Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, sitting with five Judges) 3 June 2026

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

3 June 2026 ( * )

( Competition – Concentrations – Request for information – Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 – Necessity of the information requested – Misuse of powers – Obligation to state reasons – Legal certainty – Proportionality – Impossibilium nulla obligatio est – Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Right to respect for private and family life – Documents stored on personal communication tools and applications – Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Freedom of expression – Protection of journalistic sources )

In Case T‑1119/23,

Lagardère SA, established in Paris (France), represented by P. Gassenbach, Y. Boubacir and M. Oiknine, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by P. Caro de Sousa, B. Cullen and D. Viros, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber, sitting with five Judges),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of L. Truchot, President, M. Jaeger, J. Schwarcz, M. Sampol Pucurull and T. Perišin (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: H. Eriksson, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 14 May 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Lagardère SA, seeks the annulment of Commission Decision C(2023) 6429 final of 19 September 2023 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Case M.11184 – Vivendi/Lagardère) (‘the decision of 19 September 2023’), as amended by Commission Decision C(2023) 7464 final of 27 October 2023 (‘the decision of 27 October 2023’) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 The applicant is the parent company of the Lagardère group, a French group active, inter alia, in the media sector.

3 On 24 October 2022, Vivendi SE, the parent company of the Vivendi group, a French group with an international dimension specialising in media and entertainment, present on various markets through its subsidiaries, notified the European Commission of a concentration which consisted of the acquisition of sole control of Lagardère SA.

4 By decision of 9 June 2023, the Commission authorised the proposed concentration, subject to the implementation of commitments relating to the divestment of all Vivendi’s business in the publishing of books (grouped under Editis, a Vivendi subsidiary) and of the press magazine Gala.

5 By letter of 25 July 2023, the applicant was informed by the Commission that a formal investigation would be opened into a potential early implementation of the concentration.

Decision of 19 September 2023

6 In the context of the formal investigation into a potential early implementation of the concentration, by decision of 19 September 2023, the Commission sent the applicant a request for information, on the basis of Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’) (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1), with a deadline of 27 October 2023.

7 The decision of 19 September 2023 includes an annex.

8 Recitals 2 and 6 of the decision of 19 September 2023 set out that the purpose of that decision is to obtain information to enable the Commission to assess whether Vivendi exercised decisive influence over Lagardère that could constitute breaches of the notification requirement and of the standstill obligation as well as a failure to comply with the commitments provided, in breach of the provisions of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 139/2004.

9 Recital 7 of the decision of 19 September 2023 states that the documents and communications requested are essential to allow the Commission to analyse whether the intervention and/or the consultation and/or the association of Vivendi in certain decisions taken by Lagardère may be regarded as the exercise of decisive influence by Vivendi in the terms set out in recital 6 of that decision. It is stated, inter alia, that the documents and communications concerned relate to the implementation of operational synergies, such as programmes shared between audiovisual entities of Vivendi and Lagardère, the determination of the programme schedule of the Europe 1 radio station, which belongs to the Lagardère group, appointments and departures of journalists within publications of the Lagardère group, editorial choices of magazines in the Lagardère group that may have been influenced by Vivendi executives or its main shareholder, the Bolloré group, and the relocation of entities of the Vivendi group to premises belonging to Lagardère. The decision of 19 September 2023 states that those documents and communications also concern strategic decisions taken by the Hachette publishing group (which belongs to Lagardère and in relation to which Vivendi might have played a role that could be regarded as the exercise of decisive influence, such as the dropping of litigation against a Vivendi subsidiary or the failure to submit a bid to purchase the American publisher Simon & Schuster) as well as the circumstances in which appointments were made to the board of directors of Lagardère of certain individuals with known ties to the Bolloré group.

10 Recital 8 of the decision of 19 September 2023 sets out the reasons why the Commission took the view that only a decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 could guarantee that the applicant would provide all the documents satisfying the criteria identified by the Commission in that decision.

11 Recitals 9 and 10 of the decision of 19 September 2023 state the consequences faced by the applicant if the information is inaccurate, incomplete or distorted or is provided after the deadline has expired.

12 Under Article 1 of the decision of 19 September 2023, the applicant, as the addressee of that decision, must provide the information referred to in the annex to the decision as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 27 October 2023.

13 Point I of the annex to the decision of 19 September 2023 contains general definitions, including that of the ‘relevant period’, namely the period from 1 January 2020 to 19 September 2023, and that of a ‘document’. According to those definitions:

‘The term “Document(s)” means all computer files in the possession of, held by or under the control of Lagardère and including, without restriction, the following:

(a) Any information stored electronically, including emails and instant messages (WhatsApp, SMS, Telegram, Signal, other), word-processed and pdf documents, spreadsheets and presentations;

(b) Draft Documents, metadata and copies of Documents, the originals of which are not in the possession or under the control of Lagardère, as the case may be;

(c) For the avoidance of any doubt, the term “Document” also includes:

(i) the Documents in all private and/or personal email accounts (provided that those accounts have been used for professional communications at least once) as well as mobile devices, including mobile telephones or tablets (including private and/or personal mobile telephones or tablets, provided that they have been used for professional communications at least once), including instant messages and SMS; and

(ii) Documents which, although they have been deleted by the recipient or the author, remain available or accessible in Lagardère’s IT systems or from a (personal or professional) tool used by the recipient or the author (for example, in back-ups)’.

14 Point II of the annex to the decision of 19 September 2023 also defines the ‘persons concerned’, that is to say, 15 persons identified by name, ‘as well as any persons who preceded or succeeded them [in all the] different posts which they held during the relevant period’ (‘the persons concerned’).

15 In point III of the annex to the decision of 19 September 2023, the applicant is asked to provide, inter alia, all the documents exchanged between some of the persons concerned and all the documents sent or received by those persons which are related to certain topics or contain at least one of the search terms listed in point VII of the annex to that decision.

16 Points IV, V and VI of the annex to the decision of 19 September 2023 set out how the applicant is to provide the documents requested, the contents of the accompanying report and the requirements relating to the declarations confirming that the response is complete. Point IV explains, inter alia, the procedure to be followed to request, in relation to certain documents, the protection of the confidentiality of exchanges covered by legal professional privilege and of sensitive personal data as defined in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1). Documents containing such sensitive data must be provided in an encrypted format and separately, and be identified as ‘sensitive personal data’.

17 Point VII of the annex to the decision of 19 September 2023 lists the search terms and contains instructions on their use.

Developments subsequent to the adoption of the decision of 19 September 2023

18 By the decision of 27 October 2023, the Commission extended the deadline originally set by the decision of 19 September 2023 until 1 December 2023.

19 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 27 November 2023, the applicant brought the present action seeking the annulment of the contested decision, that is to say, the decision of 19 September 2023 as amended by the decision of 27 October 2023.

Facts subsequent to the bringing of the action

20 By letter of 6 December 2023, the Director-General of the Commission’s ‘Competition’ Directorate-General stated that any document jeopardising the protection of sensitive personal data or of journalistic sources would benefit from safeguards under the relevant legislation and case-law, and provided details of those procedural safeguards (‘the letter of 6 December 2023’).

21 On 24 January 2024, the Commission adopted Decision C(2024) 572 final relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 11(3) and Article 15(1) of Regulation No 139/2004 (Case M.11184 – Vivendi/Lagardère) (‘the decision of 24 January 2024’).

22 By Article 1 of the decision of 24 January 2024, the deadline of 1 December 2023, set by Article 2 of the decision of 27 October 2023, was extended to 7 February 2024.

23 By Article 2 of the decision of 24 January 2024, pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation No 139/2004, a periodic penalty payment not exceeding 5% of its average daily turnover was imposed on the applicant for each day of delay, calculated from the first working day following the date set in Article 1 of that decision.

24 Furthermore, the decision of 24 January 2024 reproduced the procedural safeguards regarding the protection of sensitive personal data and the protection of journalistic sources set out in the letter of 6 December 2023.

25 With regard to personal data, point (a) of recital 14 of the decision of 24 January 2024 states that documents falling within the scope of the contested decision which are unconnected with the applicant’s commercial activities and contain sensitive personal data, for the purposes of Article 9 of Regulation 2016/679 and of Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39), may be placed in a virtual data room, as provided for in point 2 of the operative part of the orders of 29 October 2020, Facebook Ireland v Commission (T‑451/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:515), and of 29 October 2020, Facebook Ireland v Commission (T‑452/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:516), to allow the Commission to determine whether they are irrelevant to its investigation.

26 As regards the protection of journalistic sources, point (b) of recital 14 of the decision of 24 January 2024 states that the persons concerned by the contested decision who hold a press card may review the documents satisfying the criteria set out in the contested document, identify information covered by such protection, and provide a version in which the identification of the journalistic sources has been redacted or, failing that, withdraw the document from the information provided if it is not possible to supply a non-confidential version. It is stated that it will be for the applicant to provide the remainder of the documents and a table giving a detailed summary of the nature of the information redacted or the documents withdrawn from the information provided.

Interim proceedings

27 By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 28 November 2023, the applicant lodged an application for interim measures seeking, first, suspension of the operation of the contested decision and, second, as a precautionary measure, if the President of the General Court deemed it necessary, an order that it retain all the documents of the persons concerned that may be of interest for the Commission’s investigation.

28 By order of 29 November 2023, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R, not published), the operation of the contested decision was suspended until the adoption of the order terminating the proceedings in Case T‑1119/23 R, without prejudice to the applicant’s obligation to continue to collect the information and to retain in its possession, on an electronic device, all the documents concerned by the contested decision which may be of interest to the Commission’s investigation.

29 By order of 19 January 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R, not published, EU:T:2024:16), the President of the General Court dismissed the application for interim measures and the order of 29 November 2023, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R, not published), was cancelled.

30 By order of 6 February 2024, Lagardère v Commission (C‑89/24 P(R)-R, EU:C:2024:120), the Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered the suspension of the obligation imposed on the applicant, by the contested decision, to collect and to communicate to the Commission documents contained in the private or personal email accounts and in the private or personal mobile devices of some of its employees and company officers until the adoption of the order terminating the present interim proceedings or that ruling on the appeal in Case C‑89/24 P(R), whichever occurs first, without prejudice to the applicant’s obligation to take all appropriate measures to ensure that all of those documents are retained.

31 By order of 11 April 2024, Lagardère v Commission (C‑89/24 P(R), EU:C:2024:312), the Vice-President of the Court of Justice set aside the order of 19 January 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R, not published, EU:T:2024:16), and referred the case back to the General Court for it to rule on the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case and, if necessary, for the relevant interests to be weighed up. The applicant’s application for suspension of the obligation imposed on it by the contested decision, as amended by the decision of 24 January 2024, to collect and communicate to the Commission documents contained in private or personal email accounts and in private or personal mobile devices of some of its employees and company officers until the President of the General Court makes a fresh ruling on the application for interim measures in Case T‑1119/23 R or, failing that, until the General Court rules on the action in Case T‑1119/23 was dismissed.

32 By order of 13 June 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R-RENV, not published, EU:T:2024:382), the Vice-President of the General Court, first, decided that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for interim measures in so far as it related to the documents provided to the Commission on 30 January 2024, second, suspended the operation of the contested decision in so far as it concerned documents which had not been provided to the Commission on 30 January 2024 and, third, ordered the applicant to request that the persons concerned by the contested decision take all appropriate measures to ensure that the documents referred to in the annex to that decision, which had not yet been provided to the Commission, are retained in a format that guarantees the integrity and inalterability of those documents. The application for interim measures was dismissed as to the remainder.

33 By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 12 July 2024, the applicant lodged an application for interim measures seeking, primarily, an order that all the documents provided to the Commission on 30 January 2024, as well as any copies thereof, be sealed to prevent their consultation by the Commission or any other third party until delivery of the judgment of the General Court ruling on the action for annulment of the decision of 19 September 2023, as amended by the decision of 27 October 2023 and by the decision of 24 January 2024, and, in the alternative, that they be so sealed until the applicant has been able, within a reasonable and sufficient time period, to identify and expunge all the documents which fall within the scope of the private life of the persons concerned by the contested decision and, in any case, order the Commission, before and after the applicant submits observations, to suspend all access by its staff and its officials to the documents which the applicant handed over to it on 30 January 2024, until the date of the order terminating the interim proceedings.

34 By order of 15 July 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 RIII, not published), the Commission was ordered to suspend access by its officials and its staff to the documents handed over to it by the applicant on 30 January 2024 until the date of the order terminating the interim proceedings.

35 By order of 13 September 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 RIII, not published, EU:T:2024:624), the application for interim measures was dismissed as inadmissible and the order of 15 July 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 RIII, not published), was cancelled.

36 By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 22 August 2024, the applicant lodged an appeal in proceedings for interim measures requesting that the order of 13 June 2024, Lagardère v Commission (T‑1119/23 R-RENV, not published, EU:T:2024:382), be partially set aside.

37 By order of 21 October 2024, Lagardère v Commission (C‑569/24 P(R), not published, EU:C:2024:945), the Vice-President of the Court of Justice ordered that that case be removed from the register of the Court of Justice.

Forms of order sought

38 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

39 At the hearing, the applicant clarified that it was not claiming that the decision of 24 January 2024 should be annulled, contrary to what was stated in the reply.

40 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

41 In support of its action, the applicant raises six pleas in law, alleging, first, a misuse of powers and a breach of the principle impossibilium nulla obligatio est ; second, a failure to state reasons; third, infringement of the fundamental right to respect for private life and the confidentiality of correspondence, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ECHR); fourth, infringement of the principle of freedom of the press, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 ECHR; fifth, infringement of the principle of legal certainty; and, sixth, infringement of the principles of proportionality and protection against arbitrary intervention by public authorities within the sphere of private activities.

42 It is necessary to examine, first of all, the second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons.

The second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons

43 By the present plea in law, which consists of two parts, the applicant asserts that the Commission failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons pursuant to Article 296 TFEU and Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004. First, the Commission did not set out sufficient reasons for its choice to have recourse to a decision adopted in accordance with Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004. Second, the contested decision does not allow the applicant to understand the reasons why certain information is necessary for the purposes of the Commission’s investigation.

Preliminary observations

44 It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required under Article 296 TFEU for measures adopted by EU institutions must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted that measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent court to review its legality. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on all the circumstances of each case, in particular, the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

45 As regards, in particular, the statement of reasons for a decision requesting information, it should be recalled that Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 defines the essential elements thereof (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 17).

46 Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 provides that the Commission ‘shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time limit within which it is to be provided’. Moreover, that provision states that the Commission ‘shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 14 [of Regulation No 139/2004]’, ‘indicate or impose the penalties provided for in Article 15 [of that regulation]’ and ‘further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice’.

47 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that all language versions of an EU act must, in principle, be recognised as having the same value. In order to maintain the uniform interpretation of EU law, in the case of divergence between those versions, the provision in question must therefore be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part. Thus, the wording used in one of the language versions of an act cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that act, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement of the uniform application of EU law (see judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v Commission , C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraphs 49 and 50 and the case-law cited).

48 In the present case, it must be stated that Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 provides, in the French-language version thereof, that, in a request for information made by decision, the Commission is to state the legal basis and the ‘objet’ of that request. The other language versions of that provision use words corresponding to the term ‘purpose’, such as, for example, the English-, German-, Dutch-, Italian-, Greek- and Croatian-language versions, which use respectively the words ‘purpose’, ‘Zweck’, ‘doel’, ‘scopo’, ‘σκοπό’ and ‘svrhu’, with the exception of the Spanish-language version which uses the term ‘objeto’. It is thus clear from the terms used in the other language versions, and taking into account the context of that provision and the objective pursued by the regulation at issue, that, in Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, the legislature intended to refer to the concept of ‘purpose’, which appears in Article 11(2) of Regulation No 139/2004 and in Article 18(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), as interpreted in the case-law cited in paragraph 50 above.

49 The obligation to state specific reasons is a fundamental requirement, designed not merely to show that the request for information is justified but also to enable the undertakings concerned to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate whilst at the same time safeguarding their rights of defence (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

50 With respect to the obligation to state the ‘purpose of the request’, the Commission must indicate the purpose of its investigation in its request and therefore identify the alleged infringement of competition rules with sufficient precision (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). In that regard, the Commission is not required to communicate to the addressee of a decision requesting information all the information at its disposal concerning presumed infringements, or to make a precise legal analysis of those infringements, providing it clearly indicates the suspicions which it intends to investigate (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

51 That obligation may be explained, inter alia, by the fact that, as is apparent from Article 11(1) of Regulation No 139/2004, in order to carry out the duties assigned to it by that regulation, the Commission may, by simple request or by decision, require undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide ‘all necessary information’ (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

52 It follows therefrom that the Commission is entitled to require the disclosure only of information which may enable it to investigate presumed infringements which justify the conduct of the investigation and are set out in the request for information (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 23).

53 In addition, since the necessity of the information must be judged in relation to the purpose stated in the request for information, that purpose must be indicated with sufficient precision, otherwise it will be impossible to determine whether the information is necessary and the EU judicature will be prevented from exercising judicial review (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

54 Thus, the adequacy of the statement of reasons of a decision requesting information depends on whether or not the putative infringements that the Commission intends to investigate are defined in sufficiently clear terms (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, HeidelbergCement v Commission , C‑247/14 P, EU:C:2016:149, paragraph 25).

55 When the extent of the obligation to state reasons is assessed, account should also be taken of the stage of the investigation at which such a decision is adopted and of whether the Commission already had some information concerning the presumed infringements (see, in that regard and by analogy, judgment of 9 April 2019, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , T‑371/17, not published, EU:T:2019:232, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

56 It is in the light of that case-law that the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

The first part of the second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons in relation to the recourse had to a request for information by decision

57 The applicant asserts that the Commission fails to state reasons for the choice to have recourse to a decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004. It claims that the Commission has not substantiated its assertion that only such a decision could ensure a full response, even though the applicant cooperated with the Commission as part of the procedure initiated in the context of the review of mergers and replied to an initial request from the Commission made pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation No 139/2004.

58 According to the applicant, the objective of speed and the risk of omission of documents of contributing parties who have left the Lagardère group, as invoked in the contested decision, do not justify recourse to a request for information made by decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004. The applicant has already informed the Commission that the Lagardère group did not have a common, group-wide policy regarding the retention of the data of persons who have left their posts, with most of the entities keeping those data for between three months and one year. In addition, all the entities of the Lagardère group are able to implement such a measure on request, thus eliminating any risk of documents not being retained.

59 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

60 It should be recalled that Article 11(1) of Regulation No 139/2004 states that the Commission may ask for information ‘by simple request or by decision’, without that provision making the adoption of a decision subject to a prior simple request.

61 A request for information made by decision differs from a simple request for information because, where the Commission has recourse to the former, a fine or periodic penalty payments may be imposed in order to compel an undertaking to provide full and accurate information, pursuant, respectively, to Article 14(1)(c) and Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 139/2004 (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, thyssenkrupp v Commission , C‑581/22 P, EU:C:2024:821, paragraph 379).

62 In the present case, it is apparent from recital 8 of the contested decision that, in the context of the present proceedings intended to establish an infringement of the rules of Regulation No 139/2004, the Commission took the view that only a decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 could guarantee that the applicant would provide all the documents satisfying the criteria identified in that decision. Recourse to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 is the only procedure laid down in that regulation which allows the Commission to require the addressee undertakings to provide a full response, failing which penalties could be imposed. Moreover, the Commission took the view that it was necessary to act quickly to prevent relevant documents being deleted from the applicant’s files, in particular on the assumption that messages would be deleted after a certain period of time or certain documents originating from a contributing party would not be retained for very long after that person’s departure. In the Commission’s view, the choice of a decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 satisfied that objective of speed.

63 Accordingly, it must be stated that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 44 to 46 above, the contested decision states its legal basis with sufficient clarity and discloses, to the requisite legal standard, the reasoning followed by the Commission to explain its choice to have recourse to a request for information by decision rather than a simple request.

64 Furthermore, the obligation to state adequate reasons in decisions is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (see judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala , C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 181 and the case-law cited).

65 Therefore, the applicant’s arguments to the effect that recourse to a request for information made by decision rather than a simple request is not justified in the present case are ineffective in the context of a plea in law alleging a failure to state reasons.

66 In so far as the applicant disputes, in reality, the merits of the Commission’s decision to have recourse to a request for information made by decision, it must be observed that it essentially repeats the arguments raised in the context of the first part of the sixth plea in law, which has been examined and rejected in paragraphs 252 to 261 below.

67 The first part of the second plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The second part of the second plea in law, alleging a failure to state reasons in relation to the necessity of the information concerned for the purposes of the investigation

68 First, the applicant asserts that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate in so far as it concerns the radio business activities, that is to say, the radio activities of the group Lagardère, Europe 1, Europe 2 (formerly Virgin Radio) and RFM. Second, it argues that the statement of reasons for the contested decision does not allow it to understand the reasons why certain information is necessary for the purposes of the Commission’s investigation. The points of contention are the scope of the persons concerned, communications exchanged between two of them, the start date of the relevant period, namely 1 January 2020, and information stored on personal communication tools and applications.

69 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

70 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the purpose of the contested decision, as set out in recitals 2, 6 and 7 thereof (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above), is to establish the existence of the presumed infringements of Regulation No 139/2004, which the applicant does not dispute, are stated with sufficient clarity in the contested decision.

71 In the first place, with regard more specifically to the Commission’s requests relating to the radio business, first of all, it is apparent from the documents before the Court and from the Commission’s pleadings that Vivendi’s proposed acquisition covered the Lagardère group as a whole, including the ‘radio business’. In addition, the applicant does not dispute the Commission’s assertion that the scope of Vivendi’s bid for Lagardère also included the radio business. Lastly, recital 7 of the contested decision states that the Commission is investigating ‘the determination of the programme schedule of the Europe 1 radio station’ (see paragraph 9 above).

72 In the second place, with regard to the persons concerned, it is common ground that those persons played a strategic role within the Lagardère group and that the persons referred to in point II(4)(a) and (c) of the annex to the contested decision maintained frequent contact in various forms concerning the merger and the activities covered by the investigation. It follows that the Commission was not required to state further reasons for the contested decision in that regard.

73 In the third place, as regards the start of the relevant period, it is also established that Vivendi first acquired a stake in Lagardère in March 2020. Accordingly, the Commission could reasonably assume, on the date of the contested decision, that information from 1 January 2020 onwards could help it to determine the existence of that infringement, in particular because that information would provide a better understanding of all the events and the context in which those events had occurred. It follows that the Commission was not required to state further reasons for the contested decision in that regard.

74 In the fourth place, as for the personal communication tools, the applicant concedes that some of the persons concerned used their personal communication tools and applications for professional purposes over the relevant period. It follows that the Commission was not required to state further reasons for the contested decision in that regard.

75 In the light of the circumstances set out in paragraphs 71 to 74 above, sufficient reasons in law are provided for the contested decision, because its objective and its context enable the applicant to understand the reasons why the information requested is necessary for the Commission’s investigation.

76 Therefore, the second part of the second plea in law must be rejected, as must the second plea in its entirety.

The first plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers and a breach of the principle impossibilium nulla obligatio est

77 The first plea in law has two parts. First, the applicant claims, in essence, that the Commission exceeded and misused its powers by adopting a decision with a purely exploratory purpose. Second, it argues that the Commission did not ensure that the applicant had the legal and technical capacity to comply with the contested decision. Since the applicant is unable to access certain data which the Commission requests be disclosed, the contested decision infringes the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio est .

78 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

The first part of the first plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers

79 The concept of misuse of powers refers to cases where an administrative authority has used its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred on it. A decision may amount to misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent factors, to have been taken for such a purpose. Where more than one aim is pursued, even if the grounds of a decision include, in addition to proper grounds, an improper one, that would not make the decision invalid for misuse of powers, since it does not nullify the main aim (see judgment of 4 February 2009, Omya v Commission , T‑145/06, EU:T:2009:27, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).

80 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the factors upon which the applicant relies constitute objective, relevant and consistent evidence that the contested decision was adopted by the Commission for a purpose other than that provided for in Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, namely according to the applicant, with the aim of ordering that ‘exploratory searches’ be carried out, by transferring to it the burden of conducting those ‘searches’ and of defining the scope of the investigation.

81 In that regard, it should be recalled that Regulation No 139/2004 requires the Commission to ensure that any concentration with a Community dimension is notified and authorised before it is implemented, and that the conditions imposed by a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market are observed.

82 Under Article 11(1) of Regulation No 139/2004, ‘in order to carry out the duties assigned to it by [that regulation], the Commission may, by simple request or by decision, require the persons referred to in Article 3(1)(b), as well as undertakings and associations of undertakings, to provide all necessary information’.

83 Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 may therefore serve as the legal basis for any request for information in order that the Commission can carry out the duties assigned to it by that regulation.

84 Recital 6 of the contested decision states that the Commission requires the applicant to provide documents ‘to allow [it] to assess whether Vivendi exercised decisive influence over Lagardère that could constitute a breach of the notification requirement and/or a breach of the standstill obligation and/or a failure to comply with the conditions and obligations associated with the Commission’s decision to authorise the Vivendi/Lagardère merger’.

85 It therefore follows that the information requested by the contested decision is intended, within the meaning of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 139/2004, to enable the Commission to carry out the duties assigned to it by that regulation, such that that institution did not use its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred on it.

86 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s argument that the Commission reversed the investigatory burden by ordering it to carry out ‘exploratory searches’.

87 In that regard, it should be recalled that the contested decision defines, in points I, II and III of the annex thereto, the relevant period, the concept of a ‘document’, the persons concerned and the documents to be provided on the basis, inter alia, of the topics and search terms identified by the Commission (see paragraphs 13 to 15 above).

88 It is true that it follows from the foregoing that the applicant is required to identify both the predecessors and successors of the persons identified by name and the communication tools used by those persons. In addition, it has some discretion in relation to the means used to identify those documents which correspond to the topics identified by the Commission. However, the contested decision does not afford the applicant any leeway as regards the documents to be provided. Thus, the applicant cannot allege that the Commission reversed the investigatory burden by ordering it to carry out ‘exploratory searches’.

89 The applicant’s arguments relating to the legal and technical obstacles which it would face in implementing the contested decision will be examined in the context of the second part of the present plea in law.

90 It follows that the applicant has not established that the contested decision was vitiated by a misuse of powers.

91 The first part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The second part of the first plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle impossibilium nulla obligatio est

92 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the adage impossibilium nulla obligatio est (‘no one is obliged to do the impossible’) is among the general principles of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission , Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci , C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

93 Any procedural or other difficulties in regard to the implementation of a measure cannot have any influence on the lawfulness of that measure. However, the Commission may not impose, by a decision, which would then be invalid, an obligation whose implementation would, from the beginning, be impossible in objective and absolute terms (see judgment of 17 June 1999, Belgium v Commission , C‑75/97, EU:C:1999:311, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

94 The condition relating to the existence of an absolute impossibility of implementation is not satisfied where the person concerned simply informs the Commission of the internal difficulties, of a legal, political or practical nature, attributable to its own actions which are presented by the implementation of the decision at issue, without alternative arrangements being suggested to the Commission for the implementation of that decision that would allow those difficulties to be overcome (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 13 November 2008, Commission v France , C‑214/07, EU:C:2008:619, paragraph 50, and of 12 February 2015, Commission v France , C‑37/14, not published, EU:C:2015:90, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

95 It should also be recalled that an undertaking which is being investigated is subject to an obligation to cooperate actively, which implies that it must make available to the Commission all information relating to the subject matter of the investigation (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 April 2019, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , T‑371/17, not published, EU:T:2019:232, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).

96 It is in the light of that case-law that the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

– Personal communication tools and applications

97 The applicant claims that 19 persons concerned use personal applications, such as Yahoo, Gmail and WhatsApp, on their professional tools, 4 of whom also use their personal mobile phone for professional activities. One of those four persons uses a personal telephone as part of the ‘AVEC’ (Apportez votre équipement personnel de communication) (Bring Your Own Communication Device) scheme.

98 According to the applicant, it is required, as a private undertaking, to abide by the rules and principles applicable between private individuals, inter alia the provisions of national law prohibiting interference with private life and with the confidentiality of correspondence in accordance with Article 7 of the Charter and with Article 8 ECHR, as well as the provisions of national labour law. There are legal obstacles to implementing the contested decision, since the personal communication tools and applications of its employees and company officers cannot be accessed without running the risk of civil and criminal penalties being imposed on it.

99 It should be recalled, in that regard, that a question relating to the interpretation of the national law of a Member State is a question of fact (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 September 2016, Merck v Commission , T‑470/13, not published, EU:T:2016:452, paragraph 136 and the case-law cited). The question whether and to what extent a rule of national law applies to the case in point falls within the scope of a factual assessment by the Court and is subject to the rules on the taking of evidence and on the apportionment of the burden of proof (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 September 2012, France v Commission , T‑154/10, EU:T:2012:452, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

100 In the first place, with regard to Articles L.226-1, L.226-2, L.226-3, L.226-4 and L.226-15 of the French code pénal (Criminal Code), upon which the applicant relies to establish that implementing the contested decision would expose it to the risk of penalties, it must be observed, first of all, that the applicant failed to provide the full wording of the provisions at issue and that the report produced by an external legal firm provided by the applicant also cites only parts of those provisions and gives no precise information about their possible application in the present case.

101 Article 226-1 of the French Criminal Code provides:

‘The wilful invasion, by any means whatsoever, of the privacy of another person:

1° By intercepting, recording or transmitting words uttered in private or in confidence, without the consent of the speaker;

shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of EUR 45 000.’

102 Under Article 226-15 of the French Criminal Code:

‘Opening, destroying, delaying or diverting correspondence addressed to a third party in bad faith, whether or not it has arrived at its destination, or gaining knowledge of it fraudulently, shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of EUR 45 000.

The same penalties shall apply to the interception, diversion, use or disclosure, in bad faith, of correspondence sent, transmitted or received electronically or the installation of devices capable of allowing such interception.

…’

103 It is apparent from the wording of the provisions cited in paragraphs 101 and 102 above that they punish ‘wilful’ acts, acts committed ‘in bad faith’ or ‘fraudulent’ acts. By contrast, the contested decision is a legally binding act with a basis in EU law (Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004), adopted by an EU institution (the Commission) and imposing the obligation to provide information, failing which penalties will be imposed.

104 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, first, the principle of the primacy of EU law establishes the pre-eminence of EU law over the law of the Member State and requires all Member State bodies to give full effect to the various EU provisions, and the law of the Member States may not undermine the effect accorded to those various provisions in the territory of those States (see judgment of 18 January 2022, Thelen Technopark Berlin , C‑261/20, EU:C:2022:33, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). Second, when the applicant was asked about the apparent inconsistency raised in paragraph 103 above, it replied, in essence, that if it were to implement the contested decision without raising any objection or any difficulty, it would be acting ‘wilfully’. It must, however, be observed that the applicant has failed to produce evidence in support of the interpretation of French criminal law which it put forward at the hearing.

105 In addition, the applicant’s claims are, as the Commission argues, called into question by the wording of Article 122-4 of the French Criminal Code, which states that ‘a person who performs an act prescribed or authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions [or] who performs an action ordered by a lawful authority, save where that act is manifestly unlawful, shall not be criminally liable’.

106 Finally, the applicant has not invoked a single case in which the provisions of national law referred to in paragraph 100 above, or Article 7 of the Charter or Article 8 ECHR, have been applied in circumstances similar to those of the present case. None of the judgments cited by the applicant concerns a situation in which, first, there was a legal binding act with a basis in EU law which provided for the surrender of personal communication tools and applications and access to the content of communications in pursuit of objectives of general interest; second, the interference was not carried out with the aim of monitoring employees and company officers and would not have adverse effects, such as their dismissal; and, third, that interference was carried out, or could have been carried out, in the presence of the persons in question, or after they had been previously informed.

107 In addition, in its response to a measure of organisation of procedure, the applicant stated that the AVEC scheme, to which it refers in its pleadings, had only been used by one of the persons concerned, without providing further details about that scheme. Furthermore, the Commission has produced a document in which the applicant had answered its questions concerning, inter alia, the AVEC scheme within the Lagardère group. It is apparent from that document that some of the subsidiaries of that group had established internal rules under which ‘the [company’s] IT policy therefore appl[ied] to the personal devices of employees and company officers used for professional communications’ and that it had ‘unrestricted access’ to the personal devices used for professional purposes.

108 Even though, as the applicant claims, those internal rules are not sufficiently clear to justify the existence of a right allowing it to search for information of a professional nature contained in the personal communication tools of the persons concerned who have not consented to the collection of such information, the fact remains that the existence of such rules calls into question the applicant’s claims that it is prohibited from accessing such tools.

109 As for the applicant’s argument based on the provisions of French labour law, it is sufficient to state that that argument is wholly unsubstantiated, such that it must be rejected on the basis of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

110 It follows from all the foregoing that the applicant’s argument based on national law must be rejected.

111 In the second place, the applicant asserts that the undertaking which it commissioned to assist it in the collection of documents falling within the scope of the contested decision is not authorised to use communication tools in the manner provided for in the French Criminal Code.

112 Since the applicant has provided neither the wording of the provisions at issue nor sufficiently precise information concerning their application in the present case, the argument must be rejected pursuant to Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

113 In the third place, the applicant argues that, as an employer, it does not have access to the personal communication tools and applications of its employees and company officers.

114 In that regard, it must be stated, first of all, that, in so far as the applicant allowed, despite the existence of the AVEC scheme within some of its subsidiaries (see paragraph 107 above), some of its employees and company officers to use their personal communication tools and applications for professional purposes without ensuring that it is able, where appropriate, to identify and access professional communications sent or received using those tools and applications, the difficulties raised by that practice are attributable to its own actions within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 94 above.

115 Next, it is apparent from the case-law on the application of Article 101 TFEU that an undertaking is responsible for the conduct of all persons acting within its sphere of influence or responsibility (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 7 June 1983, Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraph 97; of 18 September 2003, Volkswagen v Commission , C‑338/00 P, EU:C:2003:473, paragraphs 97 and 98; and of 16 February 2017, H&R ChemPharm v Commission , C‑95/15 P, not published, EU:C:2017:125, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). That case-law applies in the context of the penalties under Article 83 of Regulation 2016/679 (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2023, Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos centras , C‑683/21, EU:C:2023:949, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited). The situation must be the same in the context of Regulation No 139/2004.

116 It follows from the case-law cited in paragraph 115 above that, first, it is in the interest of any undertaking to ensure that its employees do not infringe the rules applicable in the field of competition, including Regulation No 139/2004, and that, second, it would be contrary to the case-law cited in paragraphs 94, 95 and 115 above for an undertaking to be able to evade an obligation to communicate information, pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, and its duty to cooperate by relying unjustifiably (see paragraphs 120 to 197 below) on the rights of the persons acting within its sphere of influence or responsibility. Accepting that the applicant, as an employer, does not have access to the personal communication tools and applications of its employees and company officers which are used for professional purposes would seriously impair the effectiveness of EU competition law (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 18 September 2003, Volkswagen v Commission , C‑338/00 P, EU:C:2003:473, paragraph 97), of which Regulation No 139/2004 forms an integral part.

– Journalistic sources

117 The applicant asserts that, as a private undertaking, it is bound to comply with the rules and principles applicable between private individuals, in particular the provisions of national law which protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 ECHR. In that regard, the applicant argues, in essence, in the context of the second part of the fourth plea in law, that the procedural safeguards intended to protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources generate an excessive workload.

118 As that difficulty is of a practical nature and the applicant’s arguments in that regard have been rejected in the context of the second part of the fourth plea in law, the applicant has not established, to the requisite legal standard, that the contested decision would impose on it an obligation which, from the outset, would be objectively and absolutely impossible to fulfil.

119 It follows from all the foregoing that the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety.

The third plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR

120 By the third plea in law, which consists of two parts, the applicant asserts that the contested decision infringes Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR because it requires the applicant to collect and analyse documents stored on personal communication tools and applications of the persons concerned. The applicant argues, first, that the contested decision does not respect the essence of the right to respect for private life and, second, that it is disproportionate.

121 Under Article 7 of the Charter, everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

122 Article 7 of the Charter contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed in Article 8(1) ECHR, under which everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and correspondence (see judgment of 8 December 2022, Google (De-referencing of allegedly inaccurate content) , C‑460/20, EU:C:2022:962, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). Therefore, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, Article 7 thereof is to be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (see judgment of 17 December 2015, WebMindLicenses , C‑419/14, EU:C:2015:832, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

The existence of interference resulting from the contested decision in the exercise of the right provided for in Article 7 of the Charter

123 It is settled case-law that the communication of personal data to a third party constitutes an interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, whatever the subsequent use of the information communicated and even in the absence of circumstances which would allow that interference to be defined as ‘serious’. The same is true of the retention of personal data and access to those data with a view to their use by public authorities. It does not matter whether the information relating to private life is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have been inconvenienced on account of that interference (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal , C‑207/16, EU:C:2018:788, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited, and of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains , C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited). It is of no relevance in that respect that the data concerned may relate to professional activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 November 2022, Luxembourg Business Registers , C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

124 In that context, the Court of Justice has already had occasion to find that seizures of emails in the course of searches at the professional or business premises of a natural person or the premises of a commercial company constitute interference with the exercise of the right guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 December 2015, WebMindLicenses , C‑419/14, EU:C:2015:832, paragraphs 70 to 73 and 80 and the case-law cited).

125 In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 12 to 16 above, the contested decision imposes on the applicant the obligation to collect and communicate to the Commission, first, the documents sent or received, over the relevant period, by 15 persons concerned, identified in point II(4) of the annex to that decision, and corresponding to the topics listed in point III(6) of that annex, or containing the search terms listed in point VII of the same annex and, second, the documents exchanged, over the relevant period, between 6 persons identified by name in point III(7)(a) to (c) of that annex. That obligation extends to the exchanges made using both professional and personal communication tools, provided that the latter have been used at least once for professional communications.

126 In those circumstances, the documents to be collected, processed and communicated to the Commission may contain information relating to the private life of some of the applicant’s employees and company officers. The implementation of the contested decision is therefore such as to give rise to interference with the right guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.

127 With regard to the gravity of the interference, it should be recalled that, first, the obligation imposed by the contested decision also extends to exchanges made using both professional and personal communication tools, provided that the latter have been used at least once for professional communications. Second, the contested decision not only requires that the documents exchanged throughout the relevant period are communicated in the case of the persons referred to in paragraph 125 above, but also lays down, in point III(7)(d) of the annex to that decision, the obligation to hand over all the exchanges between certain persons where just one exchange corresponds to the search terms referred to in the decision.

128 Therefore, implementation of the contested decision may result in the communication of a very wide variety of personal data, which is difficult to determine beforehand, and potentially on a large scale. Moreover, the information collected from the personal communication tools may provide more information about sensitive aspects of the private life of the persons concerned than that obtained from the professional communication tools. It follows that such data, taken as a whole, may allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of the persons concerned.

129 In addition, the communication of sensitive information about the private life of the persons concerned which may allow precise conclusions to be drawn regarding the private life of those persons constitutes a serious interference with the fundamental right of the persons concerned enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 August 2022, Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija , C‑184/20, EU:C:2022:601, paragraph 105; of 22 November 2022, Luxembourg Business Registers , C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, paragraphs 41 to 44; and of 30 April 2024, La Quadrature du Net and Others (Personal data and action to combat counterfeiting) , C‑470/21, EU:C:2024:370, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited).

130 Therefore, the obligation to communicate information to the Commission laid down in the contested decision entails a risk of a serious interference with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

131 Since the contested decision constitutes, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, a limitation on the exercise of the right to respect for private life, it is necessary to determine whether such a limitation is justified according to the wording of that provision.

Justification for the interference resulting from the contested decision

132 Under the first sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law (the requirement referred to in case-law as the ‘principle of legality’) and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. The second sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter states that, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made to those rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

– Observance of the principle of legality

133 It follows from the case-law of the Court that observance of the principle of legality means that the legal basis authorising such a limitation must define the scope of that limitation sufficiently clearly and precisely (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2023, Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti (Recording of biometric and genetic data by the police) , C‑205/21, EU:C:2023:49, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

134 In the present case, it must be observed that the limitation on the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter resulting from the implementation of the contested decision is provided for by a legislative act of the Union. The contested decision was adopted on the basis of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, which confers on the Commission the power to request, by decision, that undertakings and associations of undertakings provide information necessary for it to carry out the duties assigned to it by that regulation.

135 The exercise of the powers conferred on the Commission by Regulation No 139/2004 contributes to the maintenance of the system of competition intended by the Treaties with which undertakings are absolutely bound to comply (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2018, České dráhy v Commission , T‑621/16, not published, EU:T:2018:367, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

136 Since Regulation No 139/2004 confers on the Commission sufficiently clearly and precisely the power to adopt decisions requesting information, the contested decision therefore observes the principle of legality for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter, which the applicant does not dispute.

– Respect for the essence of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter (first part of the third plea in law)

137 While the applicant does not dispute that the Commission’s services have means of ensuring that the conditions under which personal data are processed are consistent with the relevant legislation, it claims, in essence, that, despite the procedural safeguards provided for by the Commission, it is not entitled to access the personal communication tools and applications in order to comply with the contested decision without itself interfering with the private life and the confidentiality of correspondence of the persons concerned, infringing Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR. The applicant essentially argues that the contested decision does not respect the essence of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

138 According to case-law, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter (see judgment of 6 October 2015, Schrems , C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

139 In the same way, a measure permitting the public authorities to have a full overview of the private and family life of the persons concerned may compromise the essence of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains , C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 120; of 22 November 2022, Luxembourg Business Registers , C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, paragraphs 50 to 52; and of 21 March 2024, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden , C‑61/22, EU:C:2024:251, paragraphs 80 and 81 and the case-law cited).

140 However, a limitation on a fundamental right respects the essence of that right where it does not call into question that right as such, in particular if it is applicable under specific conditions as long as those conditions are fulfilled (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 6 October 2015, Delvigne , C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 48, and of 27 September 2017, Puškár , C‑73/16, EU:C:2017:725, paragraph 64).

141 In the present case, in the first place, while it is true that the information collected and communicated to the Commission pursuant to the contested decision may reveal very precise information about the private life of the persons concerned, such information is likely to provide only sparse and incidental information about certain aspects of the private life of those persons. That information relates to different categories of data relating to private life which are not necessarily related to one another and do not constitute a homogenous whole.

142 In that regard, it must be observed that the temporal, personal and material scope of the contested decision is defined by means of precise definitions of the relevant period (point I(3) of the annex thereto), the persons concerned (point II(4) of the annex thereto) and the search terms (point VII of the annex thereto), with the result that that decision does not require the applicant to collect and communicate to the Commission all the documents exchanged between its employees and company officers.

143 It must also be pointed out that personal communication tools are covered by the contested decision only if they have been used at least once for professional purposes (see paragraph 13 above). That condition means that the scope of the contested decision is limited only to persons who have used their personal communication tools for professional purposes. In that connection, it should be recalled that the purpose of the request for information at issue is to establish infringements of the competition rules and that that is an area in which relevant exchanges may take place between the persons concerned via means of communication other than professional means.

144 In addition, it must also be observed that the objective of a decision requesting information adopted on the basis of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 is not to collect, as such, information relating to the private life of the persons at issue or their personal data, but to gather information necessary to investigate presumed infringements of the obligations under that regulation. That means that, unless it is commercially relevant and therefore useful in establishing that such an infringement exists, information relating to the private life of the persons concerned and their personal data are collected only on an incidental basis (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 October 2002, Roquette Frères , C‑94/00, EU:C:2002:603, paragraph 45).

145 In the second place, the interference entailed by the contested decision is governed by procedural safeguards regarding the protection of sensitive personal data. Point IV(10)(l) of the annex to the contested decision provides that if certain documents contain sensitive personal data, as defined by Regulation 2016/679, those documents are to be supplied in an encrypted format and separately, and be identified as ‘sensitive personal data’.

146 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 9(1) of Regulation 2016/679, read in the light of recital 10 of that regulation, the concept of ‘sensitive personal data’ refers to personal data which, if processed, reveals racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership, as well as genetic data, biometric data which, if processed, allows a natural person to be uniquely identified and data concerning the health, sex life or sexual orientation of a natural person.

147 Thus, the contested decision sets out specific procedural safeguards concerning sensitive personal data by specifying that documents containing such data must be provided in an encrypted format and separately, and be identified as ‘sensitive personal data’.

148 In any case, it must be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 21 to 26 above, the contested decision was amended and supplemented by the decision of 24 January 2024. Specifically, it is clear from point (a) of recital 14 of the latter decision that, as far as concerns personal data, documents falling within the scope of the contested decision which are unconnected with the applicant’s commercial activities and contain sensitive personal data, for the purposes of Article 9 of Regulation 2016/679 and Article 10 of Regulation 2018/1725, may be placed in a virtual data room, as provided for in point 2 of the operative part of the orders of 29 October 2020, Facebook Ireland v Commission (T‑451/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:515), and of 29 October 2020, Facebook Ireland v Commission (T‑452/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:516), to allow the Commission to determine whether they are irrelevant to its investigation.

149 At the hearing, the Commission explained that the procedural safeguards provided for in point IV(10)(l) of the annex to the contested decision and those provided for in point (a) of recital 14 of the decision of 24 January 2024 were cumulative.

150 The virtual data room procedure, established by the decision of 24 January 2024, allow for further regulation of the contested decision, by affording additional procedural safeguards to ensure the protection of sensitive personal data. It should be observed, in that regard, that the right to the protection of personal data, set out in Article 8(1) of the Charter, is closely linked to the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 186 below and the analysis conducted in paragraph 185 below.

151 In the third place, the communication and the processing of information supplied in the context of a Commission investigation relating to competition law are governed by general procedural safeguards intended to ensure, inter alia, the security, integrity and confidentiality of those data.

152 Only Commission staff and officials in charge of the investigation may, if necessary, acquaint themselves with personal data. In addition, Commission staff are subject to strict obligations of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 339 TFEU and Article 17 of Regulation No 139/2004. The latter provision prohibits Commission staff and officials from disclosing information acquired or from using that information for purposes other than those for which it was acquired. In addition, the Commission’s staff and officials are bound by Article 17 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, which prohibits them, even after leaving the service, making ‘any unauthorised disclosure of information received in the line of duty, unless that information has already been made public or is accessible to the public’.

153 It follows that the contested decision cannot be regarded as compromising the essence of Article 7 of the Charter.

154 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s claim that some of the documents ‘are not accessible by the employer, on pain of – inter alia – criminal penalties’. In that regard, it must be observed that the applicant has not established, to the requisite legal standard, that the judgments of the national court and the provisions of the French Criminal Code upon which it relies are applicable in the present case (see paragraphs 97 to 112 above).

155 Furthermore, the applicant has failed to substantiate to the requisite legal standard its line of argument that the consequences of an infringement of a fundamental right in the light of domestic law are relevant to assessing whether the essence of that right has been respected. The applicant’s argument must therefore be rejected in that regard, even assuming that it has established that the documents stored on personal communication applications and devices were not accessible on pain of penalties.

156 Moreover, the applicant’s argument, raised at the hearing in reply to a question put by the Court, alleging that it is impossible for it to establish, within its undertaking, measures, reviews or procedural guarantees is ineffective for the purposes of the review of the legality of the contested decision. In any case, the applicant has not demonstrated that it could not comply with the contested decision whilst ensuring adequate protection of the right to privacy of its employees and company officers.

157 The first part of the third plea in law must therefore be rejected.

– Pursuit of objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union

158 According to case-law, competition law pursues the objective, which is indispensable for the functioning of the internal market, of ensuring that competition is not distorted in that market to the detriment of the general interest, individual undertakings and consumers (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 22 March 2022, bpost , C‑117/20, EU:C:2022:202, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited; of 22 March 2022, Nordzucker and Others , C‑151/20, EU:C:2022:203, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited; and of 20 June 2018, České dráhy v Commission , T‑621/16, not published, EU:T:2018:367, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

159 In that context, it must be observed that the contested decision is a manifestation of the powers conferred on the Commission by Article 11 of Regulation No 139/2004, the purpose of which is to enable it to carry out the task assigned to it by the Treaties, namely to ensure compliance with competition law in the internal market.

160 The importance of the public interest in the effective implementation of competition law is also emphasised by the ECtHR. Specifically, given the negative impact that infringements of competition law may have on competition on the markets and the difficulty of detecting and investigating them, it is important that competition authorities and other law-enforcement agencies are able to cooperate in their efforts to uncover and punish such anti-competitive practices. The enforcement of competition law is crucial to safeguarding the performance capacity and fairness of market economies, and, consequently, the economic well-being of a country (see ECtHR, 1 April 2025, Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V. and Others v. The Netherlands , CE:ECHR:2025:0401JUD000279916, § 197 and the case-law cited).

161 That purpose is an objective of general interest which may justify interference, even significant interference, with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2015, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission , C‑583/13 P, EU:C:2015:404, paragraph 20).

162 The contested decision therefore contributes to the achievement of an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union, which is not disputed by the applicant.

– Observance of the principle of proportionality (second part of the third plea in law)

163 By the second part of the present plea in law, the applicant argues that the contested decision is disproportionate, first, because it requires it to collect the personal communication tools of the persons concerned if they have sent just one message connected with their professional activity from that tool in the past three years, even if that message or that call was unconnected with the subject matter of the investigation, and, second, because the search terms to be applied in the personal communication tools and applications result in a large number of documents of a personal nature being disclosed.

164 In its reply, the applicant claims that the Commission confuses the protection afforded to personal data and the right to respect for private life. The protection of personal data is not a sufficient safeguard that allows the applicant to collect the documents stored on the personal communication tools of the persons concerned without infringing their right to the confidentiality of correspondence.

165 In essence, in the applicant’s view, the contested decision does not comply with the second sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, under which, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made on rights and freedoms only provided that they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

166 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

167 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the principle of proportionality requires that the limitations which may, in particular, be imposed by acts of EU law on rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to meet the legitimate objectives pursued or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused by that measure must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. Thus, the possibility of justifying a limitation of the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter must be assessed by measuring the seriousness of the interference which such a limitation entails and by verifying that the importance of the objective of general interest pursued by that limitation is proportionate to that seriousness (see judgment of 8 December 2022, Orde van Vlaamse Balies and Others , C‑694/20, EU:C:2022:963, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

– Appropriateness of the limitation

168 With regard to the appropriateness of the limitation on the right to respect for private life resulting from the contested decision, the view must be taken that, in the light of paragraphs 158 to 162 above, a decision requesting information, such as the contested decision, adopted on the basis of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, is an appropriate measure to achieve the objective of general interest of protecting effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, since it requires the companies concerned to collect and communicate to the Commission the information necessary to determine the existence of anti-competitive practices.

– Necessity of the limitation

169 As regards the requirement that the limitation on the right to respect for private life is necessary, that requirement is not met where the objective of general interest pursued can reasonably be achieved just as effectively by other means less restrictive of the fundamental rights of the data subjects. By contrast, the requirement of necessity is met where the objective pursued by the data processing at issue cannot reasonably be achieved just as effectively by other means less restrictive of the fundamental rights of data subjects, in particular the right to respect for private and family life guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck (Attempt to access personal data stored on a mobile telephone) , C‑548/21, EU:C:2024:830, paragraphs 87 and 88 and the case-law cited).

170 In that context, it should be recalled that, in a digital environment, it is common ground that information is largely exchanged within an undertaking or between undertakings by electronic means, using professional – or even personal – communication tools.

171 However, the powers of investigation enjoyed by the Commission in relation to competition law would risk being rendered ineffective if companies could evade the obligation to reply to a request for information solely because certain documents bear the word ‘personal’ or ‘private’ or are exchanged using personal communication tools, without consideration of whether those documents contain, in reality, information connected with the commercial activity of the undertakings in question.

172 Thus, to ensure the effectiveness of competition law, the Commission must be able to request all the information necessary for it to carry out the duties assigned to it by competition law, in the present case Regulation No 139/2004, that is contained in professional or even personal communication tools, provided that the latter have been used for professional purposes, whilst observing the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

173 Accordingly, the obligation imposed on the applicant by the contested decision to collect and communicate to the Commission the documents indicated by it and, on an incidental basis, the collection of data relating to private life which is thereby entailed must be regarded as being necessary for the purpose of pursuing the objective of general interest of protecting competition in the internal market, since that objective cannot reasonably be achieved just as effectively by other means less restrictive of fundamental rights, in particular the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.

– Whether the limitation is strictly proportionate

174 The assessment of whether the limitation on the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter is strictly proportionate involves balancing all the relevant factors in the individual case. Such factors include, inter alia, the seriousness of the limitation thus placed on the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue, which depends on the nature and sensitivity of the data to which the competent authorities may have access, the importance of the objective of general interest pursued by that limitation, the link existing between the owner of the documents in question and the infringement at issue and the relevance of the data in question for the purpose of establishing the facts (see judgment of 4 October 2024, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck (Attempt to access personal data stored on a mobile telephone) , C‑548/21, EU:C:2024:830, paragraphs 89 and 90 and the case-law cited).

175 In the first place, with regard to the seriousness of the interference, as is apparent from paragraph 130 above, the obligation to collect and communicate information to the Commission laid down in the contested decision entails the risk of serious interference with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

176 However, it must be noted that the contested decision does not give full and unchecked access to all the data contained in the personal communication tools of the persons concerned and does not seek to establish a continuous, untargeted and systematic monitoring regime, including the automated assessment of personal data of all the applicant’s employees and company officers, or of the persons concerned by that decision (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains , C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraphs 98 to 111, and of 4 October 2024, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck (Attempt to access personal data stored on a mobile telephone) , C‑548/21, EU:C:2024:830, paragraphs 91 to 95 and the case-law cited).

177 First, it must be observed that, in the context of the documents collected pursuant to the contested decision, data relating to private life are likely to provide only sparse and incidental information in searching for commercial information about the undertaking. In those circumstances, those data do not, on their own, provide a full overview of the private life of the person concerned without further processing, which is by no means the purpose of the investigation.

178 Second, as observed in paragraph 143 above, the obligation under the contested decision extends to exchanges made using both the professional and the personal communication tools of the persons concerned, such as their personal mobile phones, only if they have been used at least once for professional purposes. Accordingly, the scope of the request for information is restricted as regards the obligation to communicate the documents referred to in point III(7) of the annex to the contested decision and obtained from the personal communication tools in order to limit interference with the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

179 Third, it must be observed that the persons concerned were selected either because of the significance of their roles and responsibilities within the undertaking or their status, in so far as the request seeks to establish whether Vivendi exercised decisive influence over the applicant. Consequently, the contested decision is not only limited to requesting the collection of the documents concerned from persons within the applicant’s senior management, but also strictly governs the communication of the information of persons holding press cards, as is apparent from paragraph 26 above.

180 In the second place, it is apparent from the points made in paragraphs 158 to 162 above that the importance of the objective of protecting effective and undistorted competition in the internal market may justify interference, even serious interference, with the right to respect for the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

181 In the third place, as for the link existing between the owner of the communication tools in question and the infringement at issue, it must be observed that the collection of and access to data relating to private life which may be contained in professional communication tools and personal communication tools used at least once for professional purposes are, in principle, incidental in the context of the search for information of a commercial nature intended to establish an infringement on the part of the undertaking under investigation. It follows from that fact that the collection of and access to personal data concerned by a competition investigation are not intended, in principle, to establish the liability in matters of competition of the natural person in possession of those data, but simply that of the legal person with whom that natural person has an employment relationship.

182 In the fourth place, it should be recalled that the presence of a post-inspection review is a fundamental guarantee in order to ensure the compatibility of the measure in question with Article 7 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2015, Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission , C‑583/13 P, EU:C:2015:404, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). It is, moreover, with that in mind that Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004, on the basis of which the contested decision was adopted, states that decisions requesting information must indicate the right to have such decisions reviewed by the Courts of the European Union.

183 Therefore, as to whether the limitations made by the contested decision on the right to respect for private life, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, are strictly proportionate, the disadvantages caused by the implementation of the contested decision do not appear disproportionate to the objective of general interest pursued by that decision, which consists in protecting competition in the internal market (see paragraphs 158 to 162 above).

184 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s other arguments.

185 In the first place, as regards the distinction alleged by the applicant between, on the one hand, the concept of ‘personal data’ and, on the other hand, the right to the confidentiality of correspondence and information relating to ‘private life’, it is true that the contested decision lays down procedural safeguards regarding sensitive personal data as defined in Article 9(1) of Regulation 2016/679.

186 However, it must be observed that the right to the protection of personal data, set out in Article 8(1) of the Charter, is closely connected with the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter (judgments of 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 47, and of 24 November 2011, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito , C‑468/10 and C‑469/10, EU:C:2011:777, paragraph 41).

187 In that regard, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (judgment of 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 52). Thus, as long as the conditions governing the legal processing of personal data under Regulation 2016/679 are fulfilled, such processing meets, in principle, the requirements of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges) , C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraph 332).

188 In the present case, it should be recalled that, under Article 6(1)(c) of Regulation 2016/679, the applicant is engaged in a lawful processing of personal data by communicating to the Commission documents containing such data which are requested pursuant to the contested decision. Under Article 9(2)(g) of the same regulation, the processing of sensitive personal data is lawful if it is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of EU law or Member State law, which must be proportionate to the objective pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.

189 In addition, under Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725, EU institutions may lawfully process personal data if that processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in those institutions.

190 In that regard, the contested decision constitutes a manifestation of the exercise of the powers conferred on the Commission by Regulation No 139/2004, which, as is made clear in paragraph 159 above, contributes to the maintenance of the system of competition intended by the Treaties with which undertakings are absolutely bound to comply.

191 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 is not an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains , C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).

192 In the present case, as is apparent from the analysis carried out in paragraphs 153 and 163 to 183 above, the limitations imposed by the contested decision on the right to respect for private life, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, do not compromise the essence of the fundamental right and are not disproportionate to the objective of protecting effective and undistorted competition in the internal market pursued by that decision.

193 Thus, the applicant’s argument, summarised in paragraph 164 above, that the Commission confused the protection afforded to personal data with the right to respect for private life must be rejected, since it cannot call into question the conformity of the contested decision with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.

194 In the second place, with regard to the claim that the contested decision is disproportionate in that it imposes an obligation to supply documents from personal communication tools and applications of the persons concerned where they have been used just once for professional purposes during the relevant period, it must be observed that, first, the investigation concerns presumed infringements of the competition rules, making it more likely that relatively informal and discreet communication channels are used rather than professional devices.

195 Second, a change in frequency in that regard, for example, that a tool or an application must have been used at least 25 times for professional purposes, would entail the risk of documents relevant to the Commission’s investigation not being disclosed, as there is no guarantee that a person who has used a personal communication tool or application for professional purposes fewer than 25 times has not sent or received documents relevant to the Commission’s investigation.

196 In the third place, the argument that the contested decision is disproportionate owing to the fact that its implementation would bring to light a significant number of documents falling within the scope of private life, including documents concerning political opinions and religious beliefs, cannot call into question the proportionality of that decision, having regard to the fact that the applicant has still not shown that there are search terms that are more appropriate to achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the contested decision and less likely to bring to light documents concerning the political opinions or religious beliefs of the persons concerned.

197 The second part of the third plea in law must therefore be rejected, as must, in consequence, the third plea in its entirety.

The fourth plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 ECHR

198 By the fourth plea in law, the applicant submits that the contested decision infringes Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 ECHR. The plea in law is divided into two parts, based on, first, on a lack of formal procedural safeguards intended to protect journalistic sources and, second, the inadequacy of the procedural safeguards intended to protect such sources.

The first part of the fourth plea in law, alleging a lack of formal procedural safeguards intended to protect journalistic sources

199 In the first place, the applicant claims that, unless the contested decision is amended or written assurance is provided by the Commission regarding the procedural safeguards proposed informally by that institution, it is unable to take the steps necessary to comply with the contested decision without infringing the right to the protection of journalists’ sources.

200 The Commission states that, in a letter of 25 September 2023, the applicant brought to its attention legal and technical difficulties that it had encountered in complying with the decision of 19 September 2023, followed, on 4 October 2023, by a legal note in which the applicant proposed excluding from the scope of the decision of 19 September 2023 all documents which may reveal a journalistic source in cases in which it was not possible to obtain the consent of the journalists concerned.

201 On 6 October 2023, the Commission proposed applying, in relation to documents that may fall within the scope of the protection of journalistic sources, procedural safeguards similar to those put in place to guarantee the confidentiality of communications covered by legal professional privilege.

202 By the letter of 6 December 2023, the Commission confirmed the implementation of such a method. In paragraph 14 of that letter, the Commission ‘confirms that documents which could reveal journalistic sources enjoy special protection’ and ‘proposes applying procedural safeguards similar to those put in place to guarantee the confidentiality of communications covered by legal professional privilege[;] in practice, the persons concerned by the contested decision and who hold a press card could review the documents satisfying the criteria set out in the [contested decision], identify the information covered by such protection and provide a version with the identification of the journalistic sources redacted (or, failing that, withdraw the document from the information produced if it is impossible to provide a non-confidential version)[;] as the person responsible for the full and accurate supply of all documents falling within the scope of the [contested decision], Lagardère [must] supply the remainder of the documents and a table giving a detailed summary of the nature of the information redacted or the documents withdrawn from the information produced’.

203 In paragraph 14 of the decision of 24 January 2024, the Commission reproduced the procedural safeguards contained in the letter of 6 December 2023 and explained that that letter was an integral part of that decision.

204 It must be observed that, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is apparent from the case file that the procedural safeguards at issue were proposed by the Commission as early as 6 October 2023 and that formal and written assurances were given to the applicant as early as 6 December 2023. Furthermore, the applicant has disputed the adequacy of those safeguards in the context of the second part of the present plea in law.

205 Consequently, and in the light of the fact that the deadline laid down in the decision of 19 September 2023 was initially extended until 1 December 2023 and then until 7 February 2024 (see paragraphs 18 and 22 above), the applicant’s argument reproduced in paragraph 199 must be rejected.

206 In the second place, the applicant observes, in its reply, that the procedural safeguards were only integrated into the contested decision by the decision of 24 January 2024. At the hearing, it claimed that the Commission cannot, in adopting that decision, validly amend the contested decision and that the approach taken by the Commission was unsuitable for that purpose.

207 In that regard, while it is true that the legality of an EU measure is assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing at the time when the measure was adopted (see judgment of 17 December 2014, Si.mobil v Commission , T‑201/11, EU:T:2014:1096, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited), the fact remains that an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must exist when the action was brought and continue until the final decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2020, Izba Gospodarcza Producentów i Operatorów Urządzeń Rozrywkowych v Commission , C‑560/18 P, EU:C:2020:330, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). A plea for annulment is inadmissible on the ground of lack of interest in bringing proceedings where, even if it were well founded, annulment of the contested act on the basis of that plea would not give the applicant satisfaction (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2011, Evropaïki Dynamiki v ECB , C‑401/09 P, EU:C:2011:370, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). It is for the applicant to provide proof of its interest in bringing proceedings (see judgment of 30 June 2022, Camerin v Commission , C‑63/21 P, not published, EU:C:2022:516, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). In addition, it should be borne in mind that, since the conditions governing the admissibility of an action relate to the absolute bar to proceeding with an action, the Court must determine of its own motion whether the applicant has an interest in the annulment of the decision at issue (see judgment of 21 December 2022, E. Breuninger v Commission , T‑525/21, EU:T:2022:835, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

208 In the present case, in response to the measures of organisation of procedure, the applicant stated that, following the adoption of the decision of 24 January 2024, its interest in disputing the existence of formal procedural safeguards intended to protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources persisted, since, first, the Commission cannot retroactively restore the legality of the contested decision and, second, the safeguards provided were incapable of preventing any breach of the protection of journalistic sources. It put forward, in that regard, new arguments seeking to dispute the adequacy of the safeguards in question. However, those new arguments, raised for the first time by the applicant in its response to the measures of organisation of procedure, must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 84(2) of the Rules of Procedure because they are not based on new matters of law or of fact, as is apparent from paragraph 204 above.

209 In addition, such arguments cannot establish the applicant’s continued interest in bringing proceedings in the context of that claim. The applicant fails to explain, inter alia, why the annulment of the contested decision would be of benefit to it, since, as noted in paragraphs 200 to 203 above, the Commission introduced safeguards relating to the protection of journalistic sources intended to address the related concerns expressed by the applicant. In particular, in the decision of 24 January 2024, the Commission reproduced the procedural safeguards set out in the letter of 6 December 2023 and clarified that that letter was an integral part of that decision. In addition, as the applicant confirmed at the hearing, it did not modify the form of order sought in order to challenge that decision, even though the Commission, by letter of 25 January 2024, informed the Court of the adoption of the decision of 24 January 2024 and invited the applicant to modify its application on the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure.

210 The applicant has not therefore established that the annulment of the contested decision on the basis of the arguments summarised in paragraph 199 above could give it satisfaction as required by the case-law cited in paragraph 207 above.

211 The first part of the fourth plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The second part of the fourth plea in law, alleging the inadequacy of the procedural safeguards intended to protect journalistic sources

212 The applicant claims that the procedural safeguards informally proposed by the Commission involve the applicant conducting an individual review, for each journalist, of the documents corresponding to the search terms and drawing up a directory of all the documents excluded. In the present case, the search terms imposed by the Commission would bring to light over 77 000 documents, including many documents unrelated to the subject matter of the investigation. Accordingly, the Commission imposed a disproportionate workload on the applicant.

213 In that regard, the applicant argues that the Commission could have adopted less intrusive measures, in particular by refining certain search terms, linking them to others in order to narrow the scope of its requests more effectively and making the search terms specific to the individual persons concerned. Without such clarifications, and given the short deadlines set by the Commission, the possibility afforded to journalists of excluding documents which they consider to be covered by the confidentiality of their sources is artificial and does not allow their rights to be protected effectively.

214 The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

215 Article 11 of the Charter, entitled ‘Freedom of expression and information’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

216 The rights and freedoms enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter are not absolute rights, but must be considered in relation to their function in society (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others , C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

217 As set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter, the Charter allows limitations on the exercise of those rights and freedoms, provided that those limitations are provided for by law, they respect the essence of the rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

218 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 11 of the Charter constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist and democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige and Watson and Others , C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970, paragraph 93).

219 In addition, it follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. However, that provision does not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.

220 When interpreting Article 11 of the Charter, the EU judicature must therefore take account of the corresponding rights guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, as the minimum threshold of protection (see judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol , C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

221 In that regard, it should be recalled that the ECtHR has taken the view that an order for the compulsory surrender of journalistic material which contained information capable of identifying journalistic sources sufficed to find that the order in question had to be regarded as constituting an interference with the exercise of the freedom to receive and impart information under Article 10(1) ECHR (ECtHR, 14 September 2010, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands , CE:ECHR:2010:0914JUD003822403, § 72).

222 However, the ECtHR has also found that interference with the exercise of the freedom of expression by means of strategic monitoring cannot be characterised as particularly serious when such surveillance measures are not intended to disclose journalistic sources (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 29 June 2006, Weber and Saravia v. Germany , CE:ECHR:2006:0629DEC005493400, § 151).

223 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 222 above, it must be observed that the contested decision does not concern, as such, the disclosure of journalistic sources, since the subject matter of that decision is the collection of information in order to determine whether Vivendi infringed the notification requirement, the standstill obligation or the obligation to comply with conditions associated with a decision declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market. Information relating to journalistic sources would be disclosed, should the procedural safeguards provided for not be implemented, only incidentally. It follows that the limitation on the exercise of the freedom of expression entailed by the contested decision cannot be characterised as particularly serious.

224 The applicant does not raise any claims regarding the requirements laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter and does not dispute the Commission’s assertion that the implementation of the procedural safeguards set out in the letter of 6 December 2023 and reproduced in the decision of 24 January 2024 (see paragraphs 202 and 203 above) will fully protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources, since journalists will be able to review the documents satisfying the criteria set out in the contested decision, identify information covered by such protection and provide a version with the journalistic sources redacted, or, failing that, withdraw the document from the information produced if it is not possible to supply a non-confidential version.

225 The applicant claims merely that the procedural safeguards intended to protect the confidentiality of journalistic sources would generate an excessive workload. In its view, those procedural safeguards are therefore ‘artificial’, as they do not allow the rights of the journalists concerned to be protected effectively.

226 In that regard, it must be observed that it follows from the case-law of the ECtHR that the safeguards must be practically and effectively and not in a theoretical or illusory manner, in particular having regard to the significant number of electronic documents and messages seized (see, by analogy, ECtHR, 2 April 2015, Vinci Construction and GTM Génie Civil et Services v. France , CE:ECHR:2015:0402JUD006362910, § 75 and the case-law cited).

227 In the present case, the applicant argues that 14 persons have to review 77 000 documents, that is, 5 500 documents per person on average, and that the workload generated by the task for each journalist is significant. However, it must be observed that the applicant provides no indication of the workload which would be involved in producing a table giving a detailed summary of the redacted information or the documents withdrawn from the information provided. In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument based on the significant workload resulting from the contested decision cannot demonstrate that the safeguards put in place are theoretical and illusory within the meaning of the case-law of the ECtHR cited in paragraph 226 above.

228 It follows that, contrary to what the applicant claims, the work required in order to implement the procedural safeguards intended to protect journalistic sources is not of a scale such that those safeguards are ‘artificial’, theoretical or illusory, since they do not allow the effective protection of the right of journalists to protect their sources.

229 Furthermore, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the applicant proposed, on its own initiative, excluding from the scope of the contested decision all documents which may reveal a journalistic source where it was unable to obtain the consent of the journalists concerned (see paragraph 200 above).

230 Lastly, the argument that the Commission should have refined certain search terms by linking them to others in order to narrow the scope of its requests more effectively and making the search terms specific to the individual persons concerned will be examined in the context of the second part of the sixth plea in law.

231 The second part of the fourth plea in law must therefore be rejected, as must, in consequence, the fourth plea in its entirety.

The fifth plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of legal certainty

232 The applicant submits that the contested decision infringes the principle of legal certainty because it is unable to understand the scope of the obligations arising from that decision or take the necessary steps to comply with it.

233 In the first place, the collection of the personal data of the employees of the Lagardère group infringes the right to respect for their private life, opening the applicant up to criminal penalties. Since the contested decision compels the applicant to take illegal measures, it infringes the principle of legal certainty.

234 In the second place, the Commission has not provided a consistent definition of the term ‘documents’, a concept that is central to the contested decision. ‘Documents’ are ‘all computer files in the possession of, held by or under the control of Lagardère’, but that term also includes documents contained in the ‘private and/or personal email accounts’ and the ‘private and/or personal mobile telephones or tablets’ of the persons concerned, which, according to the applicant, are not in the possession of, held by or under the control of the Lagardère group.

235 In addition, the contested decision requires the applicant to confirm that the response to the request for information ‘includes all documents corresponding to that request’ and that the documents submitted are ‘genuine, accurate and complete’. However, in the defence, the Commission relies on a lower standard, according to which the applicant is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts’ to respond to the contested decision.

236 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

237 The principle of legal certainty, which is a general principle of EU law, aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by EU law remain foreseeable (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 February 1996, Duff and Others v Commission , C‑63/93, EU:C:1996:51, paragraph 20). That principle requires that every act of the administration which produces legal effects should be clear and precise so that the person concerned may know without ambiguity what are his or her rights and obligations and may take steps accordingly (see judgments of 1 October 1998, Langnese-Iglo v Commission , C‑279/95 P, EU:C:1998:447, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited, and of 14 March 2014, Cemex and Others v Commission , T‑292/11, not published, EU:T:2014:125, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited).

238 It must be stated, first of all, that, in so far as the applicant claims that the documents stored on personal communication devices and applications are not in its possession, held by it or under its control, that argument essentially corresponds to the argument rejected in the context of the first and third pleas in law, namely that the applicant is unable to access certain data which the Commission asks to be communicated.

239 In addition, it should be borne in mind that the fact that certain aspects of the contested decision could give rise to questions of interpretation cannot be regarded as a source of ambiguity such that the Court must find there to be an infringement of the principle of legal certainty vitiating the legality of that decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 March 2014, Holcim (Deutschland) and Holcim v Commission , T‑293/11, not published, EU:T:2014:127, paragraph 93).

240 That is the case as regards the interpretation of the term ‘documents’. Assuming that there is indeed ambiguity in that connection in the contested decision, the fact remains that the Commission cannot legitimately criticise the applicant for the inadequacy of its responses that might have its origin in the lack of precision of the Commission’s own questions. In addition, the Commission confirmed, in its defence, that the contested decision requires that the information supplied by the applicant is genuine, accurate and complete to its knowledge. These are factors which will have to be taken into account in the context of any action challenging a decision imposing a fine or a periodic penalty payment pursuant, respectively, to Article 14(1)(c) or Article 15(1)(a) of Regulation No 139/2004 (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 March 2014, Holcim (Deutschland) and Holcim v Commission , T‑293/11, not published, EU:T:2014:127, paragraph 94).

241 With regard to the applicant’s claims that the contested decision compels it to take illegal measures, or does not provide sufficient protection of documents covered by the confidentiality of journalistic sources, it must be observed that those facts are not the result of a lack of precision or of clarity in the contested decision. It follows that those claims are ineffective in the context of a plea alleging an infringement of the principle of legal certainty.

242 The same is true of the applicant’s assertion that, in its defence, the Commission relies on an alleged standard.

243 The fifth plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The sixth plea in law, alleging infringements of the principles of proportionality and protection against arbitrary intervention by public authorities within the sphere of private activities

244 By the present plea in law, which is comprised of two parts, the applicant claims that the contested decision is in breach of the principles of proportionality and protection against arbitrary intervention by public authorities within the sphere of private activities because that decision goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued by the Commission’s investigation, as regards, first, the legal instrument chosen, second, the extent of the information requested and, third, the deadline for a response imposed. The applicant also submits that the contested decision is not based on any reasonable grounds to foster the Commission’s suspicions of infringements.

Admissibility of the claim alleging a lack of reasonable grounds forming the basis for the contested decision

245 The Commission pleads the inadmissibility of the claim, raised for the first time in the reply, that the contested decision is not based on reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement of the rules of Regulation No 139/2004.

246 The applicant claims that the clarification of the grounds which led the Commission to suspect an infringement, set out in the section of the defence entitled ‘Timeline of relevant facts’, justifies the claim being raised at the reply stage.

247 In accordance with Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure or it amplifies a submission put forward previously, whether directly or by implication, in the application initiating proceedings and is closely connected with that submission (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission , T‑380/17, EU:T:2020:471, paragraph 87 (not published) and the case-law cited).

248 The concept of a ‘plea’ within the meaning of Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure has been interpreted broadly as also covering claims (judgment of 29 November 2018, Spain v Commission , T‑459/16, not published, EU:T:2018:857, paragraph 25) and arguments (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2019, Silver Plastics and Johannes Reifenhäuser v Commission , T‑582/15, not published, EU:T:2019:497, paragraph 198).

249 It must be observed that the fact that the Commission clarified in the defence, in greater detail than in the contested decision, the reasons why it had decided to investigate the presumed infringements cannot constitute a factor justifying the introduction of the present claim. Indeed, there was nothing to prevent the applicant raising that claim in the application, which it failed to do. Furthermore, the applicant does not argue that that claim amplifies a submission put forward previously.

250 It follows that the claim that the contested decision lacks reasonable grounds is not based on matters of law or of fact which came to light in the course of proceedings. It must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.

251 In those circumstances, the request made by the applicant in the context of that new claim, namely for measures of organisation of procedure to be adopted to allow the Court to determine whether the Commission had reasonable grounds to justify the contested decision, is redundant.

The first part of the sixth plea in law, alleging that the legal instrument chosen is disproportionate

252 The applicant claims that immediate recourse to a decision pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 rather than to a simple request in accordance with Article 11(2) of the same regulation is disproportionate. In the present case, recourse to a simple request for information was sufficient.

253 The applicant repeats the arguments summarised in paragraphs 57 and 58 above, stating that the infringement of the principle of proportionality is particularly serious as, on 20 September 2023, the Commission sent it a request for information connected with topics virtually identical to those identified in the contested decision.

254 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

255 First of all, with regard to the recourse had to a request for information by decision on the basis of Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 rather than a simple request for information under Article 11(2) of that regulation, it is clear from Article 11(1) of Regulation No 139/2004 that the Commission may ask for information ‘by simple request or by decision’, without that provision making the adoption of a decision subject to a prior simple request.

256 The Commission enjoys broad discretion in applying Articles 11, 14 and 15 of Regulation No 139/2004 (judgment of 4 October 2024, thyssenkrupp v Commission , C‑581/22 P, EU:C:2024:821, paragraph 380).

257 It is settled case-law that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 12 July 2001, Jippes and Others , C‑189/01, EU:C:2001:420, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).

258 The choice to be made between a simple request for information and a decision must be dependent on what is necessary for a proper investigation, in the light of the specific features of the case in question (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 March 2014, Holcim (Deutschland) and Holcim v Commission , T‑293/11, not published, EU:T:2014:127, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

259 In the present case, in view of the volume of information to be collected and cross-referenced as well as the need for a proper investigation and the significance of the presumed infringements, it is neither inappropriate nor disproportionate, in relation to the needs of the investigation, for the Commission to have decided to have recourse to a decision requesting information, as such a decision allows it, as observed in paragraph 61 above, to penalise the applicant if the information communicated is incomplete or late.

260 In addition, the request for information of 20 September 2023 simply asked the applicant to provide explanations concerning a limited number of events and specific circumstances. The mere fact that the request for information of 20 September 2023 concerned topics, similar to those identified in the contested decision, does not mean that the applicant has to communicate information already in the Commission’s possession, since that decision is based on precise criteria which did not appear in that previous request.

261 Lastly, the applicant’s argument that recourse to a decision rather than to a simple request for information is disproportionate since it cooperated with the Commission as part of the procedure initiated in the context of the review of mergers must be rejected. It is sufficient to recall that the procedure for examining the compatibility of a merger with the internal market is separate from the investigation procedure to establish an infringement of the rules of Regulation No 139/2004.

262 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission did not infringe the principle of proportionality by having recourse to a decision pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation No 139/2004 rather than to a simple request under Article 11(2) of the same regulation.

263 The first part of the sixth plea in law must therefore be rejected.

The second part of the sixth plea in law, alleging that the information requested was disproportionate

264 By the second part of the sixth plea in law, which consists of six complaints, the applicant seeks, in essence, to demonstrate that various aspects of the contested decision infringe the principle of proportionality by imposing on it a workload that is disproportionate to the needs of the Commission’s investigation.

– Preliminary observations

265 It should be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that measures adopted by the institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see judgment of 12 December 2012, Electrabel v Commission , T‑332/09, EU:T:2012:672, paragraph 279 and the case-law cited).

266 According to settled case-law, an undertaking which is being investigated is subject to an obligation to cooperate actively, which implies that it must make available to the Commission all information relating to the subject matter of the investigation (see judgment of 9 April 2019, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , T‑371/17, not published, EU:T:2019:232, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited).

267 It must be emphasised, however, that the Commission’s exercise of that power is subject to observance of, inter alia, the principle of proportionality. Indeed, the obligation imposed on an undertaking to supply information should not be a burden on that undertaking which is disproportionate to the needs of the investigation (see judgment of 9 April 2019, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , T‑371/17, not published, EU:T:2019:232, paragraph 120 and the case-law cited).

268 Nevertheless, the mere fact that a request for information involves a significant workload for an undertaking is not sufficient in itself to establish that it is disproportionate in relation to the needs of the investigation relating to, inter alia, the presumed infringements which the Commission intends to investigate and the circumstances of the procedure in question (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 April 2019, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , T‑371/17, not published, EU:T:2019:232, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).

269 It also follows from case-law that, having regard to the broad power of investigation conferred on the Commission by Regulation No 139/2004, it is for the Commission to decide whether a particular item of information is necessary to enable it to bring to light an infringement of the competition rules (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). However, the Commission cannot be required, before requesting any information, to be familiar with the content of the requested documents and their relative importance for the investigation (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 March 2012, Slovak Telekom v Commission , T‑458/09 and T‑171/10, EU:T:2012:145, paragraph 55).

270 Even if the Commission already has evidence, or indeed proof, of the existence of an infringement, it may legitimately take the view that it is necessary to request further information enabling it better to define the scope of the infringement, determine its duration or identify the circle of undertakings involved (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

271 As regards the judicial review exercised by the EU judicature of the Commission’s finding that an item of information is necessary, the Court of Justice has held that necessity had to be judged in relation to the purpose stated in the request for information, namely the suspected infringement which the Commission intends to investigate. The requirement that a correlation must exist between the request for information and the suspected infringement is satisfied if the Commission could reasonably suppose, at the time of the request, that the information may help it to determine whether that infringement has taken place (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

272 Since the necessity of the information must be judged in relation to the purpose stated in the request for information, that purpose must be indicated with sufficient precision, otherwise it will be impossible to determine whether the information is necessary and the EU judicature will be prevented from exercising judicial review (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 March 2016, Schwenk Zement v Commission , C‑248/14 P, not published, EU:C:2016:150, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

273 The applicant’s arguments must be examined in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 265 to 272 above. In that regard, it must be observed that the applicant does not dispute that the purpose stated in the request for information is indicated with sufficient precision in the contested decision.

– The first complaint, relating to the overlap between the topics and the search terms

274 By the first complaint, the applicant asserts that the request to produce all documents ‘prepared and/or received and/or sent and/or held by the persons concerned’ in the context of the adoption of decisions falling within the scope of certain topics is disproportionate to the needs of the investigation and generates an excessive workload for it, as it would have to meet the persons concerned individually to discuss the topics and determine search terms in addition to those already specified in the contested decision. Furthermore, the Commission did not address the concerns expressed by the applicant in that regard.

275 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

276 First of all, it must be observed that the applicant does not dispute the Commission’s assertion that the topics serve to ensure that the search conducted using keywords is complete. Accordingly, the applicant cannot legitimately claim that the Commission could itself have defined a less onerous methodology, by identifying other search terms, since the identification of additional search terms is dependent on the added value of the persons concerned. The applicant has therefore failed to establish that there is a less onerous methodology for identifying the documents necessary for the investigation.

277 In addition, the applicant has entirely failed to substantiate the claim that the requirement to hear the persons concerned, whether in order to identify additional search terms or to address that aspect of the contested decision in another way, would impose a disproportionate and excessive workload on it.

278 The first complaint must therefore be rejected.

– The second complaint, alleging that the concept of ‘persons concerned’ is disproportionate

279 By the second complaint, the applicant argues that the Commission’s request requiring it to supply documents of all the predecessors and successors of the persons identified by name in all the posts occupied by those persons over the relevant period means that a further 20 persons are concerned by the contested decision, even though 4 of those persons have no connection with the subject matter of the investigation.

280 The contested decision is therefore disproportionate, particularly since the Commission had information allowing it to make a narrower request, by requiring the applicant to communicate only the documents relating to the predecessors and successors of the persons identified by name in that decision who may have been involved in the adoption of decisions of interest to the Commission.

281 The Commission disputes that line of argument.

282 In the present case, it is clear from recital 6 of the contested decision that the objective of that decision is to obtain information to allow the Commission to assess whether Vivendi exercised decisive influence over Lagardère that could constitute breaches of the notification requirement and the standstill obligation as well as a failure to comply with commitments, contrary to the provisions of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 139/2004.

283 It must be observed, first of all, that, in the context of the present complaint, the applicant does not call into question the relevance of the documents sent or received by the 15 persons identified by name in the contested decision. Nor does it dispute that the four persons who, in its view, have no connection with the entities being investigated held strategic roles within the Lagardère group, in particular within subsidiaries that fell within the scope of the acquisition by Vivendi.

284 Thus, the applicant has not established that the Commission could not reasonably assume that the documents of those persons could assist in determining the existence of the suspected infringements of Regulation No 139/2004. In addition, neither has the applicant demonstrated that there is a less onerous method of identifying the documents necessary for the investigation nor what workload would be generated by the searches for documents originating from the four persons who, according to it, have no connection with the subject matter of the investigation.

285 It follows that the applicant has not established that the contested decision is disproportionate because that decision requires it to provide the documents of the predecessors and successors of the persons identified by name.

286 The second complaint must therefore be rejected.

– The third complaint, alleging that the search terms are disproportionate

287 By the third complaint, the applicant argues that the lack of precision of certain search terms and the manner in which they are applied result in the collection of an excessive number of documents which are unconnected with the subject matter of the Commission’s investigation.

288 According to the applicant, the disproportionate nature of those search terms is illustrated by the volume of documents corresponding to the application of each combination of search terms. The workload required is excessive because the sorting required to identify communications covered by professional legal privilege, sensitive personal data and, as the case may be, documents that may reveal journalistic sources is particularly time-consuming given the significant number of documents. The Commission could have opted for a less excessive approach without that undermining the objectives of its investigation, for example by specifying additional search terms or determining a shorter period than the relevant period, in particular for decisions under investigation relating to the departure and arrival of individuals, the choices of magazine covers or specific projects or events.

289 In addition, it is disproportionate to request that the applicant provide the entirety of an email chain, an SMS conversation or a series of instant messages over the relevant period as a whole if a single message within that conversation satisfies the terms of the contested decision or the search terms appear at various points in the conversation.

290 The Commission disputes those arguments.

291 The applicant provides only one concrete example in support of the argument that the application of the search terms in the data of all the persons concerned is neither necessary nor the least onerous measure which the Commission could have adopted. It argues that, since none of the search terms is connected with the predecessor of the person referred to in point II(4)(b) of the annex to the contested decision or his roles at Lagardère, its application in his data necessarily generates documents wholly unconnected with the investigation.

292 However, the applicant does not dispute the fact that the search terms are connected with the person mentioned in point II(4)(b) of the annex to the contested decision.

293 In addition, although the applicant disputes the necessity, in the sense of a correlation between the request for information and the suspected infringement, of certain search terms, it merely states in the application that applying those terms brings to light many documents unconnected with the investigation. It fails to demonstrate that there are search terms that are more appropriate to achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the contested decision. In those circumstances, the applicant has not established that those search terms are unnecessary.

294 As for the argument that the Commission does not produce any evidence to suspect Vivendi’s involvement in the arrival, in April 2020, of the person mentioned in point II(4)(n) of the annex to the contested decision at Lagardère, when Vivendi’s stake in the applicant amounted to just 1%, it must be observed that it is apparent from the defence that the Commission has evidence that the transfer of that person was linked to a planned merger. It follows that the applicant has not established that those search terms were unnecessary.

295 The applicant’s arguments that there are equally appropriate but less onerous measures to achieve the legitimate objectives of the investigation lack precision and are insufficiently substantiated.

296 In the first place, although the applicant asserts that the Commission could have chosen a less onerous measure without that undermining the objectives of its investigation, the applicant identifies just one combination of search terms which, in its view, could have been substituted for the search terms laid down in the contested decision. That involves the addition of ‘CNews’, the name of a news channel in France, to the search terms ‘[part of a surname] OR [part of a surname] * OR NS’. The applicant does not explain, however, why the addition of the word ‘CNews’ would constitute an equally appropriate but less onerous measure to achieve the objective of the Commission’s investigation.

297 In the second place, as regards the claim that the Commission could have made the list of search terms specific to individuals as it had done in the request for information dated 5 December 2022, it must be observed that, first, unlike the contested decision, that request was made in the context of the approval of the planned merger. Second, the applicant has provided no further explanations as to which search terms would be appropriate.

298 In the third place, as for the application of the search terms ‘[first name]’ and ‘[surname]’ combined with the term ‘Vivendi’, the fact that the person mentioned in point II(4)(b) of the annex to the contested decision sits on the management board alongside a representative of Vivendi cannot establish that there is another equally appropriate measure to achieve the objectives of the investigation. The same is true of the assertion that applying the combination of search terms concerning the arrivals, hirings or appointments of some of the persons concerned in their own documents leads to the identification of all the documents of those persons in which the arrival, hiring or appointment of any person whatsoever to any post at all is considered.

299 In the fourth place, the allegation that it is disproportionate to require that the applicant provide the entirety of a chain of communications if just one message in that conversation corresponds to search terms must be rejected, because the context of a piece of information is likely to make that information more easily understandable to the Commission and clarify its relevance for the purposes of the investigation.

300 In the fifth place, the applicant alleges that the application of certain search terms for the entirety of the relevant period is disproportionate. That allegation must be rejected since it is apparent from the contested decision, inter alia, that the Commission is examining the selection of all the covers of Paris Match and JDD-Magazine and not just those relating to certain dates.

301 As for the departures and arrivals of the persons identified in point III(6)(d) of the annex to the contested decision and the specific events, such as the plans regarding a bid to purchase the American publisher Simon & Schuster and the Margot litigation, while it cannot be ruled out that the application of the search terms could have been limited to a specific period, a period shorter than the relevant period, the applicant has failed to explain to the Court what the duration of that alternative period would be and what impact the approach it advocates would have on the volume of documents requested and therefore on its workload.

302 The third complaint must therefore be rejected.

– The fourth complaint, alleging that the request to supply all exchanges between some of the persons concerned is disproportionate

303 By the fourth complaint, the applicant argues that it is disproportionate to request that all the exchanges over the relevant period between the persons mentioned in point II(4)(a) and (c) of the annex to the contested decision are provided, because the great majority of their exchanges are unrelated to the subject matter of the investigation.

304 In the applicant’s view, the Commission could have chosen a less onerous measure by making that request subject to search terms which would have led to the identification of 765 documents rather than 4 939.

305 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

306 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that the person mentioned in point II(4)(a) of the annex to the contested decision is the chairman of a subsidiary of Lagardère, a company which is part of the news business of the Lagardère group, and that the person mentioned in point II(4)(c) of the annex to that decision is the CEO of another subsidiary of Lagardère, a company which is part of the radio business. In addition, it is apparent from recital 7 of the contested decision (see paragraph 9 above) that the Commission’s investigation concerns, inter alia, the programmes of the audiovisual entities, the radio programme schedule, the appointments and departures of journalists within publications and the editorial choices of magazines. The two persons concerned are members of the executive board of the Lagardère group.

307 It must be observed, as the Commission notes, that the persons mentioned in point II(4)(a) and (c) of the annex to the contested decision hold senior posts in an area of activity key to the Commission’s investigation, and therefore the documents requested are necessary and appropriate within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 271 above.

308 That finding is not called into question by the applicant’s claims that it would be required to identify, from among 4 939 documents, communications covered by professional legal privilege and sensitive personal data. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the fact that the applicant is required to provide a significant number of documents cannot call into question the necessity of those documents to the Commission’s investigation. Even assuming that the workload generated by that aspect of the contested decision is significant, the applicant has not established that it is disproportionate to the needs of the investigation, nor that there is a less onerous method of achieving the Commission’s objectives. Furthermore, the contested decision provides for procedural safeguards to protect communications covered by professional legal privilege and sensitive personal data.

309 It follows that the fourth complaint must be rejected.

– The fifth complaint, alleging that the relevant period is disproportionate

310 By the fifth complaint, the applicant argues that the relevant period is disproportionate because it commences on 1 January 2020 rather than on 30 June 2021. First, the planned merger was announced only in September 2021, that is to say, one year and nine months after the start of the period used by the Commission, namely 1 January 2020. Second, the issues of interest to the Commission relate to events that occurred in the summer of 2021 at the earliest.

311 The Commission disputes the applicant’s line of argument.

312 It must be recalled that Regulation No 139/2004 requires that the Commission ensure that no concentration which has a Community dimension is effected, in breach of Article 7 of Regulation No 139/2004, before being notified and authorised.

313 It is apparent from paragraph 84 above that the purpose of the Commission’s investigation is to gather information in order to assess, inter alia, whether Vivendi exercised decisive influence over Lagardère that could constitute a breach of the notification obligation and/or a breach of the standstill obligation.

314 In view of the fact that the Vivendi first acquired a stake in Lagardère in March 2020, the Commission could reasonably assume, on the date of the contested decision, that information relating to the period commencing 1 January 2020 could assist it to determine the existence of that infringement, in particular because that information would provide it with a better understanding of all the relevant events and of the context in which those events had occurred. In addition, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the Commission is investigating the appointment, in March 2020, to the management bodies of Lagardère of individuals close to the person referred to in point III(7)(b) of the annex to the contested decision and the transfer of the person mentioned in point II(4)(n) of the annex to the contested decision from an undertaking in the Vivendi group to the Lagardère group in April 2020.

315 It follows that the applicant has not established that the contested decision is disproportionate because the relevant period commences on 1 January 2020.

316 The fifth complaint must therefore be rejected.

– The sixth complaint, alleging that the deadline for a response is disproportionate

317 The applicant submits that the reply deadline imposed, which was initially set as 27 October 2023 and then extended until 1 December 2023, is disproportionate because it is too short to enable it to handle all the Commission’s requests and is not justified by the needs of the investigation.

318 It must be observed, as the Commission notes, that, on 20 October 2023 the applicant requested a 10-week extension of the deadline, bringing the total time limit to over 3 months. In addition, the deadline initially set as 27 October 2023 was extended first until 1 December 2023 and then until 7 February 2024. The applicant was therefore given a longer deadline than it deemed necessary to respond in full to the contested decision, a fact which the applicant does not dispute.

319 The sixth complaint must therefore be rejected, without it being necessary to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission in that regard.

320 Furthermore, as regards the alleged infringement of the general principle of EU law affording protection against intervention by public authorities in the private activities of a natural or legal person, raised in the context of the present plea in law, it must be observed that the applicant does not put forward any independent argument in support of that allegation which is separate from those raised in support of the infringement of the principle of proportionality. That complaint must therefore be rejected.

321 The second part of the sixth plea in law must therefore be rejected as must, in consequence, the sixth plea in its entirety.

Conclusion

322 Since all the pleas in law relied on by the applicant have been rejected, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

Costs

323 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay its own costs as well as those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter, including those relating to the interim proceedings registered under numbers T‑1119/23 R, C‑89/24 P(R)-R, C‑89/24 P(R), T‑1119/23 R-RENV and T‑1119/23 RIII.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Ninth Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Lagardère SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, including those relating to the interim proceedings registered under numbers T ‑ 1119/23 R, C ‑ 89/24 P(R)-R, C ‑ 89/24 P(R), T ‑ 1119/23 R-RENV and T ‑ 1119/23 RIII.

Truchot | Jaeger | Schwarcz

Sampol Pucurull | | Perišin

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 June 2026.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: French