project 535 was for interrogators for IFF Mk X to be installed at some ground radar stations Behind this were the operational requirements for IFF equipment, described in the document referred to, which comprised ability to discriminate not only between friend and foe,

PreparationsAir operations 215

but also between friend and ally. The underlying assessment read as

follows

There probably a substantial chance of the airspace of concern to air defence being flown across by allied aircraft.

our

The document concluded with views on required testing of project 535 and Mark X. was recommended that this was to be carried out at a specified radar station in Eastern Sweden.

Continued management The Commission has been able to follow the continued management of the IFF issue from some ten, now declassified, documents from 1958-61, kept at the Swedish War Archives. These show inter alia that in 1959, the British tele-company Marconi submitted a proposal for an IFF system for Sweden; the system seems to. have consisted of Mark X in its basic version, Swedish efforts were made to gain access also to the special encoding -

equipment, - in 1961, the air wing F11 was assigned certain airborne transponder equipment, to be used in trials towards ground stations, whereby

was stated that these i.e., Mark X will, in certain numbers, be

incorporated into the air surveillance structure of the Air Force; in this context was pointed out that the airborne transponders will be carried by the international civilian aviation, in early 1961, ten plus engineers and technicians from the air

- some

wings F2 and F13, and from the then central repair shops of the Air Materiel Agency in Arboga, had received training on Mark X, in October that same year, the company Svenska Radioaktiebo1aget

-

offered five units of Mark X to the Air Materiel Agency, with an option for an additional four,

later that same month, the Air Staff decided to reduce procurement to -

one station, to be used for tests in the following years. The reasons for this change of plans were stated to be 1 that the possibilities of bringing about improved cooperation with a relatively minor number

of Mark X units were very small, 2 that the civilian use of Mark X seemed uncertain, 3 that Air Force resources were very strained. In

this context, was pointed out that further Mark X units could be required in connection with procurement of new radar stations.

216 PreparationsAir operations

Additional Swedish information

The Commission has interviewed a number of Swedish officers and

technicians within the sphere of military aviation on IFF issues.

Although recollections of the period in question were not very detailed, the following interesting views have been expressed.

IFF matters can be seen to be of great significance in case of

potential air cooperation with other states. In the 1960s, they were several occasions discussed at high levels within the Defence on Staff.

During offensive air missions either Swedish or possible allied was not too difficult, early in sortie and target approach, to keep

track of different aircraft identities. Problems would be greater

upon return flight, when tactical conditions by necessity decided routes and altitudes. Especially during this phase of an air sortie, IFF was important to avoid accidental fire by friendly fighters or

anti-air.

Had foreign IFF equipment in some critical contingency been

supplied to Sweden, would provided some training and general —

familiarity with the system hardly have taken more than a day or

~

two to mount the not too bulky equipment in relevant radar

stations.

British information

The Commission has also been given access to protocols from the British Chiefs of Staff, dealing with IFF systems. The protocols primarily refer to the 1950s. They raise the IFF issue on numerous occasions, reasonabreflecting its significance. Documentation shows inter alia that Mark X introduced in the British Defence Forces in the mid—1950s, a few was years later than in the United States. Already at that time, its basic version deemed to be known to the Soviet Union, which gave rise was

to certain restrictions in prospective wartime use. In parallel with the

introduction, work Selective Identification Feature was progress on a

SIF, which no doubt was intended to curtail Soviet possibilities of countering the IFF system. SIF probably identical to the encoding unit

referred to in the Swedish documentation. In 1959, established that the United States, in collaboration with was the United Kingdom and Canada, was developing a new IFF model,

designated Mark XII. This was chiefly an evolution of Mark X and was

to be introduced in the U.S. Air Force as soon as possible. The Royal Air Force requested the introduction of Mark XII in British air defence

in the early 1960s. was indicated that the system, in the longer term,

—

PreparationsAir operations 217

could possibly be made available to other European states.

Conclusion

The Swedish systems evaluation of 1958, referred to above, shows that was deemed significant to be able to identify possible allied aircraft, in view of the high probability of airspace, in wartime, becoming our

subjected to,overflights by such aircraft. This general assessment

consistent with the comprehensive analysis of the issue of assistance, found in the preliminaries of the 1955 Defence Committee. also evident that, in 1961, plans made for procurement of were a number of Mark X units for Swedish radar stations, and that trials of the equipment were to be conducted. Furthermore, certain personnel was trained in operating the equipment. Later that same year, ambitions reduced, witnessed by the were as above. A prime reason given for this was that the prospects of enhanced cooperation with only a relatively limited number of Mark X units seemed very slight. However, can hardly have been the that the case mere number of Mark X units was crucial, as the range of the system by all accounts was considerable. In light of the British information, another explanation seems more likely the United States and the United Kingdom would soon be switching to the new system, Mark XII. Thus, possibilities of using ground-based Mark X equipment for identifying Western bombers flying through Swedish airspace would be soon gone. A more extensive procurement of Mark X would thus only temporarily yield increased prospects for cooperation. The fact remained, however, that the earlier, not essentially different version, Mark X, had been tested in Sweden, and that personnel had been trained in its use. Against this background, according to technicians who have been in contact with the Commission, would have been

reasonably easy to mount more modern equipment Mark XII, any

such equipment had been supplied to Sweden in future contingency. a was presupposed that certain European NATO countries only to were receive the equipment in a contingency. Against this background, the Commission finds that Sweden, by means of measures taken in the IFF area, acquired technological liberty of a action to an overall decision on the issue was made quickly create - a capability to identify aircraft of possible Western allies, were they to fly over Sweden.

218 PreparationsAir operations

6.6.4 Loran C

Background Loran C Loran, LOng RAnge Navigation an originally U.S. radio system for long-distance navigation. not unlike the DECCA-system,

better known in Sweden, but utilizes lower frequencies about 100

kHz, i.e. the long-wave spectrum, thereby giving Loran C longer range so that with only a few stations possible to cover, for example, all of the Norwegian Sea. During the build-up phase the United States was

granted permission to calibrate the system Stockholm Bromma airport and in Gothenburg Torslanda airport. Subsequently, has

become known that, when first launched, the system completely or to an overwhelming extent served military purposes. These were precision navigation for the U.S. strategic submarines as well as, most probably, for the USAF. From the Commission‘s point of view, primarily important to seek to evaluate whether the calibration in Sweden can be seen as part of preparations for operational cooperation. In addition, important to clarify, first, what were the prevailing perceptions in Sweden of the of Loran C at the time calibration was approved, and second, purpose how these understandings were communicated among concerned parties.

Technical-military conditions

Loran C had precursors already during World War II. In the 1950s, one precursor, Loran A, was in extensive use among NATO states. Loran C developed the latter part of the 1950s and the system built proper was in the North-Atlantic region in 1959-1960 under the direction of the up U.S. Coast Guard. The main customer was the U.S. Navy. The main objective was to acquire a navigational system for the U.S. strategic

submarines, permitting position fixes with margins of error no greater than a few hundred metres for the launching of ballistic missiles. At

this time, the Norwegian Sea significant operational area for these was a submarines. Because of the low frequencies used, the radio signals penetrate sea water slightly. This means that a submarine can still receive navigational data when shallowly submerged. not entirely clear how great the interest of the USAF was during the period the system developed. An indication of early USAF very was interest the fact that the procurement decision was made the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, a U.S. source has said that Loran C was the principal system for long-distance navigation also of the USAF in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the system said to have been the most

PreparationsAir operations 219

important navigational aid for U.S. bombings during the Vietnam war.

The build-up in Norway The build-up of Loran C required certain transmitters to be erected, also along the Norwegian Sea. In contacts with inter alia Norway, the United States offered two main reasons. First, was said that the system would become important to civilian shipping over time, which in fact proved to be true, but not until the 1970s. At the outset the military interests seem to have been overarching. Second, in official U.S. contacts with Norway was stated that the system was intended as a precision navigational aid for depth soundings in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere, the results of which, in turn, could be put to use in the navigation of submarines. To what extent Norway was informed of the real purpose, that Loran C would constitute a direct aid for precision navigation in war, primarily for the strategic submarines, somewhat unclear. In declassified a now Norwegian commission report from 1975, established that the issue was discussed in the Security Committee of the Cabinet on July 1958 Minister of Defence Handal informed of Loran C as a separate U.S. project without links to the Loran chain of NATO. Cabinet members had no detailed information on what the installation should be used for, but presumed that would be at the disposition of SAC Strategic Air

Command and the U.S. Navy. To this picture should be added that

secrecy was so strict, that Norway in no circumstances was to raise the issue with other NATO states. In the following years one transmitter in the Lofoten-area and one receiver station on [the island of] Jan Mayen were erected.

U. contacts with Sweden In early 1960, when Loran C was already operating and its existence no

longer classified, the United States made a request to Sweden and at the same time to a number of other West European states to permit

calibration of the system also in our country. In the briefing sent papers to the U.S. embassies from Washington, Loran C was summarily described as a navigation system for ships and aircraft in or over the Atlantic Ocean, the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, and the Baltic Sea. The system was stated to be more capable than the already existing Loran A. There was no reference made to military applications. The calibration was desirable so as to attain maximum precision and was to be accomplished by parking an aircraft with gauging equipment at a geographically exactly defined position at Bromma and Torslanda

220 PreparationsAir operations

airports [close to Stockholm and Gothenburg, respectively] whereafter the Loran C signals could be read. The issue was managed by the Foreign Ministry, which consulted the Defence Staff among others. The Defence Staff called attention to U.S. reports that Loran C could be used inter alia for navigation of press submarines equipped with the Polaris nuclear missile system. was pointed out, however, that the calibrations could hardly be linked to Polaris, improbable for Polaris submarines to operate in the as was Baltic Sea, an assessment later proved correct. The Swedish Ministry of Transportation, supported by an opinion given by the Swedish Civil Aviation Administration, recommended that the U.S. request should be granted. decided, on the basis of the above and other recommendations was and analyses, to grant permission to out the calibrations. The issue carry had first been discussed by the Cabinet preparatory committee, however, clearly demonstrating that was not perceived as a routine

matter. This also clear from the diaries of Csten Undén, in which, a

few months afterwards, he noted that the United States had made a request for certain geodetic measurements. Undén wrote [I wanted] the Cabinet to share the responsibility for a decision, as the matter seems difficult to grasp. I was inclined towards acceptance without objections. The calibrations took place later the same year. The Commission has interviewed one of the officials who participated in formulating the opinion submitted by the Defence Staff. He could not recall any discussion within the staff about the possible utilization of Loran C as a navigational aid in the USAF operations close to Swedish airspace. When asked, he pointed out that such an aspect of the issue would have been kept within the very highest level of the Swedish National Defence. The former director general of the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment FOA, Martin Fehrm, has told the Commission that FOA fully realized that Loran C was intended to serve the strategic bombers as well as the strategic submarines.

Sverker Astrom, then head of the political department of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, commented the issue in newspaper article in on a 1991 Sure enough, the Americans made a request to be permitted to fly Sweden. The Ministry of Transportation and the Defence Staff over their opinions and had no objections. In this context, the Staff gave also added that Loran C possibly also could be utilized for the navigation of Polaris submarines, but that was improbable that such submarines were intended for operations in Baltic Sea. Not surprisingly, the decision was affirmative. conceivable that Swedish authorities were too credulous in this case. But out of the

PreparationsAir operations 221

question that any member of the Cabinet deliberately should have intended to assist the Americans in a matter of military significance.

Summary

The Commission concludes that Loran C significant navigation

was a

system to be used by U.S. strategic submarines as well the USAF.

as The calibration in Sweden must be deemed irrelevant in relation to the submarines, for which the Baltic Sea could be written off as an operational area. On the other hand, the opinion of the Commission that the

calibration of Loran particularly close to the Swedish East Coast, could have contributed to the USAF capabilities of precision navigation over the Baltic Sea and surrounding land The improved precision

areas. attained with Loran C can, in the case of bomber aviation, be deemed significant for nuclear as well conventional strikes. In addition, this as

precision was presumably valuable for reconnaissance flights in the

Baltic Sea area. All in all, this leads to the conclusion that the calibration

was of significance for the effectiveness of, in the first place, so called indirect assistance, a matter discussed by the Commission in section

3.3 and to be considered in the overall assessment. The Commission can establish that clear to FOA that Loran C was

could also be utilized by the USAF. However, the Commission has found no evidence of this insight being communicated to the Defence

Staff, neither in the context of the U.S. request otherwise. Nor has nor

anything emerged to indicate that the issue of USAF use of Loran C was

discussed in contacts between the National Defence and the Government at this point in time.

6.6.5 Airbases and associated issues

Background

In the early 1950s, the Swedish Air Force, following progressive build

a

up begun during the war, emerged as one of the strongest in Western Europe, surpassed only by the RAF. Already at this time, the Swedish Air Force had special Swedish profile differing considerably from

a

that of the Western great powers. Thus, the emphasis air

was on

defence, and the aircraft usually of limited reflecting

were range

Sweden’s defence requirements. Hence, Swedish aircraft e.g., J 29

Tunnan, the Flying Barrel were lightweight, putting limited require-

ments on the length and load capacity of runways at Swedish airbases.

222 PreparationsAir operations

The medium strike aircraft A 32 Lansen introduced later in the 1950s

also had fairly moderate base requirements, yet obviously higher than

those of the J 29.

At the time, Western military aviation developed along a path

same founded experiences gained during World War II. More and more on interest focused heavy offensive air. Demands for heavier loads was on

and longer in particular, continued to grow, reaching a stage

ranges, where the United States introduced the B-52. In normal conditions this

made possible non-stop return flights from the United States to the Soviet

Union without refuelling stops. Escort fighters in at least until the use

mid-1950s, also required relatively long ranges and were consequently

larger and heavier than Swedish aircraft. By Swedish standards, all these types of aircraft made great demands on base capacity as to runway

length, load capacity, and for bombers also runway width. Against this background, clear that cooperation with Western military aviation involving the of Swedish airbases to the extent

use — contemplated raised the issue of whether Swedish bases were adequate. —

The Commission has reviewed the deliberations cooperation with the

on

West in expansion and what practical steps taken. In the

runway were following, the Commission also describes the deliberations and measures

inter alia concerning arrangements for the aircraft refuelling which could

have indicated combined of air bases with the Western Powers. use

High-level civilian and military considerations concerning airbases

General Carl Eric Almgren Ret., Chief of the Defence Staff 1961-67,

said in radio interview broadcast in the spring of 1992, just before the

a

Commission appointed, that attempts made to extend runways

was were that NATO-aircraft could also them. The measures were said to so use have concerned less than ten airbases in various parts of Sweden and to

have been intended for U.S. fighter well as strike aviation.

as

Carl Eric Almgren has also appeared before the Commission supplementing the above information follows. The main purpose of

as

the expansions to satisfy Swedish Air Force requirements. At the

was

time from the end of the 1950s onwards the Air Force was re-equipped

with aircraft requiring longer with greater load capacity

runways

probably referring primarily to the A 32 strike version. At the same

time, he acknowledged that was realized that the expanded runways could be in the event of foreign coming to our aid.

put to use a power

However, this was probably not the primary purpose.

The role of Swedish airbases in relation to the Western great powers

mainly the United Sates evidently an important issue in top-level

was

government-to-high command discussions during the first post-war years.

PreparationsAir operations 223

Western interest in Swedish airbases was one of the items discussed at a briefing on military strategic matters before the Cabinet 20 April on 1948 by the Supreme Commander, Jung, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Swedlund. According to notes made, the following discussion took place. Prime Minister Erlander Has the Supreme Commander analysed basing of Western aviation in a wider context Supreme Commander Jung Since the issue of such a sensitive nature, and because of several studies under well committee way as as assignments, has not been possible to analyse this matter. Should you, Mr. Prime Minister, so instruct the Supreme Commander, I would of course be happy to initiate such a study. Prime Minister Erlander the Defence Staff should continue to analyse the question of U.S. bases in Sweden, particularly in view of the costs incurred by the United States, and whether the benefits would justify the costs. More detailed instructions will be issued to the Supreme Commander.

Between 1953-59, Olle Karleby was the Under-Secretary of State for Defence. He has told the Commission that the expansion of Swedish airbases in the 1950s had a dual purpose. One was to adapt to new aircraft generations in the Swedish Air Force, requiring longer and sturdier runways. The other was to make feasible the reception of possible allied aircraft. The former leader of the Conservative party, J arl Hjalmarson, said for his part, that the 1955 Defence Committee received military report a on how certain runways had already been reinforced and extended with potential cooperation with the West in mind. As far Hjalmarson could as recall, the information met with no objections. Stig Synnergren, Supreme Commander 1970-78, has told the Commission that, building on World War experiences, there plans to were expand certain airbases in the event of increased preparedness, enabling them to receive larger and heavier aircraft. Thus, preparations concerned runway length as well as load capacity. The Commission has questioned a further number of high officials, earlier affiliated to either the Air Force or the Defence Staff, on airbase issues. Many of those interviewed have stressed that the gradually evolving Swedish airbase concept, with its basic structure characterized by a multitude of small, dispersed bases, in effect rendered cooperation with foreign air forces difficult. more has also been emphasized that civilian aviation interests influenced the capacity of several airfields. This applied for example to Lulea,

Dstersund, Krarnfors, Vaxjo, Kalmar, Halrnstad, Ronneby, and Angelholm. Civil aviation war assignments also taken into account.

were Opinions have been divided on whether the possibility of foreign

224 PreparationsAir operations

aircraft using Swedish military airfields really was incorporated in the actual plans. One of the officers interviewed had never heard of this aspect at all; another did apparently participate in discussions but does not believe that practical were taken. Yet another has noted

any measures

that the combination of Swedish military and civilian interests produced situation where heavier foreign military aircraft could also have been

a

received at the bases, albeit he had not interpreted this to be the purpose. Finally, there exists opinion that thoughts given to foreign military

an

aviation figured fairly prominently in actual decisions. One of these has also designated specific base runway. located in Eastern

sources a or central Sweden directly dimensioned for U.S. bombers, while another as has referred to in Southern Sweden. This spectrum of source a runway

opinions does remarkable considering the strict with

not seem secrecy

which the capabilities of airbases was surrounded. Hence, only a handful

of be assumed to have had the full overview of the actual persons can state of affairs.

the interest in receiving Western aviation at Swedish

In one case, airbases led to requests being made abroad for relevant information on

aircraft performance. Thus, in letter to the Swedish military attaché in

a London in 1960, the Air Staff’ intelligence department requested data s landing tyre diameter and ground pressure for a number of on gear

British aircraft, namely Valiant, Victor, Vulcan, Beverley and Hastings. At the time, information was requested on aircraft navigational and

same

landing aids from list submitted earlier. Bearing in mind that this

a

information needed to explore the possibilities of NATO [transport

aircraft] using bases, certain measure of accommodation could be our a

expected from those authorities which could help you obtain this

information.

To this could be added that the designation transport aircraft was hardly comprehensive. At least two of the aircraft listed, Victor and Vulcan, bombers primarily intended to nuclear weapons, and

were carry part of the RAF Bomber Command.

Actual expansion of main Swedish Air Force runways

The Commission has been informed of the capability of the main

in the Swedish airbase system in the 1950s and 1960s as to runways

length, width, and load capacity. The purpose has been to correlate these figures with Swedish Air Force or Air Materiel Administration requirederived from the intended peacetime and wartime use of the

ments,

bases, well from existing planned aircraft types. However, no

as as or

such specifications, either general airbase specific, have been found

or

in archives studied by the Commission. The Commission has therefore

PreparationsAir operations 225

had to rely on interviews and expert assessments when seeking to establish whether actual runway capabilities corresponded reasonably to

Swedish Air Force requirements or to those of Swedish civil aviation.

Summary

Initially, runway capacity has been compared to the assumed primary base use in the 1950s and 1960s fighter, strike, reconnaissance,

transport as well as civilian use.

Concerning combat aviation fighter, strike, reconnaissance

evident that strike aircraft, requiring long for takeoff with heavy

runways

payloads, set the parameters. As an example of takeoff distances, the A

32 Lansen strike aircraft with maximum payload required just under

1,600 metres using afterburner, and just under 2,300 metres without

including a certain safety margin, according to the National Defence

Materiel Administration. The distance quoted for takeoff without afterburner should be viewed as a rather generous upper limit of the

actual requirement, as normal takeoff procedures with heavy payload

should have involved the use of afterburner.

Similarly calculated, the earlier aircraft J 29 Tunnan, which had no afterburner, required 1,900 metres for take-off with maximum payload

for strike sorties.

Fighters and reconnaissance aircraft probably required shorter

runways.

Against this backdrop, the Commission has concluded that from the

mid- or late 1950s runway length to 2,300 metres could be warranted up

intended for use by strike aircraft, while runway lengths of no more

than 2,000 metres seem reasonable for fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Furthermore, the Commisson has taken into consideration the

intention for certain runways also to be used by Swedish civilian aviation

in peacetime, or as part of the total defence effort in war. In addition,

we have taken into account that training, test flights, and night fighters

might have placed special requirements on runway lengths and widths.

For reasons of military secrecy, a detailed account of Swedish base

system data precluded. The Commission can, however, establish that

the majority of Swedish airbases can be viewed as having been con-

structed according to national requirements, considering the above criteria. At the same time, we note that a lesser number of in the runways

1950s and 1960s, primarily located close to the Swedish East Coast, were of a length and width somewhat exeeding what can be derived from

the above criteria. The so-called Atlantic runway at the F 16 Air Force Base in Uppsala, which has attracted media attention however, not

226 PreparationsAir operations

one of these. The Commission’s concluding assessment that, during the period studied, certain steps were taken to make take-off and landing by Western military aircraft at Swedish airbases possible to a limited extent. The measures per se were to be seen as providing freedom of action in a technical sense, to be used pending a superior decision. The Commission will return to the possible strategic motives behind the measures

taken Cf section 6.9.

6.6.6 Aviation fuel

Background The Commission has interviewed two former high-ranking officials of the Air Materiel AdministrationNational Defence Materiel Administration FMV on inter alia aviation fuel. The emerging picture unequivocal. Thus, in 1960 or a few years earlier, the Swedish Air Force decided to switch aviation fuels and, simultaneously, to introduce high-pressure refuelling for new aircraft. This was first used on the new aircraft 32 Lansen, which thereby achieved substantially shorter refuelling times than were plaimed for when the aircraft was originally conceived. The changes thus resulted in substantial tactical advantages. The new fuel was of NATO standard type, which in peacetime had the advantage of being readily available on the international market. Parallel to switching fuels, the Swedish Air Force changed to a type of fueling couplings, also better adapted to NATO standard. Both sources have said that resultant greater capability for coordination with Western air forces was discussed when making these changes. In addition, one of the sources has told the Commission what he perceived as the unofficial view within the Air Force on measures facilitating potential cooperation with the West in 1960. This view was that such steps should be taken to the extent reasonably justified by Swedish national interests.

Summary The Commission finds that the switch to high pressure refuelling and new aviation fuel within the Swedish Air Force would have been imperative, sooner or later, in view of technological and tactical developments in military aviation. Furthermore, these measures can be deemed warranted, considering the commercial supply of aviation fuel. The

PreparationsAir operations 227

switch of fuel nozzles would have been beneficial the context of the so-called SVENORDA-flights and other international peacetime exchanges. This does not, in the Commission’s opinion, rule out the possibility that an effort to improve the technical preconditions for cooperation with the West may also have encouraged these measures. An overall examination of navigational aids used by the Swedish Air Force has revealed nothing of note with reference to the Commission’s mandate.

6.6.7 Base duty

Background The Commission has furthermore studied whether Air Force base procedures were devised in a way indicating that combined air operations from Swedish airbases were prepared for. The following has emerged. A memorandum, Memo on Western air assistance, prepared within the Defence Staff in 1955, focuses on strategic and technical prerequisites for cooperation at Swedish airbases. evident that such cooperation requires considerable preparations. not the movement per se of a unit to Sweden that constitutes a problem, but on arrival bringing all cogs in the complex air - defence and cooperation machinery to bear the major one. Friction of all kinds can be anticipated, imperilling the entire assistance effort unless careful and time-consuming preparations have been made.

clear from the context that the author implied that such preparations had not been made. Several sources, furthermore, state that the Air Force base organization and other support systems, far from being overdimensioned, during the 1950s rather were deprived. Thus, we had many aircraft and pilots

but very thin logistics. The weaknesses in the base organization

remained in the 1960s.

Summary

Thus nothing has emerged to indicate that the Air Force base organization was dimensioned to allow foreign air forces to operate on any larger scale from Swedish bases.

228 PreparationsWartime acquisition

6.7 Preparations for wartime acquisition of equipment and supplies

The endurance of the Swedish National Defence in a longer war was, despite extensive storage of strategically important goods, dependent on imports of military equipment and other essential war supplies. In the event of an imminent risk or outbreak of war was thus an important task to acquire abroad the goods required and to arrange their transportation to Sweden. To keep the gateway to the West open for receiving supplies one of the key elements of our strategy. The United Kingdom and the United States were foreseen as the principal supplier countries; already in peacetime they were the main suppliers of

military equipment to Sweden Cf section 5.2.

The competition for equipment and supplies as well as cargo space in such a contingency would presumably be tough. The United States and the United Kingdom would probably first seek to meet the needs of the NATO states. Furthermore, large forces would be brought across the Atlantic to the Central European theatre. In that context, the Swedish merchant fleet, in the early 1950s one of the ten‘ largest in the world, could consitute a bargaining chip. By placing Swedish ships at the disposal of the Western Powers, Sweden could hope for more favourable treatment in other respects. Swedish civil aviation, i.e. primarily the Swedish part of Scandinavian Airlines SAS, could also play a certain part in this. Whether Sweden would actually receive any wartime military deliveries was unclear. The Supreme Commander, Jung, wrote in March 1949 to the U.S. ambassador in Stockholm and pointed out inter alia the dependence of the Swedish National Defence on imports from the United

States of military equipment radar, radio equipment, and vehicles in

order to be capable of resisting a Soviet attack for any length of time. The answer he received was general and non-commital. In a conversation with the British naval attaché in Stockholm, Defence Minister Vougt intimated that he counted on the United Kingdom providing such deliveries. The British view, however, was that the Swedes had to be well aware that since Sweden had chosen to remain outside the Western defence system, could not count on the same treatment as participating states. Repeatedly, had been pointed out that the requirements of allied states inevitably took precedence. Within these limits was in British

interests, however, to supply Sweden with the equipment needed. And

this position could also be expected to remain valid in wartime, on condition that Sweden continued to maintain an effective defence and

would defend itself attacked. No more specific commitments on the

kind and extent of such wartime deliveries could be made, and they had to depend on circumstances. The Swedish military attache London had

PreparationsWartime Acquisition 229

been told much the same in the spring of 1949.

Available sources do not show whether this rather cautious Western position on the Swedish requirements for to be least

war - seen at partly in the light of the U.S.-British campaign for Swedish alignment with the

West was modified with the passing of time. One might that the — assume U.S. and British inclination to commit themselves wartime deliveries to

to Sweden of important supplies increased, hopes of as influencing

Sweden to join NATO written off and NATO But were resources grew.

the fundamental principle that the requirements of NATO

states took

precedence probably remained unaltered. According to British information, the Swedish Defence Staff made

a

request to the NATO Standing Group in Washington in April 1954.

Information was provided the strength of the Swedish armed forces on

and on wartime logistical requirements. The request perceived by

was the British as an attempt to logistical supplies in secure an emergency

without any of the commitments NATO membership entailed. To its

surprise, the British Government noted that the appeared have request to

been made with the knowledge and consent of the Swedish Government. In connection with acknowledging receipt of the the NATO

message,

Standing Group said to have asked the Swedes for analysis of the

an tonnage required for their logistical needs. That the Swedish expected or at least hoped that the Western Powers in the event of Soviet attack would assist Sweden, a e. with petrol, oil,

coal, military equipment, and certain materials, and semi-finished

raw

goods for the industry, clear from preconditions given in certain

war

military games and exercises. The Defence Staff in charge of planning imports the

was to meet

requirements of the armed forces, while the task of managing

the very

extensive imports for the remainder of the Swedish national

economy

devolved on the National Committee for Economic Defence Preparedness

Riksniimnden for ekonomisk fiirsvarsberedskap, later the National

Board for Economic Defence Overstyrelsen fdrekonomiskt forsvar.

The latter form of import planning discussed in this

not report.

Defence Stafl impon planning

Analyses in the early 1950s estimated the import requirements of the Swedish armed forces, beginning in the third month of almost

war, at

73,000 tonnes of equipment, primarily ammunition, and

weapons, vehicles, and 122,000 tonnes of fuel for aircraft, At the end of cars, etc. the 1960s, the requirements had been adjusted upwards almost to 250,000 tonnes per month of of which than 85 war, more per cent consisted of fuels.

230 PreparationsWartime acquisition

In 1953 Defence Staff document to the military attachés in London a and Washington, pointed out that for the endurance of the Swedish was armed forces in war, was important that the possibilities of importing military equipment from the United Kingdom, the United States, and

other countries should be secured. The Defence Staff, in consultation

with the service material administrations, had investigated the possibilities of using Western-manufactured military equipment to meet the

immediate needs of the Swedish armed forces. Theinvestigations had

resulted in lists of types of desired equipment, quantities, point in time

month of the equipment should be accessible, and

war when an

assessment of what country could presumably deliver the equipment. The intention for the lists, in the event of an outbreak of war, to be was presented, through Swedish diplomatic missions, to relevant authorities in each country basis for negotiation. At the outbreak of war, as a special purchasing delegations would immediately travel to the United Kingdom and the United States to reinforce the missions in managing these issues. Negotiations in these matters were not to be started with authorities in the respective countries in peacetime. Nor was permitted to mention that these documents existed. Sweden were drawn into war, the missions not to await further directives from Swedish were any authorities. All efforts to be directed towards acquiring the were equipment and tonnage for its transportation to Sweden. was finally stated that the lists of equipment would be continuously revised, and that consultation this matter had taken place with the Ministry of Foreign on Affairs and the National Committee for Economic Defence Preparedness. In keeping with the 1953 document, the lists appear to have been kept to date at least well into the 1950s. One 1957 proposal by the Navy up Materiel Administration for revision has thus been found. Thereafter that this up-dating lost relevance for a number of years. This can appears be linked to convictions in the late l950s that a possible war would open with violent nuclear exchange between the great powers. For a a considerable time following the outbreak of war, ocean shipping was expected to have been brought to a halt, and planning for the period thereafter was hardly worthwhile. In 1969, however, the Supreme Commander issued a document on imports of supplies in under imminent threat of war. The war or document sent to the service chiefs and certain defence authorities was well the defence attachés in London, Washington, and Ottawa. as as Initially, was stated that the Government had authorized the Supreme Commander to plan, in consultation with the National Board for Economic Defence, for rapid imports of supplies for the armed forces in war under threat of In this context, the Govermnent had decreed that or war. instructions negotiations with foreign authorities were not to be issued on

PreparationsWartime Acquisition 231

by the Supreme Commander without special authorization by the Minister of Defence. In all else, the text shows striking similarities with the substance of the 1953 document.

Transportation

In the spring of 1952, the Defence Staff presented air-transport requirements for high-priority equipment for periods of national state of alert and to the Civil Aviation Board Luftfartsstyrelsen. Requirements war — were for 90 per cent of Swedish civil aviation to be designated exclusively for military importation. In quantitative terms, however, sea transportation across the Atlantic and the North Sea would totally dominate war imports. Issues concerning the protection of these imports have been discussed in section 6.5. In World War II, the bulk of the Swedish ocean-going merchant fleet was engaged on the allied side. Already in December 1939, shipping a agreement was reached on placing Swedish tonnage at the disposal of the allies. The parties to this agreement were the British Ministry of Shipping, and the Swedish so-called 1939 Shipping Committee. This committee was appointed by the Swedish Shipowners’ Association Sveriges Redareforening, primarily to channel shipping industry contacts with the government authorities dealing with shipping matters in times of crisis. The principal shipowners of the leading Swedish shipping companies were members of the committee. After the end of the war, Sweden joined the allied shipping pool and than 200 more Swedish ships participated in transportation for the support and reconstruction of the war-torn countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Swedish merchant fleet was relatively large. Only a minor part of was needed for meeting Swedish import requirements. In the event of blockade and war, the ocean-going tonnage at sea would also be of international significance. In such situation, a could be presupposed that the merchant fleet, whether Sweden at was war or not, would be subjected to some form of centralized management, at least in waters affected by the conflict. Shipowners judged that there were hardly any alternatives to letting the tonnage, voluntarily or not, join the Western shipping pool. The 1939 Shipping Committee continued to exist on paper. Partly in the shadow of the Korean War, however, the committee revived was on the Govemment’s initiative. The purpose was to prevent the Swedish merchant fleet from being seized by foreign authorities in a war, and to secure imports of essential equipment and supplies. This would be achieved by Sweden declaring itself prepared to place hulls at the disposal of the Western Powers. Both sides maintained preparedness a

232 PreparationsWartime acquisition

to initiate talks this matter. No other activities occurred. This should on be viewed as a Government option. As a precautionary measure, the Government together with the Shipowners’ Association appointed representatives in London and New York for the event of war or similar contingencies to be authorized as their agents. These representatives were furnished with certain up-to-date information on the Swedish merchant fleet. Following the 1962 Cuba Crisis, the 1939 Shipping Committee was reactivated. Representatives abroad were also appointed, for example, in Australia and the U.S. West Coast. Discussions were initiated with on government authorities on the mandate of the committee. According to one proposal, the committee was in times of blockade and war to — liaise between the Govermnent and the merchant fleet; and in a crisis, appropriately broker the use of the merchant fleet which was of such — significance to the Swedish Government, e.g. trading its services for imports. Were Sweden to be forced into war and the merchant fleet a placed in a wider international context, the committee was to become an executive body for merchant fleet contributions to common war efforts. On the initiative of the Shipowners’ Association, a proposal for how to organize preparedness was developed in the spring of 1964. The report proposed inter alia that the 1939 Shipping Committee’s position within the total defence should be more closely defined by the authorities. Instructions for the representatives abroad should be elaborated. The convoy—duty handbook, prepared by the Navy in accordance with NATO standards, should be augmented and, possible, be distributed to Swedish merchant vessel captains already in peacetime. In consonance

with an earlier proposal the 1958 report Merchant Fleet Preparedness by the Committee Shipping Preparedness Issues Swedish merchant

on vessels should be structurally reinforced to facilitate the wartime mounting of artillery for self-defence, and be equipped with antimagnetic protection. This should consitute a precondition for Swedish merchant vessels joining NATO convoys. The proposals mentioned do not appear to have been implemented to any greater extent. The Civil Aviation Administration, formerly the Civil Aviation Board, responsible within the total defence for plarming for the wartime use of Swedish civilian aircraft. In late 1949, the Director General of the Civil Aviation Board took the initative in talks with the British air attaché in Stockholm on transferring that part of the Swedish civilian aircraft fleet not to be used by the armed forces, i.e. eight DC-6s, to Great Britain at the outbreak of war. According to the British view, the Swedish Government was not informed of these talks. Both the British Foreign Office and the Air

PreparationsWartime Acquisition 233

Ministry viewed such a transfer as very important. The British were also interested in the transportation to Great Britain of Scandinavian Airlines

maintenance personnel in a crisis. Further talks between representatives of the Swedish Civil Aviation Board and the British air attache took place in the spring and late autumn of 1950. On the latter occasion, the Director General was able to inform the air attache that he was now prepared to discuss the matter with the Foreign Office and the British

Ministry of aviation.

Sources do not reveal whether such talks took place between the Civil Aviation Board and the British authorities. A Director General who new took over at the Civil Aviation Board in 1952 had some contacts with the British on safe—c0nduct air traffic between Sweden and Great Britain, but

reached no agreement with them. On the other hand, he eventually

negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Civil Aviation Administration on safe-conduct air traffic between Sweden and the United States. The agreement stated what aircraft were allowed to land in the United States

in wartime, airports to be used, and maintenance required, etc. A certain preparedness thus existed within the shipping industry for

wartime coordination of Swedish transportation assets with those of the Western Powers. The hopes were that such coordination could have a

contributed to a favourable position the part of the Western Powers

on

on permitting Swedish ships with cargo destined to Sweden to join their convoys across the Atlantic and the North Sea. Similar plarming existed

also for civilian aviation.

234 PreparationsResistance

6.8 Preparations for resistance in the event of

occupation

Background If the regular defence collapses and a country in effect comes completely or partly under enemy control, the area considered to be occupied. In such a situation, the population may actively or passively resist the intruder, helping to force him out of the country, and ultimately, to restore a legal government. During the World War German occupation of large areas of Europe, underground forces were organized in several of the conquered countries. These forces engaged among other things in sabotage aimed at the occupying power. There was also passive resistance, e. g. demonstrations and publishing of illegal newspapers. The resistance movements were combatted with great brutality. In the light of World War H experiences, the Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949. On certain conditions these offer members of a resistance movement the same protection as combatants. Among other things, members must be under the command of a person responsible for his subordinates, and be subject to an internal disciplinary system. Successful resistance depends to a great extent on the cohesion of groups, professions, industries, non-profit, religious, union organizations and associations, etc. The individual citizen lacking the support of a group or organization has small chances of resisting occupier demands. The chances of success increase authorities and the general public are somewhat prepared for what can happen. In an occupied country, of course impossible for the Government to exercise any independent authority. The Government can therefore choose to reside outside the occupier’s reach and from a protected area lead the fight for the countrys liberation. Also the head of state can in exile actively contribute towards strengthening the morale of the population. Evacuation of the head of state and the Govermnent may need to be prepared already in peacetime. In peacetime, steps can be taken to recruit reliable people who, the event of occupation, can form the core of a resistance movement. Such persons can be supplied with communications equipment and be trained in signalling procedures so that the future resistance groups directly or indirectly will be able to maintain contact with a command authority outside occupied territory. In addition, armaments can be acquired and training be provided in their use. A network of this kind often called a stay—behind organization. A resistance movement cannot usually liberate the country on its own, but dependent on external assistance. can require materiel and

PreparationsResistance 235

advisers from abroad to implement its operations. By collecting intelligence and forwarding to an allied power, a resistance movement can help to make military actions effective against the occupier. A resistance movement can assist allied military personnel in emergencies, for example pilots forced to bail out. Against this background, a stay-behind organization can have reason to cultivate contacts in peacetime with representatives of potential providers of assistance abroad. Through such contacts, both sides can determine what persons to cooperate and create personal relations of trust with. More or less far-reaching joint planning can also be carried out.

Preparations for resistance movements in Sweden

Should Sweden be occupied, resistance presumed to continue inter alia in the form of guerilla warfare. Calls for resistance were earlier found under the designation If war comes in brochures and directions to the general public, e.g. in the phone book. has been reported that preparations for such resistance had been made in peacetime. In 1951-53, the CIA staff member William Colby served as a junior diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm. In his memoirs, he has reported that his task to build up stay—behind networks in Denmark, was Finland, Norway, and Sweden. According to Colby, the conditions for his work varied to a great extent between the countries. Thus, in one of the countries he could cooperate openly with national intelligence agencies and with their assistance choose future leaders of the resistance for CIA training in guerilla warfare, sabotage techniques, etc. In another country he secretly established contacts with reliable citizens through Americans living there. Colby does not expressly state the situation in each country, but apparently, his ability to operate depended on the countrys security political situation. According to reports Swedish newspapers in the early 1990s, Colby’s operations Sweden were not particularly extensive. He however, said to have recruited and equipped a few resistance leaders. One writer claims that the Swedish Government approved of the CIA, in cooperation with Swedish organizations, conducting a number of activities in Sweden, such as the establishment of para-military units. According to this writer, Colby should have said that the Swedish Government was aware of his work in Sweden in the 1950s, and approved of it. The newspaper articles also included reports of a Swedish stay—behind organization, basically to the following effect. The main task of the organization said to have been to function as the framework of a Swedish resistance movement which would become active in the event of a Soviet attack on Sweden. For this purpose, a

236 PreparationsResistance

number of resistance leaders said to have been recruited and trained, for example in sabotage technique and radio communications. In addition, was stated that special weapons and fuel supplies to were have been laid up and radio transmitters placed out in different locations. The organization also said to have been tasked with securing that the Royal Family, the Government, the Parliaments war delegation and the National Defence Headquarters, for example, were evacuated abroad. From there, a Swedish Government in exile was to lead the continued resistance. Alvar Lindencrona, an insurance company executive, was reportedly the leader of the organization. From 1958, he to have acted at the request of the Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, and the organization was placed under the Ministry of the Interior. Reportedly, Colby’s contacts were transferred that same year to the Swedish Government, and the CIA contributed to the organization’s resources by donating the warchest that Colby had provided for his resistance leaders. In 1968, responsibility for the organization said to have been transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The organization was reportedly financed mainly by the Government budget. Lindencrona said to have reported to a council representing various parts of society, e.g. the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, the Swedish Employers’ Confederation, and the National Farmer’s Union. Also admitted were certain Members of Parliament, some military officers, a few industrial leaders and other industrial representatives. The council’s task was to establish the organization and its leaders across party boundaries and social classes. One of the most delicate tasks of the organization reportedly to was secure foreign support for Swedish resistance. To this end, Lindencrona purportedly maintained contacts with the CIA as well as with the British intelligence agency MI which were informed of the activities of the organization. In the event of Sweden being occupied, contact was to be maintained with CIA headquarters in London and Swedish resistance thus coordinated with such activities elsewhere in Europe. The CIA would supply a Swedish resistance movement with weapons and other equipment. A good deal of the above corresponds to what the Commission itself has been able to establish. The Commission has not, however, had cause to examine this information in detail. The picture that the Commission has obtained of preparations for a resistance movement in Sweden mostly based on verbal information. No written primary sources, any existed, have been found. Tage Erlander’s diary notes, however, offer certain insights into the activities. To the Commission, such activities are of interest only they implied

PreparationsResistance 237

preparations to receive military assistance from other states.

There reason to emphasize that planning for Swedish resistance in

the event of the country being occupied not defeatist. On the

contrary,

an expression of the will to ultimately uphold the country’s independence and survival as a free nation. In such planning, preparations for

armed resistance against the occupier prominent. are in the nature of things that such plarming has to be surrounded by the utmost secrecy. Even information concerning conditions quite long still ago may have to be protected.

The information how extensive Colby’s network has varied.

on was One source has claimed that he established quite extensive network an

of contacts also including contacts with Swedish authorities, especially T—office. Another source has argued that Colby did not have time to accomplish a lot in Sweden and that have been considerably

may more difficult for him to operate here than in certain other countries. However

this may be, appears evident that the activities initiated by U.S. initiative were eventually wound They probably ceased altogether in

up. about 1960.

Parallel to these activities, there existed, at least since the early 1950s,

a framework for a Swedish resistance movement linked to the unions,

industry, and the National Defence. In 1958, this organization

was

placed under Government supervision. Erlander’s diary notes, however, show that the Prime Minister and additional minister already

one were

kept informed of the activities prior to 1958. The activities, earlier financed by industry contributions, from financed of

were now on out

taxation revenue and few ministers regularly attended the

one or a

meetings held by the executive twice The activities

group once or a year.

were managed entirely by Swedes. This did not preclude the existence of contacts between, the

on one hand, representatives of the organization and, the other, U.S. and on

British Embassy officials in Stockholm and other foreign officials. These

contacts, on which the Commission has not been able to receive any

detailed information, probably aimed primarily making

were at

possible for a resistance movement in a Soviet-occupied Sweden to

receive material assistance from the Western Powers. should also have

been important for the organization to plan connections with Swedish

a

government in exile. Apart from the acquisition of certain radio equip-

ment, little any action to have been taken. appears

238 PreparationsConcluding assessment

6.9 Concluding assessment of military preparations for cooperation with the West

Measures taken

In this chapter, the Commission has presented the findings of its examinations of actually taken within the Swedish National measures Defence for cooperation with the West. In addition, certain aspects of preparations within other parts of Sweden’s total defences have been

illustrated. Military mainly be characterized as relating either to measures can organizationpersonnel or to equipment. The organizationpersonnel primarily those described in measures are section 6.3, the Defence Headquarters organization for cooperation. on Furthermore, certain backdrop provided in the section 6.2 account a of studies, and exercises. An overall picture emerges, showing games, that there existed certain personnel preparedness in the 1950s and a 1960s, to establish operational military cooperation with those Western Powers important i.e. the United States, the United Kingdom, to us, Norway, and to extent Demnark. T 0 this were added corresponsome ding preparations for intensified acquisition of equipment. These will not be discussed in the following. Nothing the connection with USAFE — headquarters in Wiesbaden excepted has been found to indicate that - Swedish Defence Headquarters preparations were carried out beyond

exclusively Swedish confines. few of those detailed for liaison duty abroad informed of Only a were their wartime duties. The studies, and exercises described indicate games that, when external assistance discussed within the Defence Staff, was the opinions fairly and divergent as to what cooperation tasks were vague would have been given priority had planning been implemented. At the time, clear that especially direct assistance from the Western same Powers, involving relatively close cooperation with Western forces in the defence of Sweden would have required extensive preparations. This shown above, especially in the account of the 1958 Defence Decision, and will be further discussed below. Against this background, the organizationalpersonnel preparations to receive direct assistance can be

described as rudimentary. The physical in principle be categorized as preparations measures can within the of ground, naval, and air operations, as well as technical areas preparations within the field of command and control. Regarding ground operations nothing has been found indicating preparations for reception of external assistance. Nevertheless, appears that certain preparations for combined planning between Sweden and a Norway made in the early 1950s, mainly involving Swedish ground were

PreparationsConcluding assessment 239

forces in certain contingencies conceivably operating Norwegian on territory. This has been established more clearly in section 6.4 above. No physical measures linked to the reception of assistance for ground

operations have been found Cf section 5.2 on peacetime equipment

procurement, however. As to naval operations, there apparently general exchange of was a ideas within the Navy, and to extent also with certain foreign some representatives, as described in section 6.5, above. These ideas primarily concerned the escort of shipping in the Skagerrak and the North Sea and appear to have had a very limited impact the coordinating level of the on Defence Staff. No physical have been discovered within this measures area either, with the exception of what might have taken place in the

early 1950s concerning a joint plarming with Demnark for mine-laying

in Oresund. The physical measures described above can thus almost exclusively be referred to air operations and communications for operational command

and control. The boundary between these two spheres in communica-

tions vaguely defined. The air operational comprising measures, primarily communications systems, IFF systems, navigation, and airbases, has to be viewed as limited but still significant. Furthermore, notable that the technical related to measures communications also affected the preconditions for operational command and control. certainly evident that the swift and communicasecure tions links established with Norway, Denmark, and USAFE West Germany indirectly creating preconditions for other communications links with the Western system were of limited capacity. But they - very offered technical facilities for consultation and coordination primarily in an overall, strategical sense, including the exchange of general intelligence assessments. In this sense, the communications links could have been of great importance for general wartime coordination, despite their evident inadequacy for far—reaching direct cooperation between armed forces.

The fundamental view of external assistance in the 1955

Defence

Committee

For a comprehensive interpretation of the organizationalpersonnel and technical measures described above, the Commission wishes to start with chapter 3 above, and the assessments in connection with the 1958 Defence Decision discussed there. In section 3.3, the Commission has accounted for its conclusion that the secretariat memorandum of the 1955 Defence Committe should be seen to express the Defence Ministrys view on external assistance

240 PreparationsConcluding assessment

during the 1950s. The fundamental assumption was that Sweden would

for length of time than few months be able repel

not any more some to

attack without external military support. was established a great power in the memorandum that highly unlikely that Sweden could receive was

direct assistance from the West at least in the opening stages the first

months of major in which country also involved. Direct

a war our was assistance referred to actions in close connection with acts of war on

Swedish territory, directed against transports directly linked to

or enemy these. On the other hand, indirect assistance referred to actions directed

against the aggressor’s staging areas or war potential in general Indirect assistance be given in various ways and can be just as

can

important direct assistance. In fact, indirect assistance can be expected

as most to in war. Indirect assistance was then illustrated to mean us a

primarily by interdiction of airbases, naval bases, embarkation ports from which attacks could be launched a1sQ us, as well as associated

on

lines of communication. An additional, important type of indirect

assistance deemed to be operations tying down the aggressor’s

was any forces. The context made clear that the attacks on airbases, ports, etc.,

primarily to be carried out in the form of air strikes with or

were

without atomic weapons. An important implication of the memorandum thus that, from the mid-1950s the possible support of the defence of Sweden from

on,

the side of the Western great the United States and to a certain

powers

extent the United Kingdom that was discussed. There was no longer, however, reference made to Scandinavian defence cooperation and

any

its intrinsic prospects of improving the situation for Sweden’s defence.

Nor do the Commission’s indicate that Swedish interest in sources any

exclusive Scandinavian cooperation was later awakened.

In the memorandum, furthermore discussed what could be done was promote direct assistance of type in effect bordering on indirect to a

assistance i.e. limited employment of strike and bomber units. Here, the following types of measures were mentioned personal contacts, to be expanded when threatened,

war and sufficient means of communications, - secure overall coordination of air operations, certain coordination of air surveillance, -

exchange of air defence intelligence and general intelligence.

-

In its studies, the Commission has not come across anything indicating that the view of principle external assistance accounted for above was

on

changed later in the period covered the Commission’s mandate. No comprehensive assessment on this issue from the period after 1956 has

PreparationsConcluding assessment 241

been found. We will return in the next chapter to consider what knowledge the Government and Parliament and their key representatives had of the assessments just described.

Aims and measures synthesis evident that the measures actually taken did not by a long way create preconditions for receiving any larger-scale external direct assistance. The Commission’s sources thus show that any such reception of assistance would have required a demanding operationaltactical integration with the West in a number of important aspects operational coordination and exercises, and in addition comprehensive technical measures concerning command and control, air surveillance, communications, and base duty, as well as coordination measures in important tactical aspects including exercises. Contemporary international examples of requisite measures for such a purpose NATO’s common air defence organization NADGE NATO Air Defence Ground Environment System, and also the so-called COBs Collocated Operational Bases organized following an agreement between Norway and the United States in 1974. In the field of ground operations, the prepositioning of stocks, etc. in Norway for the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade constitutes a

corresponding example. The measures taken including investments in

these contexts have been very extensive. Against this background evident even though similar coordination probably would have been somewhat less complicated in the 1950s and 1960s, that the Swedish measures discussed above were marginal in comparison with a potential aim to prepare reception of direct assistance. In view of this and the 1955 Defence Committee, the Commission judges that the measures taken by the Swedish National Defence to receive external assistance, discussed above, should mainly be seen in the light of so-called indirect assistance or of such direct assistance bordering on the indirect. Sweden apparently never seriously considered requesting formal guarantees from the United States and possibly the United Kingdom of assistance in the event of an attack. Besides, highly unlikely that the Western great powers would have been prepared to make such commitments. Sweden could, however, take a number of military measures to optimize the prospects of such great power support in war. Such measures were also specified by the 1955 Defence Committee as shown above. The indirect assistance that could become relevant for Sweden was

thus mostly strategic bombing operations with or without nuclear weapons against airbases and embarkation ports across the Baltic Sea.

242 PreparationsConcluding assessment

During the period in question, from the mid-1950s onwards, this aviation acquired inter—continenta1 range. Thus, there was no longer any need for routine refuelling stops in Sweden. Since the tactic of fighter escort for bombers being phased out, there was no need either for using was Swedish airbases in this context. The previous section discussed five categories of measures concerning personal contacts, communications, coordination of air operations, coordination of air surveillance, and intelligence exchange which prior to the 1958 Defence Decision had been identified as being of key importance in the context of receiving assistance. These five categories correspond closely to what actually implemented. The Commission was would here like to comment on the various categories, without entering into comprehensive discussion of intelligence exchange, as this, in any opinion, was not part of the Commission’s mandate. our Concerning personal contacts has thus been shown that high-level peacetime military contacts were maintained with key Western states. A significant effect of this might have been the creation of a general understanding of Sweden’s strategic situation and defence capabilities. Furthermore, sometimes personal friendships developed, probably deemed valuable to the Swedish. In addition to this, plans existed to dispatch delegations to relevant countries in a crisis. Most of the

delegation tasks consisted of other duties for example intensified

procurement but highly qualified operational skills were also represented

in delegation leadership retired service chief, etc.. This latter plarming

has been of limited extent except for a period in the early 1960s when planning temporarily appeared to have been of somewhat greater extent for a few years.

Furthermore, was shown above that secure means of communications radio relay links existed with Norway and Denmark, and that the

links could be connected further into the NATO system. The capacity of these links limited but must nevertheless be considered to have was very been sufficient to enable a certain overall strategic or operational coordination. communications and their organisation within the air The means of defence system should furthermore have created preconditions for a general coordination air operations in the sense that was technically possible to manage Western bombers en route to the Soviet Union via Swedish airspace, without the aircraft being inadvertently fired upon by Swedish air defences. As a result of the calibration of Loran navigation had become more precise. It remains, however, unclear whether this was an outflow of a coherent Swedish strategy or an unintentional of deliberations on civilian shipping and consequence aviation.

PreparationsConcluding assessment 243

The expansion of runways close to the Swedish East Coast appears puzzling at first. Such base locations would have been exposed to attacks from the East in war. In addition, as mentioned above, there was no need for refuelling stops by bombers or for basing escort fighters on Swedish territory. The Commission has concluded that the runway expansion as well as the IFF measures should be viewed primarily in the context of bomber return flights from the East. Thus the most reasonable explanation for the extended runways that these were to facilitate emergency landing in the event of bombers being damaged in the course of the strike. Sweden would thus again assume its part in the context of overflights and emergency landings from the late World War discussed at the beginning of section 6.6, above. The IFF system would also have been essential in this context for identifying and directing the returning bombers and in preventing friendly fire in conjunction with actions by

the Swedish air defences. worth mentioning that recovery

plarming, i.e. plarming for emergency landings, was the key element of Norwegian cooperation with the U.S. Strategic Air Command from the mid-1950s.

Finally, as to certain coordination of air surveillance and exchange of air defence intelligence, the Commission finds that technical prerequisites

for this were at hand in the form of Swedish radar surveillance, primarily directed eastwards, and the possibility to exchange general

information but not the complete radar information, however with

various Western parties. The Commission concludes that the measures taken were essentially aimed at creating a national freedom of action so that, in a threatening not more closely defined situation, mainly indirect assistance could be quickly received primarily from the United States, given a political decision. On the other hand, nothing has emerged to indicate that any plans for operational cooperation were developed jointly with other states, or that any formal security guarantee from any of the Western great powers existed vis-a-vis Sweden. In all likelihood, only a very small group within the Swedish Military High Command had a complete picture of measures actually taken and of the over-arching aim behind them.

How much did the Government know 245

7 How much did the Government

know

7.1 Background

Key ministers and the division of labour between them

Tage Erlander was Prime Minister of Sweden throughout the period studied by this Commission. He was personally interested in and had a thorough understanding of security policy issues. At the same time, was part of his philosophy of government to let the ministers of defence, as well as other ministers, manage their own portfolios as far as possible. However, the reassessment of Swedish security policy, necessitated by the changes in the international strategic environment in Europe after the end of World War required the Prime Minister took an active part in the making of foreign and defence policy. Consequently, he devoted considerable effort to creating a Scandinavian defence union, and was deeply disappointed when this failed. Another reason why Erlander was engaged in defence policy issues was that he did not have complete confidence in Allan Vougt, Minister of Defence 1945-51. These factors probably contributed to why Erlander, during these years, devoted considerable effort to issues associated with the National Defence. Gradually, during the first half of the 1950s, as the international security environment in Europe stabilized, and after the change of ministers of defence, Erlander could concentrate on other issues. His working relationship was thus good and trusting with Vougt’s successors, Torsten

Nilsson Minister of Defence 1951-57 and Sven Andersson Minister of

Defence 1957-73. In his relations with the military leadership, Erlander said to have quite emphatically asserted the obvious fact that the duty of the military authorities was to comply with the security policy laid down by the Govermnent and Parliament, and he did not accept initiatives on their part which might discredit the official policy. In his diary entries, especially from the early 1950s, he often expressed concern for the Western orientation of the military leadership, which led him to emphasize to high-ranking officers that the course of Sweden’s foreign policy was firmly set. This was especially the case with Helge Jung,

246 How much did the Government know

Supreme Commander 1944-51, and Bengt Nordenskiold, Chief of the Air Force 1942-54. His relationship with Jung’s successor, Nils Swedlund Supreme Commander 1951-61, was excellent in the beginning, but deteriorated.

Osten Undén served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1945 and

1962. Undén was the leading ideologist and interpreter of the Swedish policy of neutrality. Initially, he conducted the foreign policy in a very independent manner, and had Erlander’s full confidence. Gradually, however, Erlander encroached on Undén’s territory in the foreign policy arena. Undén’s interest in military issues was to have been limited as long as they did not directly affect foreign policy, and he was critical of

the officer corps. Undén was succeeded by Torsten Nilsson Minister of

Foreign Affairs 1962-71, who had earlier served as inter alia Minister of Defence. As mentioned above, during Allan Vougt’s tenure as Minister of Defence, Erlander, probably was directly in charge, in consultation with Undén, of security policy issues. Unlike Vougt, Torsten Nilsson and Sven Andersson held key positions in the Cabinet, belonging to the inner circle surrounding the Prime Minister. can be assumed that they had the authorization and power to act independently within the confines of what they perceived to be general government policy. Both of them were in favour of a strong National Defence, and with the exception of certain periods, their relationship with the military leadership appears to have been one of mutual trust. As Minister of Defence, Nilsson made certain that he was kept wellinformed about military affairs. The military leadership briefed him weekly or bi-weekly. In the spring of 1953, an initiated foreign rapporteur stated, for example, referring to the relationship between Nilsson and Swedlund, that the civilian and military command structures were well—organized and completely attuned. Nilsson’s collaboration with his Under-Secretary, Olle Karleby, was close and trusting. In 1957, Nilsson left the Defence Minister post to become Minister of Social Affairs. Andersson, too, was keen on receiving first-hand information concerning developments within the National Defence. He had frequent contacts with officers in various positions. About once every year, the Military High Command held a more comprehensive briefing for the Minister of Defence, at which the Prime Minister was sometimes present. According to Carl Eric Almgren, Chief of the Defence Staff 1961-67, these briefings raised issues relating to preparations for external military assistance. Generally, Sven Andersson put great emphasis on high-ranking officers having good international relations. The most important thing to have good personal contacts, because that’s all that

How much did the Government know 247

counts the balloon goes up Sweden. On sensitive issues, Andersson was very reticent towards both highranking officers and the civil servants in the Ministry of Defence. For long time, he to have been equally restrained also towards his a seems under-secretaries. Right from the beginning, the working relationship between Andersson and Karleby does not appear to have been very good. Andersson regarded Karleby as far too willing to acccommodate the military. In the of 1958, Karleby left the Ministry and was summer succeeded by Karl Fritiofson. Fritiofson sewed Under-Secretary until as 1967, when he succeeded by Sven-Goran Olhede. In 1969, Anders was Thunborg was appointed Under-Secretary. has been said that Thunborg was the first Under-Secretary whom Andersson kept fully informed. Within the Cabinet, more in—depth discussions on security policy issues most probably kept within a smaller group. In addition to the were Prime, Foreign, and Defence Ministers, the group did also include other influential ministers, such as Per Edvin Skéild, Gunnar Stréing, Gunnar Hedlund, and Olof Palme. Deliberations on what should be done, were Sweden attacked by the Soviet Union the policy of neutrality thus having failed were apparently confined to an even smaller group. - Other Cabinet ministers’ knowledge of security-policy and military issues can be assumed to have been of a fairly general nature. Certainly, the full Cabinet appears to have been briefed annually on the military situation, budget issues, etc. but these briefings were kept on a rather general level. appears that on these occasions, the discussion did not touch upon issues relating to possible cooperation with the Western Powers. The most important thing was for a minister to know that he had the support of the Prime Minister in his overall policy. Therefore, possible that perceptions differed substantially between the ministers concerning, for example, preparations for external assistance from the Western Powers.

Constitutional aspects The Cabinet collectively responsible for the decisions made. To a limited extent, individual ministers are authorized to make decisions on their own. This has, however, hardly any implications for the issues studied by this Commission. Consequently, the Cabinet formally stands behind decisions, actions, and official statements by an individual minister, the remaining ministers de facto may not be aware of even them. Officials representing subordinate government authorities must never have reason to doubt that each Cabinet member charged with an issue represents the authority of the entire Cabinet; and likewise, that

248 How much did the Government know

information supplied by a subordinate authority to a Cabinet member will be forwarded to all ministers concerned. The Military High Command could thus assume that the Minister of Defence was representing the Cabinet’s view on issues concerning the National Defence. the Minister of Defence had been briefed, the High Command’s duty to inform the Cabinet can generally be viewed as having been fulfilled.

7.2 Partial Scandinavian defence cooperation

The initiative

The period from the end of the 1940s and the years immediately following was characterized by intensive discussions between the political and military leadership on Scandinavian defence cooperation in various forms. In September 1949, as related above, the Government authorized the Military High Command, through the Chief of the Defence Staff, Nils Swedlund, to take certain contacts with the Danish ‘and Norwegian armed forces. Already in February that same year, Swedlund had submitted a memorandum on this subject to Prime Minister Erlander. In his diary, Erlander called Swedlund’s list a proposal for military[telephone] operator cooperation with Norway and Denmark, and commented presumably concerned innocuous things, but I asked him anyway to defer any initiatives---. The day following Swedlund’s briefing, however, Erlander raised the issue in the Cabinet, and agreed that was no negotiations were to be conducted with Denmark and Norway until more detailed directives had been given. Erlander commented on Swedlund’s briefing on the issue to the Cabinet on 20 May 1949 Swedlund described his thinking on the so-called limited military cooperation with Norway. I now hope that Vougt can muster the remnants of his courage so that he can make clear to the generals that we do not intend any military cooperation with Norway now. After Swedlund again briefed the Cabinet on the issue on 6 September 1949, however, Undén informed him that the Cabinet had agreed to parts of his proposal. According to Undén’s notes, the Cabinet had no objection to contacts on purely technical preparations, i.e. exch.[anges] of messages. Codes for radio communications mutual reporting. -

interceptor control. air surveillance Weather service, etc.

presumed that an exchange of information, etc. plarmed in the event of Sweden also being dragged into war. Issues and naval a on army cooperation should, however, in most aspects, be deferred. Concerning key issues, Swedlund’s and Undén’s notes thus largely

How much did the Government know 249

convey, as was stated above, a concordant picture of the Cabinet’s position. As regards the items for which Swedlund given the was authorization to proceed, e. g. plans for the establishment of communications between the countries, and plans for coordination of air surveillance, air defence command and control, search and missions for rescue the air force, and the military weather service, the unanimity also was complete in a formal sense. possible, however, to doubt somewhat whether the Cabinet and Swedlund actually meant the things. For same the Cabinet, or at least for Undén, appears as the question purely was one of creating technical preconditions for wartime cooperation. Swedlund’s memorandum, which in this respect had received Cabinet approval, gives the impression of aiming at more far-reaching preparations for such cooperation. Undén, however, believed that they apparently were in complete agreement. On our part, one can imagine exchanging experiences on weapons technical issues with Norway and Denmark, standardization some regarding equipment, signalling, etc. clear that this cannot be exclaimed in the streets. The Military High Command shares the Cabinet’s view that cooperation of this kind and should exist. can

At a meeting with the Advisory Council Foreign Affairs 9 on on September 1949, Erlander explained that Sweden ought to do whatever could for the arming of the Scandinavian states. On the other hand, Sweden could not enter into binding cooperation carrying considerable risks but few actual rewards. For Denmark and Norway many years, were not to have any National Defence in the true sense. At the Nordic foreign minister meeting in Copenhagen 13 on September 1949, Undén raised with the Danish and Norwegian ministers of foreign affairs the prospects of Sweden cooperating militarily with Denmark and Norway after their accession to the Atlantic Treaty. He emphasized that the Swedish policy of neutrality could not be compromised by measures implying that Sweden in effect appeared allied to Denmark and Norway. This general attitude did not preclude certain a degree of technical cooperation between the Swedish National Defence on the one hand, and the Danish and Norwegian National Defences on the other. Undén had apparently, while referring to Swedlund’s memorandum, explained that the Swedish Military High Command sought to provide information on such possible cases of cooperation, and this list was neither long especially significant. The Swedish nor Government to take position the kind and of such was a on extent military cooperation on a case-by-case basis. As mentioned above, carmot be precluded that the Cabinet and the Military High Command had somewhat different interpretations of what Undén had told Swedlund on the Cabinet’s decision after the briefing on

[Km

250 How much did the Government know

6 September. clear, however, that the Cabinet agreed that certain technical preparations to be made for the exchange of messages, air were force command and control, and air surveillance. The Cabinet had apparently also agreed to the combined exercises. carried out that year between the Norwegian and Swedish air forces, e. over the Gothenburg area. Furthermore, a committee was appointed with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Defence to study possible cooperation with Denmark for the defence of Oresund. What position the Cabinet took the proposal of the so-called on

Oresund Committee not known to the Commission Cf section 6.5.

The 1950 Foreign Policy Declaration

In the Cabinet’s Foreign Policy Declaration of March 1950, the idea of peacetime military cooperation between Sweden, Demnark, and Norway which could compromise the policy of neutrality was generally rejected. Expressly excluded, however, were only combined staff talks and combined defence plarming with the Scandinavian neighbour states. That

left unstated room for a technical cooperation in a more narrow sense,

i.e. of the kind for which Swedlund had received permission. Undén’s diary entries show that the declaration to be understood in this The day that the declaration was presented, there was a way. same party leader conference, at which Undén wrote down The participants had received address in advance. Both Ohlin and my Andrén [representatives of the Liberals and the Conservatives, respectively] believed that the Cabinet had ’closed the door’ to technical cooperation with Denmark and Norway in the area of defence. We [e.g., Erlander and Undén] showed that we had developed one form of cooperation, declared incompatible with Sweden’s policy. We bypassed other possible cases, which had to be assessed on a case-bycase basis. When especially Andrén complained that we had not shown greater appreciation of the views of the Western Powers, I asked the gentlemen had not realized that General Jung’s speech had undermined the confidence that the Soviet Union had in the sincerity of Sweden’s foreign policy. This would be the most striking in the current situation. We have to express ourselves so clearly that we, as far possible, will repair the damage caused by Jung. as While distancing itself from a particular form of Scandinavian cooperation which would not come into being, e.g., combined staff talks and defence planning, the Cabinet hoped to be convincing of the credibility of the Swedish policy of neutrality. According to the Cabinet’s view, that credibility had been undermined by address by the Supreme Coman mander to students in Lund at the end of 1949, where he had dwelled the Swedish requirements for assistance from the Western Powers upon

How much did the Government know 251

in the event of a Soviet attack. About a week later, Jung and Swedlund submitted a report on Scandinavian cooperation to Erlander and Undén that Erlander found completely satisfactory. According to the generals, nothing has been implemented except what can be regarded as completely natural to us. No staff talks, no common plans. The have not even asked the Danes about their intentions and plans or mining of Oresund. The contacts made have apparently been strictly on the mark; not undertake anything that can be used to compromise our foreign policy.

Further contacts

As the previous section shows, after the negotiations for a Scandinavian defence union broke down, Erlander assumed reserved position a on Scandinavian military cooperation as such. In the spring of 1950, he emphasized to the Supreme Commander that the neutrality policy would not be allowed to be compromised by a military cooperation of little so substance as this technical-military [cooperation]. When Swedlund in early 1953 wanted Sweden to make clear to Norway that the suggested command structure within NATO would render impossible the little cooperation existing with the Norwegians, since this meant British command across the board, Erlander was very hesistant to intervene. He did not assign the cooperation any greater significance, the military follows the Cabinet’s narrow instructions. On the other hand, Undén did not object to raising the issue with the Norwegian ambassador in Stockholm. For that reason, in the spring of 1956, Jarl Hjalmarson, the Conservative Party leader, threatened to reveal the existing cooperation with the

West the Trondheim route, training of Norwegian officers at the

Swedish Army Staff and War College, procurement of weapons, expert visits, etc., Erlander asked Torsten Nilsson to inform the Supreme Commander of the situation. We [e.g., Erlander and Nilsson] agreed that no form of military cooperation should exist that we are not prepared to account for publicly. Were such [cooperation] under way now, shall be terminated. In conjunction with the Hjalmarson affair of 1959, Hjalmarson explained that he saw himself forced to prove that the Swedish National Defence was working with NATO and had its support, by revealing the procurement of missiles, the Trondheim facility, and the secret agreements reached during Vougt’s tenure as Minister of Defence concerning certain joint signalling facilities with Norway and Demnark. For this reason, Erlander explained to Sven Andersson that the damage that Hjalmarson could thus cause would have to be repaired by breaking

252 How much did the Government know

the connections with Norway and Denmark, which cannot be playing any greater role for our defence anyway. These quotations from the 1956 and 1959 diary entries are not

completely concordant. clear that Erlander was concerned that the technical-military cooperation with Denmark and Norway might

compromise Swedish security policy, without providing Sweden with any significant advantages. On the other hand, he believed that was

valuable to know of parts of Danish and Norwegian war planning.

To the extent contacts with the military high commands in the Scandinavian neighbouring states could’ establish connections with the Western great primarily the United States, the issue appears,

powers, according to Erlander’s position, to have been viewed in a somewhat

different light. This will be further discussed in the next section. Suffice,

here to mention that when Swedlund in October 1953 informed [Erlander] that the NATO commanders had decided that all contacts with

Sweden to via Norway, Erlander perceived this as something

were go

positive That was probably good.

-

Summary

As stated above Cf section 6.1, has not been possible to establish, in

detail, what the Scandinavian defence cooperation incorporated. In addition, the available information does not provide any certain

of the extent to which the Cabinet was informed of the details assurance

of these activities. clear, however, that the Military High Command did not act totally its There no indications that the Military

on own. are

High Command exceeded its authority. appears as the Cabinet was influenced by two, partly conflicting,

interests in its view the Scandinavian contacts. On the one hand, there on

that the contacts could compromise Swedish security policy,

was concern

without offering Sweden significant advantages. On the other hand,

any realized that these contacts could help to establish appears as was links with the Western great which were deemed valuable. powers,

Undoubtedly, there a connection in time between the expansion of Sweden’s military contacts with the United States, and the Government’s diminishing interest in Scandinavian defence cooperation. There are to view this sign that was key for the Government’s to

reasons as a assistance from the Western great in the event of a Soviet secure powers attack on Sweden.

How much did the Government know 253

7.3 Contacts with the Western

great powers

The first years

Already early on, was clear, at least to Erlander, that the Swedish National Defence was dependent military support from the Western on great powers to endure in the event of a Soviet attack.. Thus in the spring of 1948, Erlander explained to the Supreme Commander that the

Defence Staff should continue studying the issue of U.S. bases for Western air in Sweden, especially in consideration of the costs to the

United States, and whether the advantages sufficiently great to were motivate the costs. In the Government declaration of 9 February 1949, Erlander and Undén had explained that when discussing neutrality in peacetime, one can only mean that a state, which, in wartime, wishes to strive to remain outside the conflict, does not in peacetime tie its hands by entering into alliance treaties, rendering neutrality impossible in wartime. According to the Prime and Foreign Affairs Ministers, Sweden’s security policy thus meant only the absence of alliance treaty. On the occasion, an same Erlander went one step further when he said Let us together transform Scandinavia into a fortress strongly defended, that attack against so an us will mean that our territory transformed into base for a area another, non-aggressive great-power grouping. A Soviet attack on Sweden would thus lead to our territory being put at the disposal of the Western Powers as a basing area. After the breakdown of the negotiations to create Scandinavian a

defence union and in conjunction with the presentation

of the memorandum on partial Scandinavian defence cooperation, Swedlund raised with Erlander the issue of Sweden’s relations with the United States. He emphasized Sweden’s dependence on the West for equipment and supplies. And he stressed the necessity of informing the Americans of weaknesses and capabilities of Sweden’s defence. According to Swedlund, Erlander definitely much agreed. Swedlund briefed very [him] on the intention to inform the U.S. defence attachés in Stockholm, and to brief Americans in the United States through the Swedish military attache in Washington. According to Swedlund, Erlander believed that this was appropriate. Naturally, was known to and accepted by the Cabinet that extensive contacts already existed around the turn of the decade 1949-50 with the United Kingdom on e.g. training of military personnel and procurement. But Erlander at least knew that relations not confined to this. After were deliberations with the Military High Command in early 1951, Erlander thus established that Swedlund knew almost alarmingly much about the

254 How much did the Government know

plarming of the Atlantic Pact states. In October that same year,

Swedlund informed Erlander that he had informed the United States that

ought to dispatch qualified military attaché to Stockholm. not

a known whether Erlander also realized that Swedlund with this initiative

aimed at preparing for wartime cooperation with the United States.

As discussed in section 6.1.2, the Minister of Defence, Vougt, delivered memorandum to the British Govermnent in March 1951 on a the organization of the Swedish armed forces, equipment, and plarming for Soviet attack. The content of the memorandum must be considered a to have been top secret. Erlander had read the memorandum before

sent, but his vigilance off guard somewhat since [he] knew that

was was Undén would review it. However, that was not to be the case.

exceptional in Swedish politics when the Cabinet

was an move submitted detailed information Swedish defence resources and defence on

plarming to the British Government, aiming at securing military assistance in the event of Soviet attack. Vougt’s memorandum,

a

delivered to Henderson without objections from Erlander, did obviously transgress the limits of Swedish freedom of action, laid down in the Government’s declaration to Parliament the previous year. should also be noted that Vougt, for his part, initially was prepared to continue the

contacts at Cabinet-level when visiting London.

Against the background of the earlier exchange of information between Swedish and British military officers, uncertain how much of the memorandum to the British. This notwithstanding, Vougt’s

was news

action naturally perceived by the British sign that parts of the

was as a

Swedish Cabinet were now prepared to expand the military cooperation between Sweden and the United Kingdom. British interest in using this Swedish position, however, received a markedly reserved reply

new

from both Vougt and Erlander. Apparently, they had not realized the of sending the memorandum, and when they did, they

consequences

sought control the damage by declining British overtures for dis-

to

cussions military cooperation. Vougt’s memorandum not only most

on

remarkable but, far know, without parallel in the post-war

as as we

The British also seem to have understood Vougt’s departure from

era. the Cabinet in the autumn of 1951 further indication that his Cabinet as a

colleagues unprepared to continue his policy.

were According to British information from 1952, the Swedish Govermnent should have authorized the Defence Staff to establish some form of planning liaison with AFNORTH. And in 1954, the Foreign Office

observed that the Swedish Government had recently agreed that the

Swedish National Defence to maintain contacts with the United was

Kingdom, which the British considered valuable. According to British information, in the early 1950s, Swedish officers appear to have shown

How much did the Government know 255

greater interest in other contexts in cooperating with the United Kingdom than the Government could be expected to accept. This allegedly the was case especially concerning cooperation between the naval forces. The British, however, seem to have doubted the will and ability of the Swedish officers to carry this interest through into concrete results, contrary to Government intentions. We have not been able to find any signs of concrete measures of which the Government uninformed. was After Denmark and Norway in 1953 agreed to preparations to base U.S. air forces in both countries, party leader talks held in May at were which Erlander, Undén, Torsten Nilsson, Hedlund, Ohlin, and Hjalmarson were present. Swedlund and the Chief of the Defence Staff,

Akerman, then presented their view on the new military—political

situation. Swedlund emphasized according to Erlander that the Military ‘High Command had reached the following conclusions The most important military support was strikes from foreign bases against enemy attacks. was difficult to improvise cooperation implying that the same airport served as a base for both our own and foreign aircraft. On the other hand, should not take much time to vacate certain airports which could be completely left to the disposal of those providing assistance. Supply of equipment from the West should be guaranteed here and now. Erlander does not to have had objections to this seem any analysis. Here, the 1948 issue making airfields available to the Western on Powers resurfaced. not known to what extent the Cabinet had an opinion on which airfields considering the length and load capacity of their runways could receive foreign air. A few later, of the - years one longest runways of any base in Sweden during the 1950s and ’60s was completed on the East Coast. The Commission made the assessment above that this and a few other runways were expanded partly to allow Western heavy aircraft to land, especially connection with emergencies

Cf section 6.9.

In May 1953 also, a Swedish military delegation visited the United States to discuss problems Sweden would face the event of attack an from the Soviet Union. The Govermnent must have agreed to this visit. In October 1953, Erlander noted with satisfaction that the NATO commanders had decided that all contacts with Sweden to via were go Norway.

256 How much did the Government know

Considerations connection with the 1958 Defence Decision

The analysis made at the party leader talks in 1953 resurfaced in the proceedings of the 1955 Defence Committee as 1956 secretariat a memorandum Cf section 3.3.3. According to this memorandum, in the of Soviet attack, Sweden should seek to hold out until the event a Western Powers could render assistance. The most important form of assistance that could be expected interdiction of Soviet bases, was embarkation ports, and communications, and the relief that operations on other fronts implied. But also direct support i.e. in the form of strikes with atomic against sealift concentration, could be brought to weapons a

the fore. To promote such direct support in particular but also indirect

support, in wartime to have, for example, liaison was necessary communications equipment, and some measures planned in groups, peacetime to coordinate air operations. The memorandum emphasized that state could be sure of direct no assistance after the outbreak of A state’s strength was the best war. own guarantee of receiving support, could be provided. The indirect significant. Preparations required to utilize support was the most were direct assistance. Some such preparations were said to have been implemented already, and others could be implemented. Some preparations, however, of such nature that they could not be made in were a advance, since they required planning, insight into the plarming common of the Western Powers, and disclosure of Swedish plarming. Therefore, indirect support was primarily hoped for. For direct support, preparations were required, which considering Sweden’s position of non-participation in alliances could only partly be carried out in peacetime. Some preparations had also been made.

Olle Karleby, who served Secretary-General of the Defence

as Committee, has said the following in the of interview with the course an Commission. would have been irresponsible to refrain from preparing such could be prepared within practical limits for the measures as eventuality of Sweden becoming victim of aggression from the East. Non-participation in alliances did, however, rule out peacetime preparations for operational -cooperation. But to the extent was possible to coordinate technical systems facilitating cooperation at a later stage, would be plain stupid not to take such an opportunity. Karleby mentioned coordination of the VHF link system and an expansion of Air Force in excess of the minimum requirements for our own runways, aircraft, examples of this type of preparations. as As described above, Karleby and Torsten Nilsson, the Committee chairman, has commented preliminary description of the work of on a the 1955 Defence Committee, where was stated that the 1956

How much did the Government know 257

secretariat memorandum in all essentials reflected the opinions of the leadership of the Ministry. They have not objected to this description. Against this backdrop, clear to the Commission that the Minister of Defence and his closest colleagues intent that Sweden, with the

were

greatest possible consideration for the policy of neutrality, should make preparations so as to be able in a threatening, not closely defined

- more

situation to receive military support quickly from the Western Powers,

-

and that to a certain extent such preparations actually made in the

were mid-1950s.

Military actions

At least the Minister of Defence knew of and agreed to the actions in the

following years the expansion of the VHF communications links to

-

Denmark and Norway, the connection with Wiesbaden, and the intensified plarming for the liaison

groups.

Accordingly, Sven Andersson, who had succeeded Torsten Nilsson

as Minister of Defence in 1957, arranged briefing for the Cabinet before a the SVENORDA cooperation was made public. The head of the tele communications section of the Defence Staff, i.e. the officer who was

responsible for the signal links, was called in to conduct the briefing. Referring to the planned expansion of the VHF communications with Denmark and Norway in the early 1960s, Bo Westin, who then served as head of section the Defence Staff, said that he could probably

say that [Andersson] was in complete agreement with this, us on e.g., on

what possibilities for communicating with NATO the air safety

cooperation offered. Westin has also said that he careful make that was to sure

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sven Anderson informed

were on whatever might border on what were allowed to do within the limits we of our directives.

Those who were responsible for installing the telex link with Wiesbaden have said that they of the impression that the action

were was

sanctioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Anders Thunborg has explained that, after assuming the duties Under-Secretary of the

as

Ministry of Defence, he was told that information could be exchanged

with NATO in Wiesbaden via telex. Carl Eric Almgren has said that the Minister of Defence informed was

of the plarming for liaison that

groups and he, together with the

Supreme Commander, Rapp, had stopped becoming extensive

more

than already was. Almgren has also explained that the Government had been informed throughout to what preparations had been made,

as

and authorized these step-by-step. In December 1963, Almgren, Mangard, and Westin submittedl

an

258 How much did the Government know

account to Erlander Sweden’s connections with the West. Erlander on

commented It probably correct that all looks worse than is; but the meeting probably useful in stressing how important in the

was

Cabinet’s opinion that the National Defence observes absolute neutrality,

also when collecting information.

On the other hand, nothing has emerged indicating that the Cabinet or

of its members informed of the idea of certain coordination of any was a

IFF with the Western Powers of the significance of Loran C

systems or

navigational tool for air forces.

as a When Anders Thunborg assumed the position as Under-Secretary of

the Ministry of Defence in 1969, Sven Andersson and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Stig Synnergren, made clear to him that Sweden in the

of might cooperate with NATO. The Cabinet had therefore event war

sanctioned the National Defence already in peacetime having contacts with the West and also making certain preparations for cooperation in

wartime.

Summary

obvious that the Cabinet anxious that the contacts with the was

Western Powers should not acquire such manifestations that the officially declared policy of neutrality would be compromised domestically or internationally. At the same time, the country’s security requirements could be neglected. The Cabinet not infrequently had to weigh

not

carefully the and this regard. was important to the

pros cons Government that Swedish officers did not go too far when striving to

cooperate with foreign counterparts. Generally, Swedish officers appear have accepted this, the Government had made its position clear.

to once

Nothing has appeared to indicate that the Military High Command withheld anything of import from the political leadership, i.e. the Minister of Defence, concerning the preparations made for receiving

external military assistance. Thus, the Minister of Defence was informed

of the preparations to be able to dispatch high-level military personnel in crisis situation to those NATO states most significant to Sweden. He

a further briefed the communications links established with Denwas on

mark, Norway, and USAFE in West Germany, and their significance for comprehensive coordination of air operations. He also knew of the

a

expansion, of the minimum requirements for Swedish aircraft,

in excess of runways of certain airbases.

Already in the autumn of 1949, the Cabinet had also sanctioned the plarming for coordinating air surveillance which later was estab-

common lished between Norway and Sweden. The mentioned in this context stated in section 6.9, measures were, as

How much did the Government know 259

of key importance for Sweden to promote support from the Western Powers. To what extent the knowledge of the existing cooperation with the Western Powers was disseminated within the Cabinet uncertain. possible and even likely that most ministers did not have any comprehensive insight into the preparations for receiving external assistance under way in the 1950s and 1960s. The Minister of Defence could have kept this knowledge to himself. however, practically out of the question that key members of the Cabinet during this period were not to have known about the expectations that the Swedish National Defence would come to be assisted by the Western Powers, in particularly by U.S. bombing missions.

Concluding assessment 261

8 Concluding assessment

Security policy objectives

Decisive for the context in which Swedish post-war security and foreign policy should be viewed the fact that, from the end of the 1940s and long thereafter, the risk of a major war in Europe was judged to be considerable, on a few occasions immediate. This especially the was case in the earlier phase of the period that the Commission.has been studying. The security policy objective was then, as earlier, to uphold Sweden’s freedom and independence. The peacetime of achieving this means was in addition to maintaining a strong National Defence to safeguard an independent position outside the great power blocs and thereby to ensure that Sweden was not automatically drawn into a possible great-power war. The formula used to define this policy non-participation in was alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in Gradually, this policy war. came to be described in short as the policy of neutrality.

Threat concepts

The Soviet Union was perceived as the only imaginable attacker. The risk of an isolated Soviet attack on Sweden deemed small. In the was event of a major war, Sweden had to be prepared for the possibility of its neutrality policy failing and the country being attacked. The Swedish political and military leadership, however, appear to have judged realistic that Sweden could avoid being drawn into third world a war. Within NATO, different opinions seem to have existed on Sweden’s prospects of remaining neutral in a major The predominant opinion war. seems to have been that there was a low probability for Sweden to avoid

a Soviet attack in such a situation See Eden’s l952memorandum and

NSC 60061 of 1960; section 6.1.2 and 4.4, respectively. The Under- Secretary at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence in the early 1950s has also confirmed that the Norwegians well the British and the as as Americans doubted that Sweden could remain outside a major On war. the other hand, high-ranking Norwegian officers have reported to the Commission that the Norwegian National Defence and AFNORTH believed that the Soviet Union, in a war with the Western Powers, in its own interest mainly would respect Swedish neutrality. Soviet overflights

262 Concluding assessment

of Swedish airspace were, however, to be reckoned with.

Defence until assistance arrives

The prevailing Swedish assessment was that Sweden could not resist a Soviet attack unaided for any length of time. Weeks or months were discussed. In a more prolonged war, Sweden would thus be totally dependent on Western assistance. Therefore, became a widely accepted view, and until the mid—1950s the view expressed by the Government authorities on official situations, that the aim had to be for Sweden to be able to defend itself until assistance arrived, i.e. until the Western Powers could provide support. Later the use of this wording was discontinued, but instead was discussed more generally that Sweden ran the risk of being drawn into a war only in conjunction with a major European conflict where the attacker would not be able to focus all his resources on Sweden. was argued that the attacker would, when considering an attack on Sweden, actually have to reckon with NATO actions. Sweden realized that the key precondition for the Western Powers to provide Sweden with assistance was that they deemed such actions to be in their own interest. The starting point was that this would generally be the case, i.e. that was realistic to count on assistance. That this was an accurate assessment evident from inter alia the U.S. National Security Council policy decisions of 1952 and 1960. For the defence of the Northern part of the European NATO area was deemed of vital importance that Sweden did not come under Soviet control.

Indirect and direct assistance The assistance Sweden could hope for from the Western Powers was principally of two different types, viz indirect and direct assistance. Indirect assistance referred to Western attacks on targets in the Soviet Union from which attacks could be launched also on Sweden, as well as Western operations in other directions tying up the Soviet-bloc armed forces. Direct assistance referred to attacks on Soviet-bloc operations on Swedish territory or immediately beyond Sweden’s borders, in close cooperation with the Swedish National Defence. Also, the provision of supplies to the Swedish National Defence was perceived as a part of the indirect assistance. The distinction between indirect and direct assistance was in practice assessed to be rather vague. These two types of assistance were touched upon already the 1949 Scandinavian Defence Committee report. In the following years, in talks between the Cabinet and the Military High Command, the possibility of

Concluding assessment 263

making certain airbases available to Western air and the idea of naval cooperation for convoying of ships in the Skagerrak and the North Sea were mentioned. In time, however, became clear that the reception of such assistance would require extensive preparations. Even such preparations were made, would be some time before the assistance could take effect. Against this background not surprising that no such preparations were made. Only few later, in the 1955 Defence Committee, interest a years actually focused entirely on indirect assistance and on direct assistance bordering on indirect assistance. Such assistance, primarily in the form of bombing missions by the Western great-power air forces, required limited preparations and could also be provided rapidly and arrest an attack on Sweden. airbases and embarkation ports on the other side of the Baltic Sea were attacked, with or without nuclear weapons, was well-nigh inconceivable that a Soviet attack on Sweden could be successfully completed. The indirect assistance could be secured in war or appeared credible in peacetime would thus apparently have decisive -

consequences both for Sweden’s defence capabilities and for its overall

security policy position.

Preparations to receive assistance During the 1950s and early 1960s, Sweden took a number of measures, mostly based on the analysis of external assistance in the 1955 Defence Committee. The most important of these were the plans to dispatch liaison groups of high operational competence to foreign headquarters, the establishment of secure communications links with Norway and Denmark which could be further connected within the NATO system, and the expansion of airbase runways for the heavy great-power aviation

close to the Swedish East Coast. The IFF measures Cf section 6.6 also

fit into this picture. In the Commission’s opinion, these measures were of limited extent but nevertheless served their purpose and were essential, in a threatening but not more closely defined situation to facilitate the reception of assistance primarily in the form of bombing missions on a strategicoperational level, in accordance with the analysis by the 1955 Defence Committee. At the same time, evident that the measures would have been incomplete and insufficient the aim had been to prepare for tacticaloperational cooperation. As a step in these preparations, extensive general contact-creating activities also occurred between Sweden’s National Defence and those of the Western Powers, as well as mutual exchanges of information on military technical advances, not least of intelligence concerning the Warsaw Pact .

264 Concluding assessment

Concluding assessment

The above shows that a considerable risk of a major war in Europe from the end of the 1940s and long thereafter. According to Swedish assessments, there was a risk of Sweden being drawn into such a war and attacked by the Soviet Union. Were this to happen, we would not be able to endure alone for any length of time. The main security policy aim of the state authorities was, as far as possible, to secure Sweden’s freedom and independence. Theoretically, was possible to undertake a massive expansion of the Swedish National Defence. The small country’s resources, however, set limits for what could be accomplished by so doing. must therefore have appeared necessary to seek to secure or at least make probable some type of wartime support in the defence of Sweden. At the same time, was a strong Swedish interest that measures with this aim should not lead to such ties that we automatically would be drawn into a great-power war. Against this background, focusing on indirect assistance served its purpose. By taking limited mainly unilateral measures, favourable - preconditions could be created for assistance which could be deployed rapidly and, in addition, could more or less immediately arrest an attack on Sweden. The decisive issue was of course whether the Western Powers i.e. primarily the United States would have been prepared to - — provide the presupposed indirect assistance. As far as has been established, no guarantees ever existed. According to now declassified U.S. policy documents, the United States appears still to have been fully intent on assisting Sweden. has not been possible to establish whether this U.S. policy was known in Sweden at the time. The efforts of the Cabinet and the Military High Command to prepare Sweden for a contingency when the neutrality policy was on the verge of failure and the country was threatened with imminent attack by the Soviet Union undoubtedly meant, in many cases, difficult balances. Specific actions taken can be discussed. The Commission’s overall assessment, however, that would have been irreconcilable with the responsibility resting with Sweden’s political and military leadership, had no measures been taken to facilitate the reception of assistance from the Western great powers.

Four follow-up questions

Given the above stated necessity of making certain preparations for receiving assistance of interest to shed light upon the consequences of the policy choice in four dimensions international law; Sweden’s security-policy freedom of action; Soviet reactions; and finally,

Concluding assessment 265

concordance between policy publicly declared and implemented.

International law aspects The first issue concerns whether the measures taken contravened Sweden’s obligations according to international law. According to international law, as stated in section 2.1, not even a permanently neutral state may be precluded from conducting peacetime discussions with another state or a military alliance on how assistance would be provided in the event of the neutral state being attacked. For a state like Sweden not committed to neutrality by treaty or national legislation, such any restrictions applied even less. What has emerged concerning Swedish preparations to receive military assistance from the Western Powers in the event of an attack from the Soviet Union has thus, in the Commission’s opinion, been completely compatible with international law.

Was freedom of action in security policy lost

has been stated above that Sweden’s independent position outside of the great power blocs was a means to the overall end of securing the country’s freedom and independence. Through this, we intended to avoid being automatically drawn into a great-power war. Had the freedom of action been lost as a consequence of the preparations to receive assistance our position would have been worse than that of the NATO states. They could benefit from well-prepared and extensive military cooperation which of course was out of the question for Sweden. Nothing has appeared, however, to suggest that the Swedish Military High Command together with representatives of the armed forces of the Western Powers drew up any plans to coordinate operational activities with NATO in the event of a Soviet attack on Sweden or on the Scandinavian neighbour states. In this context important to emphasize that the preparations for receiving assistance mainly unilateral, were and that the operational contacts with the Western Powers during the first half of the 1950s, as far as the Commission involved ties aware, no or obligations to act in a certain manner in war or diminished the prospects of remaining outside major Sweden not attacked. a war, was In this sense, Sweden’s freedom of action was not restricted. There also another aspect to take into account concerning Swedish freedom of action, viz whether the Swedish preparations to receive assistance from the Western Powers would have reduced Sweden’s prospects of withstanding pressures or take actions against [territorial] violations from the West in a critical situation. does not likely appear

266 Concluding assessment

that the Swedish preparations would have had real meaning in this any regard. The preparations to receive assistance were most likely viewed confirmation of Swedish realism than something which in more as a as itself provided the West with a strengthened negotiating position. should be added that the Commission has information in come across no Swedish foreign archives which sheds closer light on this issue. or

Soviet perceptions of Sweden

An additional issue what impact the Swedish preparations could have had in Moscow. certainly known that some form of intelligence was cooperation with the Western Powers existed. In addition, Sweden openly procured advanced military equipment from the Western Powers and participated in Cocom’s control of technology transfer to the Eastern bloc. The official contacts possibly other contacts too between the - - Swedish National Defence and the military establishments of the Western

Powers should have been well known in Moscow. Through espionage

and the exploitation of leaks, the Soviet Union attempted to augment the perception of Sweden already created by other sources. The full picture also included Sweden Western democracy having ideological as a affinities with both the Nordic neighbouring states and the Western great

powers. Therefore, in opinion, be presumed that the Soviet Union, our can for these general suspected convinced that Sweden reasons, or was even operational issues cooperated with the Western Powers. Nonalso on official Soviet assessments also indicated that they viewed the wording of the Swedish Defence Doctrine to be of secondary importance since they did not reckon with Swedish neutrality as being possible in the of major Against this background, uncertain whether event a war. potential specific knowledge of preparations made to facilitate Western assistance would have significantly affected the Soviet image of Sweden. Moscow was convinced that operational cooperation existed, possible, that this view could give rise to two partly opposing moreover, effects. On the hand, be argued that the Soviet Union would one can have been less inclined to respect Swedens territorial integrity, the Swedish National Defence perceived an integrated part of NATO was as and believed that Sweden would automatically joint the West in was

the of major On the other hand, conceivable that an

event a war. impression of Swedish association with NATO, and consequently, risks of counteraction from the Western Powers in the event of an attack on Sweden, might have served deterrent the Soviet Union and thus as a on helped preserve the peace.

Concluding assessment 267

Was there a full correspondence between declared policy and actual

policy implementation Finally, there the issue of possible discrepancy between the foreign and security policy publicly declared by the Government and actions actually taken. Obviously, the Government has no obligation to make public information on the plarming of and activities for the defence of the country, can be assumed that making such information public would be detrimental to national security. But at the same time, a requirement must be that the Government does not knowingly provide misleading or false information. From this point of view, has been judged of interest to examine the information in these aspects which the Government presented in significant foreign policy statements in Parliament or in the bills preceding the defence decisions during the pertinent years. Such an examination has shown that the Government especially on two occasions, discussed the issue of preparations for military cooperation with other states, viz in the 1950 Foreign Policy Declaration and in Prime Minister Erlander’s reply to a question in Parliament on the so-called Hjalmarson affair in 1959. At the same time, the 1959 debate was the culmination of a debate on and off during the 1950s on the boundaries and prerequisites for the — policy of neutrality. In the 1950 declaration, the Government dissociated itself from such preparations for cooperation bordering on defence union. This concerned, for example, combined staff talks and combined defence plans, i.e. combined preparations for operational cooperation in war, regarded as incompatible with the Swedish policy of neutrality. On the other hand, unilateral Swedish measures that could facilitate operational coordination with other states at a later date, for example in the form of reception of an indirect assistance war, were not precluded. Against this background, the extensive exchange of information with the Western Powers in the 1950s with the obvious exception of Vougt’s memorandum must of 1951 be judged to come within the limits of the 1950 declaration. another issue that this can have created the essentially false impression that the Government opposed all forms of military cooperation with other states. The Prime Minister’s reply to the question in Parliament in 1959 categorically ruled out preparations for and consultations on military cooperation with members of a great-power alliance. As related above in chapter however, must have been clear to the Government, first that unilateral preparations had been made for the kind of cooperation which would have made possible to receive primarily indirect assistance from the United States or the United Kingdom, and second,

268 Concluding assessment

that there had been consultations and other contacts with Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States on military cooperation andor reception of wartime assistance. The 1959 statement thus conveyed deliberately picture of what had actually a erroneous occurred. In this context should be noted that the planning for assistance, far the Commission has been able to assess, continued as as without major changes in the years following 1959. Furthermore, worth mentioning that the pertinent section of the 1959 reply to the question in Parliament had been omitted when the Government 1968 returned to certain issues what the policy of neutrality required. on With the exception of the l959 reply, the Governments officially stated positions and declarations provided scope for national, unilateral receive military assistance from and to cooperate with the preparations to Western Powers in the event of Soviet attack on Sweden. As emphaa sized above, Sweden’s contingency preparations for war, as far as they have been disclosed, did not transgress these limits. must be concluded that, by and large, those preparations had Government approval.