Opinion of Advocate General Biondi delivered on 2 July 2026

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

BIONDI

delivered on 2 July 2026 ( 1 )

Case C ‑ 530/25 P

German Khan

v

Council of the European Union

( Appeal – Restrictive measures taken in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Listing criterion – Leading businesspersons operating in Russia – Businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the government of the Russian Federation – Concept of ‘influence’ – Concept of ‘economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue’ – Legal basis – Article 29 TEU – Article 215(2) TFEU – Duty to state reasons – Renewal of measures – Conditions – Burden of proof )

Table of contents

I. Introduction

II. The background to the dispute, the judgment under appeal, the proceedings before the Court and the forms of order sought

III. The appeal

A. The seventh ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the amended (g) criterion

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

2. Assessment

(a) The concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion

(b) The literal, contextual, historical and teleological interpretation of the concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the first part of the amended (g) criterion

(c) Conclusion of the analysis concerning the concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the amended (g) criterion

(d) The complaint alleging a lack of legal basis for the amended (g) criterion

B. The sixth ground of appeal, alleging a breach of the duty to state reasons, a distortion of the evidence and an infringement of the initial (g) criterion in that the General Court held that the allegation that Mr Khan was active in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation had been sufficiently established

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

2. Assessment

(a) The admissibility of the sixth ground of appeal in general and of the complaint alleging a distortion in particular

(b) Substance

(1) The classification of Alfa Bank as the largest Russian taxpayer and the condition relating to an ‘economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion

(2) The claim of an infringement of the General Court’s duty to state reasons

(3) The substantial nature of the revenue provided to the Government of the Russian Federation by the banking sector

(4) The complaint alleging that the data relating to the banking sector’s annual revenue are outdated

C. The tenth ground of appeal, alleging a breach of the duty to state reasons and an error of law based on an infringement of the amended (g) criterion

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

2. Overview of the changes in the grounds relating to Mr Khan and of the legal regime governing the maintaining acts

3. Assessment

(a) The September 2023 acts and the complaint that the statement of reasons for the judgment under appeal was insufficient as regards the question whether the Council had adduced evidence that Mr Khan continued to manage the assets of two companies based in Russia

(1) The claim of a breach of the duty to state reasons in the strict sense

(2) A fuller reading of the claim that the judgment under appeal is insufficiently reasoned

(b) The March 2024 acts and the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal, in that the General Court failed to ensure that the ground that Mr Khan continued to manage assets in Russia was supported by evidence

(1) Admissibility

(2) Substance

(c) The September 2024 acts and the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in that the General Court failed to verify that the ground that Mr Khan continued to manage Alfa Group’s assets was supported by evidence

(1) Admissibility

(2) Substance

4. Conclusion on the tenth ground of appeal

IV. Conclusion

I. Introduction

1. In its ongoing quest to ensure optimal effectiveness of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union, the Council of the European Union continually refines the criteria on which the adoption of such measures against individuals fulfilling the applicable conditions may be based. In the now well-known context of the regime of restrictive measures introduced in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the Council has, for the first time, adopted the criterion targeting leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, commonly referred to as ‘the (g) criterion’. The Court had occasion to rule on that criterion in its judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council , ( 2 ) delivered in March this year.

2. The appellant, Mr Khan, was one of the leading businesspersons listed on the basis of the (g) criterion who took part in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council .

3. His present appeal is now directed against the judgment of 4 June 2025, Khan v Council , ( 3 ) by which the General Court ruled on the lawfulness of acts maintaining his listing under the initial (g) criterion ( 4 ) and under the amended (g) criterion. ( 5 ) In June 2023, the Council made an amendment to the (g) criterion, ( 6 ) from which it is apparent, in essence, that it now covers three categories which are in principle distinct, that is to say, first, leading businesspersons operating in Russia, second, the family members of those leading businesspersons and, third, businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

4. The Court of Justice may, inter alia, in the review of that judgment of the General Court which it is called upon to carry out, usefully clarify the interpretation of the amended (g) criterion and its possible relationship with the initial (g) criterion (seventh ground of appeal), what is required of the Council for the purpose of establishing that an economic sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government (sixth ground of appeal) and the expected standard of the judicial review of decisions to maintain a listing, as regards the examination of the evidence supporting the grounds for inclusion and, in particular, its temporal relevance (tenth ground of appeal).

5. Accordingly, by the present appeal, the appellant, Mr Khan, asks the Court to set aside the judgment under appeal, by which the General Court dismissed his action for annulment brought against the following acts, in so far as they concern him:

– Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 ( 7 ) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 ( 8 ) (‘the March 2023 acts’);

– Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 ( 9 ) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 ( 10 ) (‘the September 2023 acts’);

– Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 ( 11 ) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 ( 12 ) (‘the March 2024 acts’);

– Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 ( 13 ) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 ( 14 ) (‘the September 2024 acts’).

II. The background to the dispute, the judgment under appeal, the proceedings before the Court and the forms of order sought

6. As regards the relevant background to the dispute and legal framework, I refer to paragraphs 1 to 35 of the judgment under appeal.

7. For the purposes of the present Opinion, I shall merely recall the following.

8. Mr Khan was first subject to restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in the context of the Russian aggression in Ukraine on 15 March 2022. Those measures were extended until 15 March 2023. The acts on the basis of which those measures were adopted and subsequently maintained were the subject of an action for annulment before the General Court, followed by an appeal, which the Court dismissed. ( 15 )

9. On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the March 2023 acts, by which the measures were renewed until 15 September 2023. The grounds for his inclusion, based in particular on Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP, ( 16 ) as amended by Decision 2022/329, ( 17 ) ( 18 ) were then worded as follows:

‘[The appellant] is a Russian businessperson maintaining a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, similarly to his business partners, Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven. For many years, he had been one of the main shareholders of the ABH Financial Limited, which includes a major Russian bank, Alfa Bank. He was also a shareholder of the LetterOne investment firm. In 2022, facing Western sanctions against him, he transferred the ownership of his shares in ABH Financial Limited and LetterOne to his long-time business partner Andrei Kosogov. He continued to manage the Russia-based assets of these companies. He is believed to be one of the most influential persons in Russia. He exchanged favours with Vladimir Putin in return for political support to his business and financial gains. Vladimir Putin’s eldest daughter, Maria, ran a charity project, Alfa-Endo, which was funded by Alfa Bank. Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group Consortium’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group Consortium foreign investment plans.

He has therefore been actively supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. He is also one of the leading Russian business persons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

10. With effect from 5 June 2023, Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 was replaced by the following: ( 19 )

‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to …:

…

(g) leading businesspersons operating in Russia and their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them, or businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine … shall be frozen’.

11. On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted the September 2023 acts, which had the effect of renewing the measures against Mr Khan until 15 March 2024. The grounds for including the appellant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:

‘[The appellant] is a Russian businessperson maintaining a close relationship with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, similarly to his business partners, Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven. For many years, he had been one of the main shareholders of the ABH Financial Limited, which includes a major Russian bank, Alfa Bank. He was also a shareholder of the LetterOne investment firm. In 2022, facing Western sanctions against him, he transferred the ownership of his shares in ABH Financial Limited and LetterOne to his long-time business partner Andrei Kosogov. He continued to manage the Russia-based assets of these companies. He is believed to be one of the most influential persons in Russia. He exchanged favours with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in return for political support to his business and financial gains. Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group Consortium’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group Consortium’s foreign investment plans. Moreover, he was among the leading Russian businesspersons who participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, where the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin gave a speech and urged billionaires to put “patriotism before profit”.

The insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie, subsidiary of Alfa Group Consortium, provides insurance to the vehicles of the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia), whose units operate in the occupied regions of Ukraine under Russian control, as well as the bodyguard vehicles of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, X5 Retail Group, another subsidiary of Alfa Group Consortium, cooperates with JSC Voentorg, an entity subject to restrictive measures which provides catering and laundry services, as well as military uniforms, to the armed forces of the Russian Federation and whose subsidiary sells T-shirts bearing the “Z” military symbol used by Russian propagandists to promote Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. [The appellant] has therefore been actively supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine. He is also a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

12. On 12 March 2024, the Council adopted the March 2024 acts, which had the effect of renewing the measures against the appellant until 15 September 2024 on the same grounds as those set out in the September 2023 acts.

13. On 12 September 2024, the Council adopted the September 2024 acts, in which the grounds for the inclusion of Mr Khan were set out as follows:

‘[The appellant] is a Russian businessperson maintaining a close relationship with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, similarly to his business partners, Mikhail Fridman, Petr Aven and Alexey Kuzmichev. In March 2022, he transferred his shares in ABH Holdings, which controls a major Russian bank, Alfa Bank, to his long-time business partner Andrei Kosogov. This transfer was declared by the National Bank of Ukraine to be null and void.

Additionally, the transfer of his shares in A1, which is part of the Alfa Group, could be considered fictitious.

He was also a shareholder of the LetterOne investment firm.

He continued to manage the Russia-based assets of Alfa Group. He is believed to be one of the most influential persons in Russia. He exchanged favours with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in return for political support to his business and financial gains. Vladimir Putin rewarded Alfa Group Consortium’s loyalty to the Russian authorities by providing political help to Alfa Group Consortium’s foreign investment plans. Moreover, he was among the leading Russian businesspersons who participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, where the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, gave a speech and urged billionaires to put “patriotism before profit”.

The insurance company AlfaStrakhovanie, subsidiary of Alfa Group Consortium, provides insurance to the vehicles of the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia), whose units operate in the occupied regions of Ukraine under Russian control, as well as the bodyguard vehicles of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, X5 Retail Group, another subsidiary of Alfa Group Consortium, cooperates with JSC Voentorg, an entity subject to restrictive measures which provides catering and laundry services, as well as military uniforms, to the armed forces of the Russian Federation and whose subsidiary sells T-shirts bearing the “Z” military symbol used by Russian propagandists to promote Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. [The appellant] has therefore been supporting materially or financially and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Ukraine.

[The appellant] also has a significant shareholding in Rosvodokanal, another Alfa Group company and one of the leading private operators of water utilities in Russia.

He is also a leading businessperson operating in Russia and a businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’

14. By application lodged on 24 May 2023 at the Registry of the General Court, the appellant brought an action before the General Court seeking the annulment of the contested acts in so far as they concerned him. In support of his action, he put forward five pleas in law, which he supplemented with twelve further pleas by his statement of modification concerning the September 2023 acts, with another further plea by his statement of modification concerning the March 2024 acts and, finally, with five further pleas by his statement of modification concerning the September 2024 acts, thereby bringing the total number of his pleas to 24.

15. By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed in its entirety the action brought by Mr Khan and ordered him to pay the costs.

16. By his appeal lodged on 3 August 2025, Mr Khan asks the Court to set aside the judgment under appeal, rule on the merits of the case and annul the contested acts or, in the alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court and order, in any event, the Council to pay the costs.

17. The Council contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, in the event that the Court sets aside the judgment under appeal, rule on the merits of the case and dismiss the action and order the appellant to pay the costs.

III. The appeal

18. By the present appeal, Mr Khan raises ten grounds of appeal.

19. In essence, the first ground alleges an infringement of the rights of the defence, an infringement of the right of access to the file, an infringement of essential procedural requirements and a distortion of the evidence, all resulting from the General Court’s refusal to order the Council to produce the documents requested by Mr Khan.

20. The second ground alleges an infringement of the obligation to conduct a periodic review under Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014.

21. The third ground alleges an infringement of Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(2) of Regulation No 269/2014 and a breach of the duty to state reasons that the General Court found that the Council had fulfilled its obligation to carry out an impact assessment of the measures targeting Mr Khan.

22. The fourth ground alleges a breach of the principle of proportionality arising from the General Court’s refusal to take into account the Council’s recognition of the lack of impact of the restrictive measures targeting Mr Khan.

23. The fifth ground alleges an infringement of Article 29 TEU and Article 215(2) TFEU in that the General Court found that the initial (g) criterion was lawful, notwithstanding the fact that it makes it possible to penalise persons who do not have a sufficient link to the regime or situation on which the European Union intends to exert pressure.

24. The sixth ground alleges a breach of the duty to state reasons, a distortion of the evidence and an infringement of the initial (g) criterion on account of the circumstances in which the General Court found that it was established that, in 2023, the Russian banking sector provided substantial revenues to the Russian Government.

25. The seventh ground alleges an infringement of the first part of the amended (g) criterion ( 20 ) and, in the alternative, an infringement of Article 29 TEU and Article 215(2) TFEU and a lack of legal basis, in that the General Court held that the amended (g) criterion was to be interpreted, as regards the concept of ‘leading businesspersons’, in the same way as the initial (g) criterion.

26. The eighth ground alleges an infringement of essential procedural requirements and a distortion of the twelfth plea in law raised before the General Court.

27. The ninth ground alleges an error of law in the interpretation of the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion and the concept of ‘businessperson’, as well as a failure to recognise the scope of the judicial review which falls to the General Court.

28. The tenth ground alleges a breach of the duty to state reasons and, in the alternative, an infringement of the amended (g) criterion, since the General Court failed to verify that the allegation that Mr Khan continued to manage the Russia-based assets at the time of the maintenance of his listing in September 2023, March 2024 and September 2024 was substantiated.

29. In accordance with the Court’s request, this Opinion will focus on the sixth, seventh and tenth grounds of appeal.

30. Since the examination of Mr Khan’s seventh ground of appeal requires the Court to rule on the legality of the amended (g) criterion, I shall begin the analysis with that ground, before examining, in turn, the sixth and tenth grounds, which concern the merits of the measures adopted against Mr Khan.

A. The seventh ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in the interpretation of the amended (g) criterion

31. For the remainder of the analysis, it is necessary to clarify what each of the three parts of the amended (g) criterion refers to. Accordingly, first of all, the amended (g) criterion covers leading businesspersons operating in Russia (first part). Next, it covers their immediate family members, or other natural persons, benefitting from them (second part). Finally, and in the alternative, ( 21 ) it covers businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation (third part). ( 22 )

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

32. Mr Khan challenges the interpretation made by the General Court in ruling, in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, that, with regard to the first part of the amended (g) criterion, the term ‘leading’ had to be understood in the same way as in the context of the initial (g) criterion.

33. Mr Khan argues that, since the (g) criterion was amended, that amendment should be taken into account when interpreting that criterion. The change to the wording of the (g) criterion changed the meaning and scope of the concept of ‘leading businessperson’.

34. First, the amended (g) criterion severed the link between the influence of those businesspersons and economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. The concept of ‘influence’ was thereby separated from them.

35. Second, the second part of the amended (g) criterion applies only to the immediate family members of leading businesspersons, which tends to reinforce the argument that leading businesspersons constitute a distinct category of persons on whom the Council intends to exert particular pressure.

36. Third, the new meaning of the amended (g) criterion, in particular its first part, is clarified by recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094. The General Court has, moreover, already relied on that recital to ascertain the intention of the EU legislature. ( 23 )

37. In the alternative, should the interpretation of the first part of the amended (g) criterion be the same as that of the initial (g) criterion, Mr Khan refers to his claims under the fifth ground of this appeal to argue that such an interpretation is contrary to Article 29 TEU and Article 215(2) TFEU and deprives that criterion of a legal basis.

38. The Council contends that the seventh ground of appeal should be rejected.

2. Assessment

39. Mr Khan argued before the General Court that the amended (g) criterion was unlawful because of a lack of legal basis, a breach of the principle of legal certainty and an infringement of the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business. This ground of appeal is directed against the part of the General Court’s analysis relating to the alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty.

40. Since Mr Khan criticises the General Court, in the context of this ground of appeal, for failing to take into account, with a view to interpreting the concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the first part of the amended (g) criterion, the change made to the wording of that criterion, this ground is directed solely against the General Court’s interpretation of the first part of the amended (g) criterion.

41. For the purposes of addressing this ground, it will be necessary, after recalling the scope of the initial (g) criterion, to analyse that first part in order to verify that the conclusion which the General Court reached in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal is correct.

(a) The concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion

42. As regards the initial (g) criterion, as established in Decision 2022/329 and Regulation 2023/1089, the following should be noted.

43. The initial (g) criterion was aimed at a single category of natural persons who had to satisfy two cumulative conditions. First, they had to be leading businesspersons. Second, those leading businesspersons had to be involved in one of the economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the government .

44. The Court recently ruled on the interpretation of that criterion in the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council .

45. Accordingly, having examined the various language versions, the Court held that the terms used to define the amended (g) criterion, by themselves and completely without context, do not imply a link with any sphere, such as the economic or the political sphere, or with any given persons or entities. ( 24 ) The term ‘leading’ must therefore be understood as referring to ‘the importance that must attach to the businessperson concerned in his or her sector of activity, irrespective of any links which that person may have, in addition, with [the Government of the Russian Federation]’. ( 25 ) Whilst the initial (g) criterion establishes a link with that government, this is required not of the leading businesspersons, but of the sector of activity in which they operate, since that sector must provide that government with a substantial source of revenue. ( 26 ) Consequently, the initial (g) criterion ‘involves demonstrating only that the businesspersons are of significant importance in an economic sector that is lucrative for the Government of the Russian Federation, irrespective of any links that those persons may have with that government and of whether they are actually important to it or actually able to influence it’. ( 27 )

46. It follows that, according to the Court, the concept of ‘influence’, for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion, relates to the economic sector in which those businesspersons operate and must therefore be understood ‘in the light of the economic context in which they operate, according to criteria such as their occupational status or their functions, the importance of their economic activity, the extent of their capital holdings or investments, their functions within the company in which they perform those functions or any other relevant economic criterion’. ( 28 )

47. Leading businesspersons, within the meaning of the initial (g) criterion, are therefore understood to be those who are of significant importance in economic sectors that are lucrative for the Government of the Russian Federation, that is to say likely to further, indirectly, the financing of destabilising actions in Ukraine in that they contribute to maintaining the profitability, or the prosperity, of those sectors. ( 29 )

48. Finally, influence is not limited solely to businesspersons who, as a result of their functions within a company or of the shares at their disposal, exercise actual and effective control over that company, since significant importance in the economic sector concerned can be established on the basis of objective factors other than that of control. ( 30 )

49. The Court ensured that such an interpretation was borne out by the objectives pursued, which consist in exerting additional pressure on the Russian Federation and increasing the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, with the aim of that Federation putting an end to its military aggression and, in general, its actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. ( 31 ) The Court held that, ‘by impeding the functioning of the economic sectors concerned, the imposition of restrictive measures in respect of [leading businesspersons], irrespective of any links that they may have with [the Government of the Russian Federation], is therefore capable of increasing the costs of those actions and of exerting pressure on that government to bring them to an end’. ( 32 )

(b) The literal, contextual, historical and teleological interpretation of the concept of ‘influence’ for the purposes of the first part of the amended (g) criterion

50. When interpreting a provision of EU law contained in an act imposing restrictive measures, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context, including its historical context, and the objectives of the legislation of which it forms part. ( 33 )

51. In the first place, it follows from the wording of the amended (g) criterion that a dual phenomenon arises, consisting, on the one hand, in a splitting of the initial (g) criterion (first and third parts) and, on the other hand, in an addition to that criterion (second part). Accordingly, unlike the initial (g) criterion, the first part of the amended (g) criterion no longer requires that leading businessperson operate in one of the economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the government. ( 34 )

52. Still from a literal perspective, the adjective ‘leading’ refers to ‘businesspersons’, that is to say, to persons who are active in business. ( 35 ) Influence therefore appears to be necessarily linked to the status of businessperson and to his or her importance in that field. Influence in relation to that status seems to me to be intrinsically linked to his or her economic success and power. ( 36 )

53. In the second place, that literal interpretation of the first part of the amended (g) criterion is confirmed by an analysis of the context. Accordingly, recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094 sheds light on the rationale behind the amended (g) criterion. It is apparent that the Council, in the exercise of its broad discretion, ( 37 ) found that there was a relationship of mutual interest and support between the Russian Government and leading businesspersons operating in Russia. According to the assessment made by the Council, the accumulation of wealth by those businesspersons cannot take place without the consent of the Russian Government, and their importance in the relevant economic sector is a manifestation of the interdependence between businesspersons and the Russian Government. This is precisely why the Council established the first part of the amended (g) criterion. ( 38 )

54. In the third place, the suggested interpretation is supported by a historical and teleological analysis of the (g) criterion.

55. The regimes of restrictive measures adopted in response to Russian abuses in Ukraine are characterised by a gradual increase in their intensity, based on their effectiveness, in order to exert maximum pressure on the Russian Federation by increasing the costs of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and the Council’s adoption of the initial (g) criterion illustrates that intensification. ( 39 )

56. By no longer requiring a link to an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, the broadening of the listing criterion introduced by the first part of the amended (g) criterion is consistent with that ongoing pursuit of maximum effectiveness of the restrictive measures, while the flagrant violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter constituted by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine persists.

(c) Conclusion of the analysis concerning the concept of ‘ influence ’ for the purposes of the amended (g) criterion

57. It follows from the foregoing that the arguments put forward by Mr Khan in the context of the seventh ground cannot be upheld.

58. My conclusion is that, although there has been an amendment to the wording of the (g) criterion, nothing in the wording, context or purpose of that amendment suggests that the Council intended to attribute to the term ‘leading’ a meaning different from that which it had previously attributed to the term in the context of the initial (g) criterion. Moreover, the appellant’s arguments do not support an alternative interpretation capable of justifying the existence of such a difference in meaning.

59. The first part of the amended (g) criterion concerns the influence of businesspersons from an economic perspective – since their economic success is based on the relationship of interdependence which they maintain with the Russian Government.

60. It follows that the concept of ‘influence’, for the purposes of both the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion, must necessarily be assessed in the light of the economic sector in which the businesspersons concerned operate, without, however, requiring that this sector be of particular economic importance to the Government of the Russian Federation, and must therefore be understood in the light of the economic context in which they operate, according to criteria such as those referred to in point 46 of the present Opinion.

61. Accordingly, and by analogy with what has been held with regard to the initial (g) criterion, it follows from the first part of the amended (g) criterion that the term ‘leading’ must be understood as referring to the importance which the businessperson concerned must have within his or her sector of activity, irrespective both of any links which that person may have with the Government of the Russian Federation and of the question whether the sector in which he or she is active provides a substantial source of revenue to that government.

62. The General Court therefore did not err in law when it held, in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, that the term ‘leading’ was to be interpreted in the same way in the context of the first part of the initial (g) criterion and in the context of the amended (g) criterion, since influence refers to the importance of businesspersons in the light of criteria such as their occupational status or their functions, the importance of their economic activity, the extent of their capital holdings or investments and their functions within the company in which they perform those functions. ( 40 )

63. In any event, even if an error of law were to be found in that regard, I doubt that Mr Khan could derive any benefit from it at the appeal stage. ( 41 )

(d) The complaint alleging a lack of legal basis for the amended (g) criterion

64. In the event that the Court should nevertheless address the arguments put forward in the alternative by Mr Khan, ( 42 ) I shall confine myself to noting the following.

65. The appellant seeks to challenge the General Court’s analysis of the complaint alleging a lack of legal basis for the amended (g) criterion, by referring to his claims under the fifth ground of appeal, which seeks, for its part, to challenge the analysis at first instance of the complaint alleging a lack of legal basis for the initial (g) criterion. ( 43 ) In essence, Mr Khan disputes that Article 215 TFEU, which lays down the conditions under which measures aimed at interrupting or reducing economic and financial relations with a third country may be adopted, can serve as a basis for the adoption of measures where there is not a sufficient link between the persons concerned and the third country targeted by those measures, and where natural persons may be targeted by such measures irrespective of their personal conduct. In support of his argument, he referred in particular to the judgment in Tay Za v Council . ( 44 )

66. I note that, in doing so, Mr Khan raises the same criticism as that put forward before the Court regarding the legality of the initial (g) criterion in the context of Case C‑111/24 P. ( 45 )

67. It is clear, in essence, from the judgment delivered by the Court in that case ( 46 ) that, as regards the measures which it permits to be adopted, Article 215(2) TFEU requires that there be an objective link between the persons subject to restrictive measures and the third country concerned, in order for those measures to be regarded as capable of achieving, in a way that is not manifestly inappropriate, the objective of bringing pressure to bear that the European Union is seeking to achieve with respect to that country. ( 47 )

68. By contrast, the wording of the second sentence of paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, according to which ‘Article 215(2) TFEU empowers the Council to adopt, by means of an act provided for in Article 288 TFEU, restrictive measures against any “natural or legal person”, “non-State entity” or “group” whatsoever on the sole condition that a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty provides for such measures’, ( 48 ) is not entirely free from ambiguity, since it suggests that no link is required.

69. Although, with regard to an equivalent form of words, the Court held that the General Court had ‘essentially recalled, correctly, that the adoption of such restrictive measures is only possible if there is a decision taken under Article 29 TEU’, ( 49 ) this was subject to subsequent review by the Court that the General Court had ruled on the existence of a link .

70. The Court recalled that the General Court had pointed out that, ‘as regards the [initial] (g) criterion, there was at the very least an indirect link between the businesspersons covered by that criterion and the third country concerned, … since that criterion is directed at, inter alia, a category of natural persons involved in certain economic sectors that constitute, for the Government of the Russian Federation, a substantial source of revenue enabling it to pursue its policy of destabilisation and aggression in respect of Ukraine’. ( 50 )

71. However, the General Court’s reasoning in the judgment under appeal appears to lack not only any reference to the requisite objective or, at the very least, indirect link between the restrictive measures and the country concerned, but also any determination as to whether such a link exists in the present case.

72. That omission constitutes, in my view, an error of law.

73. Since that error of law affects the part of the General Court’s reasoning relating to the examination of the legality of the initial (g) criterion, it therefore indirectly affects the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal regarding the claim that the amended (g) criterion lacks a legal basis, since that paragraph referred to that part of the reasoning.

74. However, it is settled case-law that if the grounds of a decision of the General Court reveal an infringement of EU law but the operative part of that decision can be seen to be well founded on other legal grounds, that infringement is not capable of leading to the setting aside of that decision and a substitution of grounds must be made. ( 51 ) It is therefore important to verify that the rejection of the plea alleging a lack of a legal basis for the initial (g) criterion is well-founded on legal grounds other than those vitiated by the error I have just identified, in order to ensure that the rejection of the complaint alleging a lack of a legal basis for the amended (g) criterion could have been based on other legal grounds.

75. In that regard, once again, the issue is to be found in the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council , since, in that judgment, the Court held that it was apparent from the initial (g) criterion that the Council had formulated a criterion aimed at persons having an objective link with the third country concerned ( 52 ) and that, mutatis mutandis , such a conclusion applies to the amended (g) criterion in respect of which Mr Khan relies on the same arguments. ( 53 )

76. In those circumstances, notwithstanding the error of law identified in point 71 of the present Opinion, it has no bearing on the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal as regards the initial (g) criterion. It therefore also has no bearing on the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, this time concerning the claim that the amended (g) criterion lacks a legal basis because of an insufficient link between the persons concerned and the third country in question.

B. The sixth ground of appeal, alleging a breach of the duty to state reasons, a distortion of the evidence and an infringement of the initial (g) criterion in that the General Court held that the allegation that Mr Khan was active in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation had been sufficiently established

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

77. The appellant refers to the Court’s settled case-law, according to which it is for the Council to adduce evidence that the listed person satisfies the criterion on the basis of which the listing was made and according to which the Council may not rely on a presumption unless this is provided for by the relevant legislation.

78. With regard to the listing under the initial (g) criterion, Mr Khan submits that the Council was required to demonstrate that he was active in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. The concept of ‘substantial revenue’ is, he argues, a relative concept requiring an analysis of the sources of the Russian Government’s budget.

79. However, in paragraphs 189 and 190 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court merely relied, on the one hand, on the assertion that Alfa Bank was among the twenty-four largest taxpayers in Russia in 2020 and, on the other hand, on the assertion that the annual revenue of the banking sector in Russia in 2021 reached 2.3 trillion Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 25.8 billion euros).

80. According to the appellant, that evidence is insufficient. Mr Khan claims that the fact that an undertaking is a major taxpayer in Russia does not allow any relevant conclusion to be drawn as to whether the initial (g) criterion was satisfied, since it cannot be concluded from this that the sector of activity, generally speaking, provides substantial revenue to the Russian Government. The initial (g) criterion requires evidence that an economic sector constitutes a substantial source of revenue to that government. ( 54 ) It is also necessary to link that revenue to the Russian Government’s fiscal policy, which the General Court failed to do, even though the appellant had argued before it that the Russian Government derived negligible revenue from the direct and indirect taxes generated by the Russian banking sector. ( 55 ) This therefore affects the reasoning of the judgment. Mr Khan criticises the General Court for failing to verify that the alleged revenue generated by the Russian banking sector constituted a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. Finally, even if the revenue from the Russian banking sector were relevant for the purposes of establishing that the conditions laid down by the initial (g) criterion were met, Mr Khan criticises the General Court for relying on outdated evidence to justify the 2023 listing.

81. The Council contends that this sixth ground of appeal should be rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.

2. Assessment

82. The part of the judgment under appeal to which this sixth ground of appeal relates is that which deals with the General Court’s examination of the merits of the restrictive measures targeting Mr Khan adopted on the basis of the initial (g) criterion. More specifically, Mr Khan argued, in relation to the March 2023 acts, that the Council had not established that the banking sector provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. ( 56 )

83. For its part, the General Court held that it was apparent from the grounds of the March 2023 acts that Mr Khan was active in the banking sector, by virtue of his status as a shareholder in the Alfa Group conglomerate, which includes, inter alia, Alfa Bank. ( 57 ) Referring to paragraphs 106 to 108 of its judgment in Khan v Council , ( 58 ) the General Court found that that sector provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. It also recalled that it had previously found that Alfa Bank was one of Russia’s largest taxpayers. ( 59 ) The General Court next considered that the importance of the banking sector in Russia was demonstrated by Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file, which set out that sector’s annual revenue from 2014 to 2021 and from which it was apparent that that revenue reached 2.3 trillion RUB in 2021 (approximately 25.8 billion euros). ( 60 ) In the light of that evidence, the General Court therefore concluded that the Council had provided, in accordance with the requirements of the Court’s case-law, ( 61 ) a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence capable of substantiating the fact that Mr Khan was, at the time of the March 2023 acts, a leading businessperson operating in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion. ( 62 )

(a) The admissibility of the sixth ground of appeal in general and of the complaint alleging a distortion in particular

84. First, as regards the admissibility of the sixth ground, I consider, contrary to the Council’s submissions, that Mr Khan is not seeking to obtain, before the Court, a new assessment of the facts, which traditionally falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Court. ( 63 ) The line of argument put forward by the appellant in the sixth ground invites the Court to review the legal characterisation of the facts inter alia referred to in the grounds of the 2023 acts, in order to determine whether the condition relating to an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion, was satisfied. That line of argument seeks, in essence, to maintain that the General Court should not have accepted that the Council could rely on Alfa Bank’s status as Russia’s largest taxpayer, combined with data on the annual revenue generated by the banking sector, to establish that Mr Khan was active in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion. Consequently, this sixth ground of appeal appears to be admissible.

85. Second, as regards the complaint alleging a distortion of the evidence, I note that the only reference to such a distortion is to be found in the heading of the sixth ground of appeal, without Mr Khan providing any specific submissions in that regard. However, the settled case-law of the Court requires that, where an appellant alleges that the General Court distorted facts or evidence, that person must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led the General Court to that distortion. ( 64 ) As Mr Khan has failed to meet that standard, the complaint alleging a distortion of the evidence appears to be inadmissible.

(b) Substance

(1) The classification of Alfa Bank as the largest Russian taxpayer and the condition relating to an ‘economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion

86. In essence, Mr Khan criticises the General Court for having relied on Alfa Bank’s status as the largest Russian taxpayer in order to find that the condition relating to an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, as required by the initial (g) criterion, was satisfied.

87. It is not disputed that the relevant sector for Mr Khan is the banking sector. Moreover, it can be inferred from the grounds of the March 2023 acts ( 65 ) that it was in his capacity as a former shareholder of the Alfa Group conglomerate, which includes Alfa Bank, that Mr Khan was subject to restrictive measures under the initial (g) criterion. The grounds refer to the fact that Alfa Bank is ‘one of Russia’s largest taxpayers’.

88. Mr Khan argues that the fact that Alfa Bank is one of Russia’s largest taxpayers does not mean that the banking sector itself can be regarded as an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

89. It must nevertheless be noted that the Court recently held that ‘it is possible to find, in certain circumstances, that an economic sector in a State constitutes a substantial source of revenue for its government, provided that there is a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence demonstrating that one of the most important companies in that sector , on its own, provides substantial revenue to that government’. ( 66 )

90. Accordingly, although it follows from the wording of the initial (g) criterion that, in principle, it is the economic sector, rather than a natural person or an undertaking in particular, which must constitute a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, ( 67 ) the Council is permitted, in certain circumstances, to focus on the substantial revenue provided to the Russian Government by a single company among the most important in that sector.

91. Accordingly, it was for the General Court to satisfy itself that the Council had substantiated Mr Khan’s listing by relying on a concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence establishing that Alfa Bank provided, on its own, substantial revenue to the Russian Government, so that it could be found that, as an indirect result, the economic sector in which Mr Khan operates provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government and, consequently, that the second cumulative condition of the initial (g) criterion was satisfied. ( 68 )

92. Contrary to Mr Khan’s arguments, such a body of evidence does not require the Council to demonstrate, by means of accounting evidence, the substantial nature of the revenue provided by Alfa Bank in particular, or by the banking sector in general, to the Russian Government.

93. In any event, I would point out that it follows from paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court, having noted that Alfa Bank is one of Russia’s largest private commercial and merchant banks, ( 69 ) relied, in order to establish the substantial nature of the revenue provided by Alfa Bank to that government, on the characterisation of that bank as ‘one of Russia’s largest taxpayers’, as substantiated by Exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file. Mr Khan does not dispute that characterisation.

94. It is clear from that exhibit, which the General Court must have examined, ( 70 ) that it is the Russian tax authorities themselves which confer that status on certain Russian taxable persons that fulfil the conditions and criteria which it itself determines. ( 71 ) That status therefore appears to be reserved for undertakings whose annual revenue is between 10 and 35 billion RUB (that is, between approximately 112 and 394 million euros). Alfa Bank is identified in that exhibit as being, in 2020, one of Russia’s largest taxpayers, that is to say, one of the undertakings which made the largest tax contribution to the budget of the State during the year in question. ( 72 ) Alfa Bank’s appreciable contribution ( 73 ) to the Russian budget, whilst not quantified, is nevertheless expressly referred to therein.

95. However, for the purposes of classifying a source of revenue as ‘substantial’, the Court has already held that that concept covers all the revenue generated by the economic sector concerned, which means that it is necessary to take into account, inter alia, the taxes paid by the companies operating in that sector. ( 74 ) As Russia’s largest private commercial and merchant banking institution, Alfa Bank had a leading position within the banking sector. Moreover, that sector of activity, traditionally described as the cornerstone of any national economy, is particularly strategic given that, as the saying goes, ‘money is the sinews of war’.

96. It follows from all of the foregoing that the General Court did not err in law in finding that the Council had provided a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that the sector in which Mr Khan was active provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

(2) The claim of an infringement of the General Court’s duty to state reasons

97. Mr Khan next criticises the General Court for failing to address his arguments concerning the tax rates applicable to the banking sector, to which Alfa Bank belongs, which he claims are derisory.

98. Apart from the fact that the appellant’s line of argument is once again based on an overly restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘revenue’ within the meaning of the initial (g) criterion, ( 75 ) the following must be noted.

99. It is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning, since the General Court’s duty to state reasons under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may be implicit, but it must always enable the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provide the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review on appeal. ( 76 )

100. It is clear from paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal that the link established by the General Court between Mr Khan and the substantial revenue provided to the Russian Government was based on Alfa Bank’s particular situation, as recognised by the Russian tax authorities themselves, as illustrated by Exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file. The General Court was required to verify that the economic sector in which Mr Khan operates constitutes a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, which it did by relying on Alfa Bank’s status as one of Russia’s largest taxpayers, a status which, by its nature, contradicted Mr Khan’s argument.

101. It must therefore be found that Mr Khan was in a position to know why the General Court did not uphold his arguments. The complaint alleging that the General Court breached its duty to state reasons must be rejected.

(3) The substantial nature of the revenue provided to the Government of the Russian Federation by the banking sector

102. The present complaint is directed against paragraph 190 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court examined whether the banking sector in Russia could be regarded as providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

103. Since I propose that the Court ( 77 ) should rule that the General Court’s reasoning in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal is free from any error of law and that the second cumulative condition of the initial (g) criterion could therefore be regarded as having been satisfied, in the light of Alfa Bank’s role and position within the Russian banking sector, as illustrated by its status as a large Russian taxpayer, paragraph 190 of the judgment under appeal appears to contain reasoning which is put forward solely for the sake of completeness. I shall therefore examine the present complaint only in the alternative.

104. Accordingly, as regards Mr Khan’s argument that the fact that a sector generates revenues does not make it possible to establish that that sector provides a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, since this would depend on the tax policy of that government, I note, first, that Mr Khan does not dispute that those revenues generate tax and, second, that the Court has held that ‘although it is true that whether or not a quantity is substantial can be ascertained in relative terms, that is to say, in relation to a reference quantity, that characteristic can also be ascertained in absolute terms. That is so of the revenue provided to a State’s government by a sector of its economy. An economic sector can be considered to provide a substantial amount of revenue to such a government, irrespective of what percentage such revenue represents of that government’s overall revenue’. ( 78 )

105. Moreover, I would point out that the concept of ‘revenue’, within the meaning of the second cumulative condition of the initial (g) criterion, encompasses all the financial resources that the economic sector concerned provides to the Government of the Russian Federation. ( 79 )

106. However, since the General Court established, when examining Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file, that the annual revenue of the Russian banking sector amounted to more than RUB 2.3 trillion (approximately EUR 25.8 billion) in 2021, it implicitly but necessarily established a correlation between that annual revenue and the revenue arising from it for the Russian Government, in order reasonably to conclude that that sector provided a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation without being required to link that annual revenue to the Government’s overall revenues.

107. The present complaint, if it were to be examined, should therefore be rejected.

(4) The complaint alleging that the data relating to the banking sector’s annual revenue are outdated

108. Mr Khan submits, in essence, that the General Court failed in its obligation to ensure that the restrictive measures targeting him were founded on a sufficiently sound factual basis, by basing its analysis on old, and therefore outdated, data contained in Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file. ( 80 )

109. I note that, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not rule on whether that exhibit was temporally relevant in substantiating that the sector in which Mr Khan was active provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government for the purposes of the second cumulative condition of the initial (g) criterion.

110. That silence is explained by the fact that Mr Khan does not appear to have raised this complaint before the General Court. ( 81 )

111. However, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court. ( 82 )

112. The present complaint therefore appears to be inadmissible.

113. It seems to me that it may be regarded as such on yet another ground.

114. As the Council states, provided that the evidence examined by the General Court was properly obtained, the rules and general principles of law in relation to the burden of proof were observed, and the procedural rules in relation to the taking of evidence were observed, the Court does not, in principle, have jurisdiction to review the evidence relied on by the General Court in support of the facts it has found, since it is exclusively for the General Court to assess the value of that evidence. ( 83 )

115. However, Mr Khan’s arguments do not identify any rule or principle of that nature which the General Court might have disregarded when examining Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file.

116. Finally, as already stated, Mr Khan has made no attempt to substantiate the alleged distortion which he relied on. ( 84 )

117. I therefore propose that the Court should declare inadmissible the complaint alleging that the data on the annual revenue of the banking sector are outdated, as illustrated by Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file.

118. In any event, should the Court proceed with the examination of Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file, the following should be noted.

119. That exhibit, ( 85 ) taken from a website, appears to have been published in May 2022 and consulted by the Council in November of the same year to support Mr Khan’s listing in the March 2023 acts. It consists of a statistical table illustrating trends in the annual revenue of the banking sector in Russia, after tax, from 2014 to 2021.

120. It is correct to note that the most recent data in that table relate to the year 2021.

121. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that ‘the Council [may] take into account, when assessing whether a person satisfies a listing criterion … information or evidence relating to circumstances predating the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence substantiates the grounds supporting that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and taking into account all relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue …. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation.’ ( 86 )

122. Therefore, as I have already had occasion to point out in other circumstances, the sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence that makes it possible to establish that there is an adequate link between the person subject to a measure freezing his or her funds and the regime being combated on which the Council may rely can, of course, be based on historic evidence predating the adoption of the listing acts provided that, in any event, continuity between that evidence and the situation at the time of inclusion is also established. ( 87 )

123. It was therefore for the General Court to ensure continuity between the facts deemed to be substantiated by Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file and Mr Khan’s situation in March 2023.

124. That said, it is important to recall that the examination of that exhibit was carried out by the General Court in a section of its reasoning relating to verification of the second cumulative condition of the initial (g) criterion. The Council was therefore required to establish that the banking sector provided a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. As regards the contribution of an entire sector to the national economy, understood in a broad sense, it is possible to consider that evidence relating to it falls within a different, longer, timeframe than that which relates more directly to the listed person him or herself.

125. In any event, since the website in question was accessed in 2022, data concerning the annual revenue of the Russian banking sector for the 2022 financial year were not available, since the year 2022 had not yet ended. It therefore follows from Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file that the Council relied on the most recent relevant figures available to substantiate the economic strength of that sector and to infer its substantial contribution to the revenue of the Russian Government in the March 2023 acts. I would add that 2022 was marked, as everyone is aware, by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the profound upheaval in the international order which followed, with the result that the figures for 2022 are not necessarily the most representative of the actual importance of the Russian banking sector during that turbulent period.

126. The present complaint should therefore be rejected as unfounded.

C. The tenth ground of appeal, alleging a breach of the duty to state reasons and an error of law based on an infringement of the amended (g) criterion

1. Summary of the arguments of the parties

127. In essence, Mr Khan submits that it was for the General Court to ensure that the Council had adduced evidence, at the time of the renewals in September 2023, March 2024 and September 2024, that he remained a leading businessperson for the purposes of the amended (g) criterion. The allegation that Mr Khan managed companies in Russia was based on evidence dating from 2022 and Mr Khan maintains that the Council failed to adduce evidence establishing that that allegation continued to be valid at the time of the aforementioned renewals.

128. As regards the renewal of September 2023, the General Court appears to have based its reasoning on Mr Khan’s participation in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, from which the General Court inferred that the appellant was linked to Alfa Group, without ensuring that the ground relating to his continued management of Russia-based assets had been established. Even if the General Court considered that participation to be sufficient to establish that that ground was well founded, Mr Khan argues that, on the one hand, the General Court thereby substituted its own reasoning for that of the Council and, on the other hand, it therefore misinterpreted the amended (g) criterion by construing it as applying not only to businesspersons but to any person who had maintained links with companies in Russia.

129. As regards the renewals of March 2024 and September 2024, Mr Khan argues that the General Court failed to verify that the allegation that he continued to manage assets was established.

130. The Council contends that the tenth ground of appeal is inadmissible. In the alternative, the Council submits that this ground is unfounded.

2. Overview of the changes in the grounds relating to Mr Khan and of the legal regime governing the maintaining acts

131. As regards the September 2023 acts, I would point out that they were the first acts based on the amended (g) criterion adopted against Mr Khan.

132. The grounds of those acts reproduce, in essence, those of the March 2023 acts and, in particular, the fact that Mr Khan continued to manage the Russia-based assets of two companies (ABH Financial Limited and LetterOne) referred to in the first paragraph of those grounds. ( 88 ) The grounds also state that Mr Khan had participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023.

133. As the General Court noted, ( 89 ) the grounds of the March 2024 acts are identical to those of the September 2023 acts.

134. As regards the September 2024 acts, they reproduce the substance of the grounds of the September 2023 and March 2024 acts, including the reference to Mr Khan’s participation in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023. References are added to the fact that the transfer of Mr Khan’s shares in ABH Holdings to his business partner was declared by the National Bank of Ukraine to be null and void and that the transfer of his shares in A1 group could be considered fictitious. The grounds of the September 2024 acts also refer to the fact that Mr Khan was a shareholder of the LetterOne investment firm, that he continued to manage Alfa Group’s Russia-based assets and that he has a significant shareholding in Rosvodokanal, described as an Alfa Group company and one of the leading private operators of water utilities in Russia.

135. As regards the maintaining acts, it is worth recalling the Council’s obligations with a view to and at the time of their adoption.

136. Accordingly, the maintenance of measures is always preceded by an administrative phase allowing the person concerned to put forward his or her views on the Council’s intentions and, where applicable, on any new grounds – or even criteria – supporting maintenance. Where the grounds remain unchanged, those acts require an assessment of whether, since the initial listing or since the previous review, the factual situation has changed in such a way that it is no longer possible to draw the same conclusion as to whether the person concerned continues to meet the criterion on which his or her listing was based. ( 90 ) The validity of maintaining acts thus always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their aims. ( 91 ) Where new grounds are added, the assessment of their validity must be carried out by examining, in an entirely conventional manner, the evidence and information provided by the Council, which discharges the burden of proof incumbent upon it, provided that it presents a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person concerned and the situations being combated. ( 92 ) Such a link arises, in principle, from the fact that the person concerned meets the conditions defined by the listing criterion, provided that the legality of that criterion is not called into question.

137. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the Council may take into account, when assessing whether a person satisfies a listing criterion, information or evidence relating to circumstances predating the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence substantiates the grounds supporting that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and taking into account all relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue. ( 93 ) In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation. ( 94 )

138. It is in the light of those requirements laid down by case-law that Mr Khan’s arguments must now be examined.

3. Assessment

(a) The September 2023 acts and the complaint that the statement of reasons for the judgment under appeal was insufficient as regards the question whether the Council had adduced evidence that Mr Khan continued to manage the assets of two companies based in Russia

139. In paragraph 205 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined the plea alleging Mr Khan’s participation in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in 2023, as substantiated by Exhibit No 7 in the third evidence file. That exhibit, which listed the participants at that congress, established, in the General Court’s view, the continued existence of the link between Mr Khan and Alfa Group even after he had sold his shareholdings in ABH Financial Limited and ‘support[ed] his status as a leading businessperson for the purposes of the first part of the amended (g) criterion’. ( 95 )

140. Mr Khan contends that the fact that an exhibit may substantiate the link between Alfa Group and him does not substantiate the allegation that he continues to manage the assets of ABH Financial Limited and LetterOne. ( 96 ) In other words, the starting point of his line of argument is a challenge to the General Court’s factual assessment, from which it seems to follow that the General Court inferred from a fact described in an item of evidence another fact contained in the statement of reasons.

141. That said, it seems to me that, under the guise of a complaint alleging a breach of the duty to state reasons, Mr Khan is, in actual fact, raising the question whether the General Court correctly carried out the review it was required to undertake when maintaining acts are adopted.

142. Accordingly, the appellant’s arguments put forward in the context of this tenth ground of appeal are open to two different interpretations.

143. On the one hand, it is possible to address those arguments by examining them solely from the perspective of whether the judgment under appeal was sufficiently reasoned with regard to the question whether the Council had established that Mr Khan was a leading businessperson, for the purposes of the amended (g) criterion, when the September 2023 acts were adopted.

144. On the other hand, it is also possible to adopt a somewhat fuller reading of this ground of appeal, since it could be considered that the appellant is, in actual fact, criticising the General Court for failing to ensure that the ground alleging his continued management of the Russia-based assets of two companies was substantiated.

145. It seems to me that, whichever approach is taken in addressing the present complaint, it should be rejected.

(1) The claim of a breach of the duty to state reasons in the strict sense

146. The admissibility of such a claim does not raise any difficulties. ( 97 )

147. As regards the examination of the substance of that claim, I consider that, even if the assessment carried out by the General Court in paragraph 205 of the judgment under appeal is, from a factual point of view, erroneous in that it inferred from one item of evidence that another fact to which it does not relate was substantiated, it does not, in itself, constitute a breach of the duty to state reasons.

148. In that regard, I would point out that the case-law ( 98 ) requires that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning and it must always enable the persons concerned to know why the General Court has not upheld their arguments and provide the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review on appeal. ( 99 )

149. Mr Khan was in a position to understand the reasons why the General Court found that the September 2023 acts were sufficiently substantiated.

150. It is apparent from paragraphs 204 to 206 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court considered that the fact, supported by the evidence referred to in paragraph 205 of that judgment, that Mr Khan participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023 ‘confirms the continuity of his links with the Alfa Group Consortium … and supports his status as a leading businessperson’ and that he maintained links with Alfa Group in Russia even after the alleged sale of his shareholdings in ABH Financial Limited. The General Court also based its position on a reference to the conclusion drawn from the examination of the March 2023 acts to the effect that the Council had provided a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to demonstrate that the appellant was, at the time of the March 2023 acts, a leading businessperson, for the purposes of the initial (g) criterion. It also set out the reasons why it considered that there was a certain degree of continuity with the amended (g) criterion. ( 100 )

151. In those circumstances, the judgment under appeal appears to be sufficiently reasoned, it being understood that the issue of the sufficiency of the statement of reasons is to be distinguished from the issue of whether it is well founded.

(2) A fuller reading of the claim that the judgment under appeal is insufficiently reasoned

152. If the Court were to carry out a fuller reading of the present complaint, it would have to ask whether, as regards the September 2023 acts, the General Court had ensured, to the requisite legal standard, that Mr Khan continued to meet the conditions for inclusion under the amended (g) criterion.

153. To do so, it is necessary to return to the March 2023 acts.

154. It is apparent from the analysis of the merits of Mr Khan’s listing under the initial (g) criterion that the General Court examined whether the grounds of the March 2023 acts were such as to establish that Mr Khan met the criterion on the basis of which he had been listed. Noting that the Council intended to rely on past functions or activities, the General Court, applying the case-law referred to in point 137 of this Opinion, verified whether the Council had put forward solid and consistent evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that Mr Khan had maintained links with those companies even after the alleged transfer of his shareholdings. ( 101 ) The General Court stated that the ground based on the fact that Mr Khan continued to manage the assets ‘forms part of a context of continuity in relation to his status as a shareholder in those companies and is intended to demonstrate that his status as a leading businessperson persists, in that he has maintained links with those companies’. ( 102 )

155. In paragraph 178 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined four exhibits which support those allegations and date from September 2022 and November 2022, consisting of newspaper articles published online or extracts from websites. Those exhibits indicate that Mr Khan returned to live in Russia and manages the assets of Alfa Group. Having examined those exhibits, the General Court held that ‘the fact that several credible sources reproduce that information according to which the appellant manages or supervises the assets of Alfa Group demonstrates that he remained involved with the Alfa Group Consortium in Russia even after the alleged sale of his shares, by managing that group’s assets in Russia’. ( 103 ) It concluded from this that the Council had put forward solid and consistent evidence supporting the finding that Mr Khan had maintained links with Alfa Group on the basis of his management of that group’s assets. ( 104 )

156. Mr Khan does not appear to contest that finding. ( 105 )

157. Since, in the assessment of the merits of the March 2023 acts, the General Court had ruled that the reference in the reasoning to the fact that Mr Khan continued to manage assets in Russia was intended to establish that he had maintained links with Alfa Group, it verified that that link persisted as regards the grounds of the September 2023 acts, the assessment of the validity of which is consistent with the assessment set out in point 154 of the present Opinion. The General Court considered that those links were maintained on the basis of the new exhibit examined in paragraph 205 of the judgment under appeal, which relates, as previously noted, to Mr Khan’s participation in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023.

158. Accordingly, I consider that the General Court ensured, as it was required to do, ( 106 ) that the factual and legal circumstances which led to Mr Khan’s listing continued to apply.

159. Mr Khan’s arguments therefore cannot be upheld.

(b) The March 2024 acts and the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal, in that the General Court failed to ensure that the ground that Mr Khan continued to manage assets in Russia was supported by evidence

(1) Admissibility

160. Mr Khan criticises the General Court for not ensuring that the factual and legal circumstances which led to the maintenance of the measures adopted against him continued to apply, since such an omission, in his view, constitutes a breach of the duty to state reasons. Such a criticism falls within the Court’s jurisdiction at the appeal stage, ( 107 ) with the result that the present complaint appears to be admissible.

(2) Substance

161. The General Court examined the merits of the March 2024 acts in conjunction with the merits of the September 2023 acts. It found that, ‘as the grounds for maintaining the [appellant’s] name on the lists at issue remained unchanged, there is no need to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the September 2023 acts and, on the other hand, the March 2024 acts, since the verification of the information alleged in the statement of reasons and in the evidence … relates, in essence, to the same factual circumstances’. ( 108 )

162. The judgment under appeal formally set out the reasons why the General Court was going to conduct a joint examination of the September 2023 and March 2024 acts. Since the issue of the merits of the reasoning is distinct from that of its existence or sufficiency, that finding appears sufficient for the purpose of rejecting the present complaint.

163. However, here again, it is possible to interpret Mr Khan’s arguments as criticising the General Court for failing to ensure the validity of the maintenance of the listing provided for in the March 2024 acts in light of the fact that the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continued to apply. ( 109 )

164. In that regard, in the light of the temporal proximity between the September 2023 acts and the March 2024 acts, I am of the view that the same conclusions drawn from the analysis of the facts and evidence for the September 2023 acts could apply to the March 2024 acts, it being understood that Mr Khan had the opportunity to express his views prior to the adoption of the March 2024 acts ( 110 ) and was therefore able to put forward any relevant changes in his circumstances which might call into question his continued listing. I note, in that regard, that although, in his arguments concerning the present complaint, Mr Khan disputes that he manages companies in Russia, he has not demonstrated that he no longer has any links with them.

165. The present complaint must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

(c) The September 2024 acts and the complaint alleging a failure to state reasons in that the General Court failed to verify that the ground that Mr Khan continued to manage Alfa Group’s assets was supported by evidence

(1) Admissibility

166. Mr Khan essentially criticises the General Court for failing to ensure, as it was required to do, that his continued inclusion in the September 2024 acts, on the basis of the first part of the amended (g) criterion, was founded on a sufficiently up-to-date and sound factual basis. More specifically, by failing to verify whether he could still be regarded as managing Alfa Group’s assets in Russia on the date of those acts, the General Court breached its duty to state reasons. Consequently, the present complaint appears to be admissible.

(2) Substance

167. Although it is admissible, I do not consider that the Court will need to address the substance of the present complaint, since the arguments put forward by Mr Khan concerning the September 2024 acts appear to be ineffective.

168. Mr Khan criticises the General Court for having failed to verify that the Council had adduced evidence that he continued to manage Alfa Group’s Russia-based assets when the September 2024 acts were adopted.

169. However, even if the General Court failed to do so, it must be noted that it did verify whether other grounds referred to in the September 2024 acts were sufficiently substantiated to support the continued listing of Mr Khan on the basis of the amended (g) criterion on that date.

170. It is apparent from paragraph 217 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court examined, ‘in the first place’, the allegation that Mr Khan continued to manage Alfa Group’s assets.

171. It follows that the General Court examined, ‘in the second place’, the allegation that Mr Khan had a significant shareholding in Rosvodokanal and assessed whether that part of the grounds of the September 2024 acts, which the General Court considered to relate to the first part of the amended (g) criterion, was sufficiently substantiated. ( 111 )

172. Having noted that it was apparent from the seventh evidence file that Mr Khan held a 27.58% stake in that company, which is the largest private operator of water treatment and supply systems in Russia, the importance and economic dynamism of which were also supported by the evidence in that file, the General Court found that the Council had provided ‘a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence to demonstrate that the [appellant] was, at the time of the September 2024 acts, a leading businessperson operating in Russia for the purposes of the first part of the amended (g) criterion’. ( 112 )

173. Mr Khan does not dispute that finding at the appeal stage.

174. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that, in respect of the review of the lawfulness of an EU decision adopting restrictive measures, having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself a sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of some of the other reasons mentioned cannot justify the annulment of that decision. ( 113 )

175. Consequently, since the General Court held that the September 2024 acts established to the requisite legal standard that Mr Khan satisfied the two conditions required by the first part of the amended (g) criterion, ( 114 ) so far as concerns the ground based on his status as a significant shareholder of Rosvodokanal, Mr Khan would derive no benefit if the Court were to find that the General Court failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons when examining the ground alleging that the appellant continued to manage Alfa Group’s Russia-based assets.

176. Since the complaint alleging an infringement by the General Court of the duty to state reasons in its examination of that ground is directed against grounds included in the judgment under appeal purely for the sake of completeness, it cannot lead to that judgment being set aside and must therefore be ruled to be ineffective. ( 115 )

4. Conclusion on the tenth ground of appeal

177. Following the analysis I have just carried out, the tenth ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.

IV. Conclusion

178. Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court reject the sixth, seventh and tenth grounds of the present appeal.

1 Original language: French.

2 Judgment of 26 March 2026 (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, ‘the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council ’, EU:C:2026:245).

3 Judgment of 4 June 2025, Khan v Council (T‑289/23, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2025:560).

4 See point 5 of this Opinion for references to the acts so identified.

5 For references to the acts on which Mr Khan’s listing under the amended (g) criterion was based (namely the September 2023, March 2024 and September 2024 acts), see point 5 of this Opinion.

6 See point 10 of this Opinion.

7 Council Decision of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134).

8 Council Implementing Regulation of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1).

9 Council Decision of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104).

10 Council Implementing Regulation of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3).

11 Council Decision of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/847).

12 Council Implementing Regulation of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/849).

13 Council Decision of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2456).

14 Council Implementing Regulation of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2024/2455).

15 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council .

16 Council Decision of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).

17 Council Decision of 25 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1).

18 What will be referred to for the remainder of the analysis as ‘the initial (g) criterion’ was worded as follows:

‘All funds and economic resources belonging to …:

…

(g) leading businesspersons or legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine … shall be frozen’.

19 Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 1) amended Regulation No 269/2014 in a similar manner. For the remainder of the analysis, I shall therefore refer to ‘the amended (g) criterion’.

20 Concerning the division of the amended (g) criterion into three distinct parts, see point 31 of the present Opinion.

21 Since this ground is introduced by the coordinating conjunction ‘or’.

22 Although the interpretation of this third part is not at issue in the present reference, I question its added value. Interpreted literally, the absence of the adjective ‘leading’ would suggest that this third part must be read as meaning that all businesspersons operating in Russia in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government may be subject to restrictive measures. If, on the other hand, that third part were to be read in the light of recital 4 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 146, p. 20), from which it is apparent that it is, in actual fact, aimed at leading businesspersons operating in Russia in a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, it would appear superfluous, since that category is already covered by the broad terms of the first part.

23 Mr Khan refers here to the judgment of 10 July 2024, Rashevsky v Council (T‑309/22 and T‑739/22, EU:T:2024:455, paragraph 82).

24 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraphs 173 and 174).

25 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 175).

26 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 176).

27 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 177).

28 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 178).

29 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 181).

30 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 184).

31 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 179).

32 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 180).

33 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

34 It is only in the context of the third part of the amended (g) criterion that a link is required between the businessperson – who is no longer expressly required to be leading – and a sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government.

35 As already noted by Advocate General Medina (see her Opinion in Pumpyanskiy v Council (C‑696/23 P, EU:C:2025:409, point 31).

36 To that effect, see the Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Pumpyanskiy v Council (C‑696/23 P, EU:C:2025:409, point 32).

37 As traditionally recognised by the Court: see judgment of 18 June 2026, Belaruskali and Others v Council (C‑816/24 P to C‑818/24 P, EU:C:2026:509, paragraphs 158 and 159 and the case-law cited).

38 Accordingly, ‘the Council considers, in view of this relationship of interdependence between leading businesspersons and the Government of the Russian Federation, that the designation criteria should cover leading businesspersons operating in any economic sector of Russia’ (see recital 4 of Decision 2023/1094).

39 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraphs 117 to 121).

40 The Court added to that list any other economic criterion: see the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 178).

41 I would recall that the part of the judgment challenged in the context of this ground of appeal concerns the General Court’s analysis of the alleged unlawfulness of the amended (g) criterion on the ground of a breach of the principle of legal certainty. Mr Khan’s entire line of argument seeks to demonstrate an error in the interpretation of the first part of the amended (g) criterion. However, even if the first part of the amended (g) criterion were to be interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court, it would not necessarily follow that the first part of the amended (g) criterion would fail to meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty as set out by the Court in its judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 188 and the case-law cited), since there cannot be a breach of the principle of legal certainty on the sole ground that the Courts of the European Union have to use methods of interpretation other than a purely literal interpretation in order to shed light on the meaning of a provision of general application (see, to that effect, the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 189)).

42 See point 37 of this Opinion.

43 See paragraphs 66 to 72 of the judgment under appeal.

44 Judgment of 13 March 2012 (C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138).

45 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 265 et seq.).

46 That is to say, the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council .

47 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraphs 273 and 274).

48 Emphasis added.

49 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council ( paragraph 275 ).

50 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 276). Emphasis added.

51 See, inter alia, judgments of 3 July 2025, Glonatech v REA (C‑114/24 P, EU:C:2025:520, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited), and in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 210 and the case-law cited).

52 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraphs 289 to 292).

53 Since the difference in wording between the initial (g) criterion and the amended (g) criterion is not such as to alter that conclusion and it is therefore, in my view, the three parts of the amended (g) criterion which have such a link, as required by Article 215(2) TFEU.

54 The appellant refers here to the judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑282/22, EU:T:2023:701, paragraph 80).

55 The appellant relies here, respectively, on paragraph 155 et seq. of his application before the General Court and on paragraph 124 et seq. of his reply before the General Court.

56 See paragraph 166 of the judgment under appeal.

57 See paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal.

58 Judgment of 29 November 2023 (T‑333/22, EU:T:2023:758).

59 See paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal, which refers to Exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file, and paragraph 97 of the judgment of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T‑333/22, EU:T:2023:758).

60 See paragraph 190 of the judgment under appeal.

61 Set out in paragraph 157 et seq. of the judgment under appeal.

62 See paragraph 190 of the judgment under appeal.

63 See, in an extensive body of case-law, the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 158 and the case-law cited).

64 See, in an extensive body of case-law, the judgments in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 378 and the case-law cited), and of 7 May 2026, Makhlouf v Council (C‑635/24 P, EU:C:2026:377, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

65 Reproduced in point 9 of the present Opinion.

66 The judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 382). Emphasis added.

67 See also paragraph 80 of the judgment of 8 November 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑282/22, EU:T:2023:701), cited by Mr Khan in paragraph 38 of the appeal.

68 See point 43 of this Opinion.

69 This is apparent from paragraph 106 of the judgment of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T‑333/22, EU:T:2023:758), to which paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal refers.

70 As is expressly stated in paragraph 189 of the judgment under appeal.

71 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 379).

72 In English in the text: ‘The table shows a list of Russia’s largest taxpayers who made the largest tax contribution to the country’s budget over the past year’: see the document entitled ‘Evidence 2’ in Annex A3 to the application in Case T‑289/23, which reproduces Exhibit No 2 in the first evidence file.

73 Either not negligible or significant: see judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 135).

74 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 356). See also paragraph 140 of that judgment.

75 See point 95 of this Opinion.

76 See, in an extensive body of case-law, judgment of 26 June 2025, Stadtwerke Hameln Weserbergland v Commission (C‑466/23 P, EU:C:2025:480, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

77 See point 96 of this Opinion.

78 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 138).

79 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 140).

80 It is apparent from the appeal that, although the claim that the evidence is not sufficiently recent appears at first to be of a general nature, Mr Khan subsequently refers only to the data relating to the annual revenue of the banking sector. I therefore interpret that complaint as relating solely to the challenge as to whether Exhibit No 28 in the second evidence file is sufficiently recent.

81 In his written submissions to the General Court, Mr Khan merely argued that Exhibit No 28 was ‘irrelevant’ (see paragraph 146 of the application before the General Court).

82 See judgment of 16 April 2026, Colombani v EEAS (Passive or collective harassment) (C‑343/23 P, EU:C:2026:294, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).

83 See order of 3 February 2009, Giannini v Commission (C‑231/08 P, EU:C:2009:50, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

84 See point 85 of this Opinion.

85 Reproduced on pages 111 and 112 of Part 2 of the annexes to Mr Khan’s application before the General Court.

86 Judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

87 See my Opinion in Joined Cases Latvia v Aven and Fridman (C‑440/24 P and C‑441/24 P, EU:C:2025:854, point 114).

88 Namely ABH Financial Limited, and, through it, Alfa Bank and LetterOne.

89 See paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal.

90 To that effect, see judgment of 13 March 2025, PKK v Council (C‑72/23 P, EU:C:2025:182, paragraph 106).

91 See judgment of 9 February 2023, Boshab v Council (C‑708/21 P, EU:C:2023:84, paragraph 56). See also the case-law of the General Court referred to in paragraph 162 of the judgment under appeal.

92 See the case-law referred to in paragraph 159 of the judgment under appeal, which originated in the case-law of the Court of Justice (see judgment of 11 June 2026, NSD v Council (C‑801/24 P, EU:C:2026:472, paragraph 89)).

93 See judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40).

94 See judgment of 13 March 2025, Shuvalov v Council (C‑271/24 P, EU:C:2025:180, paragraph 40).

95 See also paragraph 206 of the judgment under appeal.

96 See paragraph 66 of the appeal.

97 See the judgment of 6 October 2021, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission (C‑50/19 P, EU:C:2021:792, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited).

98 As set out in point 99 of this Opinion.

99 See, in an extensive body of case-law, judgment of 26 June 2025, Stadtwerke Hameln Weserbergland v Commission (C‑466/23 P, EU:C:2025:480, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

100 See paragraph 204 of the judgment under appeal.

101 See paragraph 176 of the judgment under appeal.

102 See paragraph 177 of the judgment under appeal.

103 Paragraph 179 of the judgment under appeal.

104 See paragraph 180 of the judgment under appeal. See also paragraph 191 of that judgment.

105 In the context of the ninth ground of the present appeal, the appellant appears to challenge only paragraph 177 of the judgment under appeal.

106 In accordance with the case-law referred to in point 136 of this Opinion.

107 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 392 and the case-law cited).

108 Paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal.

109 See judgment of 11 June 2026, NSD v Council (C‑801/24 P, EU:C:2026:472, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

110 As is apparent from paragraph 26 et seq. of the judgment under appeal.

111 See paragraph 223 et seq. of the judgment under appeal.

112 See paragraph 228 of the judgment under appeal. See also paragraph 226 of that judgment.

113 See the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 430 and the case-law cited). See also paragraph 192 of the judgment under appeal.

114 As set out in paragraph 227 of the judgment under appeal.

115 To that effect, see the judgment in Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (paragraph 240).