ext/celex/62024TJ0601

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

10 June 2026 ( * )

( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds and economic resources – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources – Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Concept of ‘immediate family member’ – Concept of ‘benefiting from leading businesspersons operating in Russia’ )

In Case T‑601/24,

Anastasia Ignatova, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by C. Zatschler, Senior Counsel,

applicant,

v

Council of the European Union, represented by A. Limonet, A. Antoniadis and L. Berger, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed, at the time of deliberation, of L. Madise, acting as President, P. Nihoul (Rapporteur) and S. Verschuur,

Registrar: M. Zwozdziak-Carbonne, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular:

– the application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 25 November 2024,

– the statement of modification of the applicant lodged at the Court Registry on 16 April 2025,

– the statement of modification of the applicant lodged at the Court Registry on 24 September 2025,

further to the hearing on 28 October 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Ms Anastasia Ignatova, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456); (ii) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455); (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/528); (iv) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/527); (v) Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/1895); and (vi) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of 12 September 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2025/1894), in so far as those acts concern her.

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

2 The applicant is the daughter of the wife of a Russian businessman, Mr Chemezov.

3 The present case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

4 On 17 March 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, the Council of the European Union adopted:

– under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), and

– under Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).

5 Those acts provided, inter alia, for the freezing of the funds and economic resources of persons identified as being responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and for the freezing of the funds and economic resources of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, the lists of which were annexed thereto (‘the lists at issue’).

The inclusion of Mr Chemezov on the lists at issue

6 On 8 September 2014, Mr Chemezov was included on the lists at issue by Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2014 L 271, p. 47) and by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2014 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2014 L 271, p. 8).

7 The grounds for that listing were as follows:

‘Sergei Chemezov is one of President Putin’s known close associate, both were KGB officers posted in Dresden and he is a member of the Supreme Council of “United Russia”. He is benefiting from his links with the Russian President by being promoted to senior positions in State-controlled firms. He chairs the Rostec conglomerate, the leading Russian state-controlled defence and industrial manufacturing corporation. Further to a decision of the Russian government, Technopromexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, is planning to build energy plants in Crimea thereby supporting its integration into the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, has supported the integration of Crimean defence companies into Russia’s defence industry, thereby consolidating the illegal annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.’

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue on successive occasions

8 The applicant was included on the lists at issue on five successive occasions. The present action challenges only the last three listings.

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the first time, which is not challenged before the Court

9 Following the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Council adopted, on 25 February 2022, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1), so as to broaden the criteria for inclusion on the lists at issue inter alia by inserting, in Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, criterion (g), targeting ‘leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’. That provision also targeted funds and economic resources ‘belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by … natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them’ (‘the original criterion (g)’).

10 At the same time, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/330 of 25 February 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), which amended the listing criterion in point (g) of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 in similar terms.

11 On 8 April 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/582 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 55) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/581 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 3). By those acts, the applicant’s name was added to line 923 of the lists at issue.

12 The grounds for that listing were as follows:

‘[The applicant] is the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, who is the CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (State Corporation for Promoting Development, Manufacturing and Export of Russian Technologies High-Tech Industrial Products).

As the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, she holds large assets in connection with him through offshore companies. [She] formally owns the 85-metre yacht “Valerie” worth 140 million [United States dollars (USD)] (more than 10 billion [Russian roubles (RUB)]) through a British Virgin Islands company called Delima Services Limited. Furthermore, she is the beneficiary of offshore companies with hundreds of millions of [USD] in assets.

[She] is associated with a natural person (her stepfather) listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’

13 By the same acts, the applicant’s mother, Ekaterina Ignatova, and grandmother, Lyudmila Rukavishikova were also included on the lists at issue in lines 922 and 924, respectively.

14 The following grounds were put forward in respect of those two individuals:

– ‘Ekaterina Ignatova is the wife of Sergei Chemezov, who is the CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (State Corporation for Assistance to Development, Production and Export of Advanced Technology Industrial Product). As the wife of Sergei Chemezov, Ekaterina Ignatova holds large assets in connection with him. On Sergei Chemezov’s last public asset declaration in 2019, Ekaterina Ignatova’s annual income of 24 million USD was included.

Ekaterina Ignatova is associated with a natural person (her husband) listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’;

– ‘Lyudmila Rukavishikova is the mother-in-law of Sergei Chemezov, who is the CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (State Corporation for Promoting Development, Manufacturing and Export of Russian Technologies High-Tech Industrial Products). As the mother-in-law of Sergei Chemezov, she holds large assets in connection with him, including shares of companies that own properties used by Rostec.

Lyudmila Rukavishikova is associated with a natural person (her son-in-law) listed under restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’

15 By notice of 11 April 2022 (OJ 2022 C 157, p. 11), the Council informed the persons concerned that they could submit a request to it, before 1 June 2022, to have the decision to include them on the lists at issue reconsidered.

16 The applicant did not respond to that notice. Nor did she challenge that initial listing before the Court.

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the second time, which is not challenged before the Court

17 On 5 June 2023, in order to strengthen the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, the Council, by Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20) and by Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1) (together, ‘the 2023 acts’), amended, inter alia, the listing criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014. Under that criterion, fund-freezing measures are to apply to leading businesspersons operating in Russia (‘the first limb’) and to their immediate family members or other natural persons, benefiting from them (‘the second limb’), as well as to businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine (together, ‘amended criterion (g)’).

18 On 13 September 2023, by Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3), the Council maintained the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue, but amended the grounds for her listing as follows:

‘[The applicant] is the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, who is the CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (State Corporation for the Promotion of the Development, Manufacture and Export of High Tech Products).

As the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, she holds large assets in connection with him through offshore companies. [She] formally owned the 85-metre yacht “Valerie” worth USD 140 million (more than RUB 10 billion) through a British Virgin Islands company called Delima Services Limited. Furthermore, she is the beneficiary of offshore companies with hundreds of millions of [USD] in assets.

[She] is an immediate family member benefitting from her stepfather Sergei Chemezov.’

19 By notice of 14 September 2023 (OJ 2023 C 324, p. 8), the Council informed the persons and entities concerned that they could submit a request to it, before 2 November 2023, to have the decision to include them on the lists at issue reconsidered.

20 That notice did not elicit any response from the applicant before 2 November 2023.

21 However, on 21 May 2024, the applicant applied to the Council for access to the documents underpinning her listings.

22 On 31 May 2024, the Council sent the applicant working document WK 5027/2022 INIT (‘the first working document’) and working documents WK 5142/2023 INIT, WK 5142/2023 ADD1 REV 1 and WK 5142/2023 ADD2.

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the third time, which is challenged before the Court

23 On 23 July 2024, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to maintain her inclusion on the lists at issue on amended grounds, worded as follows:

‘[The applicant] is the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, who is the CEO of the Russian state corporation Rostec (State Corporation for the Promotion of the Development, Manufacture and Export of High Tech Products).

As the stepdaughter of Sergei Chemezov, she holds large assets in connection with him through offshore companies. [She] could continue to be the owner of the 85 m yacht “Valerie” worth USD 140 million (more than RUB 10 billion) through a British Virgin Islands company called Delima Services Limited, in view of a possible fictitious sale. Furthermore, she is the beneficiary of offshore companies with hundreds of millions of [USD] dollars in assets.

[She] is an immediate family member benefitting from her stepfather Sergei Chemezov.’

24 By the same letter, the Council sent the applicant working document WK 10306/24 INIT (‘the second working document’), informing her that she could submit observations by 5 August 2024 at the latest.

25 On 5 August 2024, the applicant submitted observations to the Council on the latter’s proposed amendment of the grounds for her listing.

26 On 12 September 2024, the Council adopted Decision 2024/2456 and Implementing Regulation 2024/2455 (together, ‘the contested acts of September 2024’), by which the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue was maintained on the same grounds as those set out in the Council’s letter of 23 July 2024.

27 On 13 September 2024, the Council replied to the observations made by the applicant in her letter of 5 August 2024, informed her of the adoption of the contested acts of September 2024 and set 2 November 2024 as the deadline for submitting further observations.

28 On 1 November 2024, the applicant submitted a request for reconsideration to the Council.

29 On 25 November 2024, the applicant brought the present action against that third listing.

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the fourth time, which is challenged before the Court

30 On 14 March 2025, the Council adopted Decision 2025/528 and Implementing Regulation 2025/527 (together, ‘the contested acts of March 2025’), by which it maintained the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue on grounds that were unchanged.

31 On 17 March 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain her inclusion on the lists at issue, replied to the observations made in her letter of 1 November 2024 and informed her of the possibility of submitting further observations by 2 June 2025 at the latest.

32 On 16 April 2025, the applicant lodged a statement of modification seeking annulment of the contested acts of March 2025 (‘the first statement of modification’).

33 On 2 June 2025, the applicant submitted a request for reconsideration to the Council.

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the fifth time, which is challenged before the Court

34 On 12 September 2025, the Council adopted Decision 2025/1895 and Implementing Regulation 2025/1894 (together, ‘the contested acts of September 2025’), by which the applicant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue on the same grounds as those set out in the contested acts of September 2024 and the contested acts of March 2025.

35 On 15 September 2025, the Council informed the applicant of its decision to maintain her inclusion on the lists at issue, replied to the observations made in her letter of 2 June 2025 and informed her of the possibility of submitting further observations by 11 November 2025 at the latest.

36 On 24 September 2025, the applicant lodged a further statement of modification seeking annulment of the contested acts of September 2025 (‘the second statement of modification’).

Forms of order sought

37 In the application, the applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts of September 2024 in so far as they concern her;

– declare the 2023 acts to be inapplicable to her;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

38 In the defence, the Council contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action as unfounded;

– order the applicant to pay the costs;

– in the alternative, should the Court annul the contested acts of September 2024, order that the effects of Decision 2024/2456 be maintained in relation to the applicant until the partial annulment of Implementing Regulation 2024/2455 takes effect.

39 In the first statement of modification, the applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts of March 2025 in so far as they concern her;

– declare the 2023 acts to be inapplicable to her;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

40 In its observations on the first statement of modification, the Council contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the applicant’s action for annulment;

– order the applicant to pay the costs;

– in the alternative, should the Court decide to annul Decision [2024/2456] or Decision 2025/528 in so far as they concern the applicant, order that the effects of those decisions, in so far as they concern her, be maintained until the expiry of the time limit for bringing an appeal referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or, if an appeal is brought within that time limit, until the dismissal of that appeal.

41 In the second statement of modification, the applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested acts of September 2025 in so far as they concern her;

– declare the 2023 acts to be inapplicable to her;

– order the Council to pay the costs.

42 In its observations on the second statement of modification, the Council contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action for annulment;

– order the applicant to pay the costs;

– in the alternative, should the Court decide to annul Decision 2024/2456, Decision 2025/528 or Decision 2025/1895 in so far as they concern the applicant, order that the effects of those decisions, in so far as they concern her, be maintained until the expiry of the time limit for bringing an appeal referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or, if an appeal is brought within that time limit, until the dismissal of that appeal.

Law

43 The Court will first provide an overview of the case-law and describe the evidence relied on by the Council, after which it will examine each of the pleas relating to the contested acts of September 2024, of March 2025 and of September 2025 in turn.

Overview of the case-law

44 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that although the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council , T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraphs 54 and 55, and of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council , T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

45 In addition, it should be pointed out that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, was taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the statement of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons – or, at the very least, one of those reasons deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision – are substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council , T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).

46 That assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in their context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a link between the person subject to a fund-freezing measure and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council , T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

47 It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council , T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).

48 In that regard, it should be noted that the context of the measures at issue must be taken into account and that the standard of proof which may be required of the Council must be adapted in the light of the difficulty of obtaining evidence and objective information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council , T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

49 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that restrictive measures are measures of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, the validity of which always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objectives. It is thus for the Council, when periodically reviewing those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to take stock of the effects of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the lists at issue or whether it is still possible to reach the same conclusion in relation to those persons and entities (judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council , T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraphs 58 and 59).

The evidence relied on by the Council

50 The evidence relied on by the Council is spread over three working documents.

51 The first working document had already been used to justify the inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue on the first two occasions, which are not challenged in the present action. That document was forwarded to the applicant by letter of 31 May 2024 (see paragraph 22 above) and contains the following exhibits:

– two articles by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) dated 8 October 2021 (the first of those articles is ‘exhibit 1 in the first working document’);

– an article from ‘The Moscow Times’ (‘exhibit 3 in the first working document’);

– an article published by ‘Vedomosti’ in 2016;

– an article from ‘Agromassidayu’;

– the instruments by which the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom imposed restrictive measures on the applicant.

52 The second working document was forwarded to the applicant on 23 July 2024 (see paragraph 24 above) and contains two additional exhibits, relating to administrative and judicial proceedings brought by Sulberg Services Limited (‘Sulberg’), formerly Delima Services Limited (‘Delima’), which is the owner of the yacht Valerie , in order to secure the release of that vessel which was being held in a Spanish port. Those additional exhibits are:

– a report from the Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (State Tax Agency, Spain) dated 11 April 2022 (‘exhibit 1 in the second working document’);

– a judgment delivered by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo (High Court of Justice of Madrid, Administrative Chamber, Spain) on 17 April 2024 (‘exhibit 2 in the second working document’).

53 Working documents WK 5142/2023 INIT, WK 5142/2023 ADD1 REV 1 and WK 5142/2023 ADD2 were forwarded to the applicant by letter of 31 May 2024 (see paragraph 22 above) and contain numerous articles on the components and functioning of the economy of the Russian Federation.

The application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2024

54 In the application, the applicant puts forward three pleas in law challenging the contested acts of September 2024. The first alleges errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member, the second alleges that the second limb of amended criterion (g) is unlawful and the third alleges infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

55 In her first plea, the applicant submits that the Council made various errors of law and of assessment in the application to her of the ‘immediate family member’ criterion, constituting the second limb of amended criterion (g).

56 The first plea can be divided into five parts, claiming:

– in the first place, that the applicant’s wealth is not linked to Mr Chemezov;

– in the second place, that there are no links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov;

– in the third place, that the relevant assets no longer existed or were no longer owned by the applicant when the contested acts of September 2024 maintained her inclusion on the lists at issue;

– in the fourth place, that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov;

– in the fifth place, that the documents on which the Council relied are irrelevant or concern facts that are manifestly outdated or incorrect.

57 The Court is of the view that the first, second and third parts of the first plea, as well as the fifth part of the first plea in so far as it relates to those first three parts, should be considered together. The other parts or arguments will be examined at a later stage in this judgment.

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

58 It follows from the application that the arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the first three parts of the first plea are essentially concerned with three assets: the company Elsamex, the villa Estepona and the yacht Valerie .

59 In the first two parts of the first plea, the applicant submits that there is nothing linking those assets to Mr Chemezov and that she acquired the shares in Elsamex before the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, while in the third part she claims that those assets no longer existed or were no longer owned by her when the contested acts of September 2024 maintained her inclusion on the lists at issue.

60 It is appropriate to begin by examining the applicant’s arguments relating to the yacht Valerie .

61 In the second part of the first plea, the applicant claims that the yacht Valerie was bequeathed to her by her godfather, Mr Kogan. Mr Kogan was a prominent Ukrainian businessman involved in the commercial management, chartering and technical management of cargo fleets, as well as having other business interests in Ukraine. In particular, he was the owner of Sightview Consultants Limited (‘Sightview’), a British Virgin Islands company, which itself held shares in the company Linkpoint Services Limited (‘Linkpoint’), the owner of the yacht. Upon his death on 5 October 2017, Mr Kogan bequeathed Sightview to the applicant, who thus became, on 17 April 2018, the owner of that yacht.

62 The Council disputes that line of argument.

63 In that regard, the Court observes that a number of factors, taken as a whole, serve to demonstrate that, as the Council claimed, there is a link between the yacht Valerie and Mr Chemezov:

– the applicant received the yacht as a result of a gratuitous act;

– the yacht is described in exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document as one of the Chemezov family’s assets;

– exhibit 1 in the second working document refers to various port of call reports showing that Mr Chemezov, his wife and the applicant used the yacht Valerie in 2017 and 2018, before its transfer to the applicant;

– in the application, the applicant acknowledges that the yacht in question was bequeathed to her by Mr Kogan through Sightview, Linkpoint and Delima, which is, moreover, evidenced by exhibit 1 in the second working document. It is apparent from the B1 and Kept reports, produced by the applicant herself, that Mr Kogan had a 49% shareholding in RT-Logistika, a subsidiary of Rostec, chaired by Mr Chemezov, who was its majority shareholder (51%). Mr Kogan was also the manager of that company. The Kept report states that, in 2011 and 2012, that company paid out dividends to Mr Kogan in the amount of USD 1.05 million.

64 Since the applicant did not lodge a reply, the items of evidence adduced by the Council in order to demonstrate the existence of a link between Mr Chemezov and the relevant assets were not challenged by the applicant in the application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2024.

65 However, in the fifth part of the first plea, the applicant takes issue with exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document and exhibit 1 in the second working document, containing some of the items of evidence referred to in paragraph 63 above.

66 Exhibit 1 in the first working document is an article by the OCCRP dated 8 October 2021 (see paragraph 51 above). The applicant criticises that exhibit, claiming that it concerns other persons and contains allegations based on outdated facts which were not verified by reference to official records in countries with accessible registers.

67 Exhibit 3 in the first working document is an article from ‘The Moscow Times’ (see paragraph 51 above). The applicant criticises that exhibit, claiming that it merely summarises the allegations contained, inter alia, in exhibit 1 in that working document.

68 Exhibit 1 in the second working document (see paragraph 52 above) is a report from the Customs and Excise Department of the Spanish State Tax Agency dated 11 April 2022. The applicant submits that that report was misinterpreted by the Council.

69 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered evaluation of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard should be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council , T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council , T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).

70 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (see judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council , T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

71 Furthermore, it must be observed that the situation of conflict involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see judgment of 18 December 2024, Rosbank v Council , T‑270/23, not published, EU:T:2024:904, paragraph 110 and the case-law cited).

72 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the criticism levelled by the applicant at exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document and exhibit 1 in the second working document.

73 As regards exhibit 1 in the first working document, it should be observed that the OCCRP article was published in 2021 and, therefore, is not so dated that it could no longer be taken into account for the purpose of maintaining the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue by means of the contested acts of September 2024. In addition, it concerns various persons including the applicant, her mother and her stepfather as well as the assets and companies belonging to them.

74 Furthermore, in view of the difficulties in accessing the information referred to in paragraphs 48 and 71 above, combined with the fact that many transactions involve offshore companies, the Council can hardly be criticised for not having verified that information by reference to official records in countries with accessible registers.

75 As for exhibit 3 in the first working document, suffice it to note that the fact that the article which it contains reproduces information contained in exhibit 1 in that working document does not in any way detract from the evidential value of that information but, on the contrary, bolsters it, since the applicant has not questioned the credibility of the newspaper concerned.

76 Concerning exhibit 1 in the second working document, it should be observed that the applicant’s criticism is directed at the sale of the yacht Valerie and not its acquisition, which is the only matter at issue in the context of the present plea.

77 There is therefore no reason to disregard either exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document or exhibit 1 in the second working document, which were produced by the Council.

78 In those circumstances, it must be held that the Council has put forward a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish a link between the yacht Valerie and Mr Chemezov.

79 In the third part of the second plea, the applicant asserts that she no longer owns the yacht Valerie .

80 She explains that, shortly after taking possession of the yacht by inheritance, she realised that it was going to be too expensive to maintain. The company Linkpoint – the owner of the yacht Valerie – transferred that vessel to its subsidiary, Delima, on 14 September 2018 and transferred its shares in Delima to Sightview on 19 September 2018. According to the applicant, Sightview was liquidated on 14 February 2019, as a result of which she became the owner of all the shares in Delima.

81 The applicant states that, on 23 July 2021, she sold the shares in Delima – which had been renamed Sulberg on 11 March 2019 – to Imbell Global Limited for EUR 95 million. Imbell Global Limited is ultimately owned by Mr Avdolyan. On 19 January 2022, Imbell Global transferred payment for those shares to a bank account open in the applicant’s name at VTB Bank.

82 The applicant then, it is claimed, declared the proceeds from the sale of the shares in Delima, amounting to RUB 8.3 billion, in her income tax return for 2022.

83 Thus, according to the applicant, the yacht Valerie is still owned by Delima, but, since 23 July 2021, the shares in that company have been held by Imbell Global, of which Mr Avdolyan is the beneficial owner.

84 Consequently, the applicant argues that the sale of the yacht Valerie was in no way ‘fictitious’, as the Council indicated in the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2024.

85 The Council disputes that line of argument.

86 In that regard, it should be noted that, in its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 189), the Court held that the benefit received by the person whose name was included on the lists at issue under amended criterion (g), ‘or at least its consequences’, had to subsist at the time when the restrictive measures against him or her were adopted.

87 In the present case, the applicant does not dispute that, even assuming that the shares in Delima, now Sulberg, were sold to Imbell Global, which is ultimately owned by Mr Avdolyan, she received the proceeds of that sale.

88 Consequently, without it being necessary to consider whether the applicant was still in possession of the yacht Valerie when the contested acts of September 2024 were adopted, it must be held that the Council has put forward a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence demonstrating that, at that time, the applicant continued to benefit from Mr Chemezov.

89 According to settled case-law, the validity of a single ground for listing is sufficient to support the acts at issue (see order of 1 September 2015, Makhlouf v Council , T‑441/13, not published, EU:T:2015:591, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). Since the inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue by means of the contested acts of September 2024 may be justified by the benefit associated with the yacht Valerie which the applicant derived from Mr Chemezov, there is no need to examine the applicant’s arguments concerning the transfer of the shares in Elsamex and the purchase of the villa Estepona .

90 Accordingly, the first, second and to third parts of the first plea, as well as the fifth part of the first plea in so far as it relates to those other three parts, must be rejected.

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

91 In the fourth part of the first plea, the applicant submits that the Council erred in law in considering her to be an ‘immediate family member’ of Mr Chemezov.

92 In her arguments, the applicant refers to:

– the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the protection of the right to family life;

– Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77);

– Article 2(g) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31);

– related provisions, such as Article 35(2) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19);

– Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014 itself.

93 According to the applicant, those different provisions require a certain degree of dependence and close personal ties between the person concerned and the members of his or her family. Moreover, in its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605), the Court held that the immediate family member criterion was met only by spouses, children and parents and that it excluded cousins.

94 The applicant argues that no such ties ever existed between her and Mr Chemezov. When her mother married Mr Chemezov, the applicant was 17 years old and was attending the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). She later found a job which enabled her to support herself. Thus, she is not biologically related to Mr Chemezov, has never been dependent on him, was not adopted by him and has no other legal ties to him.

95 In the fifth part of the second plea, the applicant adds that, by considering her to fall within the second limb of amended criterion (g), the Council infringed the principle of legal certainty in so far as it gave the concept of ‘immediate family member’ a broader meaning than that resulting from the provisions and the case-law cited in paragraph 92 above, which require a certain degree of dependence or a biological relationship.

96 That line of argument is disputed by the Council.

97 In that regard, it should be observed that the provisions and the case-law cited by the applicant and reproduced in the first four indents of paragraph 92 above are unrelated to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by the 2023 acts, which served as the basis for maintaining the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue by means of the contested acts of September 2024.

98 On the one hand, Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and the related case-law seek to protect the family life of the individuals concerned, Directive 2004/38 regulates the right to freedom of movement and the right of residence of EU citizens, and Regulation No 604/2013 and Article 35(2) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement concern the right of third-country nationals to apply for asylum in the Member States. On the other hand, however, the aim of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by the 2023 acts, is to prevent the circumvention of restrictive measures adopted against Russian businesspersons with a view to increasing pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation following the intensification of the war against Ukraine.

99 The provisions and case-law set out in the first four indents of paragraph 92 above are therefore not relevant for the purpose of interpreting the concept of ‘immediate family member’ used in amended criterion (g).

100 The same applies to the reference to Article 4(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 (see the fifth indent of paragraph 92 above), which concerns the conditions under which the authorities of the Member States may release frozen funds so that persons subject to restrictive measures are able to meet certain specific needs. In any event, the provisions introduced by the 2023 acts amend Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 and must be reconciled with the other provisions of those instruments.

101 As regards the case-law cited in paragraph 93 above, it is true that, in its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 202), the Court annulled a restrictive measure concerning a first cousin of a leading businessperson. However, the reason for the annulment was not that the applicant in that case was not an ‘immediate family member’ of the businessperson in question, but rather that he could not be considered to derive any benefit, since the asset transfers which he had received were part of a business relationship with that businessperson and were explained by their common interests (see paragraphs 191 to 203 of the judgment cited above).

102 As is apparent from paragraphs 97 to 99 above, the concept of ‘immediate family member’ is not given a uniform interpretation in EU law, but must be construed in the light of the objective pursued by the legislation in which it appears. It follows from recital 5 of Decision 2023/1094 that the objective of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by the 2023 acts, is to prevent leading Russian businesspersons from circumventing the fund-freezing measures to which they are subject and from maintaining control over the resources available to them by distributing their funds and assets among the people close to them with the aim of concealing such funds and assets.

103 In the light of that objective, the concept of ‘immediate family member’ of a leading businessperson within the meaning of amended criterion (g) refers to any person with family ties to that leading businessperson to such a degree that the former could be used to disperse the latter’s assets with a view to evading restrictive measures. The nature of those ties, whether they be blood ties, adoptive ties or marital ties, is irrelevant.

104 In the present case, when the contested acts of September 2024 were adopted, the applicant was the daughter of Mr Chemezov’s wife and, therefore, a first-degree relative of Mr Chemezov. She therefore had sufficiently close family ties to him as to be caught by the second limb of amended criterion (g).

105 It is irrelevant, in that regard, that the applicant was 17 years old when her mother married Mr Chemezov. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that, at the time of the acquisition of the relevant assets, the applicant’s mother and Mr Chemezov had been married for approximately 10 years. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, when that acquisition occurred, the applicant and Mr Chemezov had known each other for several years.

106 The fourth part of the first plea must therefore be rejected.

– The fifth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the documents on which the Council relied are irrelevant or concern facts that are manifestly outdated or incorrect

107 In the fifth part of the first plea, the applicant submits that the documents on which the Council relied in this case present serious issues of credibility, either because they are irrelevant or because they concern facts that are manifestly outdated or incorrect.

108 The applicant’s criticisms of exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document and exhibit 1 in the second working document were considered in paragraphs 65 to 77 above, to which reference must therefore be made.

109 The criticisms of the other exhibits relied on by the Council are ineffective in view of the position taken by the Court on the other parts of the first plea.

110 Accordingly, the fifth part of the first plea must be rejected, as must, therefore, the first plea in its entirety.

The second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) is unlawful

111 By her second plea, the applicant claims, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, that amended criterion (g) is unlawful in so far as it introduces a second limb, relating to ‘immediate family members’, for the following reasons:

– that second limb cannot be based on Article 215 TFEU (first part);

– the first limb of that criterion, to which the second limb is inextricably linked, infringes the principles of proportionality, foreseeability and legal certainty (second part);

– the second limb infringes the right to family life, protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the principle of proportionality (third part);

– the second limb is manifestly inappropriate for attaining the objectives pursued and, as such, is disproportionate (fourth part);

– the second limb infringes the principle of legal certainty in so far as the Council seeks to give the concept of ‘immediate family member’ a broader meaning than that resulting from the normal interpretation of that expression (fifth part).

112 In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Courts of the European Union the inapplicability of that act.

113 Article 277 TFEU gives expression to the general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge indirectly, in seeking annulment of an act against which it can bring an action, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of such an act, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be annulled. The general act claimed to be illegal must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned and there must be a direct legal connection between the contested act and the general act the lawfulness of which is being challenged (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council , T‑14/14 and T‑87/14, EU:T:2017:102, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council , T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 145 (not published) and the case-law cited).

114 According to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the FEU Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EU acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union’s legal order. That obligation is expressly laid down in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited, and of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

115 The fact remains that the Council enjoys a broad discretion as regards the general and abstract definition of the designation criteria and procedures for adopting restrictive measures. Consequently, the rules of general application defining those criteria and procedures, such as the provisions of the 2023 acts laying down amended criterion (g) to which the plea of illegality relates, are subject to limited judicial review. That limited review applies, especially, to the assessment of the considerations of appropriateness on which the restrictive measures are based (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2015, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council , T‑10/13, EU:T:2015:235, paragraph 75).

116 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court will examine the five parts of the second plea.

– The first part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) cannot be based on Article 215 TFEU

117 The applicant submits that the second limb of amended criterion (g) cannot be based on Article 215 TFEU.

118 She argues that since it is no longer required that the influence of the businesspersons concerned be due to their economic activities in certain sectors, the first limb of amended criterion (g) does not have a sufficient link to the regime of the third State targeted, contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice on Articles 60 and 301 EC (judgment of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council , C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138, paragraph 64).

119 According to the applicant, that applies a fortiori to the second limb of amended criterion (g), concerning the immediate family members of leading businesspersons, who are even further removed from the Government of the Russian Federation or, in general, from the situations being combated.

120 The absence of any link to the Government of the Russian Federation is, it is claimed, borne out by the justification provided by the Council and the General Court for the second limb of criterion (g), to the effect that leading businesspersons operating in Russia distribute their assets among their immediate family members and other persons in order, inter alia, to conceal those assets, circumvent the restrictive measures and maintain control over the resources available to them. Immediate family members have no links whatsoever to the Government of the Russian Federation.

121 The Council disputes that line of argument.

122 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the applicant’s arguments are concerned only with Regulation 2023/1089, which alone is based on Article 215 TFEU, Decision 2023/1094 being based on Article 29 TEU.

123 As regards the applicant’s complaint alleging lack of a legal basis and claiming that it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of a link between the persons subject to restrictive measures and the regime of the third country concerned, it must be pointed out that the Treaty of Lisbon changed the state of the law by introducing a new Article 215 TFEU. Thus, while Article 215(1) TFEU covers the areas previously targeted by Articles 60 and 301 EC (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Parliament v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraphs 51 and 52), Article 215(2) TFEU empowers the Council to adopt restrictive measures against any ‘natural or legal persons’, ‘non-State entities’ or ‘groups’ on the sole condition that a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty provides for such measures. In other words, if the latter condition is satisfied, Article 215(2) TFEU enables the Council to adopt, in particular, acts imposing restrictive measures against addressees in no way linked to the governing regime of a third country (judgment of 27 February 2014, Ezz and Others v Council , T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 53). Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging lack of a legal basis and claiming that there must be a sufficient link between the persons concerned and the third country in question cannot succeed.

124 In any event, it must be stated that there is indeed a link between the Russian Federation and the persons subject to the restrictive measures.

125 Recital 3 of Decision 2023/1094, on which Regulation 2023/1089 is based, states:

‘In its conclusions of 9 February 2023, the European Council reiterated the Union’s resolute condemnation of [the Russian Federation]’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter [signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945]. The European Council also reiterated that the Union stands ready to continue to reinforce its restrictive measures against Russia.’

126 It thus appears that, while the Council considered it necessary to broaden criterion (g), it was in order to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation in view of its war of aggression against Ukraine.

127 The link between the persons referred to in the first limb of amended criterion (g) and the Government of the Russian Federation stems from the fact that the persons concerned operate in Russia and that they are ‘leading’ businesspersons there.

128 As is apparent from recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094, the Council took the view:

‘… that a relationship of mutual benefit and support exists between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons operating in Russia. In particular, the Government of the Russian Federation has systematically allowed prominent Russian businesspersons to accumulate their wealth through the exploitation of natural and other public resources. The Council considers, in view of this relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Government of the Russian Federation, that the designation criteria should cover leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector of Russia.’

129 Thus, the Council considered that the functioning of the Russian economy was characterised by the existence of a ‘relationship of mutual benefit and support’ or a ‘relationship of interdependence’ between the Government of the Russian Federation and leading businesspersons operating in Russia, by reference, in particular, to the fact that the Government of the Russian Federation has systematically allowed Russian businesspersons to accumulate their wealth through the exploitation of natural and other public resources.

130 By targeting leading businesspersons operating in Russia, the Council is in fact seeking to exploit the influence that that category of persons is capable of exerting on the Russian regime by forcing them to put pressure on that government to have it change its policy with regard to Ukraine.

131 There is therefore indeed a rational connection between the first limb of amended criterion (g) and the objective of the restrictive measures regime at issue.

132 As regards the second limb of amended criterion (g), recital 5 of Decision 2023/1094 states:

‘The Council has also assessed that leading Russian businesspersons have engaged in a systematic practice of distributing their funds and assets amongst their immediate family members and other persons, often in order to hide their assets, to circumvent the restrictive measures and to maintain control over the resources available to them. Therefore, the Council considers that immediate family members or other natural persons, who benefit in such a way from leading businesspersons operating in Russia, should also be designated as appropriate, in order to both increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine as well as to avoid the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures.’

133 While amended criterion (g) was broadened to include immediate family members of the persons referred to in the first limb of that criterion, it was thus because those persons had been observed engaging in the practice of distributing their assets among the people close to them with a view to evading the restrictive measures targeting them directly.

134 There is therefore also a link, albeit an indirect one, between the immediate family members of leading businesspersons operating in Russia, referred to in the second limb of amended criterion (g), and the Government of the Russian Federation.

135 It must therefore be held that amended criterion (g), as provided for by Regulation 2023/1089, is validly based on Article 215 TFEU.

– The second part of the second plea in law, alleging that the first limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the principles of proportionality, foreseeability and legal certainty

136 The applicant submits that the first limb of amended criterion (g), to which the second limb is inextricably linked, infringes the principles of proportionality, foreseeability and legal certainty, since the adjective ‘leading’ is vague and is capable of describing persons who are of no significance to the Government of the Russian Federation.

137 In the first place, as regards the infringement of the principles of foreseeability and legal certainty, the applicant states that, in its judgment of 18 September 2024, Kozitsyn v Council (T‑607/22 and T‑731/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:635, paragraph 80), the Court stated, with regard to the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ set out in the original criterion (g), that businesspersons were classified as ‘leading’ businesspersons having regard to ‘their importance in the light, as the case may be, of their professional status, the importance of their economic activities, the extent of their capital holdings or their functions within one or more undertakings in which they pursue those activities’.

138 The applicant argues that, if that interpretation were applied to the first limb of amended criterion (g), the field of potentially affected persons would be so wide as to confer practically unfettered discretion on the Council enabling it to impose restrictive measures on any businessperson who happens to be operating in even the least significant sectors of the Russian economy. Moreover, it is not clear that the massive increase in the number of persons likely to be caught by the first limb of amended criterion (g) would have the effect of increasing pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation.

139 The applicant argues that, in actual fact, the aim of broadening amended criterion (g) is not to include more persons on the lists at issue, but to strengthen the Council’s legal cases against the persons already included on those lists in respect of whom the evidential basis for listing is defective.

140 The Council disputes that line of argument.

141 In that regard, in the first place, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is a general principle of EU law – requires, in particular, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings. That principle applies to restrictive measures such as those at issue in the present case, which have an impact on the rights and freedoms of the persons and entities concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2015, Bank of Industry and Mine v Council , T‑10/13, EU:T:2015:235, paragraph 77).

142 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, a discretion as to the measures which the Council adopts is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (judgment of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council (T‑578/12, not published, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 116).

143 In the present case, the Court has already held that the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’ in amended criterion (g) must be construed in the same way as in the original criterion (g) and that, although, by its broad wording, it confers discretion on the Council, amended criterion (g) is sufficiently clear and foreseeable to meet the requirements of legal certainty (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2024, Kozitsyn v Council , T‑607/22 and T‑731/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:635, paragraphs 80 and 81).

144 That position is all the more compelling since, as the Council observes, amended criterion (g) exists within a legal framework that is clearly circumscribed by the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures in the light of the situation in Ukraine, namely the need, in view of the gravity of that situation, to exert maximum pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation so that it brings an end to its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and to its war of aggression against that country.

145 It should also be observed that the discretion conferred on the Council by amended criterion (g) is counterbalanced by an obligation to state reasons and by strengthened procedural rights, guaranteed by the case-law (see judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council , T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

146 Accordingly, it must be held that the first limb of amended criterion (g) is not contrary to the principles of foreseeability and legal certainty.

147 In the second place, as regards the alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality, enshrined in Article 5 TEU, the applicant submits that the first limb of amended criterion (g) is neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve the stated objective, nor is it proportionate stricto sensu to that objective.

148 First, she argues that the broadening of the original criterion (g) is not suitable for achieving the stated objective of increasing pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine. In addition, two years after the introduction of amended criterion (g), it could be expected that the Council would be able to adduce concrete evidence that that criterion enables those objectives to be achieved.

149 Secondly, the applicant asserts that amended criterion (g), particularly the first limb thereof, goes beyond what is necessary.

150 Thirdly, according to the applicant, the disadvantages entailed by broadening the original criterion (g), from the point of view of the significant increase in legal uncertainty and the considerable number of persons who may now fear having restrictive measures imposed on them, is disproportionate to any advantages gained by the Council.

151 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the principle of proportionality requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see judgment of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P, EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited).

152 Moreover, the Council is not required to adduce evidence that the restrictive measures which it imposes produce the effects anticipated by the legislation concerned, but only that those measures are capable of achieving the objectives pursued by that legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, VTB Bank v Council , C‑729/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:499, paragraph 66).

153 In the present case, it must be pointed out, first of all, that the first limb of amended criterion (g) was introduced as a result of the Russian Federation’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and seeks to increase pressure on the Russian Government with the aim, more generally, of preserving peace and international security, in accordance with the objectives of the European Union’s external action set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU.

154 In that regard, reference should be made to the rational connection between targeting ‘leading businesspersons operating in Russia’, in the light of the finding that there is a relationship of interdependence between those persons and the Russian Government (see recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094), and the objective of the restrictive measures at issue, which is to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation so that it brings an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine.

155 The first limb of amended criterion (g) is therefore appropriate for attaining the objective pursued.

156 Next, the first limb of amended criterion (g) is necessary for the achievement and implementation of the objectives referred to in Article 21 TEU, in so far as the applicant has not established, as regards that criterion, that other, less restrictive measures, such as a system of prior authorisation or an obligation to justify, a posteriori, how the funds transferred were used, would be just as effective.

157 In any event, it should be noted that the widening of the circle of persons as a result of amended criterion (g) was necessary owing to the prolonged and aggravated nature of the Russian Federation’s actions to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which obliged the Council to strengthen the already existing restrictive measures.

158 Lastly, amended criterion (g) is proportionate to the objective which it pursues since Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide that, in the circumstances stipulated in those provisions, the competent authorities of the Member States may grant specific derogations from the restrictive measures. Furthermore, it follows from Article 3 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, that the inclusion of a person on the lists at issue is to be subject to regular review in order to verify that that person’s listing is still justified in the light of the listing criteria in force.

159 Accordingly, the first limb of amended criterion (g) is consistent with the principle of proportionality.

160 The second part of the second plea in law must therefore be rejected.

– The third part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the right to family life and the principle of proportionality

161 The applicant submits that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the right to family life protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, under which ‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications’, and the principle of proportionality.

162 According to the applicant, since, in the judgment of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council (T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 142), the Court held that the ‘benefit’ potentially leading to the imposition of restrictive measures on the basis of the second limb of amended criterion (g) need not be an undue benefit, the right to family life, which encompasses the right of family members to support each other materially and, ultimately, to make normal succession arrangements, is restricted.

163 The applicant submits that, where the Council determines a person to be an immediate family member, it should be possible to inquire whether the ‘benefit’ at issue is not entirely explicable by that family relationship itself, which depends on the circumstances of the financial situation specific to the persons concerned.

164 The applicant argues that, as worded, the second limb of amended criterion (g) is neither appropriate nor proportionate to the objective pursued. It has the effect of imposing restrictive measures on persons who are not themselves linked to the war in Ukraine and is intended not to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation, but rather to seize assets distributed to, in particular, immediate family members, in the hope that that will put pressure on leading businesspersons, who could, in turn, put pressure on the government. That reasoning is, it is argued, overly speculative.

165 The Council disputes that line of argument.

166 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the second limb of amended criterion (g) targets the immediate family members of leading businesspersons operating in Russia, who benefit from such businesspersons.

167 In its judgment of 11 September 2024, Mordashova v Council (T‑497/22, not published, EU:T:2024:604, paragraph 109), the Court held that the benefit referred to in the second limb of amended criterion (g) covered any benefit regardless of its nature, which is not necessarily undue, but which must be quantitatively or qualitatively non-negligible.

168 It follows from Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that fundamental rights do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law and that their exercise may be subject to limitations under the conditions set out in that provision.

169 According to Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and, moreover, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.

170 Consequently, in order to comply with EU law, a limitation on the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue must satisfy four conditions. First, it must be ‘provided for by law’, in the sense that the EU institution adopting measures liable to restrict a natural or legal person’s fundamental rights must have a legal basis for its actions. Secondly, it must respect the essence of those rights. Thirdly, it must pursue an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Fourthly, it must be proportionate (see judgment of 5 March 2025, Ponomarenko v Council , T‑249/22, not published, EU:T:2025:202, paragraph 196 and the case-law cited).

171 The second limb of amended criterion (g) satisfies those four conditions.

172 As regards the first condition (legal basis), the restrictive measures at issue are ‘provided for by law’ since they are laid down in acts of general application, namely Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and they have a clear legal basis in EU law, namely Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, respectively.

173 As regards the second condition (respect for the essence of the right to family life), a measure freezing funds and economic resources is a provisional measure which affects only temporarily the ability of the persons concerned to dispose of their assets and, consequently, does not deprive them of the very substance of that right.

174 Moreover, under Article 3 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, the lists at issue are to be periodically reviewed so that persons and entities which no longer meet the criteria for inclusion on them are removed.

175 As regards the third condition (pursuit of an objective of general interest), the second limb of amended criterion (g) seeks to enhance the effectiveness of administrative measures taken against leading businesspersons operating in Russia with a view to increasing pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation so that it brings an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine, with the ultimate goal of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with Article 21(2)(b) and (c) TEU.

176 As regards the fourth condition (proportionality of the measure), the principle of proportionality requires that acts adopted by the EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued by the legislation in question. Consequently, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council , T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 178 and the case-law cited).

177 The case-law makes clear in that respect that, with regard to judicial review of compliance with the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Therefore, the legality of a measure adopted in those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft , C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited).

178 In the present case, the freezing of the funds and resources of immediate family members of leading businesspersons operating in Russia, who benefit from such businesspersons, is a measure appropriate for attaining the objective pursued, namely to increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation, since it has been observed that those leading businesspersons, who are in a relationship of interdependence with that government, have attempted to evade the measures to which they themselves are subject by distributing their assets among their immediate family members in order to conceal those assets.

179 As regards whether the measure at issue is necessary, the applicant submits, in the fourth part of the present plea, that other, less intrusive measures already exist to achieve the objectives pursued.

180 Thus, with reference to Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 and Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, the applicant claims that it is possible to freeze assets belonging to family members or other persons if it is proven that those assets are ‘owned, held or controlled’ by another person included on the lists at issue.

181 In addition, the applicant invokes criterion (h) introduced by Article 1(2)(a) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1218 of 23 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2023 L 159 I, p. 526) and Article 1(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1215 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2023 L 159 I, p. 330), targeting persons ‘facilitating infringements of the prohibition against circumvention’ of restrictive measures, and Articles 5 and 9 of Regulation No 269/2014, read in conjunction with national legislation applying to cases of circumvention.

182 In that regard, the Court takes the view that if, in order to combat the tendency of leading businesspersons operating in Russia to use immediate family members in order to circumvent restrictive measures, the Council were called on to demonstrate such circumvention in accordance with the rules cited by the applicant, those measures would not make it possible to attain the objective pursued as effectively.

183 Lastly, as regards the proportionality of the measure, it should be recalled that Article 2 of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide, in particular, for the possibility of, first, authorising the use of frozen funds in order to meet basic needs or to fulfil certain commitments and, secondly, granting specific authorisations permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources.

184 Moreover, as stated in paragraph 174 above, the lists at issue are periodically reviewed so that persons and entities which no longer meet the criteria for inclusion on them are removed (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2016, Rotenberg v Council , T‑720/14, EU:T:2016:689, paragraph 185 and the case-law cited).

185 Since the second limb of amended criterion (g) satisfies the four conditions set out in paragraph 170 above, the third part of the second plea must be rejected.

– The fourth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) is manifestly inappropriate and, as such, disproportionate

186 The applicant argues that the second limb of amended criterion (g), particularly the immediate family member criterion, infringes the principle of proportionality because there are other, less intrusive measures to achieve the objectives pursued.

187 That point was examined in paragraphs 176 to 184 above, to which the Court thus refers.

188 For the reasons set out in those paragraphs, the fourth part of the second plea must therefore be rejected.

– The fifth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the principle of legal certainty

189 The applicant submits that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the principle of legal certainty in so far as the Council seeks to give the concept of ‘immediate family member’ a broader meaning than that deriving from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, from Article 2(2)(c) and Article 2(g) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31), from Article 35(2) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, from Directive 2004/38 and from the normal interpretation of that expression.

190 According to the applicant, the abovementioned sources of law require a certain degree of dependence or a biological relationship.

191 The applicant claims that that interpretation is borne out by the case-law of the Court concerning the immediate family member criterion, which, to date, has upheld only the inclusion of spouses, children and parents on the lists at issue, but not cousins.

192 That line of argument is disputed by the Council.

193 In that regard, it must be stated that, as the Council points out, the present part of the second plea is not concerned with the lawfulness of the ‘immediate family member’ criterion used in the 2023 acts, but with the application of that criterion by the Council in the present case. Consequently, that part of the second plea is indissociable from the fourth part of the first plea, to which reference must be made.

194 Accordingly, the fifth part of the second plea must be rejected, as must, therefore, the second plea in its entirety.

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

195 The applicant submits that the reasons given for the contested acts of September 2024 are insufficient, since the statement of reasons for those acts is generic and lacks precision.

196 Thus, in the statement of reasons for those acts, the Council did not identify the offshore companies referred to or indicate whether the offshore companies concerned by the first assertion are the same as those concerned by the third assertion.

197 Similarly, the Council’s assertion that the applicant ‘could continue to be the owner’ of the yacht Valerie is inadequate since it is mere speculation as to whether she derives a benefit from Mr Chemezov.

198 Lastly, the Council does not explain how the applicant benefits from Mr Chemezov.

199 The Council disputes that line of argument.

200 In that regard, in the first place, it must be observed that, according to the case-law, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (see judgment of 19 June 2024, Rotenberg v Council , T‑738/22, not published, EU:T:2024:398, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

201 That is clearly the case here, since, as the Council points out, the arguments put forward in the application and the voluminous and detailed nature of the documents attached to it show that the applicant correctly identified the ‘large assets’ and ‘offshore companies’ referred to in the grounds for maintaining her inclusion on the lists at issue, as regards both the first assertion and the third assertion of the Council.

202 In the second place, whether the matter of ownership of the yacht Valerie is ‘mere speculation’ actually goes to the substance of the dispute and does not concern the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2024.

203 In the third place, since the Council asserted in the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2024 that the applicant was benefiting from Mr Chemezov and identified the assets from which that benefit was derived, the Court finds that explanation to be sufficient.

204 The third plea must therefore be rejected and, therefore, the application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2024 must be dismissed.

The application for annulment of the contested acts of March 2025

205 In the first statement of modification, the applicant states that the pleas set out in the application are also directed at the contested acts of March 2025. She also states that she modifies the first plea and introduces a fourth plea, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence.

206 Since the second plea raised in support of the present application for annulment is identical to the second plea raised in respect of the contested acts of September 2024, it must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 111 to 193 above. The third plea must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 195 to 203 above. Furthermore, in so far as the first plea raised in support of the present application for annulment is identical to the first plea raised in respect of the contested acts of September 2024, it must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 58 to 109 above. It therefore remains for the Court to examine the first plea, to the extent that it has been modified by the present application for annulment, and the fourth plea.

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

207 In the first statement of modification, the applicant puts forward new arguments concerning the first three parts of the first plea.

208 Having regard to paragraphs 58 to 90 above, the applicant’s arguments concerning the yacht Valerie should be considered first.

209 As regards the acquisition of the yacht Valerie , the applicant submits that, contrary to the Council’s assertions in the defence, exhibits 1 and 3 in the first working document do not describe Mr Chemezov as the ‘effective owner’ of the yacht. Those documents expressly refer to the yacht as being owned by the applicant.

210 Furthermore, the applicant denies that Mr Kogan, from whom she inherited that vessel, was a close partner or even a subordinate of Mr Chemezov.

211 First, the applicant states that the period during which Kaalbye Shipping International owned the yacht Valerie through Amtech Worldwide could not be independently verified by reference to public sources and thus has no relevance to the conclusions drawn in the B1 and Kept reports, according to which the yacht was ultimately transferred to the applicant by Mr Kogan.

212 Secondly, the applicant maintains that, according to the B1 and Kept reports, Mr Kogan was an independent self-made Ukrainian businessman with multiple business interests of his own and with a successful international shipping business. Mr Kogan’s income did not, it is claimed, originate from Mr Chemezov. Thus, the dividends of USD 1.05 million received by Mr Kogan as 49% shareholder in RT-Logistika were insignificant and the average annual remuneration paid to the members of that company’s board of directors for the period from 2009 to 2015 was USD 5 121. In addition, Mr Kogan ceased to hold shares in that company in December 2012. During the relevant periods, it is claimed that Mr Kogan did not have any executive role as manager of the company in question and that he was therefore not a subordinate of Mr Chemezov. Moreover, Mr Chemezov was never a member of the board of directors of RT-Logistika and never had an executive role within that company.

213 Thirdly, the applicant submits that she inherited the yacht Valerie from Mr Kogan in April 2018, that is to say, at least three years after any connection between him and RT-Logistika had ended.

214 Fourthly, the applicant asserts that the argument put forward by the Council in the defence alleging that she used the yacht Valerie in the summers of 2017 and 2018 is irrelevant since, in April 2018, she had already inherited the yacht and, prior to that, Mr Kogan had been her close friend and godfather.

215 The Council disputes that line of argument.

216 In that regard, it must be recalled that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 46 above, the Council must base the restrictive measures on a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a link between the person subject to a fund-freezing measure and the situations being combated.

217 In the present case, it should be observed that the arguments put forward by the applicant concerning the yacht Valerie do not cast doubt on the existence of a link between RT-Logistika, of which Mr Kogan was shareholder and director, and the Rostec group, which was managed by Mr Chemezov. In the B1 report, produced by the applicant, RT-Logistika is described as having been ‘established to optimise cargo transportation processes and reduce overall logistics costs for enterprises affiliated with Rostec’, of which Mr Chemezov was the chairman. Similarly, the Kept report, also produced by the applicant, states that RT-Logistika was established in March 2009 for the transportation of raw materials, components and finished products of that group, which, between 2010 and 2012, held the remaining 51% of the shares in that company. It is that link between RT-Logistika and the Rostec group which is central to the Council’s arguments.

218 Furthermore, the applicant herself acknowledges that the period during which Kaalbye Shipping International owned the yacht Valerie through Amtech Worldwide, which preceded the acquisition of that yacht by Mr Kogan, could not be independently verified by reference to open sources (see paragraph 211 above).

219 In addition, in its observations on the first statement of modification, the Council, relying on exhibit 1 in the second working document, submits that, according to information in the possession of the Spanish authorities, Mr Chemezov became the owner of the yacht Valerie through Amtech Worldwide while it was under construction.

220 That information is indeed contained in exhibit 1 in the second working document.

221 It must therefore be held that the Council has put forward a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish a link between the yacht Valerie and Mr Chemezov.

222 Regarding the sale of the yacht Valerie , in the first place, the applicant takes issue with the Council for having asserted in the defence and in its letter of 17 March 2025 that Mr Avdolyan, who was the beneficial owner of Imbell Global, the company to which that yacht was allegedly transferred, was another of Mr Chemezov’s partners. Even if Mr Avdolyan – who is also included on the fund-freezing lists – had common interests with Mr Chemezov, those interests would be irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether the disposal of that yacht was genuine, a matter that was verified in the B1 and Kept reports and is demonstrated by conclusive and comprehensive documentation.

223 In the second place, the applicant submits that the Council cannot criticise her for not having sent it evidence concerning the sale of the yacht Valerie before 1 November 2024, since such evidence had already been forwarded to it, one year earlier, in connection with the action which gave rise to the order of 13 March 2024, Sulberg Services v Council (T‑409/23, not published, EU:T:2024:168).

224 In the third place, the applicant challenges the other evidence relied on by the Council, following the Spanish State Attorney’s opinion (see exhibit 2 in the second working document), in order to find that the sale of the yacht Valerie might only be fictitious.

225 First, she claims that the period of time which elapsed between the conclusion of the contract and the payment of the price was due to the legal and technical checks that had to be carried out in connection with the transaction.

226 Secondly, the applicant states that she has no information as to why the application for a certificate of beneficial ownership was made only in August 2022. What matters is that the change was entered in Delima’s register of shareholders. The instruction to make that entry was given by Delima’s board of directors on 23 July 2021 and, according to the B1 and Kept reports produced by the applicant, the existence of the new share certificate was confirmed in a ‘certificate of incumbency’ issued by Trident on 14 September 2021.

227 Thirdly, the applicant submits that the doubts raised by the Spanish State Attorney concerning payment of the price because that payment had been made into an account at VTB Bank, which is a major financial institution, are not based on good quality evidence.

228 Fourthly, the argument that the contract for the sale of shares in Delima was not signed by the applicant is, it is claimed, overly formalistic, since it was the applicant herself who produced the contract and that contract stipulated that it could be signed separately. To pre-empt any difficulties, she has produced a copy of the contract signed by her.

229 The Council disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

230 It must be stated that that line of argument is ineffective.

231 As is already apparent from paragraphs 86 and 88 above, whether the yacht Valerie was actually sold to Imbell Global is irrelevant, since, in its judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov (T‑741/22, not published, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 189), the Court held that it was sufficient if, at the time of the adoption of the acts at issue, the person concerned was enjoying the consequences of the benefit concerned.

232 Therefore, in the present case, either the yacht Valerie was sold to Imbell Global before the adoption of the contested acts of March 2025 and the applicant must be regarded as continuing to benefit from the proceeds of that sale, having omitted to state in her pleadings what had become of those proceeds, or the yacht was not sold and the applicant continues to enjoy that benefit directly.

233 It must therefore be held that, at the time of the adoption of the contested acts of March 2025, the applicant was benefiting from Mr Chemezov in connection with the yacht Valerie .

234 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 89 above, the first three parts of the first plea must therefore be rejected, as must the fifth part of the first plea, in so far as it concerns those other parts.

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

235 In the fourth part of the first plea, the applicant puts forward new arguments to support her assertion that she is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov.

236 In the first place, the applicant, by reference to the judgment of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council (T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 47), submits that the immediate family member criterion requires there to be a direct link to the leading businessperson concerned. In the present case, the link established by the Council between her and Mr Chemezov passes ‘through’ her mother, who is also designated as an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov.

237 The Council disputes that line of argument.

238 In that regard, it must be observed that, in paragraphs 47, 49 and 50 of the judgment cited above, the Court held that persons associated with persons who are themselves associated with persons referred to in Article 2(1)(a) to (h) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, could not be subject to restrictive measures, because the application of the listing criterion in cascade fashion does not take account of the wording of Article 2(1), in fine , of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and of the requirement for there to be a sufficient link between the persons concerned and the third country targeted by the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union.

239 The interpretation at issue cannot be transposed to the ‘immediate family member’ criterion, which is the second limb of amended criterion (g).

240 Indeed, that interpretation concerns the association criterion, which is distinct from the immediate family member criterion.

241 In any event, in the present case, the inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue was maintained by the contested acts of March 2025 because the Council deemed her to be an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov, not because she was an immediate family member of her mother, who herself was an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov. The applicant’s proposed interpretation is therefore inapposite.

242 In the second place, the applicant submits that, in accordance with the judgment of 11 September 2024, Mordashova v Council (T‑497/22, not published, EU:T:2024:604, paragraphs 93 to 95), her status as immediate family member of a leading businessperson should have been assessed on the basis of factual elements and, if it had, she would not have been deemed to meet the immediate family member criterion, given that there is no factual element linking her to that businessperson.

243 The Council disputes that argument.

244 Suffice it to note that, in the judgment cited in paragraph 242 above, it was the association criterion that was under consideration, not the immediate family member criterion, with the result that the interpretation given in that judgment cannot be transposed to the present case.

245 In any event, it follows from paragraphs 103 to 105 above that, since the applicant is the daughter of Mr Chemezov’s wife, she has close family ties to him, capable of being used to disperse his assets with a view to evading restrictive measures, without it being necessary to identify other factual elements attesting to those ties.

246 Accordingly, the fourth part of the first plea must be rejected, as must, therefore, the plea in its entirety.

The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence

247 It must be stated that, by claiming that her rights of the defence were infringed, the applicant is in fact criticising the Council for failing to carry out, in the contested acts of March 2025, a review of the grounds and evidence underpinning her earlier listing in order to determine whether they were still relevant, and for failing to take into account the observations and information she had forwarded to the Council before those acts were adopted. According to the applicant, the obligation to carry out such a review stems from Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, and from Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

248 In that regard, it should be recalled that Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, provide that where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council is to review its listing decision and inform the person, entity or body concerned accordingly. Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights lays down the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken.

249 In the present case, it is not disputed that, in her letter of 1 November 2024, the applicant submitted observations on the grounds on which the contested acts of September 2024 maintained her inclusion on the lists at issue.

250 What the applicant specifically criticises is the fact that, when adopting the contested acts of March 2025, the Council failed to take into account the observations and documents forwarded in the letter of 1 November 2024.

251 However, it is apparent from the Council’s letter of 17 March 2025 that it took that information into account. First of all, in that letter, the Council expressly refers to the applicant’s letter of 1 November 2024. Next, it observes that the arguments set out in the letter of 1 November 2024 are similar to those put forward by the applicant in the application or in previous correspondence. Lastly, it refers to a number of annexes to that letter, including Annexes 1, 2 and 32.

252 The true position is that, in its letter of 17 March 2025, the Council simply took the view that the observations and documents contained in the applicant’s letter of 1 November 2024 did not alter its previous assessments for the reasons which it mentions, with the result that the contested acts of March 2025 maintained the applicant’s inclusion on the lists at issue on the same grounds as those set out in the contested acts of September 2024.

253 Consequently, the applicant’s fourth plea must be rejected and, therefore, the application for annulment of the contested acts of March 2025 must be dismissed.

The application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2025

254 In the second statement of modification, the applicant states that the pleas set out in the application and the first statement of modification are also directed at the contested acts of September 2025. Furthermore, she states that she modifies the first, third and fourth pleas in law.

255 Since the second plea raised in support of the present application for annulment is identical to the second plea raised in respect of the contested acts of September 2024, it must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 111 to 193 above. Furthermore, in so far as the first and third pleas raised in support of the present application for annulment are identical to the first and third pleas raised in respect of the contested acts of September 2024 and the contested acts of March 2025, they must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 58 to 109 and 208 to 245 above and in paragraphs 195 to 203 above, respectively. Similarly, in so far as the fourth plea raised in support of the present application for annulment is identical to the fourth plea raised in respect of the contested acts of March 2025, it must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraphs 247 to 252 above. It therefore remains for the Court to examine the first, third and fourth pleas, to the extent that they have been modified by the present application for annulment.

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

256 As regards the first three parts of the first plea, the applicant puts forward two new arguments.

257 In the light of paragraphs 58 to 90 above, those arguments should be examined in so far as they concern the yacht Valerie .

258 As regards the acquisition of the yacht Valerie , the applicant again states that, contrary to what the Council stated in its observations on the first statement of modification and in its letter of 15 September 2025, Mr Kogan was a self-made Ukrainian businessman with multiple business interests of his own and with a successful international shipping business. She also claims that Amtech Worldwide, which entered into a contract for the commissioning of that yacht in August 2009, was associated with Mr Kogan alone. In that regard, she again casts doubt on the probative value of exhibit 1 in the second working document and states that the B1 and Kept reports confirm that, at certain times, Amtech Worldwide had links only to Mr Kogan.

259 In that connection, it should be noted, in the first place, that exhibit 1 in the second working document is a report from the Customs and Excise Department of the Spanish State Tax Agency dated 11 April 2022, which the applicant does not call into question so far as concerns the acquisition of the yacht Valerie (see paragraph 76 above). That exhibit contains the following statement:

‘The boat was built by the company dedicated to the construction of boats Lürssen and the management of the construction (link between the buyer and Lürssen was Moran Yacht & Ship, INC). Construction began in 2009 under the name “Project FIREBIRD” and the owner was to be the company KROEGER WERFT GMBH & COMPANY KG (Germany), however, finally, before the construction was completed, the vessel was acquired by AMTECH WORLD WIDE LIMITED (British Virgin Islands) and Moran Yacht & Ship, INC left the project. This company, according to available intelligence, expressed its dissatisfaction with this change of owner and investigated to find out who the mysterious new owner was, finally identifying SERGUEY CHEMEZOV, who was behind various interposed people of Ukrainian origin, to whom they came to offer their services.’

260 Moreover, in the first statement of modification, the applicant herself stated that the entire period during which Kaalbye Shipping International owned the yacht Valerie through Amtech Worldwide could not be verified in the B1 and Kept reports by reference to public sources.

261 In any event, the credibility of the B1 and Kept reports is entirely relative, since they were drawn up by Russia-based audit firms paid by the applicant.

262 It follows that the Council was entitled to consider, in the contested acts of September 2025, that the yacht Valerie was a benefit which the applicant derived from Mr Chemezov.

263 As regards the sale of the yacht Valerie , the applicant submits that there is no doubt about that disposal.

264 She states that the date of the agreement relating to the purchase of the shares in Delima by Imbell Global is indicated on the first page of that agreement and that the veracity of that date is confirmed by various other items of evidence which come from independent third parties and which the Council failed to take into account. Those items consist of:

– the resolution of Delima’s board of directors of 23 July 2021, instructing the company secretary, Primeserve Secretarial Limited, to make an entry in the register of shareholders and authorising the issue of a new share certificate to Imbell Global. That resolution is signed by Primeserve Secretarial, which is an independent third party;

– the B1 and Kept reports, which refer to a certificate issued by Trident evidencing that, as of 14 September 2021, Imbell Global was already registered as the sole owner of Delima;

– proof of the payment made on 19 January 2022 by Imbell Global to the applicant;

– the applicant’s 2022 income tax return, which records the proceeds from the sale of the yacht Valerie (RUB 8.3 billion) received from Imbell Global.

265 The applicant adds that the Council’s position is wrong in law because English law does not require the date of an act and the place of its execution to be indicated next to the signature.

266 For the reasons set out in paragraphs 86 to 88 and 231 to 233 above, it must be held that the applicant’s line of argument seeking to demonstrate that the sale of the yacht Valerie actually took place is ineffective.

267 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 89 above, the first three parts of the first plea must therefore be rejected, as must the fifth part of the first plea, in so far as it concerns those other parts.

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

268 In its letter of 15 September 2025, the Council expressed the view that the concept of ‘immediate family member’ had to be interpreted in the light of the objective of the restrictive measures at issue. It stated that, in this instance, it covers persons in a position of unique trust and refers to a social unit composed of the spouse and children, parents and siblings, irrespective of the legal status binding them.

269 In the same letter, the Council considered that, in the present case, the closeness of the relationship between Mr Chemezov and the applicant was evidenced by the fact that the latter appeared in the Pirelli calendar alongside figures from the entertainment industry.

270 The applicant submits that the interpretation of the concept of ‘immediate family member’ adopted by the Council in its letter of 15 September 2025 is not consistent with the principle of legal certainty and that, in the absence of a personal relationship between her and Mr Chemezov, she cannot be regarded as an immediate family member of the latter. She also states that, in the application, she provided an analysis of numerous EU acts defining that concept and demonstrated that she cannot be regarded as such under any of those acts.

271 According to the applicant, her appearance in the 2017 Pirelli calendar does not cast doubt on the error of law committed by the Council in classifying her as an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov, since the photographer Peter Lindbergh stated that it was he himself who had the idea of including her in that calendar.

272 That line of argument is disputed by the Council.

273 In that regard, the Court refers to paragraphs 91 to 106, 189 to 193 and 235 to 245 above and rejects the applicant’s arguments for the same reasons.

274 The argument concerning the inclusion of the applicant’s photograph in the Pirelli calendar is ineffective, since the Court does not rely on that information in order to find that the Council was entitled to consider the applicant to be an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov.

275 Accordingly, the fourth part of the first plea must be rejected, as must, therefore, the plea in its entirety.

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

276 The applicant submits that the fact that, in its letter of 15 September 2025, the Council also refers to the residential property in S’Agaró (Spain) in order to justify maintaining her inclusion on the lists at issue attests to the imprecise nature of the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2025 and contradicts the Council’s argument that she was able to identify precisely the relevant assets referred to in the grounds for those acts.

277 In that regard, suffice it to note that the Council has stated that the reference to the residential property in S’Agaró in its letter of 15 September 2025 was a clerical mistake and that that property was not one of the assets referred to in the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2025.

278 The reference to that property in the Council’s letter of 15 September 2025 does not therefore demonstrate that the statement of reasons for the contested acts of September 2025 was imprecise.

279 The third plea must therefore be rejected.

The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence

280 The applicant submits that although, in its letter of 15 September 2025, the Council referred to her second request for reconsideration, to the arguments she had raised in the present proceedings and to her earlier correspondence with that institution, it did not, however, take into account the information and evidence she had submitted to demonstrate that the assertions contained in the grounds for maintaining the inclusion of her name on the lists at issue were manifestly incorrect. She claims that the Council thus infringed its obligation to conduct a proper review of the listing decision under Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 2014/269, as amended, and under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

281 In that regard, it should be observed that the Council’s letter of 15 September 2025 shows that, on many points, it took into account the arguments and documents which the applicant had forwarded to it.

282 The fact of the matter is that the applicant conflates the issue of the lack of a proper review with that of the merits of the grounds for the contested acts of September 2025, which goes to the substantive legality of those acts and has been examined above in the context of the other pleas.

283 The fourth plea must therefore be rejected and, therefore, the application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2025 must be dismissed. The action is therefore dismissed.

Costs

284 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Ms Anastasia Ignatova to pay the costs.

Madise | Nihoul | Verschuur

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 June 2026.

V. Di Bucci | S. Kingston

Registrar | President

Table of contents

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

The inclusion of Mr Chemezov on the lists at issue

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue on successive occasions

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the first time, which is not challenged before the Court

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the second time, which is not challenged before the Court

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the third time, which is challenged before the Court

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the fourth time, which is challenged before the Court

The inclusion of the applicant on the lists at issue for the fifth time, which is challenged before the Court

Forms of order sought

Law

Overview of the case-law

The evidence relied on by the Council

The application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2024

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

– The fifth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the documents on which the Council relied are irrelevant or concern facts that are manifestly outdated or incorrect

The second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) is unlawful

– The first part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) cannot be based on Article 215 TFEU

– The second part of the second plea in law, alleging that the first limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the principles of proportionality, foreseeability and legal certainty

– The third part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the right to family life and the principle of proportionality

– The fourth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) is manifestly inappropriate and, as such, disproportionate

– The fifth part of the second plea in law, alleging that the second limb of amended criterion (g) infringes the principle of legal certainty

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

The application for annulment of the contested acts of March 2025

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence

The application for annulment of the contested acts of September 2025

The first plea in law, alleging errors of law and of assessment in the application to the applicant of the concept of immediate family member

– The first and second parts of the first plea in law, concerning the links between the relevant assets and Mr Chemezov, the third part of the first plea in law, alleging that those assets ceased to exist vis-à-vis the applicant, and the section of the fifth part of the first plea in law concerning the documents on which the Council relied

– The fourth part of the first plea in law, alleging that the applicant is not an immediate family member of Mr Chemezov

The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

The fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence

Costs

* Language of the case: English.