(1) Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis and Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness,

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEDINA

delivered on 4 June 2026 ( 1 )

Case C ‑ 229/25

GQ,

IF

v

MVCI Management, S.L.,

MVCI Holidays, S.L.,

MVCI Playa Andaluza Holidays, S.L.

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Marbella (Court of First Instance No 2, Marbella, Spain))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Acquisition of a right to use immovable property on a timeshare basis – Directive 94/47/EC – Contracts for the timeshare use of immovable property – Directive 2008/122/EC – Action for annulment of timeshare or similar contracts – Action for restitution of sums paid under the contract declared null and void – Action for recovery of the part of the contract price paid as a penalty for breach of the prohibition on advance payments – Principle of effectiveness – Limitation period – Point from which the limitation period begins to run )

I. Introduction

1. A timeshare contract is defined under Directive 2008/122/EC ( 2 ) as ‘a contract of a duration of more than one year under which a consumer, for consideration, acquires the right to use one or more overnight accommodation for more than one period of occupation’. The timeshare contracts concern, mainly, holiday accommodation. ( 3 ) They were initially governed by Directive 94/47/EC, ( 4 ) which was repealed by Directive 2008/122 (together, ‘the Timeshare Directives’). The latter directive extended consumer protection to holiday products similar to timeshare contracts.

2. The Timeshare Directives aim to strengthen consumer protection in the field of timeshare (or similar) contracts characterised, according to the European Commission’s report on the evaluation of Directive 2008/122, by long-term commitments or significant financial risks for consumers. ( 5 ) This is ensured by the rules on precontractual and contractual information, the right of withdrawal and the prohibition on advance payments.

3. The present case concerns the possible limitations, brought about by the principle of effectiveness, to the national rules on the limitation period applicable to the remedies laid down by national law for breach of the Timeshare Directives’ rules on information and the prohibition on advance payments. It gives the Court the opportunity to examine, for the first time, the EU consumer protection rules in the field of timesharing from the perspective of the principle of procedural autonomy, as limited by the principle of effectiveness.

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

1. Directive 94/47

4. Article 3 of Directive 94/47 provided:

‘1. The Member States shall make provision in their legislation for measures to ensure that the vendor is required to provide any person requesting information on the immovable property or properties with a document which, in addition to a general description of the property or properties, shall provide at least brief and accurate information on the particulars referred to in points (a) to (g), (i) and (l) of the Annex and on how further information may be obtained.

2. The Member States shall make provision in their legislation to ensure that all the information referred to in paragraph 1 which must be provided in the document referred to in paragraph 1 forms an integral part of the contract.

…’

5. According to Article 4 of Directive 94/47:

‘The Member States shall make provision in their legislation to ensure that:

– the contract, which shall be in writing, includes at least the items referred to in the Annex,

…’

6. Article 6 of Directive 94/47 stated:

‘The Member States shall make provision in their legislation to prohibit any advance payments by a purchaser before the end of the period during which he [or she] may exercise the right of withdrawal.’

2. Directive 2008/122

7. Article 4 of Directive 2008/122, entitled ‘Pre-contractual information’, provides, in paragraph 1(a):

‘1. In good time before the consumer is bound by any contract or offer, the trader shall provide the consumer, in a clear and comprehensible manner, with accurate and sufficient information, as follows:

(a) in the case of a timeshare contract: by means of the standard information form as set out in Annex I and information as listed in Part 3 of that form’.

8. Article 5 of Directive 2008/122, entitled ‘The timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale or exchange contract’, provides, in paragraph 2:

‘The information referred to in Article 4(1) shall form an integral part of the contract and shall not be altered unless the parties expressly agree otherwise …’

9. Article 9 of that directive, entitled ‘Advance payment’, states, in paragraph 1:

‘Member States shall ensure that in relation to timeshare, long-term holiday product and exchange contracts any advance payment, provision of guarantees, reservation of money on accounts, explicit acknowledgement of debt or any other consideration to the trader or to any third party by the consumer before the end of the withdrawal period according to Article 6, is prohibited.’

B. Spanish law

1. Law 42/1998

10. Article 1(7) of Ley 42/1998 sobre derechos de aprovechamiento por turno de bienes inmuebles de uso turístico y normas tributarias (Law 42/1998 on timeshare and the tax regulations in that area) of 15 December 1998 (BOE No 300 of 16 December 1998, p. 42076) provided:

‘A contract under which any other right, whether real ( in rem ) or personal ( in personam ), is created or transferred for a period of more than three years, relating to the use of one or more properties for a period that is or can be determined per year, in breach of this Law, shall be null and void as a matter of law, and any rent or consideration paid shall be returned to the purchaser or assignee, and any damage suffered shall be compensated.’

11. Article 11 of that law stated:

‘1. Any advance payment made by the purchaser to the transferor before the expiry of the period allowed for exercising the right of withdrawal or while that purchaser has a right of termination referred to in the preceding article shall be prohibited. …

2. If the purchaser has advanced any amount to the transferor, that purchaser shall be entitled at any time to demand the return of double the amount, and may decide either to terminate the contract within three months of its conclusion or to demand that it be performed in full.’

2. Law 4/2012

12. Law 42/1998 was replaced by Ley 4/2012 de contratos de aprovechamiento por turno de bienes de uso turístico, de adquisición de productos vacacionales de larga duración, de reventa y de intercambio y normas tributarias (Law 4/2012 on timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale and exchange contracts and the tax regulations in that area) of 6 July 2012 (BOE No 162 of 7 July 2012, p. 49192).

13. Article 13 of Law 4/2012 provides:

‘1. In timeshare, long-term holiday product and exchange contracts, any advance payment, provision of guarantees, reservation of money on accounts, express acknowledgement of a debt or any other consideration provided in favour of the trader or any third party by the consumer before the end of the withdrawal period shall be prohibited.

…

3. Acts committed in breach of this prohibition shall be null and void and the consumer may claim double the amounts paid or guaranteed for such items.’

14. According to Article 23(7) of Law 4/2012:

‘A contract under which any other right, whether real or personal, is created or transferred for a period of more than one year, relating to the use of one or more properties for a period that is or can be determined per year, in breach of this Title, except as provided for in the following paragraph, shall be null and void as a matter of law, and any rent or consideration paid shall be returned to the purchaser or assignee, and any damage suffered shall be compensated.’

3. Civil Code

15. Article 1964(2) of the Código Civil (Civil Code) provided for a limitation period of 15 years for personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period. Following the amendment of that article, ( 6 ) it is worded as follows:

‘Personal actions not subject to a particular limitation period shall become time-barred after five years from the date on which performance of the obligation becomes enforceable.’

16. Article 1969 of the Civil Code further provides that, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the limitation period for all types of legal actions is to begin to run from the date on which the action may properly be brought.

III. Facts, national proceedings and the questions referred

17. GQ and IF, two consumers, concluded with MVCI Management S.L., MVCI Holidays S.L. and MVCI Playa Andaluza Holidays S.L. (‘MVCI Holidays’) two timeshare or similar contracts, with the first contract being concluded on 23 May 2007 and the second one on 21 March 2016.

18. GQ and IF brought an action before the referring court seeking the annulment of those contracts on the grounds of their duration and the failure to identify clearly their subject matter. They also sought the payment of a sum as restitution of the amount of the price of each contract, less the usage made (‘the action for restitution’), and the recovery of the part of the contract price paid as a penalty for breach of the prohibition on advance payments (‘the action for recovery of advance payments’).

19. MVCI Holidays contended that there is no cause for annulment and that there were no advance payments made. In the alternative, it argued that the action for restitution and the action for recovery of advance payments are time-barred according to Article 1964(2) of the Civil Code.

20. As far as the action for restitution is concerned, the referring court states that the general rules of civil law are applicable. Under national legislation and case-law, while the action for annulment of a contract cannot become time-barred, the action for the restitution of payments made pursuant to an invalid contract is subject to the rules on the limitation period for personal actions.

21. As far as the action for recovery of advance payments is concerned, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain) has established that advance timeshare or similar payments are null and void, that the payment by the trader of double the amount of part of the contract price constitutes a civil penalty and that its recovery is independent from withdrawal from the contract or its termination.

22. The referring court states that neither the Court of Justice nor the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) has ruled on the specific issue of the starting point ( dies a quo ) of the limitation period for an action for restitution or for an action for recovery of advance payments.

23. However, lower national courts have transposed the case-law of the Court of Justice on the time-barring of actions for restitution arising from a declaration of invalidity of unfair terms under Directive 93/13/EEC. ( 7 ) According to that case-law, the setting of the starting point of a limitation period to bring a claim of restitution of payments made pursuant to a contractual term held to be unfair, at the date of conclusion of the contract, may go against the principle of effectiveness. ( 8 ) By contrast, a limitation period which begins to run from the date on which the decision finding a contractual term to be unfair becomes final is compatible with the principle of effectiveness.

24. In accordance with that case-law, those national courts have considered that the starting date of the limitation period for an action for restitution and for an action for recovery of advance payments should be set at the moment when the contract for the purchase of the timeshare or similar contract is declared null and void.

25. In the view of the referring court, such an interpretation of the rules on limitation is not correct in the light of the substantial differences between, on the one hand, an action for restitution, in the context of the annulment of a timeshare (or similar) contract and an action for recovery of advance payments, and, on the other hand, an action for restitution of sums paid on the basis of an unfair term. Indeed, where a contract term is declared unfair, that declaration is contingent upon a court finding a breach of the rules on consumer contracts in accordance with the test of unfairness and transparency. However, where a contract is declared null and void because it was concluded ‘outside the law’ or where prohibited advance payments were made, the breach of the legal requirements is directly ascertainable from the moment the contract was concluded or the advance payments were made.

26. The referring court explains that this approach applies in the situation where, as in the instant case, the timeshare or similar contract exceeds the maximum duration permitted by the law or when it has been alleged that such a contract does not contain the registry identification of the property and the timeshare period to which the purchased right relates. Those situations correspond to circumstances that can be determined directly by the contracting parties without the need for them to be declared beforehand by a court. The same is true where prohibited advance payments have been made.

27. In such situations, the referring court considers that the dies a quo for an action for restitution can be fixed at the time when the contract was concluded, and the dies a quo for an action for recovery at the time when the prohibited advance payments were made.

28. Such an interpretation, according to the referring court, is compatible with the principle of effectiveness for the following reasons. First, the Spanish legal system provides for a very long limitation period for actions for restitution, namely 15 years in the wording of the Civil Code applicable until 2015, and 5 years after that date. Second, a simple out-of-court claim is sufficient to interrupt the limitation period. Third, there is no risk that the limitation period will expire before the consumer is aware that the contract concluded or the payment made is null and void, in so far as the basis of the possible annulment can be identified from the moment the contract is concluded or the payment is made.

29. In the view of the referring court, such an interpretation also contributes to legal certainty. If the dies a quo of the limitation period were to be established as starting from the date of the judicial declaration of nullity of the contract or of the judicial declaration that prohibited advance payments were made, the corresponding claim for restitution or for recovery of advance payments would effectively not be subject to a limitation period.

30. Lastly, a different interpretation would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The relevant legal relationships may date back decades. There is the risk of encouraging strategic behaviour on the part of potential applicants who would seek to delay making their claims, with the consequent economic advantage that this entails, since interest for late payment is calculated from the date when the contract was concluded or from the date on which the advance payments were made.

31. In those circumstances, the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Marbella (Court of First Instance No°2, Marbella, Spain) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Should Directives [94/47] and [2008/122] and the case-law of the [Court] on the principle of effectiveness of EU law be interpreted as not precluding a national rule or [national] case-law that establishes the starting point for the limitation period for bringing an action for restitution at the time when a timeshare or similar contract is concluded, in cases where the contract is fundamentally null and void because of circumstances that are directly discernible from the time when it was concluded, such as the excessively long duration of the contract or a failure to clearly specify its subject matter?

(2) Should Directives [94/47] and [2008/122] and the case-law of the [Court] on the principle of effectiveness of EU law be interpreted as not precluding a national rule or [national] case-law that establishes the starting point for the limitation period for an action to recover the [part of the contract price paid by means of] advance payments at the time when the prohibited payments were made under a timeshare or similar contract?’

32. GQ and IF, MVCI Holidays, the Spanish Government and the Commission have submitted written observations.

IV. Assessment

A. First question

33. It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute. ( 9 )

34. The case in the main proceedings concerns two timeshare or similar contracts. The contract concluded on 23 May 2007 falls under the temporal scope of Directive 94/47, while the contract concluded on 21 March 2016 falls under the temporal scope of Directive 2008/122.

35. It is apparent from the information provided in the order for reference that in the context of the action for annulment of the timeshare (or similar) contracts at issue in the main proceedings, the consumers allege a breach of the legal requirements inasmuch as the relevant contracts exceeded the maximum duration permitted by Spanish law. They also contend that the contracts do not contain the registry identification of the apartment concerned and the timeshare period to which the purchased right relates, failing therefore to specify clearly the subject matter of the contract.

36. Under Article 3(1) of Directive 94/47 and Article 4 of Directive 2008/122, the trader is obliged to provide the consumer with certain information before the conclusion of the contract. ( 10 ) It follows from Article 3(2), and Article 4 of Directive 94/47 and Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/122, that that information must be included in the contract, forming an integral part thereof. ( 11 )

37. Thus, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 94/47 and Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2008/122, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for restitution of sums paid by the consumer under an invalid timeshare (or similar) contract begins to run on the date of conclusion of the contract, in a situation in which the invalidity of that contract can be inferred from circumstances that can be directly established at the moment of its conclusion, such as the excessive duration or the failure to specify its subject matter.

1. Admissibility

38. The Commission and the Spanish Government express doubts as to the admissibility of the first question. More particularly, both interested parties state that the Timeshare Directives contain no rules on the maximum duration of a timeshare (or similar) contract and the possible invalidity of the contract where that duration has been exceeded. The rule on maximum duration falls, therefore, outside the scope of those directives. The same applies, according to the Commission, with regard to the identification of the property in the (Spanish) land registry. The Spanish Government submits that, although the precise description of the subject matter of the contract is partially governed by those directives, no specific consequences are attached to the failure on the part of the trader to provide such a description.

39. It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. ( 12 )

40. The Court of Justice may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. ( 13 )

41. In the present case, the first question referred requires clarification of the scope of the precontractual and contractual information that the trader is obliged to provide to the consumer. It also relates to the consequences which the Member States provide for in the event of the trader’s failure to comply with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Timeshare Directives, and the assessment, in the light of the principle of effectiveness, of the applicable national rules on the limitation period.

42. In those circumstances, I consider that the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is admissible.

2. Substance

43. In order to reply to the first question, it is necessary, as a preliminary step, to verify whether the provisions of national law which GQ and IF allege have been infringed in the present case, fall within the scope of the Timeshare Directives. It is only if that condition is fulfilled that the national rules governing the limitation period for an action for restitution based on the invalidity of a timeshare (or similar) contract would have to meet the requirements under those directives. ( 14 )

(a) Information requirements and the scope of the Timeshare Directive s

44. In the first place, as far as the national requirement of the maximum duration of a timeshare (or similar) contract is concerned, ( 15 ) it must be pointed out, as the Spanish Government and the Commission observed, that no such requirement exists under the Timeshare Directives. The Timeshare Directives provide for a minimum duration of the timeshare (or similar) contract, ( 16 ) but no maximum duration.

45. Directive 94/47 is a minimum harmonisation directive. ( 17 ) Therefore, Member States remained competent to introduce a requirement of maximum duration of the contract which is more favourable for consumers.

46. Directive 2008/122 adopts a maximum harmonisation approach. As is apparent from recital 3 thereof, Member States are not allowed to maintain or introduce in their national legislation provisions that diverge from those laid down in that directive. However, as is clear from that recital, where no such harmonised provisions exist, Member States ‘should remain free to maintain or introduce national legislation in conformity with [EU] law’.

47. As mentioned, the aspect of a maximum duration of a timeshare contract is not harmonised by Directive 2008/122. Therefore, a Member State remains competent to maintain or introduce such a requirement, to the extent that it does not appear capable of affecting any other harmonised provision of that directive. Accordingly, the national rules governing the consequences for the breach of that requirement and the limitation period within which the action for restitution can be exercised fall within the retained competence of the Member States. In those circumstances, there is no need to assess those national rules in the light of the principle of effectiveness. ( 18 )

48. In the second place, with regard to the requirement to specify the subject matter of the contract, the referring court has more particularly referred to the requirement to inform the consumer of the identification of the property in the land registry and the timeshare period to which the purchased right relates. ( 19 )

49. It must be pointed out that the Timeshare Directives require that the contract contain an accurate and detailed description of the property and its location. ( 20 ) There are no further indications in those directives as to the particular elements fulfilling that requirement. It should be noted in that regard that it follows from Article 288 TFEU that the Member States are required, when transposing a directive, to ensure that it is fully effective, whilst retaining a broad discretion as to the choice of ways and means of ensuring that the directive is implemented. ( 21 )

50. The implementation of the requirement for an accurate and detailed description under the Timeshare Directives is left to the Member States. A Member State may, therefore, lay down the identification of the property in the land registry as a concrete means to ensure that such a requirement is fulfilled. The information on the identification of the property must therefore be considered as being within the scope of the Timeshare Directives.

51. As regards the timeshare period to which the right refers, that element forms part of the information which must be provided to the consumer. ( 22 )

52. Therefore, the national requirement to specify clearly the subject matter of the contract, at least as regards specifying the duration of the timeshare right, ( 23 ) has to be considered as coming within the scope of Directive 94/47 and Directive 2008/122.

(b) T he limitation period of the action for restitution

53. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that where the relevant information has not been given to the consumer before the conclusion of the timeshare (or similar) contract, the consumer benefits from an extended withdrawal period. ( 24 ) The Timeshare Directives do not lay down a specific penalty, in particular in the event that, on expiry of the withdrawal period, the trader has failed to comply with the information requirements set out by those directives. In such a situation, and in addition to the right of withdrawal, it is the responsibility of the Member States to make provision for appropriate penalties. ( 25 ) Those penalties must, in accordance with Article 15(2) of Directive 2008/122, be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

54. As is apparent from the order for reference, under Spanish law the consequence of the breach of the precontractual and contractual information requirements is the invalidity of the contract, giving rise to the right to restitution of any consideration paid. ( 26 ) That right to restitution has been interpreted by national case-law as pertaining to the sums of money paid proportional to the remaining period of the contract in order to take into account the use being made of the property. ( 27 )

55. It also follows from the order for reference that the limitation periods of the action for annulment of the timeshare (or similar) contract and of the action for restitution are governed by the general rules on limitation under civil law. According to those general rules, the action for annulment of the contract is not subject to any limitation period. By contrast, the action for restitution of the payments made under the invalid contract is subject to the general limitation period for personal actions. In the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, the starting point ( dies a quo ) for bringing the action for restitution is the moment at which the action may properly be brought. ( 28 ) In the case of timeshare (or similar) contracts, that moment, according to the referring court, should be considered to be the conclusion of the contract.

56. The referring court harbours doubts as to whether, in relation to timeshare (or similar) contracts declared null and void, the general rules on limitation apply or whether it should transpose the case-law of the Court of Justice in relation to unfair terms ( 29 ) to the timeshare (or similar) contracts. If that case-law is applicable, the starting point of the limitation period should instead begin at the moment the final judgment annulling the contract is delivered.

57. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the Timeshare Directives do not lay down specific rules on the limitation period applicable to the national remedies available in the event of the trader’s failure to comply with the information requirements.

58. According to settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights that individuals derive from EU law, provided, however, that those rules are no less favourable than the rules governing similar situations subject to domestic law (the principle of equivalence) and do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (the principle of effectiveness). ( 30 )

59. The principle of effectiveness is also reflected in Article 13 of Directive 2008/122, which provides a general rule on judicial and administrative redress according to which Member States must ensure that, in the interests of consumers, adequate and effective means exist to ensure compliance by traders with that directive.

60. As regards that principle, which is the only principle at issue in the present proceedings, it should be noted that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings. ( 31 )

61. As regards the analysis of the characteristics of the limitation period at issue in the main proceedings, that analysis must cover the duration of the limitation period and the detailed rules for its application, including the mechanism adopted to start the period running. ( 32 )

62. First, as regards the length of the limitation period for an action for restitution under a timeshare (or similar) contract declared null and void, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings, laid down in the interests of legal certainty, are not liable to make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by the EU legal order, if such time limits are sufficient in practical terms to enable a consumer to prepare and bring an effective action. ( 33 )

63. Indeed, the Court has recognised that consumer protection is not absolute and that in the interests of legal certainty it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings. ( 34 )

64. In the present case, the limitation period for bringing a claim of restitution used to be 15 years, and was then reduced to 5 years. Provided that they are established and known in advance, those periods are in principle sufficient to enable the consumer concerned to prepare and bring an effective action. ( 35 ) That is all the more so given that, as the referring court explained, the national rules allow the interruption of the limitation period by a simple out-of-court claim. ( 36 )

65. Second, as regards the starting point of the limitation period, the Court has held, in the context of Directive 93/13, that the date of the conclusion of the agreement containing the unfair term cannot, as such, constitute the starting point of the limitation period. ( 37 )

66. That finding of the Court relies on some important considerations pertaining, essentially, to the weaker position of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, the lack of awareness by the consumers of the unfair terms or the lack of appreciation of the extent of their rights, and, where applicable, the long-term duration of the agreement including the unfair term. ( 38 )

67. In that context, the Court has held that the application of a limitation period that begins to run from the conclusion of the contract, in so far as it means that the consumer may seek the refund of payments made pursuant to a contractual term held to be unfair only during a specified period following the signing of that contract, irrespective of whether he or she was or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of that term, may make it excessively difficult for that consumer to exercise his or her rights under Directive 93/13, and, consequently, may run counter to the principle of effectiveness read in conjunction with the principle of legal certainty. ( 39 )

68. By contrast, on the date on which the decision finding the contractual term to be unfair and declaring it void on that ground becomes final, the consumer must be considered, in principle, fully aware of the unlawfulness of that term. It is therefore, in principle, from that date that that consumer is in a position effectively to assert the rights conferred on him or her by Directive 93/13. ( 40 )

69. The Court has, however, clarified that Directive 93/13 does not preclude the seller or supplier from having the right to prove that the consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of the term before the delivery of a judgment finding that term to be void. ( 41 )

70. In that regard it should be noted that, as with Directive 93/13 and other EU directives on consumer protection, the system of protection introduced by the Timeshare Directives is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weaker position vis-à-vis the trader, as regards both his or her bargaining power and his or her level of knowledge, which leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the trader without being able to influence the content of those terms. ( 42 )

71. The timeshare (or similar) contracts are often cross-border in nature, where they are concluded in a country other than the consumer’s home country and the properties concerned are located in a foreign country. ( 43 ) Moreover, as already pointed out above, those contracts are concluded over a long period of time and are characterised by long-term commitments and significant financial risks for consumers. ( 44 )

72. Information, before and at the time of concluding a timeshare (or similar) contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for the consumer. It is, in particular, on the basis of that information that the consumer decides whether he or she wishes to be bound by the conditions drafted in advance by the trader. ( 45 )

73. Therefore, the requirement to provide information is necessary in order to ensure that the consumer is aware of his or her obligations. More specifically, knowledge and a good understanding, on the part of the consumer, of the information that must be mandatorily included in the timeshare (or similar) contract are necessary for the proper performance of the contract and, in particular, for the exercise of the consumer’s rights. ( 46 )

74. In view of the fundamental importance of the information requirements and the consumer’s awareness of his or her rights, it is important to consider whether there is a risk that the right to claim restitution on the basis of an invalid timeshare (or similar) contract will expire even before the consumers could ascertain that information is lacking.

75. With regard to some items of information which are more descriptive, such as the identity of the trader, the description of the property or information concerning the facilities and services, it appears, at first sight, that an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect is capable of being apprised of the absence of that information as soon as he or she becomes acquainted with the property.

76. However, the final assessment of the effective possibility of the consumer knowing about the relevant missing information depends on the exact drafting and the circumstances of the contract. While it appears easier to ascertain the lack of information about the property when the timeshare rights relate to one specific property unit, that might not be the case when those rights relate to different possible accommodation units. ( 47 )

77. The risk of a lack of awareness is greater with regard to items of information pertaining to the exercise of rights under the timeshare (or similar) contract. Those are, in particular, the items of information which have an impact on the financial commitment of the consumer in the long run, the absence of which is likely to come to the consumer’s attention only during the performance of the contract, extending over a long period of time.

78. The information on costs, on the right to terminate the contract and on the right to resell contractual rights is particularly illustrative in that regard. ( 48 ) The consumer will most likely be apprised of the missing information on the method of calculating possible increases in costs and maintenance fees at the moment when the trader seeks to enforce those costs against the consumer. The same applies, for instance, with regard to the information on the termination of the contract or the possibility of joining a system for reselling the contractual rights. The consumer may be unaware of possible limitations and costs pertaining to the right to terminate or resell the contractual rights until he or she has actually sought to exercise those rights. ( 49 )

79. It should also be borne in mind that Article 4(1) of Directive 2008/122 clearly states that the information must be provided ‘in a clear and comprehensible manner, with accurate and sufficient information’. The unclear or incomplete nature of the information is liable to affect the consumer’s ability to assess the extent of his or her rights and obligations and deprive him or her of the possibility of exercising his or her rights. ( 50 )

80. In all those situations, if the consumer were allowed to seek restitution of the payments made on the basis of the invalid contract only during the first five years (according to the limitation period currently applicable under civil law) following the signing of the timeshare (or similar) contract, there would be a risk that the limitation period would expire before the timeshare agreement came to an end, even though the relevance of the missing information would become apparent only at a later stage in the performance of the contract.

81. Such a limitation period regime is liable to deprive consumers systematically of the possibility of claiming the return of payments made based on the invalidity of the contract, provided for under national law as a consequence of a breach of the information requirements.

82. It may also undermine the effective and dissuasive character of the contractual invalidity provided as a consequence of a breach of the information requirements. If consumers had the right to seek the annulment of the contract, but no right to restitution of the payments made, that would entail the risk that one party would obtain an undue advantage to the detriment of the other party. As GQ and IF submitted, in essence, the trader, after gaining full use of the property, could put it back on the timeshare (or rental/property) market, while the consumer would lose the future use of the property and the monies already paid for such use.

83. Therefore, as regards the starting point of the limitation period at issue in the main proceedings, there is a non-negligible risk that, in view of the way in which that period is determined, it will in practice be impossible or excessively difficult for the consumer to exercise his or her rights in a situation where there is a breach of the information requirements.

84. By contrast, at the moment when the final decision is made declaring the annulment of the contract, the consumer will, in principle, be fully aware of his or her rights and will be in a position to initiate restitution proceedings.

85. Lastly, in so far as the referring court asks whether the fixing of the starting point of the limitation period at a later date than the conclusion of the contract would be liable to conflict with the principle of legal certainty and encourage strategic litigation on the part of consumers, it must be pointed out that, by failing to provide the mandatory information at the precontractual/contractual stage, and by omitting to provide such information at any other later stage in the performance of the contract, the trader itself creates a situation which the Timeshare Directives prohibit. ( 51 ) Moreover, as the national court has explained, the action for restitution does not relate to all the sums paid, the period during which the property was used (or at least was available for use) being excluded.

86. However, the principle of effectiveness does not preclude the trader from having the right to prove that the consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the breach of the information requirements before delivery of the judgment declaring the contract to be null and void (due to that breach). In such a situation the limitation period starts to run from that moment of awareness by the consumer. ( 52 )

87. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 97/47 and Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2008/122, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for restitution of sums paid by the consumer under an invalid timeshare (or similar) contract begins to run on the date of the conclusion of the contract, irrespective of whether the consumer was aware or was in a position to become aware of the information which the trader failed to provide or provided in an unclear manner. The consumer is, in principle, fully aware of his or her rights at the moment of the final decision declaring the contract null and void. However, the principle of effectiveness does not preclude the trader from having the right to prove that the consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the elements constituting the invalidity of the contract before that date.

B. Second question

88. Article 6 of Directive 94/47 and Article 9 of Directive 2008/122 prohibit advance payments by the consumer before the end of the period during which he or she may exercise the right of withdrawal.

89. By its second question, having regard to the case-law referred to in point 33 of the present Opinion, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6 of Directive 94/47 and Article 9 of Directive 2008/122, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for recovery of (the part of the contract price paid by means of) advance payments, begins to run on the date when those payments were made under a timeshare or similar contract.

90. It follows from recitals 11 and 12 of Directive 94/47 and recital 11 of Directive 2008/122 that the aim of the prohibition on advance payments is to strengthen the consumer protection afforded by the right of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal is established in order to provide consumers with the possibility of fully understanding their rights and obligations under the contract. If the trader were able to require advance payments during the period when the withdrawal right could be exercised, that could discourage the consumer from exercising that right.

91. It also follows from Article 10 of Directive 94/47 and Article 15 of Directive 2008/122 that the imposition of a system of penalties for the breach of the prohibition on advance payments is the responsibility of the Member States.

92. It is apparent from the order for reference that, under Spanish law, advance payments are prohibited and breach of that prohibition results in the trader being required to pay back double the sums received as advance payments.

93. The question which is raised is whether the principle of effectiveness ( 53 ) precludes the starting point for the limitation period for an action for recovery of advance payments from being set as the date when those payments were made (in accordance with the general rules of civil law). As is the case with the first question, the referring court harbours doubts, in particular, as to whether the case-law of the Court developed in the context of unfair terms is to be transposed to the Timeshare Directives.

94. In that regard, as has already been pointed out above, ( 54 ) it must be borne in mind that the case-law of the Court on the national rules on the limitation period for the recovery of sums paid on the basis of unfair terms relies on a number of considerations, including the weaker position of the consumer and the fact that consumers may be unaware of the unfairness of a term included in the agreement or may not appreciate the extent of their rights.

95. As has also been indicated previously, ( 55 ) in the context of the timeshare contracts, the consumer is in weaker position vis-à-vis the trader. It is exactly for that reason that the EU legislature prohibits advance payments so as to ensure that the consumer is not discouraged from exercising his or her right of withdrawal.

96. However, as opposed to the unfair terms under Directive 93/13 and the information requirements under the Timeshare Directives, the level of exposure of consumers to the risk that the limitation period will expire before they become aware of their rights is not the same with regard to the ban on advance payments.

97. In the case of contracts concluded over a long period of time, a consumer may become aware of the unfairness of a term at a later stage when that term has an impact on his or her contractual commitment or is being enforced against him or her. Similarly, for the reasons that I have already explained, ( 56 ) that consumer may become aware of the missing or unclear information (liable to affect the consumer’s ability to assess the extent of his or her rights) only at a later stage in the performance of the timeshare (or similar) contract. The effects of the breach, by the trader, of its obligations are likely to become manifest only during the contractual relationship. For as long as the trader does not provide the information, the breach of the relevant legal requirements is continuous.

98. By contrast, the prohibition on advance payments relates to a single breach the effects of which are likely to become manifest at an earlier stage of the contractual relationship. There is no real risk that the consumer will only become aware of the ban years after the payment was made, on the occasion, for instance, of a charge being imposed on him or her or when he or she wishes to exercise certain rights.

99. It should also be noted that the protective purpose of the ban on advance payments is strong at the beginning of the contractual relationship. The ban is established so that the consumer is not dissuaded from withdrawing from the contract. However, that purpose becomes weaker over the years during the performance of the contract. That appears to be all the more so in a situation, such as the one in the main proceedings, in which the consumer not only did not withdraw from the contract but concluded a new timeshare (or similar) contract nine years after having concluded the first one.

100. Moreover, as the Commission essentially submitted, the actual ability of the consumer to ascertain his or her rights is not the same in the case of an unfair term as it is in the case of a legal prohibition on advance payments. Although an unfair term is considered to have never existed, the declaration of the unfairness of that term requires, in principle, a judicial assessment of the contractual clause which cannot be expected to be undertaken by the consumer. The question of compliance with the information requirements under the Timeshare Directives may also require judicial interpretation.

101. However, the prohibition on advance payments does not require any interpretation. Such payments are prohibited and this is clearly set out in the Timeshare Directives and in the national implementation rules. The prohibition can be ascertained by an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It is sufficient for the consumer to calculate whether the advance payments were made within the (extended) withdrawal period.

102. I do not believe that a different conclusion can be drawn from the Court’s case-law, according to which it cannot be expected that the consumer should perform steps which fall within the scope of legal research. ( 57 ) That case-law related to a situation in which it could not be assumed that a consumer might reasonably be aware of the fact that a term contained in his or her contract was equivalent in scope to a standard term that was found to be unfair by a national supreme court of a Member State. That is clearly different from the situation in which the legislature lays down a prohibition.

103. Setting a reasonable limitation period after the payments were made also ensures legal certainty in a situation involving a clear prohibition. Claiming a monetary penalty for an advance payment made a long time ago can create evidentiary problems and undermine the rights of defence of the opposing party. ( 58 ) Moreover, as the referring court explained, it creates the risk that the party claiming the penalty will seek the imposition of that penalty as late as possible in order to claim interest on the amount recovered, even though the circumstances of the prohibition are clear at the beginning of the contractual relationship.

104. In the case in the main proceedings, according to the general rules of civil law, the limitation period for the consumer to bring an action for recovery of the advance payments is 5 years (and 15 years according to the previously applicable version of the Civil Code) from the moment when those payments were made. That period appears sufficiently long to allow the consumer to claim the penalty. That is all the more so, as the referring court stated, since an out-of-court claim is sufficient to interrupt that period.

105. For that reason, I consider that the principle of effectiveness does not preclude a national rule on limitation for an action for the recovery of the contract price laid down in the event of a breach of the ban on advance payments based on general civil law.

106. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that Article 6 of Directive 94/47 and Article 9 of Directive 2008/122, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for recovery of (the part of the contract price paid by means of) advance payments, begins to run on the date when the prohibited payments were made under a timeshare (or similar) contract.

V. Conclusion

107. In view of all of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Marbella (Court of First Instance No°2, Marbella, Spain) as follows:

(1) Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis and Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness,

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for restitution of sums paid by the consumer under an invalid timeshare (or similar) contract begins to run on the date of the conclusion of the contract, irrespective of whether the consumer was aware or was in a position to become aware of the information which the trader failed to provide or provided in an unclear manner. The consumer is, in principle, fully aware of his or her rights at the moment of the final decision declaring the contract null and void. However, the principle of effectiveness does not preclude the trader from having the right to prove that the consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the elements constituting the invalidity of the contract before that date.

(2) Article 6 of Directive 94/47 and Article 9 of Directive 2008/122, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness,

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation or case-law according to which the limitation period for an action for recovery of the part of the contract price paid by means of advance payments, begins to run on the date when the prohibited payments were made under a timeshare (or similar) contract.

1 Original language: English.

2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts (OJ 2009 L 33, p. 10).

3 Staudinger, A., ‘Timeshare Contracts’ in Max-Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law, Max-EuP, 2012. On the origins of the timeshare industry see Edmonds, J., International Timesharing , 3 rd ed., Longman, London, 1991, p. 1.

4 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis (OJ 1994 L 280, p. 83).

5 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the evaluation of [Directive 2008/122], COM(2015) 644 final of 16 December 2015 (‘the Commission Evaluation Report on Directive 2008/122’).

6 The amendment was made by Ley 42/2015 de reforma de la Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law 42/2015 reforming Law 1/2000, of 7 January, on Civil Procedure) of 5 October 2015 (BOE No 239 of 6 October 2015, p. 90240).

7 Council Directive of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

8 Judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 34).

9 Judgment of 16 April 2026, Nitrogénművek (C‑519/24, EU:C:2026:297, paragraphs 19 and 20 and the case-law cited).

10 The information is given by means of a document, which was named the ‘standard information form’ in Directive 2008/122. See points 4 and 7 of the present Opinion.

11 See points 5 and 8 of the present Opinion.

12 Judgment of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims (C‑34/24, EU:C:2025:936, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

13 Ibid.

14 See, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2023, Sogefinancement (C‑50/22, EU:C:2023:177, paragraph 26).

15 The order for reference does not cite the national provisions which set out the requirement of maximum duration. However, it follows from the submissions of the Spanish Government and the Commission that such a requirement is set out in Article 3 of Law 42/1998 and Article 24 of Law 4/2012.

16 Under the first indent of Article 2 of Directive 94/47, a timeshare contract is to be concluded ‘for at least three years’. That period has been reduced to a duration of more than one year, in accordance with the definition of a ‘timeshare contract’ under Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2008/122.

17 According to Article 11 of Directive 94/47, Member States could adopt or maintain provisions which were more favourable as regards the protection of the purchasers.

18 See, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2023, Sogefinancement (C‑50/22, EU:C:2023:177, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

19 The order for reference does not cite the national provisions which set out those requirements. However, it follows from the submissions of the Spanish Government and the Commission that those requirements are set out in point 1 of Article 9(1) of Law 42/1998 and point 3 of Article 30(1) of Law 4/2012.

20 See point (c) of the annex to Directive 94/47 and the first indent of point 2 of Part 3 of Annex I to Directive 2008/122.

21 Judgment of 11 June 2020, Prezident Slovenskej republiky (C‑378/19, EU:C:2020:462, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

22 The annex to Directive 94/47 refers, more broadly in point (b), to the ‘conditions governing the exercise’ of the right which is the subject of the contract. The period within which the right may be exercised can be considered as being part of those conditions. Part 1 of Annex I to Directive 2008/122 includes among the items of information for timeshare contracts the ‘exact period within which the right which is the subject of the contract may be exercised and, if necessary, its duration’.

23 I express this reservation in case the Court considers that the requirement to provide the registry identification is outside the scope of the Timeshare Directives.

24 In that case, the withdrawal period will expire after the period laid down in the third indent of Article 5(1) of Directive 94/47 and in Article 6(3)(b) of Directive 2008/122.

25 The national responsibility to make provision for penalties stems from Article 10 of Directive 94/47 and Article 15 of Directive 2008/122. According to the second subparagraph of Article 6(3) of Directive 2008/122, in addition to the right of withdrawal, Member States must make provision for appropriate penalties in accordance with Article 15, in particular in the event that, on expiry of the withdrawal period, the trader has failed to comply with the information requirements set out in that directive.

26 See points 10 and 14 of the present Opinion. The invalidity of the contract is the consequence of a breach of any of the requirements set out in the relevant national legislation, including the requirement to specify the subject matter of the contract.

27 GQ and IF cite, in that regard, judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) No 192/2016 of 29 March 2016 (ES:TS:2016:1298).

28 See points 15 and 16 of the present Opinion.

29 See point 23 of the present Opinion.

30 Judgment of 19 March 2026, UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit (C‑679/24, EU:C:2026:223, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

31 Ibid., paragraph 63 and the case-law cited.

32 See, by analogy, judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 30).

33 Judgment of 9 July 2020, Raiffeisen Bank and BRD Groupe Societé Générale (C‑698/18 and C‑699/18, EU:C:2020:537, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

34 Judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 32).

35 Judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 41).

36 See point 28 of the present Opinion.

37 Judgment of 19 March 2026, UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit (C‑679/24, EU:C:2026:223, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

38 See the Court’s reasoning in detail in judgment of 19 March 2026, UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit (C‑679/24, EU:C:2026:223, paragraphs 70 and 71 and the case-law cited).

39 Judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

40 Judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 35).

41 Judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 38).

42 See, by analogy, judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others (C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 259 and the case-law cited).

43 See recital 11 of Directive 94/47 and the Commission Evaluation Report on Directive 2008/122, footnote 5, op. cit., p. 2.

44 See point 2 of the present Opinion.

45 See, by analogy, judgment of 30 October 2025, Mercedes-Benz Bank and Volkswagen Bank (C‑143/23, EU:C:2025:837, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

46 See, by analogy, judgment of 30 October 2025, Mercedes-Benz Bank and Volkswagen Bank (C‑143/23, EU:C:2025:837, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

47 When those accommodation units are available, for example, in different hotels which belong to the same group.

48 See the relevant items of information in points (j), (k) and (l) of the annex to Directive 94/47 and in points 4 to 6 of Part 3 of Annex I to Directive 2008/122.

49 The Commission Evaluation Report on Directive 2008/122, footnote 5, op. cit., p. 7 et seq., reveals that consumer protection issues arise in particular with regard to maintenance or service fees when they are increased for no objective reason, and with regard to the procedures and conditions for terminating the contract and the exchange of timeshare rights. See also Conway, L., ‘Timeshares: Common problems faced by UK owners – Research briefing’, House of Commons Library, 25 July 2025, pointing out, among the common problems with timeshare ownership, the excessive increases in annual fees, resale problems, exit issues and in-perpetuity clauses (which make it extremely difficult for the consumer to terminate the contract).

50 In the event of unfairness and lack of transparency of the term containing the information, the consumer would have available complementary avenues of consumer protection from Directive 93/13. If pressuring techniques were used to sign the contract, the consumer can also rely on Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22). See the Commission Evaluation Report on Directive 2008/122, footnote 5, op. cit., p. 10; Downes, N., ‘More about timeshare: A revised directive or a regulation? Incidence of other instruments of consumer protection’, Vol. 16, No 4, 2008, European Review of Private Law , pp. 607 to 625.

51 See, by analogy, judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 40).

52 That would be the case, for instance, if there is evidence of prior communication between the trader and the consumer in which the trader provides the consumer with the missing information. In such a situation, the limitation period starts to run from the moment the consumer is provided with that information.

53 See the case-law cited in point 58 of the present Opinion.

54 See point 66 of the present Opinion.

55 See point 70 of the present Opinion.

56 Points 75 and 76 of the present Opinion.

57 Judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run) (C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

58 It follows from the order for reference that the parties are in dispute over whether or not any prohibited advance payments were made. This demonstrates the difficulties associated with the courts having to rule on whether to impose a penalty more than 15 years after those payments were made (as is the case with the first timeshare contract in the main proceedings, which was concluded in 2007).