Opinion of Advocate General Medina delivered on 9 July 2026

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEDINA

delivered on 9 July 2026 ( 1 )

Case C ‑ 323/25 [Vinkers] ( i )

KBC Verzekeringen NV

v

HC,

Baloise Belgium NV

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp, Belgium))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Directive 93/13/EEC – Article 1(2) – Term reflecting a mandatory statutory provision – Model contract established by law – Requirements of intelligibility and transparency – Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles – Fire in a motorhome at a campsite – Minimum insurance coverage – Obligation to inform the consumer )

I. Introduction

1. The present case is an opportunity for the Court to explore the requirements of transparency necessary under Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts , ( 2 ) in relation to an insurance contract against civil liability in respect of the use of a motor vehicle. The particular feature of the case is that the insured vehicle is a motorhome that may be used in two ways: as a means of transport and as accommodation. The disputed contractual term provided insurance coverage corresponding to the compulsory minimum insurance required by national legislation. The issue which is raised is whether a consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, could understand that the scope of the insurance coverage is limited to traffic accidents arising from the use of the motorhome as a means of transport, to the exclusion of accidents arising from its use as accommodation.

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

1. Directive 2009/103/EC

2. The first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability , ( 3 ) as applicable in the case in the main proceedings, provides:

‘Each Member State shall, subject to Article 5, take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.’

2. Directive 93/13

3. Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 provides:

‘The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.’

4. Article 5 of that directive states:

‘In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. …’

B. Belgian law

1. Law of 21 November 1989

5. According to Article 2(1) of the Wet van 21 november 1989 betreffende de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake motorrijtuigen (Law of 21 November 1989 on compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles; ( 4 ) ‘the Law of 21 November 1989’), motor vehicles are only to be authorised to circulate if the civil liability to which they may give rise is covered.

2. Royal Decree of 1992 and Royal Decree of 2018

6. The Koninklijk besluit van 14 december 1992 betreffende de modelovereenkomst voor de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake motorrijtuigen (Royal Decree of 14 December 1992 on the model contract for obligatory motor vehicle liability insurance; ‘the Royal Decree of 1992’), ( 5 ) as applicable at the time of conclusion of the contract, provided for a model contract for obligatory motor vehicle liability insurance .

7. Article 1 of the Royal Decree of 1992 stated that contracts in relation to the compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance must comply with the provisions of the model contract annexed to that royal decree (‘the Model Contract’). It further provided that it was nevertheless permitted to deviate from those provisions in favour of the policyholder, the insured or any third party involved in the performance of the contract.

8. The Model Contract defined damage as any event that has caused damage and which may give rise to the application of the contract.

9. Chapter 1 of the Model Contract was entitled ‘Object and scope of the insurance’. According to Article 1 thereof:

‘Under this contract, the company covers, in accordance with the Law of 21 November 1989 and subject to the following conditions, the civil liability of the insured parties arising from damage caused in Belgium by the specified vehicle …

…

Insurance is provided with regard to damage occurring on public roads or on public or private premises.’

10. The Royal Decree of 1992 was replaced by the Koninklijk besluit van 16 april 2018 tot vaststelling van de voorwaarden van de verzekeringsovereenkomsten tot dekking van de verplichte aansprakelijkheid inzake motorrijtuigen (Royal Decree of 16 April 2018 laying down the terms and conditions of insurance contracts covering obligatory motor vehicle liability; ‘the Royal Decree of 2018’). ( 6 )

III. The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

11. On 14 September 2011, HC, a consumer, concluded a contract with Baloise Belgium NV (‘Baloise’), the defendant in the main proceedings, to insure against civil liability in respect of his motorhome (‘the 2011 insurance contract’).

12. On 1 July 2021, HC parked the motorhome on a campsite in Belgium. During the night of 1 to 2 July 2021, a fire broke out in the motorhome. The cause of the fire was the charging of HC’s electric mobility scooter at a 230-volt electrical socket in the motorhome. ( 7 ) The fire spread to other motorhomes and also caused damage to the campsite’s infrastructure.

13. Baloise refused to provide HC with insurance cover for the accident, arguing that at the time of the accident, the motorhome was being used as accommodation and not as a means of transport. The risk incurred was thus not causally related to the use of the vehicle and was therefore not covered by the insurance policy.

14. HC brought an action against Baloise before the rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen (Court of First Instance, Antwerp division, Antwerp, Belgium).

15. KBC Verzekeringen NV (‘KBC’), the insurer of the campsite and of other injured parties, made a recourse claim against HC and Baloise, asking for reimbursement of the compensation it had already paid to the insured persons.

16. The rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen, afdeling Antwerpen (Court of First Instance, Antwerp division, Antwerp) rejected both HC’s claim and that of KBC. In that regard, it relied on Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. It assumed, at least implicitly, that the extent of the minimum coverage of liability insurance, as determined, inter alia, from the case-law of the Court of Justice regarding the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ (judgment of 28 November 2017, Rodrigues de Andrade (C‑514/16, ‘the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade ’ , EU:C:2017:908), was a matter of common knowledge, including on the part of consumers.

17. In the view of the referring court, by making reference to case-law which post-dates the conclusion of the insurance contract, the first-instance court has altered retroactively the scope of the insurance.

18. KBC lodged an appeal with the hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp, Belgium), which is the referring court.

19. Baloise argues before the referring court that the 2011 insurance contract reproduces, word for word, the Model Contract. According to Article 1 of the Model Contract, the insurance policy is to cover civil liability incurred according to the Law of 21 November 1989. That reference to the law is sufficiently clear. The terms of the insurance policy must be presumed as being ipso facto clear and comprehensible.

20. HC counters that, based on the wording of the policy, he could assume that he was fully insured for civil liability in respect of the motorhome. Nowhere does that policy state that only risks related to the use of vehicles (as a means of transport) are covered.

21. KBC submits that the insurance policy issued by Baloise is not clear with regard to the scope of the insurance coverage.

22. The referring court states that it follows from the case-law of the Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation, Belgium), that Articles 2 and 3 of the Law of 21 November 1989 govern not only the legal obligation to insure a motor vehicle but also the extent of the insurance coverage. According to that case-law, mandatory civil liability insurance covers only the risks related to the use of a vehicle. Thus, under Belgian law, the scope of the insurance coverage is equivalent to the insurance obligation, but that principle is not reflected in the law or in the model insurance policy.

23. In those circumstances the hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Does the requirement of plain, intelligible language, which is intended to enable a consumer to assess the economic and legal consequences of concluding a contract, require the company to inform the consumer that the cover offered does not exceed the minimum cover which is required for driving, with the consequence that significant risks associated with a [motorhome], and which may occur at a campsite, will not be covered, and that, had that consumer been aware of this, he or she might have opted for a different contract by taking out an additional policy or a contract with an insurer which offers more comprehensive cover?

(2) Is it [to] be inferred from the fact that an insurance contract corresponds to a model contract drawn up by the State that the requirement of plain, intelligible language, within the meaning of Directive [93/13], is ipso facto satisfied, so that the consumer can be presumed to be able to assess the economic and legal consequences of the contractual terms relating to the subject matter and extent of the cover?

(3) Is it relevant that the model policy is compulsory under law and that an insurer can offer more comprehensive cover?

(4) Is it relevant whether the consumer has specific needs in view of the subject matter to be insured (fire insurance, civil liability insurance, etc.) and whether the insurer was aware of them before taking out the policy?

(5) Is the fact relevant that neither the [Law of 21 November 1989] nor the model policy clearly specif[ies] the type of risk or extent of cover, in particular the fact that only risks relating to the use of a vehicle (in traffic) are covered, with the result that even a careful linguistic reading of the [Law of 21 November 1989] and the model policy do not make it possible to determine under what circumstances a [motorhome] catching fire at a campsite is covered by the policy?

(6) Is it relevant that the insurance contract is automatically amended in line with changes in the law, which may subsequently limit the extent of the statutory minimum cover which the consumer initially considered to have been agreed, so that certain risks which, in the consumer’s view, were covered when the contract was taken out may no longer be covered?’

24. HC, Baloise, the Belgian and Polish Governments and the European Commission submitted written observations. The Belgian Government and the Commission presented their arguments and responded to the Court’s written and oral questions at the hearing held on 15 April 2026.

IV. Assessment

A. Preliminary issue: the classification of the accident as linked to the ‘use of vehicles’

25. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. ( 8 )

26. Furthermore, the fact that a referring court has, formally speaking, worded its request for a preliminary ruling by referring to certain provisions of EU law does not preclude the Court of Justice from providing to the referring court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the order for reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute. ( 9 )

27. In the present case, all the questions referred for a preliminary ruling concern Directive 93/13, and more particularly the transparency of a term in the 2011 insurance contract. That term circumscribes the scope of the insurance coverage, with reference to the Law of 21 November 1989, which partially transposes Article 3 of Directive 2009/103.

28. Under the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, each Member State is, subject to Article 5 of that directive, to take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.

29. Although the referring court has not formally asked the Court whether or not the accident involved in the main proceedings, namely the motorhome catching fire, was linked to the ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, the Belgian and Polish Governments, as well as the Commission, considered that that was a preliminary issue that had to be addressed.

30. I agree with those interested parties that that is a central issue that has to be examined in order to enable the national court to determine the case before it.

31. Indeed, if the accident in the main proceedings is linked to the ‘use of vehicles’ under Directive 2009/103, the liability which arises would have to be covered and it would be of no relevance to examine the relevant contractual term of the 2011 insurance contract under Directive 93/13. It is only if the accident is not linked to the ‘use of vehicles’ that the relevant term of the insurance contract must be examined under Directive 93/13.

32. In that regard, it must be recalled that the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ cannot be left to the assessment of each Member State but is an autonomous concept of EU law, ( 10 ) which it is for the Court to interpret.

33. In view of the concerns that may be inferred from the order for reference as to consideration of the Court’s case-law when it post-dates the conclusion of a contract, it is important to clarify that taking such case-law into consideration does not result in a ‘retroactive’ altering of the scope of the insurance policy agreed between the parties in the main proceedings. ( 11 )

34. In that connection, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the interpretation which the Court gives to a rule of EU law, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 267 TFEU, clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the date of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may and must be applied by the courts to legal relationships arising and established before the delivery of the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied. ( 12 )

35. Having clarified that point, and in order to provide a useful answer to the questions referred, it is necessary to examine the preliminary issue of whether the situation in the main proceedings may be classified as an accident linked to the ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103.

36. It should be stated, first, that a motorhome, such as that in the main proceedings, is covered by the concept of ‘vehicle’, referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103, which is defined as a ‘vehicle intended for travel on land and propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled’.

37. In that regard, it must be noted that that definition is unconnected with the use which is made or may be made of the vehicle in question. Consequently, the fact that a motorhome may be used in two ways, as a means of transport and as accommodation, has no effect on the finding that such a vehicle corresponds to the concept of ‘vehicle’ in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103. ( 13 )

38. Furthermore, it is evident from the file submitted to the Court that the motorhome in question is normally based in the territory of a Member State and is not covered by a derogation adopted pursuant to Article 5 of that directive.

39. Second, as regards the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, which, as pointed out above, is an autonomous concept of EU law, it must be interpreted in the light, in particular, of the context of that provision and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. ( 14 )

40. The development of EU legislation concerning insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles, including Directive 2009/103, shows that the objective of protecting the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles has continuously been pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature. ( 15 )

41. In the light of those considerations, in its case-law the Court has ruled that the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ in that provision is not limited to road use, that is to say, to travel on public roads, but that that concept covers any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle. ( 16 )

42. The Court has also stated that, as the motor vehicles referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/103 are, irrespective of their characteristics, intended normally to serve as a means of transport, that concept covers any use of a vehicle as a means of transport. ( 17 )

43. In that regard, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the fact that the vehicle involved in an accident was stationary when the accident occurred does not, in itself, preclude the use of that vehicle at that time from falling within the scope of its function as a means of transport and, therefore, within the scope of the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. ( 18 )

44. The question of whether or not the engine of the vehicle concerned was running at the time of the accident is not conclusive either. ( 19 )

45. The concept of ‘use of vehicles’ likewise does not depend on the characteristics of the terrain on which the vehicle was used and, in particular, the fact that the vehicle at issue was, at the time of the accident, stationary and in a car park. ( 20 )

46. The Court thus found in the judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora that a situation in which a vehicle parked in a private garage of a building, used in accordance with its function as a means of transport, has caught fire, caused by the electrical circuit of that vehicle, causing damage to a building, falls within the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, referred to in the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. ( 21 )

47. However, in the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , the Court pointed out the different situation of those vehicles which are also intended to be used in certain circumstances as machines for carrying out work. ( 22 ) For those vehicles, it is necessary to determine whether, at the time of the accident involving such a vehicle, that vehicle was used principally as a means of transport, in which case that use can be covered by the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103, or as a machine for carrying out work, in which case the use in question cannot be covered by that concept. ( 23 )

48. In that case, a tractor was being used to generate the motive power required to drive the pump of a herbicide sprayer attached to it for the purpose of applying herbicide to the vines on a farm. Such use appeared to be principally connected with the function of that tractor as a machine for carrying out work and not as a means of transport. ( 24 )

49. The Belgian and Polish Governments argue that the accident in the main proceedings is linked to the ‘use of vehicles’ and that the situation is similar to that of the judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora . The Commission expressed the opposite view at the hearing and submitted that the relevant precedent was, rather, the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade.

50. In that regard, as referred to above, ( 25 ) it must be pointed out that a motorhome such as the one in the main proceedings may be used in two ways: for transportation and for accommodation. In order to determine whether an accident is linked to the ‘use of vehicles’, it is important to determine whether, at the time of the accident, the use of the motorhome was consistent with that vehicle’s function as a means of transport or rather as accommodation .

51. I agree with the Commission that the situation in the main proceedings resembles that of the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , and that at the time of the accident the motorhome was not being used as a means of transport.

52. It is apparent from the information provided in the order for reference that the fire was caused by an electric mobility scooter being plugged into a (faulty) electrical socket in the motorhome. It appears, therefore, that at the time of the accident the vehicle was being used as an electricity power source for a device that is unconnected to the use of the vehicle as a means of transport. By analogy with the case that gave rise to the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , where the vehicle was being used as a machine, the use being made in the case in the main proceedings is not consistent with the vehicle’s function as a means of transport. Rather, it appears to be related to the other function of that vehicle: as accommodation.

53. That situation must therefore be distinguished from that of the judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora , where the car caught fire because of the electric circuit of the vehicle, which was being used in accordance with its function as a means of transport.

54. In those circumstances, it appears that the situation in the main proceedings, where a motorhome caught fire after a device was plugged into that motorhome’s socket, is not consistent with that vehicle’s function as a means of transport and may not, therefore, be classified as an accident linked to the ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103. In view of that finding, it is necessary to examine next whether Directive 93/13 is applicable to the contractual terms governing the scope of the insurance policy at issue.

B. The second question (on the scope of application of Directive 93/13)

55. It follows from the order for reference that liability insurance in respect of motor vehicles is compulsory under the Law of 21 November 1989 and that the 2011 insurance contract reproduces the Model Contract established by the Royal Decree of 1992. ( 26 ) According to that decree, motor vehicle liability insurance contracts must comply with the terms of the Model Contract, even though derogations may be allowed in favour of the policyholder, the insured or any other party concerned by the application of that contract.

56. By its question, the referring court expresses doubts as to whether the disputed term of the 2011 insurance contract governing the scope of the insurance cover taken out satisfies the requirements of transparency under Directive 93/13, to the extent that it reproduces a term laid down in the Model Contract.

57. Since that question concerns the scope of the judicial review of an insurance contract which corresponds to a model insurance policy established by law, it is appropriate, pursuant to the case-law referred to in point 25 of the present Opinion, to reformulate the question so as to examine whether the disputed term falls within the scope of Directive 93/13, in the light of Article 1(2) of that directive. That latter provision excludes from its substantive scope any contractual terms which reflect ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’.

58. Consequently, by its second question, which must be examined first, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that that directive applies to a term in a motor vehicle civil liability insurance contract concerning the scope of the insurance, to the extent that such a contract reflects a mandatory insurance model contract established by legislation, from whose provisions an insurer may derogate in order to offer more comprehensive coverage.

59. It follows from the Court’s case-law that the wording ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13, in the light of the thirteenth recital of that directive, encompasses both provisions of national law which apply between the contracting parties independently of their choice and those which are supplementary, that is to say, which apply by default in the absence of other arrangements established between the parties. ( 27 )

60. The exclusion of terms which reflect ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ from the substantive scope of application of the scheme of Directive 93/13 is justified by the fact that it is, in principle, legitimate to presume that the national legislature has struck a balance between all the rights and obligations of the parties to certain contracts, a balance which the EU legislature expressly intended to preserve. ( 28 )

61. Accordingly, the fact that the national legislature has struck a balance between all the rights and obligations of the parties to certain contracts does not constitute a condition for the application of the exclusion in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13, but the justification for such an exclusion. ( 29 )

62. It is for the national court before which the case has been brought to determine whether the clause in question falls within Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 in the light of the criteria which have been identified by the Court, while bearing in mind that, given the objective of consumer protection pursued by that directive, the exception provided for in Article 1(2) is to be interpreted strictly. ( 30 )

63. In the present case, the referring court points out that according to the Royal Decree of 1992, insurance contracts must reproduce the terms of the Model Contract annexed to that decree and that the model insurance policy is compulsory. It appears therefore that the Model Contract applies irrespective of the choice of the parties, resulting in its classification as a ‘mandatory’ provision under Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13.

64. However, the referring court’s doubts as to that classification appear to relate to the possibility to derogate from the terms of the Model Contract in order to provide more extensive protection.

65. The Commission submitted that the possibility to derogate from the terms of the Model Contract implies that the provisions in question are not ‘mandatory’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13. In the Commission’s view, since the Royal Decree of 1992 does not seem to require that an insurance contract cover only accidents related to the ‘use of a vehicle’ and an insurer may derogate from it in order to provide further coverage, the term at issue providing for insurance coverage does not fall within the exception of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13.

66. I cannot agree with that position. The minimum insurance coverage laid down in the model contract is compulsory . The fact that an insurer may go beyond that scope and provide more extensive coverage does not change the mandatory nature of the minimum scope of insurance.

67. The Court has ruled that the fact that it is possible to derogate from a supplementary provision of national law is irrelevant to the determination of whether a contractual term which reflects such a provision is excluded from the scope of Directive 93/13 pursuant to Article 1(2) thereof. ( 31 )

68. Similarly, the fact that it is possible to derogate, in favour of the consumer, from a provision of national law which applies between the parties to a contract irrespective of their choice, such as the terms of the Model Contract, should have no bearing on whether a contractual term which reflects such a provision is excluded from the scope of Directive 93/13.

69. Therefore, if the insurance contract term at issue provides only the minimum coverage which corresponds exactly to the compulsory coverage laid down in the model policy (as laid down in the Model Contract), it cannot be considered that that term does not reflect a ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory’ provision merely because the insurance company could, hypothetically, have provided more protection (which, in this case, it did not).

70. A different conclusion may not be drawn from the judgment in Všeobecná úverová banka . ( 32 ) That case concerned the possibility of judicial review of an acceleration clause provided in a credit agreement, which allowed the creditor to claim repayment of the outstanding balance under that agreement, in the event of failure by the debtors to fulfil their contractual obligations. That clause reproduced provisions of national legislation which permitted creditors to demand repayment of a credit in full if the parties had agreed to it. The referring court had clarified in that case that the relevant national provisions did not apply by default since they required an agreement by the parties. Moreover, even if the parties had so agreed, the creditor was not required to exercise the right in question.

71. The national legislation at issue in the case in the main proceedings is different from that examined by the Court in the case referred to in the previous point. As opposed to an acceleration mechanism, to which the parties must agree in order for it to apply (and, even if they do agree, there is no obligation to make use of that mechanism), the parties to a civil liability motor insurance contract under Belgian law have no choice but to reflect in that contract the terms of the minimum insurance coverage laid down in the Model Contract.

72. The Belgian Government put forward another line of reasoning in order to support its position that the disputed term is not excluded from the scheme of Directive 93/13. Its line of reasoning relates to the scope of application of the Model Contract as such. According to that government, the Model Contract was designed only for ordinary vehicles and not for vehicles that have a ‘complex’ character, or that have various uses, such as a motorhome. Thus, where a motor vehicle insurance contract reproduces the Model Contract in relation to a vehicle to which that Model Contract was not designed to apply, then the contractual clauses in question do not come within the scope of the exclusion provided for in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13. The Belgian Government referred, in that regard, to the judgment of the Court in RWE Vertrieb . ( 33 )

73. In that judgment, the Court ruled that Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that that directive applies to provisions in general terms and conditions, incorporated into consumer contracts, which reproduce a rule of national law applicable to another category of contracts and are not subject to the national legislation concerned. ( 34 ) If it were permitted to exclude the application of Directive 93/13 to contractual terms merely because they reproduce national statutory or regulatory provisions that do not apply to the contract concluded by the parties, or refer to such provisions, that would call into question the system of consumer protection established by that directive. ( 35 )

74. It is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of its national law, to verify the validity of the interpretation of the relevant national legislation suggested by the Belgian Government.

75. Should the referring court come to the conclusion that the Model Contract was not intended to apply to vehicles that have various uses, such as a motorhome, which can be used as a means of transport and as accommodation, then the disputed term on the scope of liability insurance is subject to the provisions of Directive 93/13.

76. However, should the referring court come to the conclusion that the Model Contract applies to all type of vehicles, including motorhomes such as the one in the main proceedings, then Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as excluding from the scope of that directive a term which reflects the terms of the Model Contract.

77. Thus, subject to verification by the referring court, Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that that directive does not apply to a term in a motor vehicle civil liability insurance contract concerning the scope of the insurance, to the extent that such a contract reflects a mandatory insurance model contract established by law, even though an insurer may derogate from the terms of that model contract to offer more comprehensive coverage. However, that directive is applicable if the national court were to consider that the term in question reproduces a rule of national law establishing a model contract which was not designed to apply to the category of vehicles concerned by the insurance contract.

C. The first, third, fourth and fifth questions (on the requirement of transparency)

78. The requirement of transparency in relation to unfair terms is expressed in the rule laid down in Article 4(2) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13, which require that contract terms have to be drafted in plain, intelligible language.

79. Under Article 4(2) of that directive, the transparency of contractual terms is a prerequisite for excluding the core terms of the contract from the review of unfairness. Indeed, according to that provision, the assessment of the unfair nature of the terms may relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, in so far as those terms are in plain, intelligible language.

80. The preamble to Directive 93/13 gives some indications on which terms may be considered as the core terms of an insurance contract. The nineteenth recital states that, in insurance contracts, the terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the insurer’s liability are not to be subject to an assessment of unfair character since those restrictions are taken into account in calculating the premium paid by the consumer.

81. According to the case-law of the Court, the essentials of an insurance transaction are that the insurer undertakes, in return for prior payment of a premium, to provide the insured, in the event of materialisation of the risk covered, with the service agreed when the contract was concluded. ( 36 )

82. In the present case, the contractual term at issue concerns the scope of the insurance cover taken out. In those circumstances, it appears that such a term circumscribes the risk insured and the insurer’s liability and sets out the essential obligations of the insurance contract at issue, which is, however, a matter for the referring court to determine. ( 37 )

83. If the referring court were to consider that that term forms part of the main subject matter of the insurance contract, that court must also determine whether that term has been drafted by the seller or supplier ‘in plain, intelligible language’.

84. That said, the same transparency requirement as that referred to in Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 also appears in Article 5 of that directive, which provides that contractual terms in writing must ‘always be drafted in plain, intelligible language’. The Court has previously held that the transparency requirement as it appears in the first of those provisions has the same scope as that referred to in the second of those provisions. ( 38 )

85. Consequently, in the light of the case-law referred to in point 25 above, by its first and third to fifth questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(2) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing whether a term governing the scope of the insurance in a civil liability insurance contract for a motorhome is drafted in plain, intelligible language, the national court must examine whether the insurer has informed the consumer that the insurance covers the use of that vehicle in its function as a means of transport, to the exclusion of the risks from the use of that vehicle as accommodation, for which additional insurance would be required. ( 39 )

86. In its case-law, the Court has adopted a broad understanding of the requirement of transparency, taking into account that the system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, in particular as regards his or her level of knowledge. ( 40 )

87. The requirement of transparency involves, therefore, not only formal but also substantive criteria. ( 41 ) It must be understood as requiring not only that the term concerned be grammatically intelligible to the consumer, but also that an average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, is in a position to understand the specific functioning of that term and thus evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the potentially significant economic consequences of such a term for his or her financial obligations. ( 42 )

88. Information, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it, is of fundamental importance for a consumer. It is on the basis of that information in particular that the consumer decides whether he or she wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier. ( 43 )

89. As is also apparent from settled case-law, the plainness and intelligibility of a given term must be assessed in the light of all the relevant facts, including the promotional material and information provided by the seller or supplier in the negotiation of the relevant contract and the level of attention to be expected of the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. ( 44 )

90. In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the contractual term at issue, reproducing the Model Contract, stipulates that the insurance contract covers civil liability as a result of ‘damage’ caused by the vehicle ‘in accordance with the Law of 21 November 1989’, the term ‘damage’ being defined as any event that has caused damage and which may give rise to the application of the contract.

91. The question raised here is whether, in relation to a motorhome insurance contract, the mere reference to the Law of 21 November 1989 and to the damage as ‘any event’ causing damage, is sufficient for an average consumer to understand the precise coverage of the insurance policy and, more particularly, that only damage that results from the use of the vehicle as a means of transport is covered, to the exclusion of any risks related to the use of the vehicle as accommodation (such as the accident in the main proceedings, which resulted from plugging a mobility scooter into the motorhome’s electrical socket).

92. In its case-law, in examining the transparency of clauses in mortgage contracts which stipulated a variable interest rate established on the basis of an official index (published in a State’s official journal), the Court found that the requirement of transparency must be assessed in the light of all the relevant facts, including whether the main elements relating to the calculation of the index are easily accessible on account of their publication. ( 45 )

93. In the context of the main proceedings, as mentioned above, the contractual term in question refers to the applicable law for determining the coverage of the insurance contract, which is of course publicly available to consumers.

94. However, it follows from the order for reference and the fifth question for a preliminary ruling of the referring court, which is exclusively responsible for interpreting national law, ( 46 ) that it is not possible, from reading that law and the insurance policy, for an average consumer to understand the scope of the insurance coverage, in particular in relation to a motorhome. The referring court has also stated that, although the national case-law has established that the scope of civil insurance covers only risks related to the use of a vehicle, that information is not reproduced in the law or the insurance policy. ( 47 )

95. Furthermore, as stated above in the context of the assessment of the second question, the Belgian Government has explained that the Model Contract, which determines the scope of insurance coverage by reference to the Law of 21 November 1989, was designed to be incorporated into insurance contracts for ordinary vehicles, with no specific needs as to the risk to be insured. That is not the case, however, for motorhomes, which by definition function as a means of transport and as accommodation, resulting in risks that are unrelated to the function as a means of transport.

96. As that government and the Commission in essence submitted, for motorhomes, the function of which is twofold, namely as a means of transport and as accommodation, the risk factors are of a different nature and extent compared to an ordinary vehicle. The consumer must, therefore, receive specific information in relation to the relevant risk factors when concluding the contract. In particular, the consumer must be informed that the minimum insurance coverage provided by national legislation (transposing Directive 2009/103) relates to the use of the motorhome that is consistent with its function as means of transport and not as accommodation.

97. That information is essential for the consumer to be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences, for him or her, resulting from the limitation of the insurance cover to the minimum required by law. ( 48 ) After being fully informed, the consumer can decide whether the minimum coverage, which only covers the use of the motorhome as a means of transport, is enough, or whether it is necessary to take out additional insurance to cover the additional risks related to that type of vehicle, based on the specific features and risks related to the type of vehicle to be insured.

98. Such information on the level of risk is necessary so that a consumer who is not an expert in the insurance sector can understand the relevant term determining the scope of liability. Therefore, consumers cannot be expected to demonstrate a higher level of vigilance and knowledge when concluding an insurance contract for a motorhome than they would when concluding an insurance contract for an ordinary vehicle. ( 49 )

99. Having regard to the case-law referred to in point 89 above, it falls on the referring court to assess whether the term at issue in the main proceedings is plain and intelligible in the light of the relevant facts. It will have to examine whether the consumer was informed during the negotiation of the insurance contract as to what is covered by the mandatory civil liability insurance and, in particular, whether the insurance company explained that it was possible to take out additional insurance to cover the risks related to the use of the motorhome in its function as accommodation.

100. In the light of the above, I take the view that Article 4(2) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing whether a term governing the scope of the insurance in a civil liability insurance contract for a motorhome is drafted in plain, intelligible language, the national court must examine whether the insurer has informed the consumer that the insurance policy covers risks related to the use of that vehicle as a means of transport, to the exclusion of the risks from the use of that vehicle as accommodation, which may be covered by additional insurance. That interpretation applies only if the national court finds that the term at issue is not to be excluded from the scope of that directive under Article 1(2) thereof.

D. The sixth question

101. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. ( 50 )

102. By its sixth question, the referring court asks the Court about the relevance, for the assessment of the requirement of transparency of the disputed term in the main proceedings, of the automatic amendment of the insurance contract in line with changes in the law, which may subsequently limit the extent of the statutory minimum scope of the insurance coverage. The effect of such a limitation could be, according to the referring court, that certain risks, which in the consumer’s view were covered when the contract was concluded, may no longer be insured.

103. However, the order for reference does not contain information about the ‘changes in the law’ in question and does not explain how those changes reduced the minimum statutory scope of the insurance coverage.

104. The Court therefore does not have the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to that question.

105. For that reason, I propose that the sixth question be declared inadmissible.

E. The request by Baloise to limit the effects of the judgment

106. In its written submissions, Baloise asked the Court to limit the effects of the judgment if the Court, contrary to Baloise’s arguments, were to require, in the context of the obligation to draft an insurance contract in plain, intelligible language, that the contract expressly state the minimum legal scope and what goes beyond that scope; what specific damage is covered by the insurance and what is not covered; and what is covered by the law which determines the scope of the insurance cover and what is not.

107. That request is based on the premiss that it is not sufficient for insurers to incorporate the Model Contract in the terms and conditions of their policies and that the future judgment of the Court is liable to result in an obligation for insurers to cover all the damage resulting from a vehicle not being used in its normal function as a means of transport.

108. However, if the Court follows my assessment in the preliminary observations and as regards the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the request made by Baloise will be devoid of purpose.

109. Therefore, I do not consider that it is necessary to provide a response to Baloise’s request.

V. Conclusion

110. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred by the hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Court of Appeal, Antwerp, Belgium) as follows:

(1) Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts

must be interpreted as meaning that that directive does not apply to a term in a motor vehicle civil liability insurance contract concerning the scope of the insurance, to the extent that such a contract reflects a mandatory insurance model contract established by law, even though an insurer may derogate from the terms of that model contract to offer more comprehensive coverage. However, that directive is applicable if the national court were to consider that the term in question reproduces a rule of national law establishing a model contract which was not designed to apply to the category of vehicles concerned by the insurance contract.

(2) Article 4(2) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13

must be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing whether the term governing the scope of the insurance in a civil liability insurance contract for a motorhome is drafted in plain, intelligible language, the national court must examine whether the insurer has informed the consumer that the insurance policy covers risks related to the use of that vehicle as a means of transport, to the exclusion of the risks from the use of that vehicle as accommodation, which may be covered by additional insurance. That interpretation applies only if the national court finds that the term at issue is not to be excluded from the scope of that directive under Article 1(2) thereof.

(3) The sixth question is inadmissible.

1 Original language: English.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

2 OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29 .

3 OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11 .

4 Belgisch Staatsblad of 8 December 1989.

5 BelgischStaatsbladof 3 February 1993.

6 BelgischStaatsbladof 2 May 2018.

7 More precisely, it appears from the case file before the Court that the motorhome’s electrical socket was faulty.

8 See, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2026, Prokuratura na Republika Bulgaria (C‑312/24, EU:C:2026:449, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

9 Judgment of 16 April 2026, Nitrogénművek (C‑519/24, EU:C:2026:297, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

10 See, to that effect, the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 31.

11 See point 17 of the present Opinion.

12 Judgment of 15 January 2026, AVR-Afvalverwerking (C‑692/23, EU:C:2026:4, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

13 See, to that effect, the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 29.

14 See, to that effect, the judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 31.

15 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 33.

16 Judgment of 20 June 2019, Línea Directa Aseguradora (C‑100/18, ‘the judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora ’, EU:C:2019:517, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

17 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 38.

18 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 39.

19 The judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora , paragraph 38.

20 The judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora , paragraph 40.

21 See, to that effect, the judgment in Línea Directa Aseguradora , paragraphs 45 and 48.

22 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 40.

23 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 40.

24 The judgment in Rodrigues de Andrade , paragraph 41.

25 See point 37 of the present Opinion.

26 The referring court has stated that the Royal Decree of 1992, which was applicable at the time of conclusion of the contract, has in the meantime been repealed by the Royal Decree of 2018, which also contains a model contract. In their written submissions, both HC and Baloise refer to the Royal Decree of 2018, and more particularly to Article 38 thereof, which lays down the object of the insurance. In response to a question put to it by the Court as to the impact of the entry into force of the Royal Decree of 2018 on the contractual relationship of the parties in the main proceedings, the Belgian Government stated that, on the basis of the transitional provision of that royal decree, insurers had to modify their contracts by 1 November 2019 at the latest. However, it also confirmed that the consequences of that change in relation to the case in the main proceedings were minimal because the Royal Decree of 2018 did not modify the scope and object of the insurance coverage.

27 See, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2026, PKO BP (Critical benchmark) (C‑471/24, EU:C:2026:85, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).

28 Judgment of 5 May 2022, Zagrebačka banka (C‑567/20, EU:C:2022:352, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

29 Judgment of 9 July 2020, Banca Transilvania (C‑81/19, EU:C:2020:532, paragraph 27).

30 See, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2021, Trapeza Peiraios (C‑243/20, EU:C:2021:1045, paragraph 37).

31 Judgment of 9 July 2020, Banca Transilvania (C‑81/19, EU:C:2020:532, paragraph 35).

32 Judgment of 9 November 2023 (C‑598/21, EU:C:2023:845).

33 Judgment of 21 March 2013 (C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180).

34 Ibid., paragraph 39.

35 Ibid., paragraph 30.

36 Judgment of 23 April 2015, Van Hove (C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

37 See, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Van Hove (C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 36).

38 Judgment of 16 March 2023, Caixabank (Loan arrangement fees) (C‑565/21, EU:C:2023:212, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

39 The answer to those questions is relevant only if the referring court considers, on the basis of the criteria developed in the context of my analysis of the second question for a preliminary ruling, that the contractual term on the scope of the insurance cover taken out does not reflect a mandatory statutory or regulatory provision and is therefore not covered by the exception laid down in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13.

40 See, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2026, PKO BP (Critical benchmark) , (C‑471/24, EU:C:2026:85, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

41 See my Opinion in Caixabank and Others (Review of transparency in collective actions) (C‑450/22, EU:C:2024:64, points 41 to 43).

42 Judgment of 4 July 2024, Caixabank and Others (Review of transparency in collective actions) (C‑450/22, EU:C:2024:577, paragraph 37).

43 Judgment of 12 February 2026, PKO BP (Critical benchmark) (C‑471/24, EU:C:2026:85, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

44 See, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2023, Caixabank (Loan arrangement fees) (C‑565/21, EU:C:2023:212, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

45 Judgments of 3 March 2020, Gómez del Moral Guasch (C‑125/18, EU:C:2020:138, paragraphs 53 and 56), and of 13 July 2023, Banco Santander (Reference to an official index) (C‑265/22, EU:C:2023:578, paragraph 56).

46 See, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2026, BNP Paribas Bank Polska (C‑246/25, EU:C:2026:362, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

47 See point 22 of the present Opinion.

48 See, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015, Van Hove (C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 47).

49 See, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2023, Ocidental – Companhia Portuguesa de Seguros de Vida (C‑263/22, EU:C:2023:311, paragraph 28).

50 Judgment of 18 December 2025, Tenergie (Request for remission of import duties) (C‑259/24, EU:C:2025:1013, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).