ext/celex/62025TJ0131

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

28 January 2026 ( * )

( EU trade mark – Application for the EU word mark EcoGuard – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑131/25,

ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, established in Zurich (Switzerland), represented by M. Hartmann, S. Fröhlich and H. Lerchl, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, J. Schwarcz (Rapporteur) and M. Kancheva, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 December 2024 (Case R 1305/2024-4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 17 July 2023, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word mark EcoGuard.

3 Following the restriction made in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, the mark applied for covered goods in, inter alia, Classes 6, 9 and 17 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 6: ‘Cable straps and cable ties (metallic); pipes and corrugated pipes (both of metal) for protecting electric cables; pipe and tubes and screw fittings (of metal); clamps of metal; connection fittings of metal, for pipes, tubes or corrugated pipes protecting electric cables; conduit connectors (non-electric) of metal; junctions of metal for pipes; connection angles or connection elbows of metal, for pipes, tubes or corrugated pipes protecting electric cables’;

– Class 9: ‘Electric installation material, namely electric cables, switches, conduits; plugs, reducing pieces and extensions for electricity conduits, conduit holders, cable covers (conduits); connections for electric cables; electric sockets’;

– Class 17: ‘Seals for pipes, tubes and corrugated pipes; connection fittings, not of metal, for pipes, tubes or corrugated pipes protecting electric cables; conduit connectors (non-electric) of plastic; junctions of plastic for pipes; connection angles or connection elbows, not of metal, for pipes, tubes or corrugated pipes protecting electric cables’.

4 By decision of 10 May 2024, the examiner rejected the application for registration, on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation.

5 On 27 June 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

7 The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the mark applied for would be perceived by the relevant public, consisting of the English-speaking general public and professional public in the European Union, as designating goods intended to be environmentally friendly and offering protection against damage or harm, or as indicating that those goods provided protection for ecological purposes or that they protected the environment. The Board of Appeal concluded that the sign was descriptive within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, therefore, was also devoid of the distinctive character required by Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s arguments based on a comparison with other, earlier registrations.

Forms of order sought

8 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs.

9 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

Law

10 The applicant relies on three pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, second, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation and, third, breach of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration.

First plea: infringement of Article 7 (1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

11 The applicant submits that, contrary to the finding of the Board of Appeal, the mark applied for is not descriptive of the goods covered. In that regard, first, the applicant disputes, in essence, the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the meaning of the parts making up the mark applied for and the meaning of that mark taken as a whole. Second, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the mark applied for and the goods in question.

12 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

13 Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service, must not be registered. Article 7(2) of that regulation provides that Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

14 Those signs are deemed incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 30, and of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL) , T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 37).

15 For a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a relationship between the sign and the goods or services in question that is sufficiently direct and specific to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgments of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM) , T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB) , T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

16 Whether a sign is descriptive can be assessed only, first, by reference to the goods or services concerned and, second, by reference to the understanding which the relevant public has of the sign (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg) , T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

17 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether, as the applicant submits, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 in the present case.

18 In the first place, as regards the relevant public, in paragraphs 17 and 19 of the contested decision the Board of Appeal found that that public consisted of both the English-speaking general public and the English-speaking professional public in the European Union, which has a higher level of attention. The applicant does not dispute those assessments of the Board of Appeal.

19 In the second place, the Board of Appeal pointed out that the sign ‘EcoGuard’, which constitutes the mark applied for, consisted of the prefix ‘eco’ and the English word ‘guard’. That assessment by the Board of Appeal is not disputed by the applicant.

20 The present plea can essentially be broken down into four complaints, relating to the meaning of the word ‘eco’, the meaning of the word ‘guard’, the meaning of the mark applied for as a whole and the existence of a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between that mark and the goods in question.

21 Thus, first, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the meaning of the term ‘eco’.

22 In that regard, it should be noted that, first, in paragraph 23 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal endorsed the definition of the term ‘eco’ adopted by the examiner, as set out in a dictionary, as ‘[describing] something as being related to ecology (environment)’. Second, the Board of Appeal recalled, in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, the case-law according to which the term ‘eco’ referred to the word ‘ecological’ and was often used when marketing goods and services to indicate the ecological origin of the product or the fact that it does not have any impact on the environment (judgments of 15 June 2022, F I S I v EUIPO – Verband der Deutschen Daunen- und Federnindustrie (ECODOWN) , T‑338/21, not published, EU:T:2022:360, paragraph 30, and of 21 December 2022, Trend Glass v EUIPO (ECO STORAGE) , T‑777/21, not published, EU:T:2022:846, paragraph 47).

23 The applicant does not put forward any argument capable of casting doubt on those assessments. It merely makes a general reference to its statement of grounds for the appeal before the Board of Appeal, annexed to the application. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, according to settled case-law, although specific points in the text of the application can be supported and completed by references to specific passages in the documents attached, a general reference to other documents cannot compensate for the failure to set out the essential elements of the legal argument which must appear in the application (judgment of 19 October 2006, Bitburger Brauerei v OHIM – Anheuser-Busch (BUD, American Bud and Anheuser Busch Bud) , T‑350/04 to T‑352/04, EU:T:2006:330, paragraph 33; see also, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, MasterCard and Others v Commission , C‑382/12 P, EU:C:2014:2201, paragraph 41). It follows that the general reference in the application to the statement of grounds for the appeal lodged by the applicant before EUIPO is inadmissible.

24 The present argument must therefore be rejected.

25 Second, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the meaning of the word ‘guard’.

26 First of all, the applicant claims that, within the sign applied for, the Board of Appeal incorrectly identified the element ‘guard’ as a verb, even though it concluded that the word ‘eco’ was an adjective that combined with nouns and adjectives. The Board of Appeal thus failed to fulfil its obligation to examine the sign as a whole, inter alia, by placing its various component parts in their context. Next, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal incorrectly found, in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, that the word ‘guard’ indicated that the goods covered do not harm the environment, whereas that word has an entirely different meaning. Lastly, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the word ‘guard’ in relation to the goods covered by the mark applied for.

27 In that regard, first of all, it should be noted that, in paragraph 21 of the contested decision, referred to by the applicant, the Board of Appeal reproduced the examiner’s findings that the word ‘guard’ meant ‘shield’ or ‘protect’. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in paragraph 25 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that the word ‘guard’ could be perceived by the relevant public as referring to something that protects or as the act of protecting. Therefore, it is apparent from that assessment that the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘guard’ could relate to both a noun and a verb.

28 In so far as the Board of Appeal did not reject the meaning of the word ‘guard’ as a noun, that argument must be rejected as having no factual basis.

29 Next, the applicant complains that in paragraph 32 of the contested decision the Board of Appeal misinterpreted the word ‘guard’ as indicating that the goods covered did not harm the environment, whereas that word has an entirely different meaning.

30 In that regard, it is sufficient to note, as EUIPO correctly did, that paragraph 32 of the contested decision relates not to the interpretation of the word ‘guard’ alone, but to the interpretation of the sign ‘EcoGuard’ as a whole. Thus, the Board of Appeal noted that the mark applied for, taken as a whole, indicated that the goods covered did not harm the environment throughout their life cycle, namely that they provided protection for ecological purposes or that they protected the environment. The applicant’s argument is not capable of calling into question that assessment of the Board of Appeal relating to the meaning of the word ‘guard’, when it is understood in the context of the mark applied for taken as a whole.

31 In those circumstances, that argument must also be rejected.

32 Lastly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the meaning of the word ‘guard’ in relation to the goods covered by the mark applied for, it should be noted, as stated in paragraph 27 above, that the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘guard’ was perceived by the relevant public as designating something that protects or as the act of protecting. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that the word ‘guard’, in relation to the goods covered by the mark applied for, suggested that the goods provided protection or a safeguard against potential harm. According to the Board of Appeal, those goods could be perceived as being designed to protect against damage or harm.

33 The applicant claims, however, that the element ‘guard’ is generally understood as a person or group of people whose job is to protect a person, place or thing from danger or attack, or to prevent a person such as a criminal from escaping, or as a device that protects a dangerous part of something or that protects something from damage (fire guard, trigger guard). In the present context, the applicant maintains that the element ‘guard’ is associated with an active, vigilant role in preventing harm or unauthorised access. The applicant concludes from this that the word ‘guard’ thus refers to a person or device specifically intended actively to provide protection or serve a protective function.

34 In that regard, first, it should be noted that the interpretation of the word ‘guard’ has already been examined by the General Court, which has held that the word refers to something which protects or to the act of protecting (judgment of 13 July 2022, Brand Energy Holdings v EUIPO (RAPIDGUARD) , T‑573/21, not published, EU:T:2022:450, paragraphs 31 and 34).

35 Second, the applicant itself provides several interpretations of the word ‘guard’, and it is important to note that only one of those interpretations attributes to that word a meaning implying the act of protecting. It is apparent from paragraph 29 of the application that the applicant itself admits that that word may also be understood as referring to a device specifically intended to serve a protective function.

36 It should be borne in mind that a word sign must be refused registration under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned (judgments of 23 October 2003, OHIM v Wrigley , C‑191/01 P, EU:C:2003:579, paragraph 32, and of 12 February 2004, Campina Melkunie , C‑265/00, EU:C:2004:87, paragraph 38).

37 Thus, in so far as the applicant itself admits that the word ‘guard’ may have meanings which do not imply an active role of vigilance, but may, inter alia, be understood as referring to a device intended to serve a protective function, as the Board of Appeal essentially held, the argument that the Board of Appeal misconstrued the meaning of that word cannot succeed. That argument must therefore also be rejected.

38 Third, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal misinterpreted the sign ‘EcoGuard’ taken as a whole. In that regard, it relies on the linguistic structure of the sign. According to the applicant, the word ‘guard’ is an agentive noun associated with entities or mechanisms that actively perform a guarding or protective function. It argues that the term ‘eco’ is, in standard language patterns, paired with a noun that inherently possesses an environmental attribute. The combination of those two terms thus creates a semantic and syntactic divergence. The sign ‘EcoGuard’ is, in the applicant’s view, therefore perceived as someone or something actively involved in safeguarding an ecological system. However, the applicant maintains that the goods covered by the mark applied for do not have such a function.

39 In that regard, it must be remembered that a trade mark consisting of a neologism or a word composed of elements each of which is descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought is itself descriptive of the characteristics of those goods or services for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, unless there is a perceptible difference between the neologism or the word and the mere sum of its parts. That presupposes that, because of the unusual nature of the combination in relation to the goods or services, the neologism or word creates an impression which is sufficiently far removed from that produced by a simple combination of meanings lent by the elements of which it is composed, with the result that the word is more than the sum of its parts. In that connection, an analysis of the term in question in the light of the appropriate lexical and grammatical rules is also relevant (see judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2007, MacLean-Fogg v OHIM (LOKTHREAD) , T‑339/05, not published, EU:T:2007:172, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

40 First, the terms ‘eco’ and ‘guard’ are easily and immediately recognisable in the sign ‘EcoGuard’.

41 Thus, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, the public perceives, in relation to the goods covered, the term ‘eco’ as indicating that those goods have specific characteristics that make them environmentally friendly and the word ‘guard’ as indicating that they provide protection or safeguard against potential harm.

42 Second, contrary to what the applicant maintains, the combination of the terms ‘eco’ and ‘guard’ in the sign ‘EcoGuard’ is not unusual to the point of creating an impression far removed from that produced by a simple combination of meanings lent by the elements of which it is composed, as the Board of Appeal stated in paragraph 31 of the contested decision.

43 Therefore, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the sign ‘EcoGuard’, being composed of elements descriptive of characteristics of the goods in respect of which registration was sought, was itself descriptive of those characteristics, in that, having regard to the goods covered by the mark applied for, that sign suggested that those goods were environmentally friendly and offered protection against damage or harm.

44 Consequently, the applicant’s argument that the goods covered by the mark applied for do not have tangible environmental attributes and do not perform the function of actively safeguarding against potential danger through vigilance and force is irrelevant.

45 Fourth, the applicant submits that there is no sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the mark applied for and the contested goods.

46 In that regard, the Board of Appeal found, in a finding which has not been disputed by the applicant, that the contested goods in Classes 6, 9 and 17 are, as a whole, various components and materials used for electrical installations, pipes and tubing, including pipe and tube fittings, electric cables and installation materials, cable management and protection products and seals and connectors for pipes and tubing.

47 The Board of Appeal thus noted, in paragraphs 32 and 35 of the contested decision, that the mark applied for, as a whole, conveyed to the relevant public direct and specific information about easily recognisable characteristics of the goods in question, namely the fact that those goods were both environmentally friendly and protective, and that those characteristics would be perceived without any interpretative effort.

48 According to the applicant, on the contrary, the sign ‘EcoGuard’ conveys a broad and abstract concept requiring several stages of interpretation rather than an immediate and direct meaning. Furthermore, the use of the sign ‘EcoGuard’ in the English-speaking market shows, in the applicant’s submission, that that term is not identified as designating the characteristics of the goods in question.

49 In that regard, it follows from all of the foregoing, and in particular from paragraph 43 above, that the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the relevant public would understand directly and specifically that the goods covered by the sign ‘EcoGuard’ were intended to be environmentally friendly and offered protection against damage or harm. Thus, the relevant public will perceive the descriptive meaning of that sign immediately, as providing information on certain characteristics of the goods concerned.

50 The Board of Appeal was therefore fully entitled to conclude, in paragraph 42 of the contested decision, that there was a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the mark applied for and the goods in question.

51 Moreover, that conclusion cannot be called into question by the fact, relied on by the applicant, that the sign ‘EcoGuard’ is used in English-speaking markets, without being regarded as descriptive, as it claims is the case in the United States.

52 In that regard, first, it should be recalled that, according to well-established case-law, the EU trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system and the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the EU judicature (see judgment of 17 July 2008, L & D v OHIM , C‑488/06 P, EU:C:2008:420, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, EUIPO and, as the case may be, the EU judicature are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or indeed a third country, that a sign is registrable as a national trade mark (judgment of 27 February 2002, Streamserve v OHIM (STREAMSERVE) , T‑106/00, EU:T:2002:43, paragraph 47).

53 Second, and in any event, the use of the sign on the market, including with the intention of indicating the commercial origin of the goods or services, is not relevant to the examination of its descriptive character, as the Board of Appeal correctly observed in paragraph 41 of the contested decision (see, to that effect, and by analogy, judgment of 2 March 2022, Distintiva Solutions v EUIPO – Makeblock (Makeblock) , T‑86/21, not published, EU:T:2022:107, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

54 In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal did not err as regards the assessment of the descriptive character of the mark applied for.

55 The first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

Second plea: infringement of Article 7 (1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

56 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Board of Appeal erred in not examining the distinctive character of the mark applied for independently, as required by Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation.

57 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s argument.

58 In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with settled case-law, it is apparent from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed therein applies for the sign not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (judgments of 19 September 2002, DKV v OHIM , C‑104/00 P, EU:C:2002:506, paragraph 29, and of 7 October 2015, Cyprus v OHIM (XAΛΛOYMI and HALLOUMI) , T‑292/14 and T‑293/14, EU:T:2015:752, paragraph 74).

59 In the present case, since it has been held, in paragraph 54 above, that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods covered for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and that that ground alone justifies the refusal of registration, it is no longer necessary to examine the merits of the plea alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.

Third plea: breach of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration

60 First, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal disregarded the fact that an identical mark had been accepted for goods which, because of their functional overlap, were identical or, at the very least, highly similar. Second, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s practice is particularly inconsistent because, eight days after the contested decision, an identical mark for identical or highly similar goods was registered.

61 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

62 It should be borne in mind that decisions concerning the registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which EUIPO takes under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous administrative practice (judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM , C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65).

63 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, since the application by EUIPO of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration must be consistent with respect for the principle of legality, a person who files an application for registration of a sign as an EU trade mark cannot rely, to his or her advantage and in order to secure an identical decision, on a possibly unlawful act committed to the benefit of someone else (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73, 75 and 76 and the case-law cited, and order of 23 May 2024, Tyczka v EUIPO (READYPACK) , T‑330/23, not published, EU:T:2024:324, paragraph 74).

64 Moreover, for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of sound administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be stringent and full, in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered. That examination must be undertaken in each individual case. The registration of a sign as an EU trade mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 77).

65 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 18 to 54 above, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find that the mark applied for was caught by the ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, with the result that the applicant cannot successfully rely on previous decisions of EUIPO in order to cast doubt on that assessment.

66 In any event, as regards the applicant’s argument that EUIPO has adopted decisions in which registration of the sign ‘EcoGuard’ was accepted, a number of points should be noted.

67 First of all, as the Board of Appeal rightly pointed out in paragraph 47 of the contested decision, international registration No 1 661 371 designating the European Union has been removed from the register and cannot, therefore, be relied on as corresponding to EUIPO’s practice. In those circumstances, there is no need to rule on the admissibility of the document submitted by the applicant as Annex A6 to the application.

68 Next, international registration No 1 825 298 designating the European Union for the mark ‘EcoGuard’, validated by EUIPO, concerns a figurative mark. It must therefore be held that the factual circumstances underlying the two applications for registration are different, with the result that, contrary to what the applicant claims, it cannot be concluded that EUIPO’s decision-making practice is inconsistent (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM , C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraph 77).

69 Lastly, as regards application for international registration No 1 817 968 designating the European Union, it is apparent from Annex A5 to the application that that application for registration was the subject of only a provisional and partial refusal to grant protection, whereas, in principle, registration of the sign for goods partially identical to those covered by the mark applied for was allowed. However, that procedure was ongoing when the contested decision was adopted and cannot serve to establish EUIPO’s practice. In that regard, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that neither the Board of Appeal nor the General Court can be bound by the decisions adopted by the examiner. In particular, it would be contrary to the Board of Appeal’s task as a review body, as defined in recital 30 and in Articles 66 to 71 of Regulation 2017/1001, for its competence to be restricted by the requirement to respect the decisions of the first-instance adjudicating bodies of EUIPO (see judgments of 7 November 2019, A9.com v EUIPO (Representation of a bell) , T‑240/19, not published, EU:T:2019:779, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited, and of 14 September 2022, Lotion v EUIPO (BLACK IRISH) , T‑498/21, not published, EU:T:2022:543, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

70 Therefore, the applicant’s arguments relating to the decisions of the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO recognising the registrability of other marks must be rejected.

71 Consequently, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

72 Since none of the pleas has been upheld, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

73 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

74 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear their own costs.

Buttigieg | Schwarcz | Kancheva

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 28 January 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Papasavvas

Registrar | President

* Language of the case: English.