Report for the Hearing in Case 301/88

I — Legislative background

The common organization of the market in fishery products, as established by Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 (hereinafter referred to as the basic regulation), is characterized by the adoption of common marketing standards for the products in question, the creation of producers' organizations which require their members to conform to certain rules, in particular with respect to production and marketing, and a price regime under which the producers' organizations may fix a withdrawal price below which they do not sell the products brought in by their members, and the payment to those organizations of compensation for fish withdrawn from the market. That compensation is financed from Community funds.

1. Provisions concerning marketing standards

According to the fourth recital in the preamble to the basic regulation, the application of common marketing standards for the products in question should have the effect of keeping products of unsatisfactory quality off the market and facilitating trade relations based on fair competition, thus helping to improve the profitability of production.

The common marketing standards are laid down by the Council and, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the basic regulation, may in particular cover classification by quality, size or weight, packing, presentation and labelling. Article 2(2) provides:

In addition, Article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 103/76 of 19 January 1986 laying down certain common marketing standards for certain fresh or chilled fish (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 29), most recently amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 33/89 of 5 January 1989 (Official Journal 1989 L 5, p. 18), provides that certain sea fish may be marketed for human consumption only if they comply with the marketing standards for specified freshness and size categories, with the exception of small quantities of fish disposed of by inshore fisherman direct to retailers or to consumers.

Under Article 4(1) and (2) of the basic regulation, the Member States are to carry out inspections of the products for which common marketing standards have been adopted for conformity with those standards, and they are to take all appropriate measures to penalize infringements thereof.

The Sea Fish (Marketing Standard) Regulations 1986 (SI 1986, No 1272) provide that any infringement of the basic regulation is to constitute an offence in the United Kingdom.

2. Provisions concerning producers' organizations

Article 5(1) of the basic regulation is worded as follows:

Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 105/76 of 19 January 1976 on the recognition of producers' organizations in the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 39) provided that such recognition was to be granted by the Member States, subject to the fulfilment by the producers' organizations of certain conditions, including those laid down in Article 5 of the basic regulation (which were also included in the previous basic regulation — Council Regulation (EEC) No 100/76 of 19 January 1976, Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 1). Pursuant to Article 4 of the same regulation, recognition was to be withdrawn in particular if those conditions were no longer fulfilled.

Detail was added to those provisions by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2062/80 of 31 July 1980 on the conditions and procedure for granting or withdrawing recognitions of producers' organizations and associations thereof in the fishing industry (Official Journal 1980 L 200, p. 82), as amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1995/84 of 12 July 1984 (Official Journal 1984 L 186, p. 23).

Articles 8 and 9(1) thereof are worded as follows :

3. Provisions concerning the price regime

In the terms of the 12th and 13th recitals in the preamble to the basic regulation, a guide price which is representative of production areas in the Community which will be used for intervention on the market must be fixed and in order to stabilize prices, producers' organizations should be able to intervene in the market, notably by applying a withdrawal price below which the products of their members shall be withdrawn from the market.

Article 12(1) of the basic regulation provides for the fixing of a Community withdrawal price according to the freshness, size or weight and presentation of the products. The withdrawal prices are calculated by applying a percentage to the guide price fixed by the Council for each of the products. Pursuant to Article 9, producers' organizations may fix withdrawal prices and grant an indemnity to members in respect of the quantities of fish withdrawn from the market.

The basic regulation also provides for the grant of compensation to producers' organizations for the quantities withdrawn from the market. The relevant part of the preamble states as follows:

Article 13 of the basic regulation provides in particular that:

In addition, Regulation (EEC) No 2202/82, which lays down general rules for the granting of financial compensation, states, in the fifth recital in the preamble thereto, that such compensation should be granted only in respect of products which, having been offered for sale in the usual manner, have failed to find a buyer at the Community withdrawal price. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the same regulation, which are relevant to the present case, are worded as follows :

Finally, Regulation (EEC) No 3137/82, amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3165/84 of 14 November 1984 (Official Journal 1984 L 297, p. 14) provides that for the purpose of granting financial compensation, each producers' organization is to keep a register showing the quantities withdrawn from the market and in order to check that the information contained in the register corresponds to the quantities effectively put up for sale each Member State is to establish rules for surveillance.

According to the 11th recital in the preamble to the same regulation: ... in the case of an infraction of limited importance of the financial rules of compensation, taking into account the innovative nature of the said rules, the minimal financial advantage resulting from this infraction should not be sanctioned by the total suppression of the right to financial compensation but only by a standard reduction thereof.

Article 13(1) of the regulation provides as follows:

II — Facts and procedure

The Fish Producers' Organization Ltd is recognized by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food as a producers' organization for the trawler owners of Grimsby and Hull. The Grimsby Fish Producers' Organization Ltd is recognized in respect of owners of inshore and seiner vessels registered at Grimsby.

On 7 September 1983, the abovementioned Ministry wrote to each of those producers' organizations mentioning advice received to the effect that there is no visible procedure for grading by your members to European Community standards in your area of operation ... . That complaint, which was not challenged, was reiterated by the same Ministry in a series of letters and at meetings in 1983, 1984 and 1985 and was also repeated by the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (hereinafter referred to as IBAP) in letters which it sent to those producers' organizations during the same period. On 1 August 1985, the Ministry informed the Grimsby Fish Producers' Organization Ltd in particular of a visit to Grimsby by Mr Derham, the Chief Inspector of Fisheries and Director of the Maritime Fisheries Inspectorate, in the course of which he stated that no attempt was being made to grade the fish into the number of size grades required by the Community regulation, with the result that the size grades in the samples examined were mixed rather than homogeneous. Moreover, the Commission added that in April 1987 it sent its officials to Grimsby to examine the activities of the Grimsby Fish Producers' Organization Ltd and that because of the irregularities discovered it suggested to the United Kingdom that its recognition be withdrawn.

At the end of 1985 IBAP decided to grant no financial compensation at all to the two producers' organizations for most species for the period between September 1983 and December 1985 and the organizations commenced proceedings for judicial review of that decision. On 12 June 1987 MacPherson J. found in their favour. IBAP then lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal.

It appears from the order for reference that, except in the case of the fish withdrawn from the market for which compensation of about UKL 80000 was claimed, the conditions under which the two producers' organizations sold fish during the period in question fell far short of compliance with the marketing standards laid down by the Community legislation.

Considering that the central issue in the proceedings related to the extent to which the Community provisions on quality control and those on compensation are linked with each other, the Court of Appeal, by order of 7 June 1988, stayed the proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court:

The order for reference was received at the Court Registry on 13 October 1988.

Pursuant to Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, written observations were submitted by the Fish Producers' Organization Ltd and the Grimsby Fish Producers' Organization Ltd, the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, represented by Alan Pardoe, QC, instructed by Messrs Rowe & Maw, solicitors, by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by J. A. Gensmantel, of the Treasury Solicitor's Department, acting as Agent, and by the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Peter Oliver, a member of its Legal Department, acting as Agent.

Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate General, the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry.

III — Written observations submitted to the Court

The first question

The plaintiffs in the main proceedings claim that the payment of financial compensation for the fish withdrawn is subject only to the conditions expressly set out in Article 13(1) of the basic regulation and reiterated in Article 3 of Regulation No 2202/82. They state that in this case all those conditions have been satisfied as regards all the fish withdrawn in respect of which compensation is sought.

No provision of the applicable rules provides any basis for the reasoning adopted by IBAP with respect to Article 13 of the basic regulation. According to IBAP, compensation is granted only if the producers' organization shows that all the fish sold by its members, being of the same species as that in respect of which the organization intervened during the year in question, conformed to the standards laid down under Article 2 of that regulation. In their opinion the effect of such reasoning is tantamount to incorporating an additional condition in Article 13 of the basic regulation, which is wholly unjustified and wrong in law. The consequence of IBAP's arguments is that, because some unparticularized part of the fish of a given species sold by a producers' organization in Hull or Grimsby does not conform to the grading standards, that organization will obtain no compensation for fish withdrawn in any port, even though all the fish withdrawn had been offered for sale in full conformity with grading standards and even though it may be that much of the fish sold (possibly in other ports) was also graded in accordance with those standards. And conversely, it would follow that if fish is landed and sold by members of other producers' organizations in Hull or Grimsby, those other organizations would lose all entitlement to compensation for all fish withdrawn of the same species as that sold at Hull or Grimsby, wherever withdrawn.

According to the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, those consequences were in fact accepted by IBAP as flowing from its reasoning, thus hindering the objectives of Article 39(1) of the Treaty. They threaten the standard of living of fishermen, destabilize the fish market and do not assure the availability of supplies of fish at reasonable prices to the consumer.

They also maintain that the objective of the regulation of the market for fish is pursued by means of two distinct policies: the regulation of grading standards and a price support mechanism. Although those policies intermesh, since grading standards are to some extent necessary to the operation of the price support mechanism, the latter cannot be seen as a general policing mechanism for grading standards. The price support mechanism, consisting of compensation by means of intervention, can only operate in relation to producers who are in producers' organizations — grading standards bind all producers, whether or not in producers' organizations. Grading standards must therefore be enforced by means of generally applicable criminal sanctions, without reference to producers' organizations. The appropriate sanction against a producers' organization that fails in its selling operation to apply Community grading standards is a withdrawal of recognition by the Member State, pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 2062/80.

In the view of the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, the foregoing analysis is supported by consideration of the basic regulation. The fact that producers' organizations are nowhere mentioned in Title I shows that they are not intended to play a part in the regulation of marketing standards. Conversely, they play a central role in price support, which is dealt with in Title III. Throughout the regulation the only important points of interplay between marketing standards and price support are to be found in Article 13(1)(b), dealing with fish withdrawn and in the provisions on the calculation of compensation.

The plaintiffs in the main proceedings consider that, contrary to the view advanced by IBAP before the Court of Appeal, the payments made under Article 13(1) of the basic regulation do not constitute financial support to producers' organizations but compensation for the fish withdrawn from sale because, although it was graded properly, it did not reach the minimum Community price in the market.

It also seems to them to be fallacious to argue, as IBAP did, that the intervention scheme is concerned with removing the dregs from the market. A glut of high-grade fish at a particular port at a particular auction means that it does not reach the withdrawal price and is sold to intervention through the producers' organization.

Moreover, according to the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, IBAP is not correct in its argument that the price intervention scheme is to do with regulating public health. That is administered quite independently and rigorously and policed by criminal sanctions.

Finally they claim that IBAP's arguments lead to a wholly irrational conclusion. Deficiencies in grading in the last week of the year would be fatal to recovery in respect of the whole year. Such a result would be wholly inconsistent with the relevant policy objectives.

The United Kingdom submits that no compensation is payable if a producers' organization has failed to a significant extent to comply with Community marketing standards in respect of other fish of the withdrawn species put up for sale but not withdrawn during the period in respect of which compensation is claimed.

That conclusion follows, in its opinion, from the central features of the Community regime for marketing fish. Thus, the provisions on quality control forbid anyone from offering for sale any fish which do not conform to the detailed grading standards based on freshness and size and they provide for official inspection to ensure conformity. Moreover, the adoption of marketing standards is of particular importance in fixing guide prices and withdrawal prices, which are determined by reference to the guide prices. In that way, standards are linked to the system of intervention by the withdrawal of fish and consequently to the provisions for compensation.

As regards the functioning of the producers' organizations, the United Kingdom states it is through them that production and marketing are controlled and rationalized and supplies are adjusted to demand. They deserve to be supported by the Community because they contribute to the achievement of Community objectives, but they do not merit Community support if they undermine those objectives. It is true that when infringements are committed the United Kingdom authorities have available criminal sanctions and the possibility of withdrawing recognition from a producers' organization. However, those are draconian measures which must be distinguished from the withholding of compensation. The function of compensation is to give positive encouragement to producers who comply with the Community rules whereas the imposition of a penalty or the withdrawal of recognition, although possibly providing an incentive to comply with those rules, do not have a positive role in the pursuit of Community objectives. Acceptance of the applicant organizations' argument that the refusal to grant compensation constitutes a penalty which is not provided for by the Community rules would entail the absurd result that the members of a producers' organization could be subject to criminal penalties whilst at the same time the producers' organization to which they belong is receiving compensation. Withdrawal of recognition should be used only as a last resort and only after performance of the other functions of a producers' organization has been taken into account, since if recognition is withdrawn there will be more members of the fishing industry who are working outside the Community regime.

The United Kingdom considers that it is the responsibility of producers' organizations to ensure correct grading and that, for that reason, they should not grant an indemnity to their members where the Community marketing standards have not been complied with pursuant to Article 9(1) of the basic regulation. A producers' organization which complies with those provisions will not lose anything by not being paid compensation by IBAP, since it will not have paid out anything to its members who are defaulting. The applicant organizations' argument that it is excessive to forfeit all compensation even where part of the product put up for sale has been correctly graded is unfounded since such a situation can only arise if a producers' organization grants an indemnity in circumstances where it should not have done so and then seeks to make good the amounts it has wrongly paid out by recovering compensation from IBAP.

The United Kingdom also considers that the payment of compensation to those who do not comply with Community marketing standards hampers the objectives laid down in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty and the common fisheries policy. As is apparent from the judgment of the Court in Case 819/79 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission [1981] ECR 21, payments may only be charged to Community funds if the rules authorizing such payments have been complied with. Moreover, as the Court stated in that judgment, the provisions of Community regulations must be applied uniformly and so far as possible to the same effect throughout the Community. Also relevant to this case are the considerations set out by the Court in Case 11/76 Netherlands v Commission [1979] ECR 245: essentially, the conditions under which agricultural expenditure is to be borne must be applied strictly and a wide interpretation is not permissible, lest traders in one State are favoured to the detriment of those in other Member States. The United Kingdom considers, in fact, that the payment of compensation in circumstances where producers' organizations are not operating Community marketing standards satisfactorily is inconsistent with fair competition and results in discrimination against producers' organizations which go to the trouble and expense of ensuring that their members grade the withdrawn fish correctly. To pay compensation in those circumstances is contrary to Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty. The United Kingdom also argues that a Member State which pays through its intervention board compensation to a producers' organization which does not ensure compliance with Community marketing standards is failing in its duty under Article 5 of the Treaty.

Finally, in its opinion, an interpretation of the Community rules to the effect that compensation must be paid so long as the withdrawn fish are properly graded undermines Article 2(2) of the basic regulation. Where regulations refer to annual quantities offered for sale and previously graded, they must be read in a way which is consistent with the important provisions which provide that no fish is to be offered for sale unless it is graded according to Community marketing standards. Compensation is to be paid according to the proportion that withdrawn fish bear to annual quantities of the same species put up for sale, it being assumed that they have been correctly graded. In other words, provisions for calculation of compensation must not be read in such a way as to undermine the essential requirement that all fish offered for sale are properly graded.

The United Kingdom concludes from the foregoing that the answer to the first question should be in the negative.

The Commission submits that it follows quite unequivocally from the wording of Article 4(1) of Regulation No 2202/82 that the failure to grade quantities actually sold must have some financial consequences for the producers' organizations concerned. Any argument to the effect that the grading of withdrawn quantities alone will suffice for the entitlement to full financial compensation is thus wholly untenable.

The second question

The applicants in the main proceedings maintain that compensation should be calculated by reference to the total quantity of fish of a given species put up for sale, reduced pro tanto to reflect that quantity of fish of that species put up for sale in breach of the Community marketing standards. Since Article 13(l)(c) of the basic regulation refers to Article 13(3) of the same regulation, it is clear that the compensation diminishes the greater is the proportion that the annual quantity of fish withdrawn bears to the annual quantity of fish of that species that is put up for sale in accordance with Article 5(1). Moreover, by virtue of Article 4 of Regulation 2202/82, a comparison of the quantities of fish of each species put up for sale during the fishing year and the quantities withdrawn from the market during the same year is necessary for the proper application of the rules contained in Article 13(3) of the basic regulation.

The applicants in the main proceedings observe that for the purpose of calculating financial compensation, they kept registers showing the monthly quantities of the relevant species put up for sale during the fishing year and the monthly quantities of those products withdrawn from the market, as required by Article 6 of Regulation No 3137/82.

The United Kingdom considers it unnecessary to reply to the second question, for the reasons which it put forward in relation to the first question. Subsidiarily, with respect to Question 2(b), it considers that it would be contrary to the objectives of the applicable rules to pay compensation irrespective of whether a producers' organization complied with the Community legislation. It stresses that the provisions relating to the calculation of compensation are not designed to provide for a diminishing scale of compensation in proportion to the quantity of fish put up for sale in breach of Community marketing standards. In its opinion, the purpose of the digressive scale in Article 13(3) of the basic regulation is merely to reduce compensation as the quantity of fish offered for sale in excess of demand rises. In any event, the wording of Article 4(1) of Regulation No 2202/82 does not allow the payment of some compensation whilst eliminating fish offered for sale but not properly graded, since the reference to Article 2 of the basic regulation in that provision in intended to emphasize the assumption that the grading requirements laid down in that article have be complied with.

The Commission observes that Question 2(b) suggests that in calculating the total quantity of fish put up for sale batches not complying with the standards might be disregarded but it considers that that reasoning is not consonant with the letter or the aims of the legislation concerned.

Breach of the Community marketing standards is a serious matter, notably because it is liable to cause grave distortions in the market and it cannot be regarded as an infringement of limited importance within the meaning of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 3137/82. Consequently, the contravention of those standards must entail the loss to the producers' organizations of all financial compensation for the species concerned for the year in question.

The Commission submits that the quantities of one species of fish put up for sale during one year are to be regarded as an indivisible whole. That interpretation is borne out by Article 13(3) of the basic regulation, which provides that the amount of the financial compensation for quantities withdrawn from the market is to be determined according to a percentage of the annual quantities of the product concerned which are put up for sale. In its view, the term product must mean species since it is an implicit reference to products listed in Annex 1(A) and (D) in paragraph 1 of Article 13. The word product in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 2202/82 must have the same meaning. That provision refers to quantities offered for sale during the fishing year. The fishing year corresponds with the calendar year.

It cannot be left to the whim of the producers' organizations to decide to what extent they will comply with the marketing standards and to claim compensation accordingly. In the Commission's view, producers' organizations are always bound to observe the marketing standards even if they exercise their right to fix a withdrawal price exceeding the parameters laid down in Article 13(1)(a) of the basic regulation and are thus entitled to no compensation in any event.

The Commission also observes that it is manifest from the 11th recital in the preamble to Regulation No 3137/82 and from Article 13(1) thereof that the financial compensation regime takes full account of the principle of proportionality. What is more, as regards grading, that provision is supplemented by Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3703/85 of 23 December 1985 laying down detailed rules for applying the common marketing standards for certain fresh or chilled fish (Official Journal 1985 L 351, p. 63), which provides :

In the Commission's view, it is perfectly equitable that a producers' organization which has flouted the grading requirement to such an extent that it is unable to invoke either of those two exceptional provisions should forfeit all financial compensation for the species in issue for the year concerned. It also observes that, as is apparent from the judgment of the Court in Case 272/81 RUMI v Fonds d'orientation et de régularisation des marchés agricoles [1982] ECR 4167, the principle of proportionality does not preclude the Commission from providing that, where a party failed even to a slight extent to comply with the principal obligation for the grant of an aid, that aid was to be forfeited in full. In the present case the obligation to observe the Community marketing standards is not merely the principal obligation for the grant of financial compensation: it is an obligation which is imposed on all persons who offer fish for sale within the Community, whether or not they seek or are entitled to financial compensation.

The third question

The applicants in the main proceedings consider that it is the responsibility of the Member State to establish the quantity of fish put up for sale in breach of the Community marketing standards. They emphasize the crucial importance of the rules for surveillance provided for in Article 8 of Regulation No 3137/82 for the proper administration of the common fisheries policy intervention scheme. In their view IBAP has produced no evidence to show that the United Kingdom has established any such rules for surveillance, which explains why, as the Court of Appeal noted, no particulars have ever been given by the Board as to the quantities of fish sold whose grading did not satisfy Community standards'. In the absence of proper surveillance, it cannot be for producers' organizations themselves to challenge the figures of quantities shown on their own registers. Accordingly, no deduction from the compensation claimed may lawfully be made.

The United Kingdom considers that the third question does not fall to be answered unless, contrary to its submission, the Court answers Questions 1 and 2(b) in the affirmative.

To cover such an eventuality, it states that it is for the producers' organizations to prove that the annual quantity of fish both put up for sale and not withdrawn has been graded according to Community marketing standards. It points out that the relevant provisions of Article 4(1) of the basic regulation, of Article 8 of Regulation No 2062/80 and of Article 8 of Regulation No 3137/82 provide for inspections of quantities of fish put up for sale and surveillance of producers' organizations to see that Community marketing standards are being enforced. Moreover, the producers' organizations are bound to keep a register pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation No 3137/82. The Inspectorate acting on behalf of IBAP obviously cannot monitor each and every parcel of fish put up for sale and therefore the burden is on the producers' organizations to show that they have complied with Community marketing standards.

In support of that argument it observes that by virtue of the judgment in Case 254/85 Irish Grain Board (Trading) Ltd v Minister for Agriculture [1986] ECR 3309, those seeking finance from the Community should establish that they are entitled to it.

The Commission also considers that in view of its observations on the second question, the third question does not arise in the terms in which it is posed. However, for completeness it examines the problem as to the burden of proof as regards Article 13(1) of Regulation No 3137/82; it states that once a producers' organization has infringed the rules for financial compensation, it is for that organization to show that the infringement is of limited importance. In its opinion, it is also plain from that provision that that organization bears the burden of proving that the infringement was committed without intent to defraud and in the absence of gross negligence.

In that connection, the Commission considers that it is appropriate to apply to this case by analogy the case-law of the Court relating to the clearance of EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund) accounts according to which, once the Commission has established that a Member State has infringed the rules of the common organization of the market, the burden of proof rests upon the Member State to show that the infringement is more limited in extent than the Commission contends (see in particular Case 49/83 Luxembourg v Commission [1984] ECR 2931, and Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749.

The fourth question

The applicants in the main proceedings claim that in view of their submissions on the previous questions the fact of not correctly grading fish put up for sale can give rise to no more than a reduction in compensation. If, contrary to that submission, a failure to grade properly can be treated as a matter of penalty, it must be considered to be an infringement of the rules for financial compensation within the meaning of Article 13 of Regulation No 3137/82. If a Member State alleges such an infringement it must first consider whether it is an infringement of limited importance. In such a case, if the producers' organization has shown, to the satisfaction of the Member State, that the infringement was committed without intent to defraud or in the absence of gross negligence the penalty should not exceed an amount equal to 10% of the Community withdrawal price applicable to the quantities which have been withdrawn.

The United Kingdom observes that the correct grading of fish is fundamental to the rational development of the market and the stabilization of prices and thus to the primary objectives of the common fisheries policy and therefore a failure properly to grade cannot be regarded as of limited importance. On the facts of the case, where the Court of Appeal has accepted that significant failures occurred, no question of a failure of limited importance arises.

The Commission takes the same view and adds that the fact that the applicant organizations did not heed the repeated warnings given by the competent authorities constitutes at the very least gross negligence within the meaning of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 3137/82.

The fifth question

The applicants in the main proceedings state that the United Kingdom never considered whether the alleged infringement was of limited importance and consequently they were never given the opportunity of proving either that they had no intent to defraud or that they were guiltless of any gross negligence. Accordingly, in their view the deprivation of all compensation by way of penalty for infringement was unlawful.

The United Kingdom considers that in view of its previous submissions the fifth question does not fall to be answered. If, contrary to its submission, it does call for an answer it submits that it is for producers' organizations seeking compensation from the Community to establish the amount of the fish put up for sale and properly graded and to establish that infringements of Community marketing standards are of limited importance.

The Commission has not submitted any observations on the fifth question.

1 Language of the case: English.