Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) 16 July 2026
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber)
16 July 2026 ( * )
( Appeal – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures adopted in view of the situation in Belarus – Decision 2012/642/CFSP – Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 – Freezing of funds – Restriction on admission to and transit through the territory of the European Union – Inclusion and maintenance of the appellant’s name on the lists of persons, entities and bodies concerned by the restrictive measures – Criterion relating to benefiting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko )
In Case C‑39/25 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 22 January 2025,
Bogoljub Karić, residing in Belgrade (Serbia), represented by A. Bass, A. Beauchemin, W. Julié, and T. Marembert, avocats,
appellant,
the other party to the proceedings being:
Council of the European Union, represented by L. Berger and S. Van Overmeire, acting as Agents,
defendant at first instance,
THE COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of I. Ziemele, President of the Chamber, F. Biltgen (Rapporteur), President of the First Chamber, acting as Judge of the Sixth Chamber, and S. Gervasoni, Judge,
Advocate General: A. Biondi,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the written procedure,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By his appeal, Mr Bogoljub Karić asks that the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 November 2024, Karić v Council (T‑520/22, EU:T:2024:774; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed his action seeking annulment of (i) Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 77), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 1) (together, ‘the initial acts’); and (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/421 of 24 February 2023 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 41), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023 implementing Article 8a of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 61, p. 20) (together, ‘the maintaining acts’), in so far as all of those acts (together, ‘the acts at issue’) concern the appellant.
I. Legal context
A. Regulation No 765/2006
2 Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2006 L 134, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/355 of 2 March 2022 (OJ 2022 L 67, p. 1) (‘Regulation No 765/2006’), provides, in paragraphs 1 and 5 thereof:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
…
5. Annex I shall also consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (b) of Article 4(1) of [Council] Decision 2012/642/CFSP [of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ 2012 L 285, p. 1), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/356 of 2 March 2022 (OJ 2022 L 67, p. 103) (“Decision 2012/642”)], have been identified by the Council [of the European Union] as benefiting from or supporting the [regime of President Lukashenko], as well as legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by them.’
3 Article 8a(4) of that regulation provides:
‘The lists in Annex I shall be reviewed in regular intervals and at least every 12 months.’
B. Decision 2012/642
4 Article 3(1) of Decision 2012/642 provides:
‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of persons:
…
(b) benefit from or support the [regime of President Lukashenko].
…’
5 Under Article 4(1) of that decision:
‘All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I that meet any of the following criteria shall be frozen:
…
(b) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the [regime of President Lukashenko];
…’
6 Article 8 of that decision provides:
‘…
2. This Decision shall be kept under constant review and shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.
…’
C. Implementing Decision 2022/881
7 Article 1 of Implementing Decision 2022/881 provides:
‘Annex I to Decision 2012/642/CFSP is hereby amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.’
8 Point 1 of Annex I to Decision 2012/642, in the version resulting from Implementing Decision 2022/881, identifies the appellant as a ‘Serbian businessman and politician, associated with the company Dana Holdings’ and justifies the restrictive measures against the appellant by reference to the following grounds:
‘[The appellant] is a Serbian businessperson and politician. Together with his family members, he developed a network of real estate companies in Belarus and has cultivated a network of contacts with the family of [President Lukashenko].
In particular, he has been closely associated with Dana Holdings and its former subsidiary Dana Astra, and he reportedly represented those entities during meetings with [President Lukashenko].
The Minsk World project, which was developed by a company associated with [the appellant], was described by [President Lukashenko] as “an example of cooperation of the Slavonic world”.
Thanks to those close relationships with [President Lukashenko] and his entourage, companies associated with Karić received preferential treatment from the [regime of President Lukashenko], including tax breaks and plots of land for real estate development.
He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the [regime of President Lukashenko].’
D. Implementing Regulation 2022/876
9 Article 1 of Implementing Regulation 2022/876 is worded as follows:
‘Annex I to Regulation [No 765/2006] is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.’
10 Point 1 of Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006, in the version resulting from Implementing Regulation 2022/876, also identifies the appellant as a ‘Serbian businessman and politician, associated with the company Dana Holdings’ and justifies the restrictive measures against the appellant by reference to the same grounds as those set out in Point 1 of Annex I to Decision 2012/642, in the version resulting from Implementing Decision 2022/881.
E. Decision 2023/421
11 Article 1 of Decision 2023/421 provides:
‘Decision [2012/642] is amended as follows:
…
(2) Annex I is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.’
12 In accordance with Point 1 of the Annex to Decision 2023/421, the reference to the appellant’s name on the list under Point 1 of Annex I to Decision 2012/642, in the version resulting from Implementing Decision 2022/881, remained unaltered.
F. Implementing Regulation 2023/419
13 Article 1 of Implementing Regulation 2023/419 provides:
‘Annex I to Regulation [No 765/2006] is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.’
14 In accordance with Point 1 of the Annex to Implementing Regulation 2023/419, the reference to the appellant’s name on the list under Point 1 of Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006, in the version resulting from Implementing Regulation 2022/876, was not the subject of any amendments.
II. Background to the dispute
15 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 15 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, it may be summarised as follows.
16 On 18 May 2006, the Council adopted, under Articles 60 and 301 EC (now Articles 75 and 215 TFEU), Regulation No 765/2006 and, on 15 October 2012, under Article 29 TEU, Decision 2012/642.
17 The restrictive measures taken against the appellant, who is a Serbian businessperson and politician, were adopted by the Council pursuant to the criterion of benefiting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko (‘the general criterion at issue’), laid down, first, in Article 3(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 and, second, in Article 4(1)(b) of that decision and Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006.
18 By the initial acts, the appellant’s name was included on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures set out in the annex to Decision 2012/642 and in Annex I to Regulation No 765/2006 (together, ‘the lists in question’).
19 By letter of 15 June 2022, the appellant requested that the Council communicate to him all the evidence supporting the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue.
20 On 30 June 2022, the Council provided the appellant with a number of documents, including document WK 5817/2022 INIT and document WK 5817/2022 ADD 1, containing the evidence concerning him.
21 By letter of 21 December 2022, the Council notified the appellant of its intention to maintain the restrictive measures against him and sent additional evidence to him. The Council also gave the appellant the opportunity to submit observations by 12 January 2023.
22 By letter of 11 January 2023, the appellant challenged the grounds for maintaining his name on the lists at issue and requested that the Council reconsider its decision.
23 On 24 February 2023, the Council adopted the maintaining acts, by way of which the restrictive measures against the appellant were extended to 28 February 2024. In those acts, the Council justified the extension of those measures by reproducing all of the grounds contained in the initial acts.
24 By letter of 27 February 2023, the Council replied to the appellant’s letter of 11 January 2023, and informed him of its decision to maintain his name on the lists at issue by way of the maintaining acts.
III. The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal
25 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 28 August 2022, the appellant, who was the applicant at first instance, brought an action for annulment of the initial acts, in so far as they concern him.
26 By way of a procedural document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 May 2023, the appellant amended the form of order sought so that it also covered the maintaining acts in so far as those acts concern him.
27 In support of his action before the General Court, the appellant relied on three pleas in law alleging (i) infringement of the rights of the defence, (ii) manifest errors of assessment and (iii) disproportionate interference with his fundamental rights.
28 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council.
IV. Forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal
29 The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:
– set aside the judgment under appeal;
– give judgment on the merits and annul the acts at issue in so far as they concern him;
– in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court; and
– order the Council to pay the costs.
30 The Council contends that the Court of Justice should:
– dismiss the appeal;
– in the alternative, should the Court decide to set aside the judgment under appeal and give final judgment itself, dismiss the application for annulment of the acts at issue; and
– order the appellant to pay the costs relating to the present appeal and the action at first instance.
V. The appeal
A. Admissibility of the appeal
1. Arguments of the parties
31 The Council submits that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety, inasmuch as it lacks clarity. Certain grounds of appeal raised by the appellant overlap in part and the appeal fails to identify with sufficient accuracy the arguments relied upon in support of the grounds of appeal, with the result that it is difficult, in the Council’s submission, to determine the exact scope of each of the grounds raised.
32 The appellant contends that, contrary to the Council’s claims, the scope of each of the grounds he has raised is clear from the appeal and the specific paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which reference is made. He submits, moreover, that those grounds of appeal do not overlap.
2. Findings of the Court
33 It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, merely reproduces the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 May 2022, Boshab v Council , C‑242/21 P, EU:C:2022:375, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
34 An appeal supported by an argument that is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to exercise its powers of judicial review, in particular because essential elements on which the line of argument is based are not indicated sufficiently coherently and intelligibly in the text of the appeal, which is worded in a vague and ambiguous manner in that regard, also does not satisfy those requirements and must be dismissed as inadmissible. Furthermore, an appeal lacking any coherent structure which simply makes general statements and contains no specific indications as to the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which may be vitiated by an error of law must be dismissed as clearly inadmissible (judgment of 11 December 2025, ABLV Bank v SRB , C‑602/22 P, EU:C:2025:953, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
35 In the present case, the appeal identifies precisely the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which are disputed, and sets out the grounds on which, in the appellant’s submission, those paragraphs are vitiated by errors of law.
36 Consequently, the Council’s arguments cannot call into question the admissibility of the appeal in its entirety.
B. Substance
37 The appellant raises six grounds in support of his appeal, alleging (i) error of law on the part of the General Court in the interpretation and application of Article 3(1)(b) and Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642 and of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006; (ii) error of law and infringement of the general criterion at issue; (iii) distortion of the evidence and the arguments submitted by the appellant; (iv) disregard, on the part of the General Court, of the scope of its judicial review and of the infringement of Article 263 TFEU, essential procedural requirements and the obligation to state reasons; (v) error of law as a result of the failure, on the part of the General Court, to take into consideration the case-law on the passage of time; and (vi) infringement of essential procedural requirements and of the obligation to state reasons, and disregard, on the part of the General Court, of the scope of its judicial review and of the infringement of Article 263 TFEU.
1. The first ground of appeal
(a) Arguments of the parties
38 By his first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in the interpretation and application of Article 3(1)(b) and Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, and of Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006, which relate to the general criterion at issue.
39 The appellant maintains that, in paragraph 31 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that his name was not included and, subsequently, maintained on the lists in question on the ground that the companies with which he was associated were already included on the lists at issue, therefore excluding the application of the association criterion. However, in paragraphs 36, 58, 64, 69, 76, 83, 112 and 118 of that judgment, the General Court, in the appellant’s submission, expressly referred to the concept of ‘common interests’, which is tantamount to extending the general criterion at issue by applying one of the legal elements of the association criterion. The appellant argues that the General Court confirmed that the maintenance of the appellant’s name on the lists at issue, on the ground that he was associated with the companies Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, which benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko on account of common economic interests connecting them to that regime, was well founded.
40 In the appellant’s submission, such an extension of the general criterion at issue cannot be accepted since, at the time of the acts at issue, the Council had expressly limited the association criterion to persons associated with persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus. That is not, however, the case as regards the appellant.
41 The appellant argues that such an extension is, moreover, contrary to the settled case-law of the General Court, under which the general criterion at issue applies only qualitatively or quantitatively significant support for the regime in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2014, National Iranian Oil Company v Council , T‑578/12, EU:T:2014:678, paragraph 119, and of 15 June 2017, Kiselev v Council , T‑262/15, EU:T:2017:392, paragraph 74). That criterion cannot be confused with a simple form of association, at the risk of depriving it of any effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council , T‑741/22, EU:T:2024:605, paragraph 186). In order to sanction a person on the basis of that criterion, it is not the existence of common economic interests that ought to be established, in the appellant’s submission, but the ability of the person included on the list in question to exert influence on the decision-making process of the company concerned when that person was listed (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2013, Nabipour and Others v Council , T‑58/12, EU:T:2013:640, paragraphs 108 to 110; of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council , T‑252/22, EU:T:2023:496, paragraph 109; and of 10 July 2024, Rashevsky v Council , T‑309/22 and T‑739/22, EU:T:2024:455, paragraph 211). The appellant also argues that the General Court has never accepted that such support exists where the person concerned is merely associated with the company in question, without being a director, shareholder or even an employee thereof, since such a situation comes under the association criterion.
42 The appellant thus maintains that, in the present case, he was wrongly sanctioned on the ground that he was closely associated with two companies which benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko. The appellant argues that the General Court only referred, in paragraphs 44, 67, 80, 94, 105, 107, 111 and 115 of the judgment under appeal, to the preferential treatment received by those companies by reference to the judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, EU:T:2023:364). However, had the General Court correctly applied the general criterion at issue, it would have found that the appellant could be sanctioned only if the Council had established his ability to exert decisive influence on the activities of those two companies, resulting in a benefit from or support afforded to the regime of President Lukashenko. The appellant puts forward the argument that the Council was unable to adduce such evidence since, as the General Court itself observed in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, he is neither the owner nor a director of either of those companies, or of any company operating in Belarus.
43 The Council contends that the first ground of appeal must be rejected.
(b) Findings of the Court
44 The general criterion at issue is laid down in Article 3(1)(b) and Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, and in Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006.
45 Pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, persons who benefit from or support the regime of President Lukashenko are to be subject to a prohibition on entry into and transit through the territory of the European Union.
46 Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642, to which Article 2(5) of Regulation No 765/2006 refers, provides for the freezing of all funds and economic resources of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefitting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko, and of legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them.
47 It should be observed that, under the guise of an alleged wrongful extension of the general criterion at issue by the General Court, the appellant seeks, in actual fact, to call into question the finding, made by the General Court in paragraph 118 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant can be regarded as a person who is benefitting from and supporting the regime of President Lukashenko, with the result that he satisfied that criterion. In that connection, the appellant’s line of argument relates primarily to the finding, made by the General Court, that common economic interests existed between himself and the two companies referred to in the acts at issue, namely Dana Astra and Dana Holdings.
48 However, in paragraph 118 of that judgment, the General Court arrived at its finding that the appellant satisfied the general criterion at issue not only on the ground that such common interests existed, but also on account of his involvement, as a businessperson, both in establishing and maintaining a close relationship with President Lukashenko and in conducting the Minsk World project.
49 In that regard, the General Court admittedly held, in paragraphs 79 and 110 of that judgment, that the items of evidence produced by the Council did not show that the appellant was the shareholder or officially the director of Dana Holdings or of its subsidiaries, including Dana Astra, at the time when the acts at issue were adopted. Nevertheless, the General Court noted, in paragraphs 111 to 114 of the judgment under appeal, that (i) in the grounds of the acts at issue, it is not claimed that the appellant is the official owner or director of Dana Holdings or Dana Astra; (ii) the exhibits contained in the Council’s evidence files constitute a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence allowing it to be found that, at the time when the contested acts were adopted, and in spite of the fact that the appellant was neither the official owner nor the director of Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, he was closely associated with those companies on account of common economic interests linking the appellant thereto; and (iii) a number of items of evidence demonstrated, to the requisite legal standard, that the close relationships that the appellant and his brother had formed, from the mid-2000s onwards, with President Lukashenko had been decisive for the position of Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, which were tasked with the development of the Minsk World project, the importance of which for the Belarusian economy had been publicly highlighted by President Lukashenko himself.
50 It is on the basis of those findings that the General Court ruled, in paragraph 115 of the judgment under appeal, that all of those factors constitute a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence allowing it to be found that it is on account of the close relationships between, on the one hand, the appellant and his family members and, on the other hand, President Lukashenko, that Dana Holdings and Dana Astra received preferential treatment from the latter’s regime, in particular in the context of the development of the Minsk World project.
51 Moreover, the General Court pointed out, in paragraphs 116 and 117 of the judgment under appeal, that it is clear from recital 6 of Decision 2012/642 that the concept of ‘support to the regime’ in terms of the general criterion at issue does not encompass only financial or material support to the regime of President Lukashenko, but that it refers to any form of support to that regime. Furthermore, the General Court found, in its judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, EU:T:2023:364), which has become final, that having regard to the size and prestigious nature of the Minsk World project for the regime, confirmed by the public statements made by President Lukashenko himself, and the particular importance of that project to the Belarus economy, those factors demonstrated support to the regime of President Lukashenko.
52 It follows that, contrary to what the appellant maintains, the General Court did not apply a new association criterion but rather, in paragraphs 116 to 118 of the judgment under appeal, interpreted and applied the general criterion at issue without erring in law in that regard.
53 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
2. The third ground of appeal
54 By his third ground of appeal, which is divided into three limbs and should be examined before the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted the evidence put before it. It is necessary, at the outset, to assess the second limb of that ground of appeal.
(a) The second limb of the third ground of appeal
(1) Arguments of the parties
55 By way of the second limb of his third ground of appeal, the appellant maintains that no common economic interests exist between himself, Dana Holdings and its subsidiaries, including Dana Astra.
56 The appellant submits that the General Court distorted the evidence by finding, in paragraphs 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 71 and 89 of the judgment under appeal, that he was the founder, co-owner and director of Dana Holdings and its subsidiaries, including Dana Astra, as part of a larger entity, BK Group. The appellant also criticises the General Court for stating, in paragraphs 64 to 67 and 114 of that judgment, that he had publicly and repeatedly conducted himself like the director or, at the very least, the representative of the companies involved in the Minsk World project, in particular Dana Holdings and its subsidiaries, both in discussions with President Lukashenko and in the press and on his own social media channels. That line of reasoning is, moreover, contradictory, in the appellant’s submission.
57 He disputes the claim that he is the founder, co-owner and director of BK Group, Dana Astra or Dana Holdings, or any other company operating in Belarus. He also refutes the claim that he publicly and repeatedly conducted himself like the director or, at the very least, the representative of those companies or any other company operating in Belarus.
58 The appellant adds that the General Court failed to take into consideration those items of evidence that he had produced before it, namely press articles dating from 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2021, official certificates, and an excerpt from the entry in the Belarusian corporate register concerning Dana Astra, demonstrating that he was involved in the corporate structure of Dana Astra or Dana Holdings neither as a founder nor as an owner or director.
59 Furthermore, the appellant claims that the General Court relied on vague and contradictory evidence. He observes, in particular, that in paragraphs 65 to 67 and 114 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court distorted the evidence relating to the alleged discussions with President Lukashenko, statements made to the press and the appellant’s publications on social media. According to the appellant, those items of evidence cannot, in actual fact, suffice to establish the existence of a connection between himself and the companies Dana Astra and Dana Holdings, or, therefore, the existence of common economic interests.
60 As regards statements made to the press, the appellant submits that, in order to find that he had made statements in which he behaved as though he were the director of Dana Holdings and its subsidiaries or, at the very least, as a person authorised to represent those entities, the General Court once again relied, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, on a single document, containing screenshots of an article which in turn refers to a video in which the appellant allegedly answered a question about contradictions affecting one of his company’s projects. The appellant submits that he himself observed at the hearing before the General Court, that video could not be accessed and the actual content thereof had never been discussed, since it had been neither reproduced nor mentioned in the article, and nor had any details been provided as to the alleged answers that he had given to the journalist. According to the appellant, that article could not, therefore, support the finding that he had behaved as though he were the director of or as a person authorised to represent that company, since the statements allegedly made were neither reproduced nor, accordingly, verifiable. In his submission, the General Court again distorted the evidence.
61 In so far as concerns social media publications, and more particular the reference to several posts on the appellant’s Instagram account, he claims that the General Court relied, in paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, on translated screenshots of an article published in 2019, at a time when the appellant’s children were still the indirect owners of businesses in Belarus. He states that although the screenshots are not fully legible, it seems that around nine Instagram posts from the appellant’s Instagram account are reproduced, most of which represent pictures of him and his family. Only one post, based on the translation of the caption, seems to refer to the Maya Minsk project which was, at that time, developed by companies owned by his children. He submits that the fact that he vaguely used the pronoun ‘we’ is insufficient to support the finding that, in doing so, he had conducted himself as the ‘director’ of any company, especially since there is no single name of any company mentioned in those posts.
62 In addition, the appellant criticises the General Court for holding, in paragraphs 57 and 69 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had claimed that at the end of 2020, Dana Holdings and its former subsidiary, Dana Astra, had been sold; their current owner was a company established in the United Arab Emirates. According to the appellant, only the subsidiaries of Dana Holdings, including Dana Astra, were in fact sold. Mr A thus became the sole shareholder in Dana Holdings and holds those shares on behalf of the appellant’s son, who remains the indirect owner of that company.
63 The Council contends that the appellant has distorted the findings at which the General Court arrived, and consequently takes the view that the second limb of the third ground of appeal should be rejected.
(2) Findings of the Court
64 It must be recalled that it is clear from Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal is to be limited to points of law and that the General Court therefore has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The assessment of the facts and evidence does not, save where the facts and evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 7 May 2026, Makhlouf v Council , C‑635/24 P, EU:C:2026:377, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
65 In the present case, it should be noted that, under the guise of an allegation of distortion of evidence, the appellant, by essentially reproducing the same arguments as those he raised before the General Court, seeks in actual fact to obtain a fresh assessment of that evidence, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in an appeal, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 33 and 65 of the present judgment.
66 In any event, it should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 3 April 2014, France v Commission , C‑559/12 P, EU:C:2014:217, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). Thus, in the present case, the review conducted by the Court of Justice must be confined to ascertaining whether the General Court, in finding, in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, that there were common interests linking the appellant with Dana Holdings and its subsidiaries, including Dana Astra, manifestly exceeded the scope of a reasonable assessment of the evidence.
67 In that connection, it is clear from paragraphs 64 to 83 of that judgment that the General Court carried out a detailed examination of the items of evidence produced by the Council, and inferred that that evidence demonstrated specifically, precisely and consistently that (i) the appellant had publicly and repeatedly conducted himself like the director or, at the very least, the representative of the companies Dana Holdings and Dana Astra which were involved in Minsk World, a project which was of particular importance for Belarus and, accordingly, the regime of President Lukashenko; and (ii) when the maintaining acts were adopted, common interests linking the appellant to Dana Holdings and Dana Astra continued to exist and that the alleged changes in the ownership structure of those companies had not altered the control that the members of the Karić family – and, in particular, the appellant – in fact exercised over the latter companies. However, it is not obvious that, in finding as it did, the General Court exceeded the scope of a reasonable examination of the evidence.
68 As to the appellant’s argument alleging that the General Court failed to take into consideration several official documents demonstrating that the appellant plays no role and holds no interests in the companies Dana Astra and Dana Holdings, suffice it to observe that the General Court held, in paragraphs 65 to 75 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant himself publicly and repeatedly conducted himself like the director or, at the very least, the representative of Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, both in discussions with President Lukashenko and in the press and on his own social media channels. The General Court found, in paragraph 76 of that judgment, that the items of evidence produced by the Council in that regard, constituted a sufficiently solid demonstration that, when the maintaining acts were adopted, common economic interests linking the appellant to Dana Holdings and Dana Astra continued to exist since the alleged changes in the ownership structure of those companies did not alter the control that the members of the appellant’s family and the appellant himself exercised over those entities.
69 It follows that, although the General Court may not have taken into consideration certain official documents, such as excerpts from corporate registers or a certificate of incorporation, furnished by the appellant in order to demonstrate that he neither plays a role nor holds any interests in Dana Astra or Dana Holdings, that fact and those documents cannot, in any event, call into question the finding at which the General Court arrived, according to which the appellant, though admittedly not officially the director of those companies, nevertheless controls and is linked with those companies by common interests.
70 It should be noted in that connection that the appellant does not challenge the substance of paragraphs 79 to 82 of the judgment under appeal. The General Court admittedly held, in paragraph 79 of that judgment, that the items of evidence produced by the Council did not show that the appellant was the shareholder or officially the director of Dana Holdings or of its subsidiaries, including Dana Astra, either when the initial acts were adopted or when the maintaining acts were adopted. However, the General Court did observe, in paragraph 80 of that judgment, that in the grounds of the acts at issue, it was not claimed that the appellant was the official owner or director of those companies, but that his name had instead been included then maintained on the lists at issue in particular on account of his status as a businessperson in Belarus and his activities in the real estate sector, as well as his contacts with the family of President Lukashenko, which had allowed companies with which he was closely associated, in particular Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, to receive preferential treatment from the regime of President Lukashenko.
71 Furthermore, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which proof of the merits of the grounds for listing and maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue is assessed in the light of the context of the restrictive measures. Thus, in a context that does not facilitate access to evidence and objective information, it is sufficient to produce a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council , C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraphs 51 to 53). Next, the General Court pointed out, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, that difficulty in obtaining more specific evidence in a country such as Belarus which is characterised by a regime of an authoritarian nature must be taken into consideration and that, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must in fact rely on publicly available sources of information, such as reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information. The General Court inferred from the above that press articles may be used in order to corroborate the existence of certain facts if they are sufficiently specific, precise and consistent as regards the facts described. In that regard, it would be excessive and disproportionate to require the Council itself to investigate on the ground the accuracy of facts which are relayed by numerous media.
72 It is on the basis of those findings, which the appellant does not call into question, that in paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that, in those circumstances, having regard to the context in Belarus, the items contained in the Council’s evidence files constitute a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence of the common economic interests linking the appellant with Dana Holdings and Dana Astra at the time when the acts at issue were adopted, making it possible to regard the appellant as being closely associated with those entities.
73 Consequently, the second limb of the third ground of appeal should be rejected as inadmissible in part and, in any case, as unfounded.
(b) The first limb of the third ground of appeal
(1) Arguments of the parties
74 By way of the first limb of his third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted evidence by finding, wrongly, in particular in paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal, that Dana Astra and Dana Holdings were part of BK Group and that the latter was a legal entity.
75 The appellant argues that the items of evidence on which the General Court relied in paragraph 60 of the judgment under appeal, namely four press articles published online, referred to BK Group in a vague and contradictory manner, contained statements falsely attributed to the appellant and his brother, and only mentioned either the Karić brothers or BK Group in passing. Such items cannot suffice, in the appellant’s submission, to support the finding that BK Group is a legal entity.
76 In that connection, the appellant submits, first, that Exhibit No 1 in document WK 5817/2022 INIT makes no mention of BK Group at any point, but vaguely refers to the ‘company Karić Brothers’ and, second, that Exhibit No 3 of document WK 5817/2022 INIT makes no mention of BK Group either, and contains only a vague reference to ‘the business of the developers of Mayak Minsk and Minsk-Mir, the Karić brothers’. The article contained in Exhibit No 3 does, however, make specific reference to the names of companies that do indeed exist, such as Zoomex Investment, Dana Astra and Dana Holdings, in which the appellant is not involved. Third, Exhibit No 4 of document WK 5817/2022 INIT refers, in the appellant’s submission, to ‘BK Group’ only in relation to the business ventures in which the appellant was engaged in Serbia in 1997, in the context of words allegedly spoken by his brother evoking ‘corporations such as BK Group’. Fourth, the appellant submits that Exhibit No 4 in document WK 5817/2022 ADD 1, to which paragraph 60 of the judgment under appeal refers, makes a single mention of ‘BK Group’, describing it as an ‘international corporation’.
77 The appellant recalls that, before the General Court, he maintained, as is clear from paragraph 47 of that judgment, that BK Group was not a legal person, but an abbreviation of the word combination ‘Braca Karić’, which, in Serbian, means the ‘Karić Brothers’, used by the media and also by members of the Karić family to refer to any business ventures pursued by any member of the Karić family. In order to reject that argument, the General Court relied, in paragraphs 62 and 63 of that judgment, on two statements dating back to 2017 and 2020, and reported online, attributed to the appellant and his brother, in which reference was made to ‘companies such as BK Group’, ‘BK Group “Dana Holdings”’ or ‘international corporation BK Group’. However, according to the appellant, those two isolated statements, falsely attributed to him and his brother, cannot suffice to support the finding, made by the General Court in paragraph 62 of that judgment, that the appellant himself stated that BK Group is a company.
78 Furthermore, the appellant submits that the General Court failed to take into consideration the numerous items of evidence that he had produced and which demonstrate that BK Group does not exist and that Dana Astra and Dana Holdings could not, therefore, be part of it. The appellant had, in particular, submitted, in that connection, several items of evidence relating to the chain of ownership of Dana Astra and Dana Holdings both before and after 2020, which items included undisputed excerpts from corporate registers and official certificates. It is clear from those items, in the appellant’s submission, that as an entity indirectly owned by Dana Holdings before 4 December 2020, and now indirectly owned by the company Enterprise Development Holdings Limited, in which the appellant plays no part and holds no interest, was not part of BK Group. Moreover, it is clear, in the appellant’s submission, from the information before the General Court that the shareholders in Dana Holdings were natural persons, in particular the appellant’s son, which is the ultimate owner thereof, and that that company was not part of either a holding company or any other legal entity.
79 In so far as concerns Dana Holdings, the appellant states that this is a company registered in Cyprus and directly owned by his children, as is clear from the official shareholders’ certificate for Dana Holdings Ltd (Cyprus), issued on 23 November 2020. Further to the sale, after December 2020, of its operational subsidiaries, a restructuring of the undertaking took place, following which only the appellant’s son remained the ultimate owner of Dana Holdings. It was thus clearly apparent from the documents in the General Court’s file that Dana Holdings’ shareholders were natural persons, and that the company was therefore not part of any holding or other legal entity. Accordingly, by finding, in paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal, that Dana Holdings was part of BK Group, the General Court distorted the evidence.
80 As to Dana Astra, the appellant states that it was wholly held, until 4 December 2020, by its parent company, Dana Holdings, through two Cyprus companies, Rodrick Limited and Triworst Limited, as is demonstrated, in his submission, by several documents relating to the registration, in the Belarusian corporate register, of the foreign limited liability company Dana Astra – the two shareholders in that company being Rodrick Limited and Triworst Limited – and to the share ownership of the latter two companies.
81 The appellant submits that, on 4 December 2020, Dana Holdings sold the entirety of the shares in all of its Cyprus subsidiaries, including the shares in Rodrick Limited and Triworst Limited. These Cyprus companies are now fully owned by Enterprise Development Holding Limited, a company in which the appellant plays no part and has no interest.
82 The Council takes the view that the first limb of the third ground of appeal must be rejected.
(2) Findings of the Court
83 It should be observed that, by way of the first limb of the third ground of appeal, the appellant challenges the findings of the General Court which led it to conclude that Dana Astra and Dana Holdings were part of BK Group and that the latter was a legal entity. However, in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that, even if BK Group were not to be a legal entity per se, that fact cannot call into question the existence of common economic interests, linking the appellant to Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, which finding is not, moreover, vitiated by an error of law, as is clear from the examination of the second limb of the third ground of appeal.
84 Consequently, the first limb of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.
(c) The third limb of the third ground of appeal
(1) Arguments of the parties
85 By way of the third limb of his third ground of appeal, the appellant disputes the claim that he maintained a network of contacts with President Lukashenko and his entourage, and submits that, in any event, there is no timeline or continuity of facts in that regard.
86 He claims that the General Court distorted the evidence and, in paragraphs 85, 86, 114 and 115 of the judgment under appeal, incorrectly qualified his relationship with President Lukashenko as a relationship involving close ties or a privileged relationship.
87 The appellant observes that the only items of evidence that the General Court took into consideration were, in paragraphs 86, 88, 90 and 91 of that judgment, press articles, a report and a publication on the website of President Lukashenko, referring, first, to meetings in which the appellant’s brother took part, without these being relevant to establishing the existence of ties between the appellant and President Lukashenko; second, a single meeting that took place in 2015 between himself and President Lukashenko and their attendance at the same event in 2017; and, third, the alleged involvement of President Lukashenko’s daughter-in- law, Mrs Lilia Lukashenko, in the company Dana Astra.
88 More specifically, the appellant maintains that, in paragraphs 86 and 90 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court relied on a press article from occrp.org which refers vaguely to the fact that the Karić brothers benefitted from their relationship with President Lukashenko, and claims that members of the Karić family had forged ties with the latter after political rivals in their home country had begun investigating their businesses in the mid-2000s. However, in order to substantiate those allegations, that article merely refers to two instances in which, it is claimed, the appellant’s brother met President Lukashenko, in 2015 and 2019, and the alleged involvement of the daughter-in-law of President Lukashenko in Dana Astra, a company in which the appellant is not, he submits, involved and was not, in any event, when the acts at issue were adopted.
89 The appellant also claims that, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court relied on a report relayed by the website belsat.eu, which includes a diagram allegedly linking the Karić family to President Lukashenko without, however, mentioning any specific source or reference in that regard. It is argued that the report also contains a photograph of the appellant’s brother with President Lukashenko, without any indication of the date on which the photograph was taken, and that the report makes vague reference to a meeting that took place in 2015. The appellant submits that in the same paragraph of the judgment under appeal, the General Court relied on a press article published on the website rferl.org, which includes a photograph, taken at the opening of the Dana Mall Trade Center in Minsk, in which the daughter-in-law of President Lukashenko appears. Furthermore, in paragraph 88 of that judgement, which refers to paragraphs 63 and 66 thereof, the General Court relied on a publication from the website of President Lukashenko, president.gov.by, regarding a meeting that was held in 2015. Lastly, in paragraph 91 of that judgment, which refers to paragraph 71 thereof, the General Court relied on a document regarding a meeting held between the appellant’s brother and President Lukashenko in 2021.
90 According to the appellant, however, those items of evidence cannot suffice to establish the existence of close ties or a network of contacts between himself and President Lukashenko.
91 The appellant recalls that, according to the case-law of the General Court, a link as indirect as the alleged involvement of the daughter-in-law of President Lukashenko in Dana Astra is not sufficient to establish that a person is benefiting from or supports the regime (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council , T‑301/22, EU:T:2024:214, paragraphs 57 to 60). The same may be said as regards the single meeting that the appellant allegedly had with President Lukashenko in 2015 and the fact that he attended the same event as the latter in 2017 (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 December 2023, Moshkovich v Council , T‑283/22, EU:T:2023:849, paragraph 42).
92 Accordingly, in the appellant’s submission, the General Court wrongly found, in paragraphs 113 to 115 and 118 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s close or privileged relationship with President Lukashenko demonstrates that the appellant benefits from or supports the regime in Belarus.
93 The Council takes the view that the third limb of the third ground of appeal must be rejected.
(2) Findings of the Court
94 In the present case, it should be noted at the outset that, under the guise of an allegation of distortion of evidence, the appellant, by essentially reproducing the same arguments as those he raised before the General Court, seeks in actual fact to obtain a fresh assessment of that evidence, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in an appeal, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 33 and 64 of the present judgment.
95 In any event, it is clear from paragraphs 85 to 92 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court carried out a detailed examination of the evidence produced by the Council, seeking to demonstrate the continuous existence for several years of close ties between, on the one hand, the appellant and his family members, in particular his brother; and, on the other hand, President Lukashenko. However, it is not obvious that the General Court distorted that evidence.
96 Furthermore, it is clear from the examination of the first ground of appeal that the General Court rightly found that the factors set out in paragraphs 111 to 117 of the judgment under appeal, which included the close ties between the appellant, his family and President Lukashenko, justified the inclusion of the appellant’s name on the lists in question on the ground that he benefitted from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko, with the result that the appellant satisfied the general criterion at issue.
97 Consequently, the third limb of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded and, accordingly, the third ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
3. The second ground of appeal
(a) Arguments of the parties
98 By way of his second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by failing to distinguish, throughout the judgment under appeal, between the two aspects of the general criterion at issue, namely, on the one hand, the alleged benefit from and, on the other hand, the support allegedly provided to, the regime of President Lukashenko.
99 In the appellant’s submission, it is apparent from the case-law of the General Court that the concepts of ‘support’ and ‘benefit’ are separate criteria (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2017, BelTechExport v Council , T‑765/15, EU:T:2017:669, paragraph 92). According to the appellant, the General Court disregarded that case-law by referring, in particular in paragraphs 29, 48, 121, 127 and 128 of the judgment under appeal, to the benefit from and support for the regime, without distinguishing between acts of benefit and acts of support.
100 The appellant claims that, while the General Court expressly referred, in paragraph 37 of that judgment, to alleged support that he provided to President Lukashenko, its reasoning in that connection is contradictory in so far as the statements made by President Lukashenko himself, to which the General Court refers, demonstrate only the latter’s support for the development of the Minsk World project and the importance of that project in his view. That alleged act of support is not an act of support on the part of the appellant for President Lukashenko.
101 Moreover, according to the appellant, the reference made by the General Court, in paragraphs 99 and 102 of the judgment under appeal, to the support provided by the regime of President Lukashenko to the undertakings linked to the appellant and involved in the development of the Minsk World project and the support of that regime from which Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, companies belonging to BK Group, allegedly benefited, cannot demonstrate the existence of support provided to that regime by the appellant.
102 The Council takes the view that the second ground of appeal should be rejected.
(b) Findings of the Court
103 It should be observed that the appellant’s line of argument is based on an incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal.
104 Contrary to what the appellant claims, the General Court did not fail to distinguish between, on the one hand, benefiting from and, on the other hand, supporting the regime, but it did find, in particular in the light of the context in Belarus and in the appellant’s case specifically, that the exhibits produced by the Council constituted a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence allowing it to be found that the appellant satisfied both aspects of the general criterion at issue, namely benefit from and support for the regime of President Lukashenko.
105 In any event, it is settled case-law that if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned in the contested act is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that act (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2018, Bank Tejarat v Council , C‑248/17 P, EU:C:2018:967, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). Thus, even if the General Court had ultimately found that only one aspect of the general criterion at issue, relating to the benefit from or the support for the regime of President Lukashenko, was satisfied in the case at hand, such a fact cannot lead to the annulment of the acts at issue.
106 Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
4. The fourth ground of appeal
(a) Arguments of the parties
107 By his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court disregarded the scope of its judicial review and infringed Article 263 TFEU, essential procedural requirements and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by stating insufficient and contradictory reasons for the judgment under appeal.
108 The appellant recalls that, according to settled case-law, the Court of Justice and the General Court cannot substitute their own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 February 2013, Portugal v Commission , C‑246/11 P, EU:C:2013:118, paragraph 85, and of 6 October 2021, World Duty Free Group and Spain v Commission , C‑51/19 P and C‑64/19 P, EU:C:2021:793, paragraph 70). The General Court may not therefore, add to, subtract from or amend the statement of reasons for acts the lawfulness of which is challenged before it, in particular where it is argued that those acts do not satisfy the requirement to state reasons (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 4 June 2020, Hungary v Council , C‑456/18 P, EU:C:2020:421, paragraphs 71 to 73).
109 The appellant submits that, in the case in point, the General Court wrongly substituted its own grounds for those of the Council, according to which he was closely linked to Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, by way of contradictory reasoning. He argues that, in the present case, in the wake of the confusion between the general criterion at issue and the then non-existent criterion of association with persons benefiting from or supporting the Belarusian regime, the General Court sought, in the judgment under appeal, to establish the existence of common economic interests between the appellant and the companies Dana Holdings and Dana Astra in order to establish a close association between him and those companies, as alleged by the statement of reasons for the acts at issue.
110 The appellant submits that the General Court thus found, first, in paragraphs 59 to 63 of the judgment under appeal, that Dana Astra and Dana Holdings belonged to BK Group, of which he was allegedly the founder and principal owner and, second, in paragraphs 70 to 76 of that judgment, that he and his family members had de facto control over those companies, including after these were sold to a third party in late 2020. In doing so, the General Court departed from the Council’s statement of reasons by basing its assessment not on the existence of an association between the appellant and those two companies, but on his alleged capacity as an indirect shareholder in and de facto director of those companies.
111 The Council takes the view that the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected.
(b) Findings of the Court
112 It should be borne in mind that it is clear from the examination of the first ground of appeal that the General Court did not confuse the general criterion at issue – which relates to benefiting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko – and the criterion relating to association with persons benefiting from or supporting that regime.
113 Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the grounds of the acts at issue, the Council did not base the inclusion or the maintenance of the appellant’s name on the lists in question solely on the existences of close ties between the appellant and Dana Holdings as well as Dana Astra. The Council relied on a range of factors relating to (i) the appellant’s capacity as a Serbian businessperson and politician; (ii) the fact that he, together with his family members, had developed a network of real estate companies in Belarus and cultivated a network of contacts with the family of President Lukashenko; (iii) the fact that he represented the companies Dana Holdings and Dana Astra at meetings with President Lukashenko; (iv) the existence of close relationships between the appellant, President Lukashenko and his entourage; (v) the fact that the Minsk World project, developed by a company associated with the appellant, was presented by President Lukashenko as an example of cooperation of the Slavonic world; and (vi) the fact that, thanks to those close relationships with President Lukashenko and his entourage, Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, which are associated with the appellant, received preferential treatment from the regime of President Lukashenko.
114 It follows that, contrary to the appellant’s claims, the General Court did not depart from the statement of reasons on which the Council relied and did not substitute its own reasons for those of the latter when it examined whether the facts referred to justified the inclusion and then the maintenance of the appellant’s name on the lists in question on the ground that he benefited from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko, with the result that he satisfied the general criterion at issue.
115 Accordingly, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
5. The fifth ground of appeal
(a) Arguments of the parties
116 By way of his fifth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by failing, in paragraphs 119 to 125 of the judgment under appeal, to take into account, first, the case-law on the passage of time and, second, the need to identify temporally relevant conduct justifying the adoption and maintenance of restrictive measures against the person concerned.
117 In particular, the appellant criticises the General Court for relying solely on the judgment of 12 February 2020, Boshab v Council (T‑171/18, EU:T:2020:55, paragraph 84), in order to justify its decision to uphold restrictive measures against him on the basis of past events, even though that judgment cannot, in the appellant’s submission, be transposed to the situation in question in the case at hand. Indeed, the case that gave rise to that judgment concerned a separate system of restrictive measures and did not include the general criterion at issue. Furthermore, the individual sanctioned was part of the ‘first circle’ of natural persons to whom the restrictive measures are addressed – as categorised in point 40 of the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Tay Za v Council (C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2011:786) – in his capacity as former deputy prime minister, and therefore had real decision-making power and represented the highest degree of political responsibility in the situation which the European Union sought to combat. That is not, however, the case as regards the appellant here. Moreover, in the same judgment, the individual concerned had been sanctioned on the basis of human rights violations committed under his responsibility in the past, which does not, however, in the appellant's submission, call into question the fact that, according to the settled case-law of the General Court, the acts alleged must have taken place at the time when that person’s name was included on the lists in question, in particular in so far as concerns the general criterion at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2024, Aven v Council , T‑301/22, EU:T:2024:214, paragraph 80), inter alia where it is a matter of sanctioning the person concerned on the basis of ties he or she may have with a company or the existence of alleged common interests (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2024, Rashevsky v Council , T‑309/22 and T‑739/22, EU:T:2024:455, and of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council , T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608, paragraph 77).
118 In any case, the appellant maintains that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is for the Council to demonstrate that the reason for the initial listing is ongoing (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2023, Council v El-Qaddafi , C‑413/21 P, EU:C:2023:306, paragraph 75). The review of the factual situation entails taking into consideration not only the general situation in the country concerned, but also the specific situation of the individual concerned.
119 However, in the present case, the General Court failed to take into consideration the appellant’s specific situation in so far as concerns both the alleged network of contacts with President Lukashenko and his supposed ties with Dana Astra and Dana Holdings. The General Court made no reference to any recent event that might demonstrate that such contacts were ongoing for a number of years. The facts on which the General Court relied in order to find that there existed common economic interests between the appellant and those two companies – namely a meeting held in 2015, a statement allegedly made in 2019, a publication on Instagram earlier that same year, and a statement allegedly made to the press by the appellant’s wife in 2021 – were out of date, in the appellant’s submission, since the evidence contained in the case file, in particular the excerpts from the Cyprus and Belarus corporate registers, show that the appellant had played no part in those companies since 2020.
120 Moreover, according to the appellant, the fact that his son remains the ultimate owner of Dana Holdings can neither establish the existence of a common interest between the appellant and that company nor call into question the change of ownership which took place in December 2020. In that connection, the appellant disputes the claim that he had stated that Dana Holdings had been sold, claiming instead that he has consistently stated that only the subsidiaries of that company had been sold and that it was, therefore, natural that his son should remain the ultimate owner of Dana Holdings.
121 The appellant adds that, by finding, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council could rely exclusively on factual allegations relating to a period predating the adoption of the acts at issue, the General Court disregarded the case-law according to which, in relying on statements made in the past, without the Council stating how those facts were still current when the contested acts were adopted, the Council had failed to substantiate the inclusion of the name of the person concerned on the list in question (judgments of 20 March 2024, Mazepin v Council , T‑743/22, EU:T:2024:180; of 29 May 2024, Akhmedov v Council , T‑363/22, EU:T:2024:326; and of 11 September 2024, Ezubov v Council , T‑741/22, EU:T:2024:605, and Tokareva v Council , T‑744/22, EU:T:2024:608).
122 Furthermore, the appellant takes the view that, even if the Council were able to rely on past facts or events, that is possible only in so far as that information or those factors contribute to establishing that, despite the passage of time, the person concerned satisfied the listing criterion in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council , C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40). However, in the present case, the Council failed to submit any relevant material in that regard.
123 The Council takes the view that the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected.
(b) Findings of the Court
124 It should be noted that, in paragraphs 119 to 124 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined the relevance of the facts on which the acts at issue are based.
125 The General Court recalled, in paragraph 120 of that judgment, its own settled case-law according to which the reference, in the grounds of the acts at issue, to facts that occurred before the adoption of those acts, does not necessary mean that the restrictive measures taken against an applicant are outdated. Indeed, in order to establish that an applicant is benefitting from or supporting the regime of President Lukashenko, such reference cannot, as a matter of principle, be deemed to be of no relevance solely because certain conduct dates from the more or less remote past.
126 The General Court stated, in paragraph 121 of that judgment, that that interpretation is supported by Article 8 of Decision 2012/642, under which that decision is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met, and by Article 8a(4) of Regulation No 765/2006, pursuant to which the list in Annex I to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. The General Court held that, if those provisions were not to be rendered redundant, they were to be considered to allow the continued inclusion on the lists at issue of the names of persons and entities not having committed any act which shows that they benefit from or support the regime of President Lukashenko during the period preceding the review, if that continued inclusion is still justified in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, of the fact that the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures have not been achieved.
127 It is in the light of those findings that the General Court held, in paragraph 122 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had, admittedly, taken into consideration factual elements that dated back to the mid-2000s when the relationship between, on the one hand, the appellant and his brother, and, on the other hand, President Lukashenko, began, those factual elements from the past were nevertheless part of a continuity of facts showing that the appellant was closely associated with Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, and that he benefitted from and supported the regime of President Lukashenko during the periods preceding the adoption of the acts at issue. The General Court noted, in the same paragraph of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had relied on those factual elements as a whole in order to justify including, then maintaining, the appellant’s name on the lists at issue.
128 It follows that, contrary to what the appellant submits, the General Court did not err in law in applying the principles governing the passage of time.
129 Consequently, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
6. The sixth ground of appeal
(a) Arguments of the parties
130 By his sixth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in that it stated insufficient reasons for the judgment under appeal, disregarded the scope of its judicial review and, accordingly, infringed the general criterion at issue, essential procedural requirements and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as Article 263 TFEU.
131 The appellant observes that, in order to assess whether the companies with which he was allegedly linked enjoyed preferential treatment from the regime of President Lukashenko, in the form, inter alia, of tax breaks or free construction plots for real estate development, the General Court followed a two-pronged line of reasoning in paragraphs 93 to 106 of the judgment under appeal.
132 The appellant submits that the General Court, having recalled, in paragraphs 95 to 98 of that judgment, the supposed importance of the Minsk World project to the regime of President Lukashenko, relied (i) in paragraphs 101 and 102 of that judgment, on two public statements made by President Lukashenko in 2015 and 2019, which allegedly demonstrate the support from which the companies Dana Holdings and Dana Astra, belonging to BK Group, benefited from that regime; and (ii) in paragraphs 103 to 106 of that judgment, alleged preferential tax treatment. According to the appellant, those two statements are both out of date and isolated, since the General Court failed to establish whether those statements were followed by any effects. He submits that mere statements of that nature cannot suffice to demonstrate the existence of benefits of qualitative and quantitative significance within the meaning of the general criterion at issue, unless the scope of that criterion were unlawfully extended. In any event, the General Court infringed that criterion and its obligation to state reasons, in the appellant’s submission, in so far as it failed to establish that those statements had continued to produce their effects when the Council adopted the acts at issue.
133 As regards the alleged preferential tax treatment, the appellant recalls that, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU and the settled case-law of the General Court, the lawfulness of the acts at issue can only be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law on which they were adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2013, Bateni v Council , T‑42/12 and T‑181/12, EU:T:2013:409, paragraph 51). Since the burden of proof is on the Council, it is not for the appellant to establish beyond any doubt that the allegations made against him are false. In the event of any doubt, it is for the General Court to find that the allegation in question has not been sufficiently substantiated by the Council (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 April 2021, Sharif v Council , T‑540/19, EU:T:2021:220, paragraphs 120 to 122), since the General Court cannot, in that respect, make up for any shortcomings in the file submitted by the Council.
134 The appellant submits that, in the present case, the grounds of the judgment under appeal, whereby the companies linked to the appellant received preferential treatment from the Belarusian authorities, are based primarily on material not contained in the Council’s file; the General Court simply referred, in that regard, to paragraph 105 of the judgment of 28 June 2023, Dana Astra v Council (T‑239/21, EU:T:2023:364), which was handed down after the date on which the acts at issue in the present case were adopted. The General Court thus disregarded the scope of its review, since that ought to have been confined solely to the material contained in the Council’s file. The appellant submits that that conclusion is all the more compelling in that the items of evidence on which the General Court relied in that judgment, namely a presidential decree concerning the implementation of the Minsk City project and a press release published on the website of President Lukashenko, were not contained in the Council’s file in the present case. He submits, however, that the General Court cannot rely on items of evidence not contained on the case file, including whether such items are drawn from the public domain.
135 The Council takes the view that the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected.
(b) Findings of the Court
136 It should be observed that, by way of his line of argument alleging error of law on the part of the General Court, in that it disregarded the general criterion at issue and the obligation to state reasons, the appellant seeks, in actual fact, to call into question the assessment of the facts and evidence which the General Court carried out in the judgment under appeal. According to the settled case-law recalled in paragraph 64 of the present judgment, the assessment of the facts does not, save where the facts and evidence are distorted – which argument has not been raised by the appellant in the present case – constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.
137 Consequently, the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
138 Since none of the grounds of appeal has been successful, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
VI. Costs
139 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
140 In the present case, since the Council has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council.
On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby:
1. Dismisses the appeal;
2. Orders Mr Bogoljub Karić to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.
Ziemele | Biltgen | Gervasoni
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 July 2026.
A. Calot Escobar | | I. Ziemele
Registrar | | President of the Chamber
* Language of the case: English.