Citizen participation in European politics

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Citizen

Participation in

European

Politics

STATE§§OF§ENIMWÃ" UTREDNXNGA

SOL

1‘‘7‘Z: £5

Citizen

Participation

Politics

European

Hans Agné

Cees van der Eijk

Brigid Laffan

i Britta Lejon Pippa Norris Hermann Schmin‘

Richard Sinnott

Demokratiutredningens 32

skrift nr

STATENS OFFENTLIGA

UTREDNINGAR

SOU och Ds ingår i 1999 års nummerserie kan köpas från Fakta Info Direkt.

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Omslagsbild: Pressens Bild

Grafisk formgivning: Susan Nilsson, Jupiter ISBN 91-7610-714- Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2000 ISSN O375-25OX

Preface

In October 1999 conference held Stockholm Citizen a was on Participation in European Politics. The background of the dis-

cussion low Swedish the Elections the Eurowas a turn-out to Parliament in June. We wanted give of and pean to an account discuss research citizen participation European politics on

illuminating possible explanations. Special attention given

was to the connection between the hand the level of participation on one and the other hand the role of the institutions and of the on mass

medial

During the two days five international and four Swedish scholars contributed by giving lectures consisting of variety of chala

lenging perspectives and empirical data. In order stimulate the

to public debate pleased publish of the lectures. we are now to most The conference arranged by The Commission Demowas on cracy Sweden in cooperation with The Swedish Ministry of

Justice and The Committe of Evaluation of the General Election of 1998.

The organisers their deepest gratitude

want to express to professor Sören Holmberg for his during the plangenerous support ning of the conference. However, neither professor Holmberg nor the organisers but the authors themselves finally responsible are for the opinions formulated in this book.

Erik Amna’

Principal Secreterary

The Commission on Democracy

PREFACE

Notes

1In Swedish the Commission Democracy also has published other

on analyses dealing with global and European challenges Swedish

to democracy, for instance Demokrati på europeisk nivå SOU 1998:124, EU demokratiproje/et SOU 1998:145, Bör demo-

- ett kratin avnationaliseras SOU 1999:11 and Globaliseringen ocb demokratin SOU 1999:56.

EU

Democracy within the

in the of the 1999

Light

European Parliamentary

Elections

Member of Cabinet Britta Lejon, Ministry of Justice

Ladies and gentlemen,

I ha welcome all the seminar "Citizen Particiam .Ppy to ou to on pation. in European Politics. This. . . focused of the seminar is on one most important common goals in Europe: To grant that the European Union will be and percieved be union of the people of to a

Europe.

We Who share that vision terribl back b the are y set y p oor turnout 0 the electionsI Euro arliamentu thisu in to Pean summer. A low participation. . . the . . the obstacle . citizens is greatest in

the of securing and prosperity Europe.

process peace

The EU has been given important tasks. They involve

guaranteeing

peace, ensuring a good environment, creating favourable living conditions, and much besides. We do consider national decinot sions be sufficient in addressing such problems precarious to as security, environmental threats, organised international crime, flows of capital that shift jobs from another with one country to

lightning speed, but few. We need political decision-

to name a

DEMOCRACY WITHINTHE EU IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1999 EUROPEAN...

making that deal powerfully with those problems for which can individual nations lack sufficient decision-making authority.

Decisions reached within the European Union have major con-

nearly all policy EU policies have effects the

sequences areas. on

work of national parliaments well that of municipalities

as as on councils. The EU influences the everyday life of people and county living within and in fact also far outside the borders of the community. Moreover, the influence of the EU in such steadily areas The Treaty of Amsterdam has number of political

increasing. put a issues the Union agenda which essentially of everyday

on are an

for example policy, social issues, equality bet-

nature, consumer

and employment policy.

ween men and women At the time know that decisions and decision—makers same we

the political sphere have popular legitimacy and support.

must The European elections the single occasion which the are on citizens of Europe join forces influence the shape of the can to EU’s future. Nevertheless only half, 49.9 cent, of the EU citiper entitled did in the European elections held this zens to vote so The election turnout in Sweden was 38.8 per cent. summer. We elections which well below half of the elicannot accept

gible participate. There number of for

voters are a reasons concern. First, consider that low election reduces the legiwe a turnout timacy of the institution concerned. Second, afraid that low in election will rub we are a turnout one off other elections. That low the Euroon to say, a turnout elections might also citizens into the habit of not voting pean get national elections. Third, high election has its intrinsic democratic a turnout own value. indicative of broad political debate within society, in a which people familiarise themselves with political most current

issues and make their judgements regarding the political

own development they would like few take part elections to see. the risk the opposite that democracy will be diluted and that a — representative will in be reduced government a sense to govern-

ment by a minority.

BHITFA LEJON

T0 the trend towards low electoral turnout need knowreverse we ledge. This why the Swedish Government the Committee gave of Evaluation of the General Election of 1998 the additional task

of analysing the results of the 1999 European elections. also why the Commission Democracy in Sweden, the on Committee of Evaluation of the General Election of 1998 and the Ministry of Justice, have invited take in this seminar. you to part

There might be different views the ideals of democracy. But the on absolute majority of people in full the key role of are agreement on general elections in democracy. The EU not nation, a a a

special organisation but does have directly elected parlia-

very a

However, the authority of this parliament be equated

ment. cannot with that of national parliament. a People countries have realised that the Euroour power Union concentrated exclusively the Parliament. An pean not important why the European Parliament does not attract reason

the interest national parliament undoubtedly that sig-

same as a nificant vested the national governments. power But the low interest in the European Parliament reflects low a interest in democratically elected institutions generally. From the point of View of democracy number of negative trends be a can society today, both in Sweden and in of the mature seen most democracies. There declining confidence in political institutions. Public participation and the confidence of citizens in the ability of the established parties solve problems and take action being to

successively weakened. Public participation society requires

efforts and commitment both of which greater permanent — are

decreasing.

As far I the situation not dramatic in the present as can see, EU member Democracy system not threatened states. as a —on the There considerable popular for democracy contrary. support the best form of as governance.

But since public confidence and participation long-term so-

are

cial phenomena, important to heed the warning signs early on.

DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE EU IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1999 EUROPEAN...

Beside the low also have the results of the electurn-out we recent tions

European Union facing massive and in part difficult challenges. Enlargement eastwards of them. one

We must identify which problems specifically related the

are to EU. Efforts to make the work of the EU more transparent are an important part of this. Sweden has long tradition of public a access to information. The question of applies all EU transparency to institutions. The EU be organisation of its Modermust an age. nising the institutions of the EU crucial for public participation. We need transparent and understandable We need processes.

budgetary disciplin, accountability, equal opurtunities for and

men to documents other things. But order women access among to , boost European elections also reflect turnout at we must upon what role would have the EU play the future. we However, I don’t think will be enough implement instituto tional reforms at the EU-level. The political parties, other NGOs, the media will also have revise the in which they mass etc, to way work.

Many EU—related issues have had divisive effect the tradia on tional parties. Nevertheless, I believe that these parties have must the EU issues the agenda, partly for the sake of courage to put on their future and partly because allow people’s own we cannot confidence in politicians deteriorate still further. A study made in to 1998 shows that 60 of consider themselves over per cent voters to be uninformed when EU—related issues. A 2 comes to mere per cent consider themselves be well informed. to very Among other things there be effort increase and must an to deepen information to the public about union—decisions and the the fulfilling of them. This responsability for the progress a EU—institutions specially the council and the member — — states. Creating national democracies took decades. Building our European cooperation democratic foundation also be on a must

BRITTA LEJON

allowed take time, perhaps longer bearing in mind how

to even

the East European democracies new are.

After this introduction I look forward hearing views

to your and discussing these with the two days. In

matters you over next the coming discussions about the future development of the Union the Swedish intend keep focus popular

governments to on

and participation. There be joint analysis of the

support must a

for the low election and proposals of reasons turnout measures that might the trend.

reverse

Thank

you.

Some People Vote Why

and Others do not

Cees van der Eijk‘

The question of the determinants of participation in elections has

occupied political scientists and political practitioners alike,

particularly since the introduction of universal suffrage. This question arises from the basic observation that all people who have the not right make of that right: while people vote, to vote use some others do Consequently, tempted ask whether this not. one to difference originates in other distinctions between these two and what other characteristics involved. groups, so, are Before World War H, this question had be addressed mainly to

analysis of of turnout by region, municipality, or

percentages smaller geographical units. Renowned in this the even respect are studies of the French sociographer André Siegfried 1913 and the

Swedish sociologist Herbert Tingsten 1937. Notwithstanding the insights these analysts gained, this approach has limita-

severe tions, and fallacious conclusions. The developmay even generate of methods after World War II, and the explosion of ment survey

possibilities for analysing large of data

practical amounts survey

with the development of cheap technology have allowed

computer the pursuit of the question of why people do do vote at the or not level of the individual This approach has greatly invoter. survey understanding of the individual—level determinants of creased our

1The author professor Department of political science and at Amsterdam school of communication research at university of

Amsterdam.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

electoral participation. Yet, spite of the tremendous number of

survey—based publications, important questions remain

unanswe-

red particularly concerning the determinants of changes

— overall levels of Most recently, the insight has been estabturnout. lished that combinations of indiVidual—level and aggregate or system-level information required order make further are to progress in answering the question of who and who does votes not, but this approach has been applied much. not yet very In this I will focus the behavior of individual report, on voters,

and the why they do do employ their right

reasons or not to vote. I will therefore systematically address the effects of systemic not characteristics the over—all likelihood of voting although on — passing I will occasionally refer of the work in that tradito some tion.

This divided in three In the first, I review report parts. a number of theoretical approaches the question of individual to electoral participation. The relevant this discussion concern not how successful each of these approaches in explaining differ-

between but rather their conceptual and theoretical ences voters, logic. In the second of this first findings from part report, a recent study of the Swedish electorate will be reported. These derive from

the Swedish of the European Election Study 1999. The segment third part consists of reflective that link 1 and comments parts and that contain informed speculation about of the some causes low turnout in the Swedish parliamentary elections most recent and European elections that, the be subjected at moment, cannot to empirical testing because of lack of relevant data.

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Part 1: Theoretical and conceptual

approaches

The literature electoral participation contains number of on a approaches that differ in of the locus of the factors consiterms

be of causal importance for making people either partici-

dered to abstain in elections. One rarely finds these approaches pate or ideal form, theorists and empirical analysts the benefits as most see of using elements of them in complementary fashion, but for the a

of presentation I will discuss them separately or

purpose more

less ideal—type form. Thefirst of these approaches looks for the explanation of dif-

ferences electoral participation the involved: different to Voters people have different characteristics that help to understand why

they behave differently. The second approach looks at the other that of necessity involved the conduct of elections: actors are

the political parties, the candidates and the politicians. They have

reach and mobilize and the that they fail do to Voters to extent to

this will explain non—voting. The third approach focuses

so on something else again: the specific of the election hand. context at Not all elections alike, and from the differences between them are

explain why people and others do not.

one may try to some vote Each of these three approaches will be discussed in more some detail below.

Who votes depends on voters’ characteristics

The logic of this approach the notion that should rests on voters certain qualities in order to turn out and vote. In general possess think of the following kinds of qualities that relate to one can may

turnout:

Physical qualities: voting requires trip ballot station, and 9 a to a therefore that sufficiently healthy and mobile to a person make this tri that he has sufficient visual and motor skills to P, read the ballot and handle encilc I -machine,u etc. In a P or votin g politicalu u electionsn have been organizedc inu most western systems such minimize the physical and demands that a way as to motor

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

required for casting one’s that the number of are vote, so people unable to vote for these trivial minimized. reasons Yet, for people the activities required will remain some to vote too strenuous the very old, chronically ill, and disabled — — although be expected that their number quite small can developed democratic such Sweden. systems as

Economic and social such time and resources as flexible

To the that voting organized in such

money. extent a way that lot of time because of distance travel costs a to to a polling station, because of waiting for their etc. queues turn, this deter people from voting, and people with free may more time flexible time schedule will be advantaged. This or a more will be particularly when people’s income low that they so so cannot afford lose time that for acquiring their to necessary income In large believed that these factors play measure,

minor role in preventing people from going the

at most a to polls in developed democracies, only because of western were measures taken to minimize these effects long polling

such as

hours, possibilities for absentee voting postal voting, etc.

or

Social connectedness. Elections collective enterprise, the are a results of which relevant for society political are a or commu-

nity Whole. Belonging that community society then

as a to or important factor that whereas being an promotes turnout, estranged or alienated from obstruct electoral participamay tion. For this social integration factor that impinges reason, a turnout, and the individual level this relates the on at to extent that individual integrated networks of relationships that an make into member of the community. Although a person a difficult which characteristics should be taken to state concrete indicative for integration, the relevant literature looks as at

factors such membership of and being active in non-political

as

2 Although not of relevance societies, the most western consequences of this logic sometimes in the opposite direction: voting be run can a source of income in conditions of widespread combination poverty with practice of vote-buying. In such circumstances, elections a operate as a means of redistributing income.

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contexts and organizations including churches, youth

— groups, sports and recreational organzations, and membership

etc. — at of multi—person household that bestows

a upon a person res-

ponsibility for others.

Relevant cognitive and information-/oandling skills. Although

often perceived that voting highly abstract

not way, a act,

particularly in the context of society. Usually voters do

a mass

know the candidates personally, and parties themselves not are often abstract entities. Many of the communications directed

at

the of kind of prior knowledge

voters assume presence some or

understanding of politics. The larger voter’s capacity hand-

a to

abstract and the larger the of

messages arguments, store experience and knowledge s/he the better s/he will be

possesses, able understand the of the voting in general,

to nature act as well in the specific election hand. Although be

as at cannot

assumed that this understanding will necessarily drive people

to

their reasonable that lack of undercast votes, to expect

standing will keep people

away.

A number of characteristics relate cogni-

more concrete to

tive and information-handling skills. Education primary

a

education both duration in level increases one: more as one’s capacity for handling information, increases cognitive skills, and provides specific information that helps

make sense of what election about. In addition formal education,

an to

the amount of previously accumulated experiential knowledge

and understanding also helps. Because of this,

we may expect — ceteris paribas older people to have acquired understan-

— more

ding and hence frequently than

to vote more younger ones. Also those who, for whatever have had direct

reasons, expe-

riences with parties, politicians, and political

processes general, will of this facilitative though not suffi-

possess more cient condition for voting.

Relevant attitudes. In the of their lives, from childhood

course socialization well from experiences in later life,

as as voters have acquired attitudes that either facilitate impede

may or electoral participation. Such attitudes referred the

are to literature e.g. Verba and Nie, 1972 civic attitudes, and they

as

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

pertain generalized rather than election-specific feelings

to

such the following

as

Self—esteem, of political competence and of sense sense political efficacy, all of which refer to whether voter a looks him/herself who have impact at as a person may an his/her life and What going the world on own on on — which makes reasonable to cast vote a —or as someone who unable to affect to do rendering electoral so — par-

ticipation useless activity.

a

Generalized feelings about the importance of politics in general. A view that the political largely irrele-

process for Whatever happens the world and one’s vant own

life impediment to electoral participation, whereas

an the opposite View will promote it.

Generalized feelings about the malleability

openness, and benevolence of the political system all increase the relevance and potentially beneficial effects of voting,

whereas feelings of opposite nature promote percepan a tion of voting futile hazardous. as or even

Civic attitudes, such those referred to above, cannot be as observed directly in terms of overt behavior. Rather, they have be inferred from to items in questionnaires to responses survey that expected yield valid indicators for these attitudes. are to

The approach which people’s characteristics looked are upon as factors that important for their participation lack thereof are or has been influential in political science since the 1960’s. Its very archetype perhaps the seminal work Verba, Nie and others Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978, later followed others see, Parry al., 1992. This tradition has many e.g. et yielded something like standard model which socio-economic a characteristics of people representing their and social — resources

connectedness impinge both directly well indirectly via

— as as — civic attitudes, that themselves strongly determined these are background characteristics electoral participation. Most same —on of the comparative work in this tradition has focussed the on

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question how societal and institutional circumstances affect the relative strength of the direct, and indirect impact of people’s background their participation. An institutional framework of,

on

compulsory voting, takes most of the direct and the ine.g., away direct impact of background, renders such distinctions largely

as irrelevant. Other contexts, such largely secularized and post-

as a modern society would yield strong indirect effects of back-

very ground, and forth.

so

In spite of the wealth of insights yielded by this approach,

notoriously unable for variation in dif-

to account turnout across ferent elections single system. After all, most of the factors

a

identified this approach important do not change rapid-

as very

at all, time. Yet, in most countries successive elections

over yield different of sometimes dramatically

rates turnout, so.

Who votes depends on mobilization efforts by parties and others

The line of reasoning of this approach focuses but

not on voters,

other actors that involved in elections. These first and on are are foremost the parties and candidates that vie for the support of the voters. To the extent that parties and politicians effort in

put more

reaching people and to getting out the vote, people will be

more reached, people will be affected the persuasive communi-

more cations from parties aimed mobilization, and consequently the

at number of people casting their will be higher. By

vote contrast, to

the that parties succeed discouraging the of

extent supporters their opponents from voting e.g., so-called "negative

campaigning they will have the effect of lowering the number of

voters.

Aside from parties and politicians, other also be im-

actors may portant the mobilization One think in this respect

process. can

of organizations such that

as pressure groups or cause groups

occasionally take part in the electoral struggle mobilizing their

followers, usually in effort to make them support candidate

an a or party sympathetic towards their interest An important

or cause. example of such behavior in countries the effort labor

many

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

unions their members followers the polls. Less fre-

to get or to

quently nowadays democracies, but important in for-

in western

times, the efforts of churches to mobilize their believers mer were

support of favored party. Even the absence of overt efforts

a

by formal organizations, mobilizing influence from

a can emanate social particularly when cohesive social exist from

pressure, groups which individuals derive part of their identity. Obviously, such implicit social and the influence of organiza-

pressure more open tions will usually reinforce each other. Such group-based mobilization the cornerstone of the kind of electoral cleavage-poli-

was tics that existed most of European democracies until the 1960’s and 1970’s, but that has lost most of its strength since then Final-

the media play important role in the mobilization

mass an

After all, few have direct communications process. very voters with politicians parties, and few will be informed of appeals

or very

parties and organized without media.

groups

When looking at whether not individual people turn out to

or cast their vote, the logic of this approach implies that those who have been reached mobilizing agents who have been

—or

reached frequently intensively

more or more —will vote more often than those who not. The kind of people that

were are more likely to be reached mobilizing those that

agents are are com-

paratively easily targetted recipients of and influence

as messages attempts, such members of parties, organized interest

as groups or cohesive social groups.‘

The logic of this approach quite compelling when observe

we that the efforts of parties and others mobilize voters

to vary widely different elections, and that turnout

across rates across

3For the genesis and historical of cleavage politics, Lipset and

roots see Rokkan 1967, Rose and Urwin 1970 and Lijphart 1968. For the most wide-ranging and comparative study that documents the decline of cleavage politics and of the of this decline Franklin, Mackie

— causes —see and Valen 1992. 4 Obviously, people WO are eager for information can also easily be reached, but this refers only the efforts of mobilizing agents, but to

not to the interaction of their efforts with qualities of voters the first of the approaches, discussed above.

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those elections often concomitantly. The between

vary contrast national parliamentary elections the hand and elections to

on one the European Parliament the other point. has been

on a case well documented that the mobilizing efforts of parties and media

much smaller in the latter than in the former, indicated are as their spending European elections only fraction of the

a resour-

they accustomed to spend contests for the national ces are parliament.5 Still, this approach too, has its persistently weak side. When controlling for having been reached parties, and for having been exposed to mobilizing information and communication, still observes large differences turnout. Some people

one evidently to the polls to cast their without having

go vote even been prodded do while for others the most intensive barrage

to so, of mobilizing efforts remains without effect. To large extent

a these differences behavior coincide with the differences

in voters’ characteristics that identified important by the

were as pre-

vious approach.

Who votes depends on the election-specific context

In this perspective the starting point the recognition that

every election again different with idiosyncracies. The

a one, its own special aspects of election, that help to bring people

one may some

the polling station, be absent in another election, with the to may effect that of them will stay home, while others will be

some now motivated instead to cast their vote. From this perspective, depends the aspects that characterize each election turn who

on will turn out and who will not.

In order avoid confusion, be emphasized that this

to must tradition different forms, analytical, and

comes two one one narrative in character. The latter comprises large number of

a case studies of single elections often pleasant narrative and first

— at

sight quite convincing. Sometimes written political journalists,

sometimes academics, these accounts try to make specific

a

election intelligible by pointing to the particular character of the

5See, Blumler 1983, Reif 1985, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996.

e.g.,

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

contest, the unique of candidates parties that pitted

set or was

against each other, the particular political possibly

events or even scandals, the charismatic character of of the the

some main actors, novelty of how the media operated, the unusual economic social

or circumstances that surrounded the election, and forth. From all

so these chronicle that leaves for

aspects, a woven no room any other election outcome than the that indeed materialized.

one Publications such these of great value for getting taste of

as are a what going at the election in question, to refresh one’s

was on

in terms of Chronology of indeed the idiosyncra-

memory a or — — sies of the contest at that time and place. But they not of great

are analytical value. Their defect that the accounts they provide

are

sensible testable hence cannot be rejected inade-

no way — as quate explanations. A gifted story teller this make

can way a convincing account for election, using only well-established

any facts. The trouble however, that different selection from the

a abundance of Well-established facts equally well be combined

can

into seemingly convincing but entirely different

a story, con-

tents and possibly incompatible with contradictory to

even or

other This problem only be remedied by explicit

ones. can an

comparative perspective.

The analytical tradition of the specific election context

approach based comparison. A specific election

on context can

only be sensibly described by explicit comparison. that

An account emphasizes, for example, that incumbent lost election be-

an an

of being embroiled in scandal, requires for testing that cause a other elections also investigated which other incumbents

are

involved in scandals, well elections where the incumwere as as bents not, but where their opponents where nobody

were were, or

On the basis of Mill’s time-honored logic of concomitant was. variation Mill, 1974/75, only such comparison reveal

a can whether not the attribution of certain outcomes to the factor

or incumbent involved scandal holds has be rejected

up or to as ad boc. will be obvious that such explicit comparison requires

abstraction in its explanatory terms, in the terms of more or, Przeworski and Teune’s 1970 seminal contribution the topic,

on

CEES VAN DER EIJK

requires the replacement of by theoretically inte-

proper names resting concepts.

An important set of such theoretically interesting concepts

are provided by the general theoretical framework of rational choice, in which behavior explained by people’s evaluation of the and

costs benefits monetary otherwise associated with each of the alter-

or native of action that to them. Applied to the

courses are open question who votes and who does not, the will be that

answer people will the benefits of that action outweigh the

vote costs, and that they will abstain in the opposite In order to avoid

case. the tautology that all action rational, otherwise would not

as have been undertaken, costs and benefits usually restricted to

are people’s economic and political goals interests. In somewhat

or a different, but compatible, terminology, voters evaluate what at stake in particular election and, depending their individual

a on goals and interests, their perceptions and expectations, arrive

may at different conclusions in different elections. In situations

some the stakes sufficiently high to warrant the trouble of going to

are the polls, in other situations they not and abstention will be the

are result. The task of the analyst to identify the contextual factors

that render specific election conversely, less

a more or consequential than another for specific and thus explain their

voters, to

turning out conversely, not these events.

or

The perspective of what at stake particularly suited for shedding light differences between elections of indi-

on terms vidual electoral participation why does the in

same voter vote one election, while abstaining in another whereas this pattern

one, may be the for another voter and of why

reverse aggregate turnout the of turnout higher election than in another.

percentage one Barring rather infrequent changes in the electoral and in

system electoral procedures, the cost of voting to be

we may assume rather invariant elections.‘ Consequently, differences in

across

6 instances this assumption unwarranted in the absence of

In some even changes in electoral procedures the electoral system. Elections

or may differ in terms of relevant opportunity will be the when

costs, as case one

located in vacation period and another not.

a one

WHY SOME PEOPLEVOTEAND OTHERS D0 NOT

individual behavior have be understood from dif-

or aggregate to ferences in the benefit side, i.e. differences of what voters

perceive to be at stake. These perceptions be thought of to be

can affected by number of factors.

a

The most important difference what at stake in election

an

relate to the political, and particular the policy,

consequences an election conceivably generate. for example,

may no programmatic other relevant differences exist between all

or or even

most parties, the stakes less, because the policy

are same conse-

be expected irrespective of which party wins. 7 quences can to occur

programmatic differences do exist between contending But even parties candidates, the stakes will ceteris paribus be low when

or — —

not be expected that these will be reflected in actual

can government policies, dependent whom wins the election. In the

on case of European elections, for example, clearly discernable relation

no exists between the election result the hand and the policies

on one of the EU the other hand, the composition of the European

on as Parliament has for the composition of relevant

no consequences policy-making institutions such the European Commission, the

as Council of Ministers the European Council. This in sharp

or contrast to elections for national parliaments in parliamentary

where the election result affects the political color of systems, the administration. This difference also be expressed dif-

may as a ference the and of executive that affec-

extent scope power ted elections.8 Equally detrimental the feeling that something

to important stake the voter’s belief that the of the

at outcome election foregone conclusion. Here perceptions of what other

a

7In this, and the remainder of the the perception of the

argument, voter that of relevance, and not the assessment of analyst, politician

an

journalist. For the sake of brevity, this will not always be spelled out or detail in the text. Similarly, whatever differences voters perceive to exist between parties, must matter to them, i.e., must relate to the goals, values

policy preferences they hold. or 8 particularly this kind of difference that distinguishes so-called firstorder elections in which executive at stake from second-order

power

where this not the See, Reif and Schmitt 1980, and ones, case. e.g., Marsh and Franklin 1996.

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will do of immediate relevance, but the existence of such voters are perceptions unlikely in view of the information voters not acquire about others’ preferences, either via informal commu-

nications of pre—election opinion polls. When neither

or way sincere tactical voting conceivably affect the election nor may result in that for the stakes low: the a way matters a voter, are election will then always be expected yield the result to same

desired or not

Although this approach powerful in explaining the dif-

very ferences in electoral participation between national parliamen-

presidential elections the hand, and local, regional tary or on one and European elections the other, has far been less on so successful identifying the contextual factors that explain variacan tions in between elections of the kind, particularly turnout same between different first-order elections also 7. What see note the for sometimes quite sizeable differences in the reason — per- — of people that their ballot from national parliacentage cast one election the next The factors mentioned above do not mentary to much, other contextual factors be called seem to vary very so must help. As contextual factor, the closeness of the upon to a race

has often been hypothesized be important, but the empirical

to for this far limited best, while the applicability of support so at

this hypothesis only straightforward two-party systems.

Hypotheses about other contextual factors however, yet are, rather in the literature. With second—order elecscarce respect to tions has been established that important contextual factor an that affects their importance their location in the cycle to voters

9One could object this line of reasoning, theorists do, the to as some on grounds of the infinitesimal small likelihood that single voter’s ballot a will swing the election result in that that voter. The a way matters to this objection either that voters’ estimates of this probability reply to grossly exagerated, that the belief that others exist with or voters act on identical preferences, and that collectively their do matter. See also votes Franklin, 1996. lo For first review of the effect of closeness of the Van Egmond, a race, see 1999.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

of first-order elections, but this insufficient fully too, to account for, the decline in the 1999 elections the e.g., turnout to European Parliament countries of the European Union. most Returning to the question addressed this why report — some people vote and others do not the reasoning above leads the — to identification of series of characteristics of individuals that be a can expected affect their likelihood of voting. First of all, to

that have political goals desires; they do

necessary voters or not, benefits be achieved from voting. Second, they no are to must perceive differences between parties in the that respects matter to them. In line with the above, have the argument voters must feeling that stake and that the election executive power at result different Some of these latter requirements can go ways. seem pretty tall orders develop such knowledge invoters were to or formation entirely their They however, make of on own. can, use various from which they derive information and sources can cues about the nature of the various parties, about what stake, and at

Thus, in this approach, availability of and such

so on. exposure to also important distinguishing characteristic of sources an voters.

What the nature of the act of voting

The three approaches that discussed above differ in what they were the nature of the voting In addition, other interpresee as act. yet

HSee Franklin, der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1996, Oppenhuis van 1995 and Franklin 1996. ‘Z Obviously, this also implies that they have less developed more or perceptions about parties candidates whatsoever. or 13The which the social and political provides with extent to context voters relevant information and in this therefore of particular cues respect importance. In comparative study, Granberg and Holmberg 1988 a demonstrated that the Swedish much conducive voters’ context more to acquiring relevant information than that of the United dif- States. In a ferent study, Van der Brug 1997 showed that that provides a context sufficient relevant informational deficiencies of cues can overcome voters.

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tations often referred that not straightforwardly associ-

are to are ated with of these approaches, but that have be discussed

any to nonetheless.

The last-mentioned approach, that emphasizes the electionspecific clearly looks Voting instrumental behavior,

context, at as

which political interests, goals, desires and expressed

causes are

the ballot. In this view, differences indicate that on turnout not all elections are seen Voters as equally important as means to further these interests and goals, but such differences in turnout

necessarily worrisome in themselves. Very low turnout, are not however, indicates that view the election hand

many voters at as barely at all relevant to their substantive political interests

or not and persistent, this constitutes threat the notion

concerns. a to of representative democratic governance.

A quite different interpretation of what the voting act means

for people emphasizes that allows the expression of identity and

identification. In this view, voting intrinsically different

not from other kinds of behavior that be understood from the

can per-

spective of identity politics, and the of which cannot be

usage reduced instrumental motivations and the cost—benefit reasoning

to

implicit therein. This interpretation of the meaning of the voting particularly related the first approaches to the expla-

act to two nation of non—voting discussed above. When party-related identities exist but deeply entrenched, then mobilizing

are not very efforts of parties and others remind people

are necessary to thereof. When party-related identities deeply seated in people’s

are consciousness, then these will propel them to the ballot box,

even without mobilizing efforts by others. When parties candidates

or

linked voters’ political identities identifications, are not to or mobilizing efforts appealing to them will be of avail, and other

no

appeals have be made. This view the meaning

instrumental to on

of voting does not in itself regard low turnout worrisome.

as merely indicates that the number of people who identify in

a

psychologically meaningful of the word with specific politi-

sense

cal organizations such parties small. This would

groups or as only be problematic the that would View such iden-

to extent one

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

tifications prerequisite for social integration, but that would as probably constitute fallacy of the pars pro toto kind. a

A third interpretation of the meaning of the voting that

act

for the political such. In its negative

expresses support system as form, holds that non-voting lack of expresses support, or even

rejection of the existing political This interpretation

system. not

directly linked of the three approaches understanding

to any to non-voting, but under appropriate circumstances follow may —— — from each. Not having been socialized into for the existsupport ing political order would lead abstention, much being to as as mobilized into electoral boycott. Even from instrumental an an perspective, non—voting be the choice for those who reject the may current favor of another that they be advanced system expect to electoral abstentionism. Yet, neither of these hypothetical

situations be empirically relevant in of the estabseems to any lished democracies of the European Union. In its form strong

non—voting implying active rejection of the existing political

re-

gime, this view of the meaning of the voting hardly

act seems

relevant. In milder interpretation, non-voting would be regarded

a the result of indifference disenchantment with the demoas to or cratic system, condition that under specific circumstances would a indeed bode for democratic stability. This interpretation of non-

voting has become in political

recent years en vogue commentary in various countries. In Germany became known the as phenomenon of Politi/everdrossenbeit relating a term to a syndrome of cynicism, distrust, and withdrawal, the Netherlands

H The tremendous decline in such identifications reported in the liteas rature on party identification the hand see the review Dalton on one and Wattenberg, 1993, and the decline of cleavage politics the other on e.g., Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992, cannot in convincing any manbe linked to social disintegration. ner S See, in this particular the various contributions of the Beliefs respect, in Government project Kaase and Newton, 1995, where the relationship between citizens and their probed in rather detail and states great as much possible historically comparative perspective. Most relevant in as the context of this references Biorcio and Mannheimer 1995 report are and Topf 1995.

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the /aloof the idea of unbridgeable chasm between voters and as an

the political professionals."’ In spite of the plausibility of

apparent

such interpretations, empirical lacking. Extensive

support analysis of the data from study of Germany and the Nethera recent the conclusion that lands led to

neither the declining membership of political parties, the nor possibly declining of participation elections sufficient rate ground for assuming crisis in the relationship between voters and a

politics, implied the terminology of Verdrossen/aeit and

as very /eloof. Rather, these phenomena reflect changes the position of parties tuis-a-tvis other the political realm. Van der Eijk actors and Van der 27. Brug, 1998, p.

In its positive form, however, the "support for the political system interpretation holds that the act of voting allows the expression of feelings of civic—mindedness, citizen duty, and forth, so feelings that would be with the notion of diffuse commensurate

support for the existing political order. This interpretation coin-

cides with the approach that looks at voters’ characteristics par-

ticularly the absence of civic attitudes explaining

presence or

electoral participation.

Forces impinging on the decision to vote or not

The considerations from the preceding sections be summarican zed into three different kinds of forces that isolation in — or combination impact the decsion to vote to abstain: — on or

Coercion, and persuasion. This exist in the form pressure may

of legal obligation such compulsory voting the

some as or absence thereof. ‘7 different form, the expectation of In a

’ The debates Verdrosserz/oeit and /eloof have been summarized in Van on der Eijk and Van der Brug 1998. A particularly relevant contribution to these discussions Van Gunsteren and Andeweg 1994. 17Apart from legal conditions, little research has been conducted into the existence of other coercive Common wisdom holds such pressures.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

positive or negative sanctions including social approval

or being ostracized will constitute either ballot pressure to cast a

or alternatively to stay from the polls. Most mobilizing

away

appeals modern campaigns focussed persuasion.

are on Intrinsic satisfaction. This derives from the possibility of expressing authentic feelings, such of citizen duty, as a sense identification with parties, Obviously, deor groups or etc.

pending the kind of feeling, be voting well

on may as as nonvoting that yields satisfaction. Instrumental motivation. In this the differential of effort case benefit, the of what stake determines versus or assessment at whether the ballot voter casts a or not.

In explaining why some people vote and others do not, one can the of each of the different approaches mentioned assess power so

far, and subsequently combine them into single expla-

one can a natory model. In the of this I will analyse next part report, survey data pertaining electoral participation Sweden the occasion to at of the elections the European Parliament of June 1999. As to often the in empirical research, the data available from this case study do all factors that think of theoretically not cover one can and that have been mentioned the previous Lack of pages. space well empirical insights from other studies result leaving as as out of the questionnaire those factors that expected be of little are to

explanatory The analyses be presented will therefore

power. to neither for each of the various approaches separately, for their nor combination, yield full of the question why people a account some vote and others do not in this specific historical situation.

Moreover, when analyzing only single election, adequate

a no account be given of the impact of all those contextual factors can

effects be minor, but impossible that they play certain role in to not a personal relationships such those between, husband and wife.or as e.g., from socially cohesive that be expected exist pressure groups can to systems dominated cleavage politics cindition that has mostly —a vanished western democracies as documented by, Franklin, e.g., Mackie and Valen, 1992.

CEES VAN DER E|JK

these elections, that would require explicit comparison that exist at with other Swedish elections, with elections in other countries,

or both. Such comparative analyses have been conducted for other elections and other countries, however. In the concluding of

part this I will summarize the findings of those studies and dis-

paper

their possible relevance for understanding electoral partici-

cuss pation the Swedish elections for the European Parliament in

1999.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

Part 2: Electoral participation in Sweden in June 1999

The analyses reported below conducted data from the

were on Swedish part of the European Election Study 1999 EES99.

The European Election Study 1999

The EES99 of voters that executed in the period

a survey was immediately following the elections to the European Parliament of June 1999. In each of the member of the European Union

states EU random sample of interviewed by telephone,

a voters was

using questionnaire that took approximately 30

a on average minutes administer. This study and the questionnaire

to were designed and organized by international research just

an group, as

its following earlier European elections in 1989 were counterparts and 1994. In addition to conducting voter study, the EES enter-

a prise conducts other kinds of research related the European

to electoral and representation such studies of elites

process, as MP’s, MEP’s, studies of the manifestoes and election pledges of

the various political parties, studies of legislative behavior by

MEP’s and their in the European Parliament, and

party groups studies of the in which the media reported and

way mass commented about these elections and their campaign.

The 1999 EES voter-study consisted of Sören Holmberg

group

University of Gothenburg, Hermann Schmitt University of

18The Italian sample was not interviewed telephone, but teleinterviewing instead. This sample consists of the members of an existing panel study, who downloaded the questionnaire and completed their

on individual PC’s, to then upload the completed version again. The samples in all other drawn randomly. Unsuccessful

were cases attempts due to not reaching the intended respondent refusal

— or —

of result biases of the samples. may, course, The data of this study will be archived in the Zentral Archive Cologne and the Steinmetz Archive Amsterdam, and will

become available to interested analysts the beginning of 2001. Before that time, they

can only be obtained with permission of the primary investigators.

CEES VAN DER EIJK

Mannheim, Mark Franklin Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., USA, Michael Marsh Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, Renato

Mannheimer University of Genoa, Jacques Thomassen University of Twente, the Netherlands, and Wouter der Brug, van Holli Semetko, Klaus Schönbach and der Eijk from Cees van all the University of Amsterdam. Relevant contextual knowledge

and assistence with translations of questionnaires provided by was series of ad hoc specialists and native speakers, whose a country contribution has been of value. The fieldwork conducted great was an international consortium of institutions, coordinated survey

IPSOS Hamburg. The funding for this large-scale study from different

came The major financed the University of sources. part was

Amsterdam, supplemented large from NWO

a grant the Netherlands’ Science Foundation. Important further contribu-

tions from CIS Madrid, the University of Genoa, the came

University of Mannheim, and Trinity College Hartford, Conn.,

USA. The Swedish sample this study resulted in 505 successful in-

terviews, that provide the data be analyzed below. to

The structure of the analyses

From the interview data, be derived that pertain measures can to

the different approaches for explaining participation and that

voter described Part 1 of this For each of these I will first were report. of all the differential between its categories, report turnout as these differentials manifested themselves in the of the responses Swedish in study. This differential simply the difvoters our

19All analyses reported here conducted unweighted data, that were on means that no corrections made to for kind of were compensate any distributional differences between the sample the hand and the on one sampled population of Swedish adults the other hand. Whereas on Weighting often affects univariate distributions, has in general much a smaller impact bivariate results such differences between groups on as or multivariate analyses.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

ference points between the first and the second

percentage mentioned categories of each describes differences in

measure.

which helpful indicating which of these chaturnout, are very racteristics of less, in of differences

voters matter more, or terms

electoral participation. Yet, these differentials Without

cannot further ado be causally attributed the in question,

to measures because of the possibility that the differences between the categories reported be generated by other important characteristics,

may that plausibly be thought of Therefore, addi-

may more as causes. tional analyses will be presented, which several measures are

used simultaneously explain in statistical parlance the differ-

to

between turning and abstaining. These multience out to vote variate analyses will first of all be presented for each of the clusters of that relate the theoretical approaches discussed

measures to earlier, and subsequently for all these jointly.

Differences turnout

The data of the EES99 contain information about large number

a of characteristics of As of the analyses to be

voters. a start reported, Tables 1 through 3 differences in turning out to vote

present between different of respondents. Table 1 reports such

groups differences in when looking background characteristics of citi-

at

zens.

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Table Differences in electoral participation background characteristics, European Elections of 1999 Data: Swedish of EES99, n=505 segment

Background Groups compared Turnout differential % characteristics

Gender men vs. women 0.5 n.s. Education high vs. |ow 4.8 n.s. Age 30 to 60 vs. under 30 13.5 Age over 60 vs. 30 to 60 26.4 Union member yes vs. no -7.1 n.s. Attends church never vs. rest -13.6 Urbanisation large/town vs. rural area 16.3

Table 1 shows that gender and education little in matter very terms of turnout. The difference in between and turnout men women a mere 0.5 "/0, difference that statistically significant, india not as cated by the n.s. designation in the last column. In other words, the difference small that could have occurred by so chance, without real difference existing the population. The any difference in for the education signiturnout two groups not ficant either, which first surprising. Two things be seems at must kept mind, however. First, compulsory education far into the

teenage years ensures that the large majority of the populavery tion endowed with the cognitive and information-handling skills that education expected with the that to generate, consequence

2° Unless indicated otherwise, in all analyses p-level of .05 has been used a to establish whether not results statistically significant. be or are must kept mind that whether difference significant depends both or not a on the magnitude of the difference and the size of the that groups are compared. The latter constrained the total sample size, which are 505. The implication that differences that significant in this are not study, be found be significant in other studies with substantially may to a larger number of respondents.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

differences this smaller than when large portions of

respect are a population have barely formal education all. Second, educa-

any at tion measured rather crudely this study, which also mask

may differences that -in spite of the generally high level; of education

— could possibly still be found with refined measurements. 2‘

more The other background variables reported here however,

are, very powerful in discriminating between those who voted and those

who abstained. People 60 of frequently

over years age vote more than those between 30 and 60 difference of 26.4 %, while the

a

latter show 13.5 higher than those under 30.

a turnout rate Combining these differences shows that the oldest of these

two

has almost 40 % higher than the age groups an turnout rate youngest

People who sometimes attend church irrespective of the fre-

considerably likely to vote than those

quency thereof are more who they church, finding that in line

say never to go to a seems with the social integration hypothesis mentioned in Part This,

however, odds with the fact that union—members less,

at are rather than likely although this latter difference

more to vote

significant, possibly because of the relatively small of

not group

members.

Finally, of this of variables, urbanisation. Respondents

group themselves indicated whether they lived large small

a town, a

rural The difference between the first and the last town or a area. significant 16.3 "/o, with the respondents living in small towns

falling about halfway between the other two groups. Exactly why

these differences between and less urbanised respondents

more exist clear from these descriptive results; but clear that

not

the differences quite pronounced.

are

2‘ Education measured the which the respondent stopped with

age at full-time education. This of measuring obviously does not represent

way kinds of education levels of scholastic achievement. In the analyses

or here, the divided into categories: those that ended

responses were two full-time education before the of 18 the low group, and those that

age ended their education 18 later the high group.

at age or

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The which second of respondent characteris-

extent to a group tics correlated turning reported in Table

to out to vote These variables all of interest in and information

concern aspects and knowledge about politics. These variables form of the

part syndrome of civic attitudes and orientations referred

to part The variables that relate media also of relevance

to exposure are

the approach that explains by the efforts of mobilizing

turnout agents.

Table 2: Differences in electoral participation political in-

volvement and knowledge, European Elections of 1999

Data: Swedish of EES99, n=505

segment

Watched tv programs about often/sometimes vs. never 30.4 EE Read papers about EE often/sometimes vs. never 31.6 Watches news on TV/ general always 3 days p.w. 31.0 vs. = Reads newspapers / general always 3 days p.w. 21.1 vs. = Knows which party won EE yes vs. no 28.8 Mentions issue yes vs. no 14.7 Mentions party yes vs. no 9.3 Informed about EU sufficient vs. insufficient 6.1 n.s.

Table 2 shows that people who interested in the European are elections and its campaign, who interested in politics in are general, who keep informed by watching TV-news and reading newspapers about this specific election, about politics general, or turn out in much higher numbers than those who interested, are not who attention political and who exposed pay no to news, are to little information from televison Almost all or newspapers. measures of interest and irrespective of whether they exposure —

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

focused the European election particular yield a turnout are on — differential of approximately 30 °/o, which that these difsuggests ferent characteristics overlap considerable extent. Separate to a

analyses reported here show that this indeed large

not to a the the distinction in the sample effectuated by of extent case: one the variables say, interest in the EE campaign coincides to a very large with the distinction that made by another such extent as political interest in general. Three of the variables relate knowledge and insight. The first to straightforward: whether people able indicate or not were to which of the Swedish parties had the European election only won 45 % able correctly indicate this. The variables were to next two

proxies for knowledge and insight. They indicate whether

are or respondents able give substantive answer to an not were to any

question about the important problems in the country,

open most respectively, which of the parties the would be most country undertake policy that issue. The logic of

likely to a preferred on

these variables that in order provide kind of resto any answer,

need idea be entirely idiosyncratic of pondents some which may

what in the and of what the various parties stand goes on country for. Both variables significantly related but the difare to turnout, ferential much smaller than in the of the interest and case expovariables. sure The last variable in this table whether the respondents concerns

feel that they sufficiently insufficiently informed about the

are or politics of the European Union. Although those who think that

they sufficiently informed than 20 % of the sample turn

are less

in higher numbers, the difference not statistically signifi-

out

cant. A final series of variables, reported Table deals with politi-

cal civic attitudes and political approval and satisfac-

preferences,

tion. Political preferences, first of all, relate the that to extent res-

pondents identify with political the to which

a party, or extent they find of the parties electorally appealing. Those who idenone tify with 23.7 % often than those who do a party turn out more Moreover, the one’s preference for party irresnot. stronger a —

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pective which the larger the likelihood that — one turns out to vote.

For each of the parties in Sweden, the respondents asked how were likely was on scale from 1 to 10 that they would for a ever vote

that party. For each thus possible derive from person to his/her entire of which he/she finds the best set responses party

one of all, and how strong that preference measured the on scale of 1 10. The this preference, the same to stronger more

likely that the respondent turned the best out to vote:

party 10, the probability of voting than 12 % scores a more

higher than the best In other words, the party scores a etc.

better the best the voter’s the likely he/ she party eyes, more

to vote. As this has little do with the specific of the to context

election, with the efforts of mobilizing that election or agents — as equally the for identifying with parties this shows that case — the stronger the affective relation between and parties the voters

larger the likelihood of voting.

Intention to vote national election also strongly linked a to

turning out to vote in the European election. Together with the

previous findings this table this demonstrates that turnout

European elections much related voter’s affective very to a

linkage to the national party system.

WHY SOME PEOPLEVOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

Table 3: Differences in electoral participation political prefecivic attitudes, political approval and satisfaction, Eurorences, Elections of 1999 pean Data: Swedish of EES99, n=505 segment

Groups Turnout compared differential %

Political preferences Identifies with political party yes vs. no 23.7 a Preference for "best" party 10 vs. 9 12.3 Preference for "best" party 10 vs. 8 19.1 Preference for "best" party 1 Ovs. 7 23.7 Votes national election yes vs. no 18.8

Civic attitudes Politics too complicated agree vs. rest -22.7 So voters agree vs. rest -26.7 many Parties not different a ree vs. rest -11.6 Political approval and satisfaction

on integration Opinion EU integration further vs. too far 31.3 on EU good/bad thing good vs. bad 31.2

The three items referred civic attitudes refer three stateto as to of which the respondents had indicate whether not ments to or he/she with them. These three order: agrees are,

Sometimes politics complicated that like just 6 so someone me understand What going cannot on. S0 people in elections that vote does not matter. O many vote my Most of the parties in Sweden much alike that does not 9 are so make much of difference which government. a one

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In different agreeing with each of these

ways, statements expresses

feeling that does not make take in elections. No a sense to part wonder that all three those who with the statement

cases agree vote in significantly smaller numbers than others.

Political approval and satisfaction, long they of

as as are a general kind, have strong relation to turnout. As the satisfac-

a soon as

tion approval becomes tied to political parties in the of

or —as case approval of the government satisfaction with government

or policy European integration less not significantly related

on — or

to voting abstaining. Those not satisfied with democracy

versus Sweden considerably less likely to vote than those who

are are satisfied. This differential much smaller for the question about satisfaction with democracy in the EU, which demonstrates that

being satisfied with democracy Europe less deterrent not a to voting than being satisfied with democracy in Sweden itself.

not This makes after all, represented the European

sense: one Parliament of the Swedish parties, and long

way as as one

with those, well content one may as vote.

Disapproval of the EU and of European integration how-

much stimulus to stay at home the European elecever, very a tions. Those who find the bad thing approximately

EU a one third of the sample, who find that integration has already

or gone too far, have than 30 % lower than citizens

more a turnout rate Who regard the good thing also about third of the

EU as a one sample and those who feel that integration should be pushed further. This that, considerably the European

suggests to a extent, elections in Sweden elections for that large

are a system a segment

of the population disagrees with. Representation via the European

Parliament evidently not this segment to im-

seen as a way

matters, and, in view of the pro-integrative stance of the EP, prove not entirely without

reason.

Multivariate Analyses

The analyses reported in Tables 2 and suggestive, but limi-

3 are ted the conclusions that be drawn from them. Two

can problems particular play role. First, there be considerable

a may a

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

overlap between the various Characteristics that investiga-

were ted. Second, though the turnout differential between

even groups

compared be large, this difference necessarily caused

may not the characteristic which the differ. In order to deal with

on groups

these problems, multivariate analysis that analysis

necessary; in which number of different characteristics simultaneously

a are taken into in of their for turnout. In

account terms consequences addition to this, theoretical considerations must be utilized, the

on basis of which various factors be ordered vis-a-vis each other

can

distant, intermediary of turnout. Iwill report as more or causes

here only limited number of such analyses, using multiple

a regression methods.

The investigations consisted of series of consecutive analyses,

a

which voter Characteristics that shown to be overlapping

were in their effect in statistical parlance: factors that

on turnout are multicollinear weeded such that only the

were out to an extent most important of them retained, and the superfluous other

are

eliminated. To the that from statistical point of ones extent - a View multicollinear variables equally important, I chose

— are to

retain the generic and drop the specific one.

most one to more These analyses done first for each of the blocks of variables

were distinguished in Tables 1 3 1 block of variables each from

to Tables 1 and 3 from Table 3. The variables that remained from these analyses all of them significant within these separate analy-

22An objection against linear methods such multiple regression that

as this technique not optimally suited for dichotomous dependent

a variable, is. More appropriate methods, of the non-linear

as turnout regression type, however, found to rarely differ substantive results

are, from the method used here e.g., Oppenhuis, 1995, Franklin, Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1996. Moreover, they much less self-evident for

are a non-technical audience than traditional regression methods. Explicit causal models, in which entire structure of hypothesized causal rela-

an tionships tested, would be the logical next step following the analyses reported here. Such elaborate analyses will be reported elsewhere,

more however. 23For detailed description and justification of the strategy of

a more analysis, see Franklin, Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1996.

CEES VAN DER EIJK

ses then successively combined into final model, the result

were a of which multivariate regression model that reported in

a Table and will be discussed below.

Table 4 shows in what the variables of the five blocks

sequence

entered and, for each block addition, the explanatory were or

of the model the column of cumulative adjusted R2. power see All together, these variables explain of the variance, and

29 percent each of the blocks adds significantly the explanation, and

to over

above what had already been explained by variables previously

entered. Although 29 percent of variance explained turnout-differ-

does impressive first sight, actually

ences not seem very at not

result comparison similar analyses reported else-

a poor to where. does indicate, however, that individual electoral

participation only to limited extent explicable by the kind of fac-

a tors discussed; complete explanation would all likelihood

a more require rather idiosyncratic factors. On the other hand, the

many results also imply that small number of Characteristics

a voter

to large for differences systematic accounts a extent turnout a manner.

2‘ These exploratory analyses with pairwise deletion of missing

were run data; listwise deletion yields virtually identical results. 25See, der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1990, who somewhat

e.g., van an similar analysis for the Netherlands and the European election of 1989,

R2 of 25 In EU-wide analysis for 1989 Oppenhuis get to an percent. an 1995 arrives R2 of slightly 20 Moreover, would be

at an over percent. fallacious to that 100 the attainable maximum

assume percent explained variance. For number of technical relating skewed

a reasons, to distributions of categorical data, the attainable maximum much lower, often in the of 50 60 but difficult calculate with

range to percent, to precision.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

Table Multivariate regression of electoral participation in the European Elections of 1999 Data: Swedish segment of EES99, n=505

beta significance Cumul. adj. Fl

Block 1 .09

Age .17 Urbanization .06 n.s. p=.16 Attends church .02 n.s. p=.60

Block 2 .17

EU good thim .09 Satisfied with democracy Sweden .12

Block 3 .22

Identifies with a political party .07 n.s. p=.08 Preference for best party .12

Block 4 .27

Interest EE campaigl .13 Pays attention to political news .11

The column with beta coefficients indicates the relative explana-

strength of the different variables. The higher this coefficient, tory

the important the variable question in explaining why

more

people and others do In instances, the multisome vote not. some variate perspective of this table results variables losing their significance compared What in Tables 1-3. This does not

to was seen

necessarily that such variables important the

mean are not explanation, but rather that their effect turnout via of

on runs one the other variables that included the analysis. This

now same

the why, for example, church attendance and urbaniza-

reason tion significant Table The effect of the urban-rural

are not distinction certainly real, but largely mediated by

on turnout opinions about the EU urban people inclined

in areas are more to think the EU good thing, rural people tend much

a areas

CEES VAN DER EIJK

to seeing bad thing, and differences in political

more as a interest and involvement in rural party identification

areas

lower, people comparatively less attention to politics, and

pay

often with the that politics compliagree more statement too cated understand. Likewise, the effect of church attendence

to taken satisfaction with democracy in Sweden, interest

over in the campaign for the European elections and finding the EU

a good thing.

Table 4 leads the following observations. First, clear effect

to a

exists of opinions about the EU good thing bad thing,

vs. even when the other explanatory factors mentioned in this table

taken into Such effect found in of the are account. an was not any other members of the European Union least far the 1989

—at as as and 1994 European elections concerned." The effect be

were may not surprising the light of the controversies in Sweden

over membership of the EU and related the

matters such as common currency, but raises the question whether 1999 this

a specific Swedish phenomenon, that has emerged else-

or a pattern where well. This report not the place to investigate this

as question, and analyses about this will be reported elsewhere.

Not only evaluative opinions about the EU have effect

an on electoral participation, but also evaluations of Swedish democracy itself. Almost 25 °/o of the sample indicates that they

are not very,

all satisfied with democracy in Sweden, and this opinion or not at

2° Interestingly, strong correlation exists between being satisfied with

a democracy in Sweden and seeing the EU good thing. This suggests

as a that divide exists in the Swedish population, with the

a on one extreme a segment that does of the EU and dissatisfied with demo-

not approve

Sweden most strongly reprresented the countryside and cracy on the other extreme a segment that satisfied with democracy in Sweden

as well with its membership of the EU most strongly represented in the

as urban areas. As far evaluations concerning the EU concerned, this

as not a new insight. That linked to dissatisfaction with democracy in Sweden less trivial, aswell aspolitically more disturbing. This report, however, not the place to elaborate these findings further. 27On this point Franklin, der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1996 and Van

see van der Eijk, Franklin and Mackie 1996, 275.

p.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

not only related to staying at home in the European elections of 1999, but also to feeling that Swedish membership of the EU

a

bad thing.

Being integrated into the social and political system also

clearly related to voting abstaining, quite accordance with

versus theoretical expectations described in part 1 of this report. Social

integration captured by church attendance, and

to some extent being politically integrated identification, but the latter

party captured better the question of whether the system

even con-

tains at least party that respondent feels really positively

one a about the variable referred in Table 4 Preference for best

to as party.

Interest in the European election campaign, reading about this

election and paying attention in general to political

newspapers,

also determinants of Surprisingly, in the news, are strong turnout. light of findings for other EU members in previous European elections, the specific items about interest the EE campaign

are

powerful than general indicators of political interest. This more

that, other countries in 1989 and 1994, the suggests contrast to European election in Sweden in 1999 contained element that

an

be entirely reduced the voter’s links the domestic cannot to to political Again will have be in further research

system. to seen whether this also be found in other countries in 1999, and,

to again, such analyses will have be reported elsewhere.

to

Finally, in accordance with the theoretical expectations

expres-

sed Part feelings of political inefficacy do explain of

some the differences between voting and non-voting, when all

even other factors in Table 4 simultaneously taken into account.

are

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Part 3: Reflective comments and informed

speculation

The empirical analyses contained this brief report limited.

are This for number of different

a reasons:

9 Information about the mobilising efforts or lack thereof political parties, media and other politically relevant actors, organizations and institutions at this moment not available. Therefore, impossible the kinds of forces that

to assess

referred in 1 mobilising This were to part as agents. not to

that these considerations irrelevant when trying to say are explain the low turnout the 1999 European elections in Sweden, the contrary. In Sweden, in the other member states

on as of the Union, parties, political leaders, relevant interest

groups and media displayed distinct lack of interest and activity,

a particularly when compared their behavior the time of elec-

to at tions for the Riksdag. This obviously, the entire expla-

not nation for the low the European elections, but

turnout should nevertheless be ignored relevant factor.

not as a

The drop in between the first 1995 and the second

turnout 1999 European elections in Sweden possibly be related

may to

difference in the level of activities of these political and social a institutions. All member of the European Union

states experienced distinctly higher their first than their

a turnout second and later European elections. This first-time boost

at least to extent attributable to the extra attention seems some that given to the novel phenomenon of European elections,

a factor that absent in all subsequent elections to the European Parliament.

Q A fuller explanation for the low level of the Euro-

turnout

election Sweden 1999 requires comparative analyses,

pean where the comparisons involve both other elections in Sweden such previous European elections, various Riksdag elections,

as etc., and European elections other countries in

1999, as well at previous European elections. Obviously, this not

as the place for such extensive comparisons, especially since much of the information that would be required not yet,

not, or

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

available. The approach, referred to Part that seeks

to relate levels of turnout as well individual differences in elec-

as toral participation to "what at stake various elections,

that only be employed such comparative approach

one can a

just like the approach that focusses mobilizing dis- — on agents, cussed in the previous paragraph. Because of these limitations,

the results of the empirical analyses reported here pertain only

individual differences in behavior within the single to context of June 1999 in Sweden. Every of that thus

aspect context a

in this study and, though these have constant even aspects may contributed to the low over—all turnout in Swedish

perspective, they remain inaccessible for research long they

as as are constants. O As indicated several times in Part elaborate analyses

more can be performed the available Swedish data. Such analyses will

on

explicate detail the inter—relationships between the

in greater factors that influence individual electoral participation, and will thus help to understand precisely how factors such

us more as,

related to differences in turnout. They will e.g., age, are com-

plement, but not replace, the major empirical findings reported

in Part

Apart from pointing out the limitations of the analyses this

re-

bit of informed speculation order shed tentative port, a seems to light the declining level of turnout in Swedish elections, for the

on Riksdag well for the European Parliament. The remarks below

as as

based earlier research and are to some extent on to some extent

logical extrapolation from the interpretations of that earlier

on research. Instrumental motivations of importance explaining

are great

electorates. From this follows turnout contemporary western the logic that turnout will be lower when the less stake in

at an

23The most important previous research that I here Van der Eijk

use and Franklin 1996, Oppenhuis 1995, Franklin, Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1995, Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, Franklin 1996, and some of the sources referred to in these texts.

CEES VAN DER EIJK

election. That there little stake European elections not at because of the alleged limitations of the and prerogatives of powers the European Parliament. After all, the role of the EP has grown substantially in recently since the ratification of recent years, most the Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Parliament has currently far from negligeable role in the legislative of the EU. a process This evidenced by the fact that those who have specific interest a in certain EU legislation such branches of industry, social — as and subnational government agencies willing to movements, —are invest considerable trying influence the results of EU resources to legislation via lobbying the EP. Yet, despite this increased role at of the EP in the making of EU legislation, the of the EP power does extend the composition of the European Commission, not to that of the Council. Stated differently, European eleclet alone to tions decide the composition of the European Parliament, which itself important for the of individual pieces of legislaoutcome tion, but which in of relevance for the composition not any way of the executive and policy—initiating institutions of the EU. In the situation that exists in the elections for the national contrast to

parliaments of the EU member-states, absolutely impossible

link the composition of the EP kind of over—all policy to to any direction that will be force for the subsequent period. Moreover, the absence of opposition divide in the EP makes a government vs. impossible for ordinary citizens well for most media to

as as

link the results of the elections for the EP kind of policy to any direction of the EU. These circumstances thwart almost sort any of instrumental motivation for casting vote the European a elections. One could wonder why, given the logic described above, turn-

European elections generally higher previous Euro-

out was elections than in 1999. Apart from the drop in turnout after pean the boost that only the first time of European elections, occurs at has continued decline in member-states, albeit turnout to most

29The hereafter originate from intensive discussions these arguments on ics between Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh and self, conducted at to my various occasions.

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

with occasional increases, that often attributable were to occasional of the European elections with other elections concurrency one of the member-states, the with the Irish Dáil as was case elections in 1989, and with regional elections in Spain in 1999. Two

different mechanisms be expected here. One can to operate generational replacement, by which former generations socialized —

conditions of cleavage politics and the resulting high degrees of

electoral mobilization gradually replaced generations —are new that subjected such intense mobilizing efforts, and were never to that have therefore weaker internalization of the that a norm one should The second mechanism that would lead the vote. to persistent decline in turnout for European elections be thought may

of gradual learning. takes time before the default interpreta-

as tion of political systems along the that used patterns one most

to i.e., the system of one’s country experienced inadequate

as when dealing with the European Union.

A final remark that has be made here in to concerns turnout elections for the national parliaments of the member of the states EU. Although Topf described late 1995 the variations in as as turnout in these and other countries trendless fluctuawestern as tion, recent observations of in national elections in more turnout EU countries point in the direction of gradual decline. this a indeed the could, of point here the still case, one course, too to

further declining of cleavage politics and generational

remnants replacement. In addition to this, however, could think of one a more structural that, this speculation will have reason correct, additional depressing effects in national parliamentary on turnout elections. citizens learn of being exposed as a consequence to reality, they not only learn that the results of elections for the EP

unrelated to kind of policy direction for the EU, but they are any also learn that their and the parliamentary own governments majorities which these rest become increasingly less influential upon

for growing number of policy EU legislation and

a areas, as regulation become important and limit the of national more scope po-

licy—making. As the EU syphons off policy making from

powers national parliamentary regimes, the stakes national elections become smaller, and the instrumental logic that same generates

CEES VAN DER EIJK

declining in EP elections will equally give rise to declining

turnout turnout national elections.

Such development would be detrimental from normative

a not a democratic point of view the diminished importance of the party composition of national parliaments would be compensated by increased importance of the composition of the

an party European Parliament. As argued above, however, this all

not at the because of the institutional structure of the EU.

case current Seen from this perspective, the citizens of the EU gradually

are

disempowered electorally, and the declining national

turnout and European elections only be regarded rational reaction

can as a of the this development. In another context I argued

voters to with co—authors that the conditions that European elec-

my turn tions into so-called second—order elections undermines not only the democratic character of the EU, but tends do for domes-

to so

tic political well Franklin, der Eijk and Marsh,

processes as van 1996. A declining impact of elections policy-direction and

on a declining participation of citizens in the electoral the

process —at national well the the EU level only increase this danger.

as as —can

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

References

Biorcio, R. and R. Mannheimer 1995 Relationships between Citizens and Political Parties. In H.—D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, eds., Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 206-226 pp. Blumler, LG., ed. 1983 Communicating Voters. Popular to Responses to the First European Community Elections. London: Sage Brug, W. der 1997 Where’s the Party Voters’ Perceptions van Party Positions. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam Dalton. RJ. and M.P. Wattenberg, 1993 The Not Simple Act so of Voting. In A.W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State the Discipline II. Washington: American Political Science Association Egmond, M. van 1999 Rain Falls All Us hut Some Manage on

Wet than Others Accounting Context Through

to get more for the Individual in Electoral Participation. Paper, presented at

EPOP, Northampton, September 1999

Eijk, C. der, and W. der Brug 1998 the Sur-

van van Different at

face, Similar in Depth Attitudes towards Politics in Germany — and the Netherlands, Amsterdam: DIA Eijk, C. der, and M.N. Franklin, eds. 1996 Choosing Europe van The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face

Union. Ann Arbor Mich.: The University of Michigan Press

Eijk, C. der, and E.V. Oppenhuis 1990 Turnout and Secondvan order Effects in the European Elections of June 1989 — Evidence from the Netherlands. Acta Politica, vol. 25, nr.1:67— 94 Eijk, C. der, M.N. Franklin and T. Mackie 1996 The Dog van that Did Not Bark: The 1994 Elections the Light of 1989. In C. van der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union.

Ann Arbor Mich.: The University of Michigan

Press; pp. 268-282

CEES VAN DER EIJK

Franklin, M.N. 1996 Electoral Participation. In L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris, eds. Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. Thousand Oaks Cal.: Sage; pp. 216—235 Franklin, M.N., C. der Eijk and M. Marsh 1996 Conclusions: van The Electoral Connection and the Democratic Deficit. In C. der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe The van European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union. Ann Arbor Mich.: The University of Michigan Press; pp. 366-388 Franklin, M.N., C. der Eijk and E.V. Oppenhuis 1995 The van Motivational Basis Electoral participation: European Elections provide Critical Test. Paper, presented at ECPR Joint a Sessions, Bordeaux Franklin, M.N., C. der Eijk and E.V. Oppenhuis 1996 The van Institutional Context: Turnout. In: C. der Eijk and M.N. van Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union. Ann Arbor Mich.: The

University of Michigan Press; pp. 306-331

Franklin, M.N., T. Mackie and H. Valen, eds. 1992 Electoral Change. Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures

in Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Granberg, D. and Holmberg 1988 The Political System Matters: Social Psychology and Voting Behavior in Sweden and the United

States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Gunsteren, H. and R.A. Andeweg 1994 Het grote Ongenoevan, de Klooftussen Politie/e. Haarlem: Aramith gen: over Burgers en Kaase, M. and K. Newton, eds. 1995 Beliefsin Government. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press Lijphart, A. 1968 The Politics Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press Lipset, M., and Rokkan 1967 Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. In M. Lipset and Rokkan,

WHY SOME PEOPLE VOTE AND OTHERS DO NOT

eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross—National Perspectives. New York: Free Press Marsh, M., and M.N. Franklin 1996 The Foundations: Unanswered Questions from the Study of European Elections, 1979-1994. In C. der Eijk and M.N. Franklin, eds., van Choosing Europe The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union. Ann Arbor Mich.: The University of Michigan Press; 11-32 pp. Mill, .S. 1974/75 A System of Logic. Vols. vii and viii Collected Works .S. Mill. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

originally published in 1843

Oppenhuis, E.V. 1995 Voting Behavior in Europe. Amsterdam:

Het Spinhuis

Parry, G., G. Moyser and N. Day 1992 Political Participation and

Democracy in Britain. New York: Cambridge University Press

Przeworski, A., and H. Teune 1970 The Logic Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley Reif, K., ed. 1985 Ten European Elections: Campaigns and Results the I979/8 First Direct Elections the European Parliament. to Aldershot: Gower Reif, K., and H. Schmitt 1980 Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Euro- Election Results. European journal Political Research, pean 8:3—44 Rose, R., and D. Urwin 1970 Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems since 1945. Political Studies, Vol. 182287-319 Schmitt, H., and. Thomassen, eds. 1999 Political Representation and legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press Siegfried, A. 1913 Tahleau Politique de France de l’Ouest sous Troisieme Répuhlique. Paris: Colin Tingsten, H. 1937 Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics. London: King and Son

CEES VAN DER EIJK

Topf, R. 1995 Electoral Participation. In H.—D. Klingemann and

D. Fuchs, eds., Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press; pp. 27-51

Verba, and N. Nie 1972 Participation in America. Political

Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row Verba, S., N. Nie and LO. Kim 1978 Participation and Political

Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

European Parliament

Elections

lnstitutions, Attitudes and Participation

Richard Sinnott‘

Introduction

This begins with description of the problem of low partici-

paper a

in European Parliament elections and, in the of these

pation course observations, makes preliminary suggestions the

some as to cau-

of variation in In order place the problem of low ses turnout. to

in the then looks briefly attitudes to turnout context, paper at European integration and the relationship between the citizens

at and the Union. The issue of the discrepancies prevailing interpretations of the of low in European Parliament

sources turnout elections then considered. A concluding section tackles the question of What should be done about the problem of abstention,

the under headings: the facilitation of

considering matter two participation and the mobilisation of participation.

The variations in turnout in European Parliament elections

Over the period since 1979 and direct result of successive revi-

as a sions of the EU treaties, the of the European Parliament

powers

l The author professor of Politics Department and Centre for

at Comparative Research Public Opinion and Political Behaviour at

on University college Dublin.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

have increased significantly. In the increasing contrast to power and importance of the Parliament, in European Parliament turnout elections has declined from of 65.9 in - an average turnout per cent 1979 to 52.4 cent in 1999. In fact the picture than per worse these figures indicate. Three countries in the European Union

Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg have compulsory voting and Italy had compulsory least quasi-compulsory voting until

or at 1993. Furthermore certain countries either regularly from time or to time hold nation-wide elections national, regional concurrent or local that artificially boost the in the European electurnout tion. Leaving these countries side, the remaining to one turnout member 52.9 in 1979 and only 39.4 in states was per cent per cent 1999 Table 1.

see

Apart from the boost arising from compulsory voting and the

concurrence of other elections, in European Parliament turnout

elections affected by the day of voting Sunday weekday,

versus with weekday voting contributing low in European to turnout Parliament elections in Denmark, the Netherlands, Britain and

Ireland. Beyond these few obvious factors however, there wide- , spread disagreement to what low in European as causes turnout Parliament elections. This issue will be analysed in detail besome low. But first consider the of overall attinecessary to matter tudes European integration the citizens of the Union. to among

RICHARD SINNOTI Table Turnout five European Parliament elections, 1979—99

Mean — member states

Mean states 52.9 49.4 49.5 47.0 39.4 47.6

— without compulsory voting or concurrent nation-wide elections

‘Concurrentnation-wideelections

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

Attitudes to European integration

The of for European integration highly

measurement support sensitive to variations in question wording. The four standard Eurobarometer indicators of attitudes integration customarily to are labelled unification, membership, benefits, and dissolution.

The levels of for integration elicited these questions support depend both the stimulus presented in the question and the on on response categories, in particular whether the on response catego-

ries offer explicit middle position.

an

The unification indicator for general

measures support a very aspiration efforts to unify Western Europe and does so on a four point scale very much for 7 9 for 9 to some extent to some , ,

extent against, very much against that does provide expli-

not an cit middle neutral point. The rather stimulus and the or vague absence of middle position combine produce high levels of a to

support for integration, touching almost 80 the begin-

per cent at

ning of the 19905 Figure 1. The members/vip indicator provi-

see

des stimulus country X’s membership of the a more concrete European Union and three point scale that includes explicit a an

middle position good thing, neither good bad, a bad

a nor

thing. As such, probably provides realistic of

a more gauge

support for integration that typically 10 20

runs some to percentage points behind the unification indicator. The third Eurobaro—

meter indicator asks whether the respondent’s has benefcountry ted from membership of the Union but, like the unification indi-

cator, does provide middle position categories

not a the response benefited and did benefit. Because involves are not an element of perception well evaluation, surprising that as as not the benefits indicator registers positive that slightly a response lower than that registered the membership indicator. Indeed,

the between the might be for the gap two greater were not preof neutral the membership indicator and the sence a category absence of such category the benefits indicator. Finally, there a the dissolution indicator. This question the hypothetical poses situation of the scrapping of the Community Union, with or strong

negative and positive options and middle position sorry,

a very

RICHARD

indifferent n s relievedz. The indicator has been criticised

very

, because hypothetical; nonetheless provides useful of

a measure

enthusiasm lack of enthusiasm for European integration,

or

showing, une—uly 1994 for example, quite modest level of

a

enthusiasm cent that actually slightly lower than the

43 per was

level of indifference and dont know combined 46 cent see

per

Figure 1.

Figure Attitudes to the European Union four Euroburometer indi-

cators umfication, membership, benefits and dissolution 1973-1998

/ /

./‘

/ .. / k

/ /

7 . ‘ .- ‘.

/ ,./

/ / i’’E;;:iu..,nm’m andmag:

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z / - -o-Umficalionveryn-uch

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50 / andsontwhalInfavour 1

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——Dissoluuon.verysom i

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ceEurobaromclervECS73-EB-39

2The very added to relieved in 1993.

was

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

None of these questions ideal indicator of attitudes inte-

an to

gration; could be said that they together form adequate

nor an battery of items. One must therefore exercise certain degree of

a caution interpreting the evidence. In particular, attempts

to categorise the indicators of diffuse-affective specific-

in terms versus utilitarian dimensions of support quickly into difficulties. As

run

Niedermayer 1995; 54-5 notes, the only unambiguously utilita-

rian that based the benefits question. That having

measure on been said, however, these the best available

are many respects

data and, provided they interpreted cautiously, they enable

are one to make reasonably valid inferences. Before attempting

some a

of the current state of support for European integration summary

evidenced these indicators, must also take account of the as one substantial variation in the indicators time and the

over across member states.

In terms of changes time, there first of all significant

over was a falling off for integration between the late 1970s and

support the early 1980s Figure 1. This have been related the

see may to prevailing Eurosclerosis that commentators European

many on integration have identified. This followed, however, sub-

was a stantial and sustained rise in support between 1982 and 1991. worth noting that this rise predated the arrival of Jacques Delors

as President of the Commission and certainly predated the major initiative of the first Delors presidency, namely the launch of the Single Market 1992 On the other hand, there be

programme. can little doubt but that the rise and rise in for integration

support was sustained the activism of the Delors Commission, by the

pas-

of the Single European Act and by the publicity and sage promotional efforts that surrounded Project 1992.

In fact, however, the actual arrival of the calendar 1992

year confirmed general downward trend for integration

a support

Figure 1. The period since 1989 packed with political

see so

and economic developments that impossible attribute this

to decline factor}. Indications that the decline under-

to any one was

3 There substantial and technically highly sophisticated literature

a on the mainly economic determinants of for inte

support

RICHARD SINNOTT

in number of member prior 1991 Nieder— way a states even to

1995: 67 suggest that not simply to the mayer was a response signing of the Maastricht Treaty but also have reflected

may a negative reaction to the growing intrusiveness of the Single Market

both the politics and economics of individual programme on states. Another factor the waning of the euphoria that

Was surrounded the fall of the Berlin Wall and the growth the realisation that event brought challenges and uncertainties regarding the future shape and role of the Community and not simply the

was dawning of of and prosperity for all. Whatever its

a new era peace

the decline support for integration that began in the causes, second half of 1991 has shown little sign of being reversed

or no

While overall support for the Union time has varied by

over

20 percentage points, the in support countries some range across has been much 50 percentage points; 1997, for example,

as as

measured the membership indicator, from 31 support, as went

cent Sweden to 83 cent Ireland. Although per per any grouping of countries based definite cut-off points distribution

on a such this somewhat arbitrary, probably useful to think of

as

of four countries with high levels of for EU a group support membership and of six with quite low levels. The former

a group comprises Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. The

com-

position of the latter surprising: predictably, includes the

more three the Union Sweden, Austria and

most recent entrants to Finland and the UK; the surprise that also includes Germany

and Belgium but does not include Denmark. On the other hand,

actual opposition integration high in Denmark in all but

to as as

of the low-support countries. one

Eichenberg 1998 provides excellent review and extension of this

an research. From the point of view of the present discussion, the most relevant findings that the influence of objective economic circum-

are

for integration less in the period following stances on support was Maastricht than had been before Eichenberg, 1998:12 and that the effects depending the indicator of the dependent variable that

vary on used.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

When probes beyond the general sentiments captured

one very by the four basic indicators, to, for example, attitudes to whether

not certain policy should be decided at the European at or areas or the national level, finds greater discrepancies between

one even member states and somewhat different ordering. Thus regard

a to the issue of the Europeanization of defence policy,

some coun-

tries show high degree of for Europeanization and

a very support

others low degree. Ranged the side of the Europeaniza-

a very on tion of defence the Netherlands 76 cent in first place and,

are per

somewhat lower level, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Gerat a

On the other hand, Sweden and Finland this evidenmany. are, on

overwhelmingly opposed the Europeanization of decision-

ce, to making the defence Finland being 8 for and 90

area, per cent per

cent against. On this negative side also, though strongly,

not as

finds Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Portugal and the United one Kingdom. However, before drawing large inferences about the

any future for European defence policy from

prospects a common these data, should that the of don’t know

one note rate responses

this item remarkably, might suspiciously, low

to one say an

of 4 cent. average per

The suspicion mentioned in the previous paragraph leads to the

hypothesis that significant proportion of the

some responses on

preferences regarding the Europeanization of defence and other

policies actually reflect non-attitudes. A Eurobarometer—based

research project turnout in the European Parliament elections of

on

1994 provided the opportunity to test this hypothesis using

an exploratory question the overall issue of policy attribution bet-

on

the national and European levels. The question, which ween new

inserted Eurobarometer 41.1, included the specific response was category I haven’t really thought about it. This response was chosen 26 cent of respondents, proportion that, when

per a combined with the 10 cent who spontaneously offered "dont

per a know yields than one-third of the sample who

response, more acknowledge that they do have opinion the basic issue

not any on

of the appropriate of decision—making of the

scope competence European and national authorities Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, 65-72. Further evidence from the study that

same suggests

RICHARD SINNOTI

those who willing opinion, despite,

even were to express an to echo Converse 1964, invitation to disavow opia generous any nion when felt, have had explicit well none was may not a very or thought-out basis for that opinion. Those who did take view a on the question of the overall of issues decided the Eurorange on Union asked When insert pean were you say response to previous question, this general feeling that have about the a you

European Union European Community, have specific

or you issues in mind This retrospective probe showed that only 17 per cent of the sample had specific issues in mind responding the to original question. This reinforces the view that attitudes in this

be less than well formed. area may This expectation further confirmed Eurobarometer data

from 1995 perceptions of the allocation of decision making on between national and the European Union power governments level wide of issues. Inter alia, the data show that 38 over a range cent of the European public believe that foreign policy deciper ded at EU level and precisely the proportion believe that desame fence decided EU level Eurobarometer, 1995: B65. matters are at

On reading of the foreign and security policy of

any common as

1995, these perceptions wildly inaccurate. The proportion

were seeing foreign policy as being at least to extent decided at some the European Union level should be much higher and the proportion seeing the for defence should be much lower. Lest same be assumed that people getting in relation the are wrong to com-

foreign and security policy simply because this inhe-

mon an rently complex and remote should also that the area, one note

proportion perceiving agricultural policy as being at least to

some extent decided the European Union level only 40 at per cent. The overall impression from this review of the evidence of various aspects of for European integration be summarisupport can sed follows: there fairly widespread for the rather as support notion of efforts unify Western Europe; result of vague to as a a downturn since the second half of for membership 1991, support of the Union running at only about 50 and matched per cent almost equal level of indifference whether the an as to or not Union continues to exist; finally, despite initial the appearances to

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

attitudes the policy of the Union neither contrary, to scope are well-formed well—informed. All of this suggests that the per-

nor missive consensus Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970,

ever existed, rather fragile creature. One could further and

was a go that the itself, much bandied about, actually

suggest term so was

misleading that glossed significant flaws in the fabric of

over

public opinion towards integration. Were not for the prevalence of the permissive assumption, there might not have

consensus

been such surprise when, the integration began to make

as process

inroads the economic and political life of the member greater on

for integration began to waning that beca-

states, support wane, a

manifest only in opinion polls but also in referendums and me not in parliamentary debates in several countries.

These weaknesses in attitudes integration confirmed

to are the evidence relating knowledge of the institutions of the

to Union. Space does permit detailed discussion of this aspect

not a but the essentials be briefly summarised. Knowledge of Euro-

can

affairs low; prevailing attitudes the Union characteripean to are sed either indifference lack of knowledge combination

or or a of both; and this lack of knowledge particularly important because dip below quite high level of knowledge has de-

any a a vastating effect the and coherence of attitudes in-

on structure to tegration4.These features of the orientations of citizens the

to European Union confirm the outlined earlier in this

argument chapter that well structured, supportive attitudes commensurate with the of integration have in fact developed.

current stage not The key question in the is: D0 these attitudes have

current context

effect levels of participation in European Parliament elecany on tions

Sources of participation and abstention

The usual explanation given for low turnout in European Parlia-

elections that the Parliament has not got enough ment power. This explanation be of the second-order

tends to cast terms election model. The of this approach that, in compari-

essence

For detailed discussion see Sinnott, 1998.

a more

RICHARD SINNOTT

son to national elections, European Parliament elections do

not affect the distribution of and that there therefore,

power less at stake such elections Reif and Schmitt, 1981, Franklin and

van der Eijk 1996. From this starting point the that

argument turn-

will be lower and that those who do will be out turn out to vote motivated do by national considerations and by Euro-

to so not pean ones. The problem that this plausible model receives little or no support when tested against the evidence of

voter perceptions, attitudes and behaviour.

Evidence perceptions of and perceptions of what

on power at stake in elections indicates that electorates by and large

do not make the sophisticated calculations about differences between the

of national parliaments and of the European Parliament power or about differences in what stake between the kinds of

at two elections that the second-order—election model requires. Moreover,

to the extent that such differential perceptions exist, they have

no discernible effect the propensity Thus, for example,

on to Vote perceptions of the of the Parliament have little effect

power or no on turnout Table 2. There simply difference in reported

no turnout those with low, fairly low, fairly high

among very or very high estimates of the of the Parliament. What does make

power a difference the citizen doesn’t know anything about

the power of the Parliament. Likewise, show that relative perceptions

one can of the of the European Parliament comparison with the

power power of national parliaments do not have the anticipated effect

on turnout. In fact they have effect people who the

a perverse — see European Parliament having than their national

as more power

parliament slightly less likely for Table 3.

are to vote

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

Table 2. Type of electoral participation/absention by perception of the of the European Parliament, 1994 non-compulsory

power countries only °/o

Peroeivedpowerof theEuropeanParliament Typeof electoralparticipation/abstenfion

Very Fairlylow Fairlyhigh Veryhigh

low 3-5 6-8 9, 1o

DontKNOW 11

E°"’°‘°

power non-compulsory countries only °/o

Perceiveddifference powerthe oftheEPandnationalparliaments Typeof ,p . . r . | EP lotlessa EPslightly Twothe EPslightlyEPalot Dontknow -9 -3to less-2,-1 sameO more1,2 3to9

RICHARD S|NNO‘||

Turning to the attitudes that do the affective image of the

matter, Parliament influences turnout. Moreover, that having

seems not

image of the Parliament damaging of the likeliany as terms

hood of voting having negative image. The perceived reliability

as a of the Parliament making that the decisions taken the

sure European Union in the interests of ordinary people affects

are turnout. European party and candidate differentials also have

an impact Table 4.

Table 4. Type of electoral participation/abstention European party differential, 1994 non-compulsory voting countries only °/0

Europeanpartydifferential Typeofelectoralparticipation/abstention

Very Fairlylow Fairlyhigh Veryhigh

Dom low 3-5 6-8 9, 10

know 1. 2

E°’°‘°

The concepts of party and candidate differentials refer how

to much matters to the individual citizens whether particular parties candidates win seats the European Parliament

or elections. The campaign also matters, least in of

at terms turnout. But matters only the citizen’s the campaign

exposure to active, that he she reads about discusses with family

or or

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

friends colleagues work. The evidence that purely or or at passive that the campaign that limited exposure, exposure to

being the receiving end of advertising, television radio

to on or or leaflets, canvassing does nothing to increase the coverage, or or level of Thus the campaign influential but turnout. no means decisive. In the light of the above, perhaps the most surprising contention of previous research that attitudes to European integration have significant effect turnout in European Parliament elecno on tions. This counter-intuitive finding have arisen partly bemay in European Parliament elections has been treated cause turnout as

simple dichotomy voted did not vote and partly be-

a — versus — of the limited of attitudes to integration investigated cause range as possible of participation and abstention. In fact, abstention sources European Parliament elections fourfold phenomenon a depending whether voluntary circumstantial and on or on whether accompanied by abstention national elections or specific European elections Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, to 1998: 40-43. Consequently, there dependent variable not one but four, and the explanation does not cover all four same cases.

Obviously, the key dependent variable voluntary Euro—speci-

fic abstention. The various influences Euro-turnout cited above on doubt the prevailing conclusion that attitudes European cast on to integration do not matter. However, such bivariate relationships do the point. What needed multivariate analysis not prove a that controls for all the relevant influences. In fact, logistic a regression analysis using wide of contextual and attitudinal a range variables does show that voluntary Euro—specific abstention significantly affected by attitudes European integration, by attituto des the European Parliament and attitudes the parties and to to candidates in the election and that not significantly affected by second-order considerations and calculations Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998: 222-236. Given the conventional wisdom of the

second-order-election-model, perhaps the most important mesof this analysis of turnout in the 1994 European sage to come out Parliament elections that attitudes and perceptions and to experiences of Europe and of the European Parliament make a

RICHARD SINNOTT

difference to people’s participation. Contrary what often

to argued, European elections simply national elections

are not proxy

appendages to domestic politics. This that appeals in

or means cast terms of domestic political issues necessarily conducive

are not either to mobilising voters to winning This brings the

or votes. us

wider issue of how to respond to the challenge of increasing

turn-

out and improving the quality of participation in European Par-

liament elections.

Approaches to a solution

There instant solution the problem of in European

no to turnout Parliament elections but there piecemeal, gradualist that

are steps

be taken facilitate participation and mobilise it. In can a to b to terms of facilitating participation, three factors need be conside-

to red. First, the timing of the election: really sensible pick

to a weekend in mid-June for election Parliament that does

an to a not have base in the hearts and mind of the citizens The data

a secure from 1994 show that absence from home, either for the day, for

the weekend for holidays significant of

or was a source circumstantial abstention Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998. At minimum, the choice of mid-June does facilitate the

a not

voters. Secondly, the evidence that registration and voting

suggests card problems lead significant of circumstantial

to a amount abstention. Among the non—compulsory voting countries, the problem most prevalent Britain, France and Spain but also discernible other countries. Improved administrative

arran-

gements or improved communication concerning existing

arrangements would help to solve this problem. Thirdly, there the issue of the day of voting. the question whether voting should

be weekday Sunday, clear that Sunday voting

on a or on a

conducive The evidence however, that more to turnout. suggests,

both weekday and Sunday voting inhibit participation, each dif-

ferent The logical solution would be allow voting

ways. to on a

Sunday and Monday. Although this would considerably increase

a the administrative of holding elections, ought be

costs to seriously considered and just for European elections.

not

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

Turning the challenge of mobilising the should

to voters, one

that compulsory voting form of mobilisation; the note a voter problem that coercive mobilisation and, such, incon-

as ceivable for European Parliament elections. Holding concurrent elections also form of mobilisation; the problem that

a mo-

sub—European basis and, itself, does nothing bilises voters on a for the quality of European participation. Other institutional fac-

directly affecting participation include the nature of the elec-

tors toral though the effect of this complex than

system, more previously thought. More important, however, the indirect effect that from the constitutional of the EU and from the

stems system role of the Parliament within it. Comparing the European Parlia-

national parliaments, have argued that the only

ment to some way

widespread participation European Parliament elec-

to secure tions have the European executive elected and responsible

to

the European Parliament. European elections would then to produce party combination of parties with mandate to govern

a or a Europe. Such proposal be examined in the light of the natu-

a must

of and of the style of decision—making the European re power Union.

Power be concentrated be dispersed. Examples are

can or can the traditional British model the hand and the American

on one model the other. But political further differentiated

on systems are

according whether the style of decision—making adversarial

to or consensual. Combining these dimensions gives four types of

two democratic see Figure 2.

governance

RICHARD SINNOTT

Figure Types democratic

governance

Concentration/dispersal of power

Concentrated Dispersed

Adversarial Type | Type

Britain The United States

Style of decision-

makina

Consensual Type Type IV

The Netherlands Switzerland

The point that democratic in the European Union

governance falls into Type IV and Virtually certain to continue do for the

so foreseeable future. This must be taken into account in considering

to mobilise voter participation. Mass mobilisation not measures going to be brought about by grand transformation in the

some role of the Parliament that would enable European Parliament elections to produce mandate to Europe. Given that

a govern a

big—bang approach perhaps fortunate that the

not on, raw material for gradualist approach mobilisation exists. Even in

a to the of the EU constitution and of the role of the Par-

present state liament, the evidence indicates that the image of the Parliament matters, that the reliability of the Parliament that Euro-

matters,

and candidate differentials and that overall attipean party matter tudes to European integration matter. These all things that

are can be worked here and without waiting for

on now someone or something to transform the European Parliament in would

Ways not be consistent with the nature of either the institutions of

or the political of the Union.

processes

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

References

Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott and Palle Svensson 1998 People

and Parliament in the European Union; Participation, Demo-

and Legitimacy, Oxford, Oxford University Press

cracy

Converse Philip E. 1964 ‘The nature of belief systems

among

publics’ in Ideology and Discontent, ed. D.A. Apter. New

mass

York, Free Press Eichenberg, Richard, C., 1998 Measurement Cumula-

matter:

tion the study of public opinion and European integration,

Paper presented at American Political Science Association

Annual Meeting, September 3-6, 1998, Boston Eurobarometer, 1995 Report Standard Earobarometer 43,

on

European Commission Directorate General X, Autumn Franklin, Mark and Caes der Eijk eds. 1996 Choosing

van

Europe T/øe European Union and National Politics in the Face

Union, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Lindberg, L. N. and Scheingold, A. eds. 1970 Europes

Would-Be Polity: Patterns Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, N: Prentice—Hall

Niedermayer, Oskar, 1995 Trends and Contrasts in Oskar

Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott eds., Public Opinion and

Internationalized Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Reif, Karl—Heinz and Hermann Schmitt 1980 Nine second-

order elections: conceptual framework for the analysis of

a European elections results, European Journal of Political Research, 3-4

Sinnott, Richard 1998 Knowledge and the position of attitudes

European Common Foreign and Security Policy the

to a on

real-to-random continuum Paper presented at American Poli-

tical Science Association Annual Meeting, September 3-6, 1998,

Boston

Integration and Statehood in the European Union

The Distribution of Powers Between the EU

and the Member States

Brigid Laffan‘

Introduction

There considerable scholarly debate about the challenges facing the contemporary nation state and about the changing nature of statehood in Europe, and this debate focused in particular by

the ending of the Cold War and the evolution of two processes —

European integration. The continuing centrality of nation states to political order asserted trenchantly by authors, who point

many to the depth and breadth of the institutions they have spawned. Others point to the arrival of borders and to perfo-

more porous

rated sovereignty, to the possibility of prismatic patters of political authority scattering allegiances and dispersing them not only

the national level but also the subnational and supranational at at level, and multiple loyalties. Controversy about the role of the

to nation state bound with debates about the relationship bet-

up

European integration and statehood. Laffan, O’Donnell, ween Smith 2000, Moravcisk 1998, Sweet Stone al. 1998.

et

The objective of this analyse the distribution of

paper to

between the EU and the member states, but in powers a manner which reflects the ties and tensions that moulding the kind

on are of political and economic order that emerging the Union.

l The author Jean Monet Professor of European politics Department

at of politics at university college Dublin.

INTEGRATION AND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Three tensions integration have considerable impact the

a on relationship between statehood and integration and between the member states and the collectivity. These

are:

the tension between union of states and market

a a

the tension between the polity and problem-solving

EU as a a

area

the tension between EU level policy—making and policy making I

at other levels.

These tensions throw contradictions that have particular bea-

up a ring the subject of this conference, namely, the demo-

on matter cratic fabric of integration and the participation of citizens EU

politics.

A Union of States and a Market

Promoting and facilitating economic exchange central to the

was integration effort from the outset. Patterns of commercial

exchange and the perceived economic needs of member

states were critical the development of the market and the internal

common market. 1998, Milward al. 1993, Laffan al. 2000.

Moravcsik et et

The Union’s economic order operated the micro rather than the

at

level, injecting considerable competitive into the macro pressures domestic economies and thereby fundamentally altering patterns of production, distribution and exchange. The internal market

launched in the mid—1980s, transformative chaprogramme, was

in that required strengthening of the political-economic

racter a authority of the Union. The removal of internal barriers physical,

—

fiscal and technical national economies reflected a search

—among for efficiency and competitiveness in the European

greater eco-

involved deepening of the market in goods nomy. a common and extension of cross-border competition services and pub-

an to lic procurement. Large sections of the national economies that had

been relatively untouched market integration, notably financial

services and public utilities, brought within the remit of the

were

Union’s regulatory A whole language of regulation,

range. new

BRIGID LAFFAN

home control, mutual nition, a level in

count ry reco g y g field"n bu1ltu roach to EU ulation.u "The uantitativen

a new app re g q accumulation of Euro laws and market emn g measures

new pean o P

produced truly qualitativec c shiftn n the dynam1co of u 0

a in economic 1ntegration and in European economic The transforma-

governance. tional of the internal market led changes that

nature programme to have direct bearing the of this conference. The

a on concerns most

significant are:

change in the regulatory reach and capacity of the EU,

0 a step which reflected in the concept of the EU "regulatory

as a state. This EC laws and the development of

meant more new European agencies. EC regulation became visible and

more contested within the member states and impacted directly

more

individual citizens. on the internal market reduced the boundary control capacity of 0 national in variety of

governments a ways. the of the generated for further 0 success programme pressures

economic integration notably, the single project.

currency the extensive mobilisation of national in the Brussels 0 actors since the mid-1980s, all seeking voice and influence in this

growing of public policy making. Domestic social forces

arena

drawn of the national into the European of were out arena po-

licy making they beam stakeholders in EU policy making.

as

The significance of market/ economic integration in the of

process European integration shapes in fundamental the kind of

a manner political and economic order that emerging in Europe. This illustrated by analysis of the second tension, highlighted above,

notably between the EU problem-solving and polity.

as a arena as a

Problem Solving Arena and Polity

Much of the day day politics and public policy making of the

to European Union characterised by the search for solutions to the

problems generated by the make policies that must

attempt to stretch such wide variety of member states. The actors

across a

|NTEGRATION AND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

engaged in EU policy making purposeful. The Union’s policy

are regimes have been created and sustained by political acting

actors,

purposively to achieve specific goals to resolve specific

or problems. Wallace, ZOOO, They be convinced of the be-

p. must nefits of collective action and the appropriateness of the Union

as the in which tackle these problems. They engaged

arena to are a

variety of projects, necessarily the project of European inte-

not gration se. The multileveled system of policy-making has

per pro-

duced multiple and diverse of policy subsystems rather

arenas a set

than traditional political hierarchy. EU public policy making

a non-hierarchical, characterised by ongoing negotiations and

segmented in different institutional settings and policy networks. The technical of much of what the EU does privileges the poli-

nature

tics of the pragmatist and the who populate the myriad of

experts committees attached the services of the Commission and the

to Council sub-structure. Much of what agreed the level

occurs at

of the specialists rather than their political The complex

masters. nature of the Union’s institutional landscape and the multiple decision rules that animate the policy privileges insiders,

process

those with knowledge and experience of

how the EU process works. To the hundreds of thousands of officials and representati-

of interest organisations who populate the Brussels level ves arena, Euro politics familiar both of substance and

terms process. To the electorate, the other hand, weakly connected

mass on to Euro politics, the EU remote. and unwieldy. Paradoxi-

arcane, cally, precisely those attributes of the that endow

system with authoritative role in public policy making raise difficult

an issues of polity.

The deepening of market integration, the intensification of

treaty change and big projects such EMU and enlargement

as brought polity issues rather than just the politics of policy

— —to the fore. Up the early 1990s, the authority and legitimacy of the

to EU could the "shadow of the past and the instrumental

rest on benefits brought the member and their peoples. This

to states

to be insufficient the EU beyond market regulaappears as goes tion the European integration has become politi-

narrow sense. cised and divisive issue in the domestic politics of

a many states.

BRIGID LAFFAN

Lines of resistance integration to be the increase al-

to appear on beit With considerable cross-national Variation Wallace, 2000. A

marked characteristic of scholarly writing the EU in the 19905

on

focus the so-called democratic deficit. The deficit

a on term

implies inadequacy and insufficiency, but what the appropri-

an

benchmark against which the Union T0 date the ate to test pro-

of enhancing the democratic element in the Union follocess wing the well—worn Union path of incremental change and

prag-

matic adaptation, unlike the of market integration.

not process

However, unlike market integration, there over-arching goal

no

big idea. In fact, national political leaders extremely cautious or are

in relation the politics of integration. They far happier

to are to launch big projects in the economic sphere than disturb the ba-

to lance logic of domestic politics. The political leaders show

or same

marked reluctance communicate the realities of in a to power

Europe their electorates. They persist with the contemporary to old language of national interest when Janus-like they both

serve the national and collective European The realities of

governance. interdependence in Europe and widely that European

more mean

embrace broad agenda of co—operation. This

governments must a leads the tension, the tension between national and Euro-

to next

pean policy making.

Tensions in Multileveled Policy Making

All multileveled of public policy making characterised

systems are by tension and contention about the appropriate level of policy

making and implementation. The Union, multileveled polity,

as a

such conflicts. I asked specifically in this

no stranger to was section address the distribution of between the national

to powers and the European. However, just question of the

not a amount of EU but the overall of

competence any one area pattern economic that results from the in which the EU

governance manner

public policy making. The pattern since the 19505 one engages

whereby and of public police have within

more more areas come the ambit of collective The major constitutional sett-

governance. lements, the treaties, have been critical in the formal extension of

INTEGRATION AND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

EU competence. The treaties reflect dual On the a process. one hand, treaties formalise policy co—operation that already new was

taking place. This particularly true of EU RD

programmes, environmental policy, education and culture, co—operation juson tice and home affairs. On the other hand, the treaties may set up

policy goals such the single defining the calen-

new as currency dar, institutions, and eligibility criteria for membership processes, of the EU has expanded in other new currency zone. competence notably, the judicial activism of the Court of Justice and ways, the policy entrepreneurship of the Commission. But the treaties tell that the EU has few exclusive competencies, from the us apart common commercial policy, elements of competition policy and recently monetary policy for the Euro 11. EU public more policy making operates the basis of exclusive but on not competence the sharing of with national authorities. This more on competence has led what has been termed creeping competence whereby to the EU has role, however, minor, of national now a many areas policy. The of the Union’s role differs depending the nature on

kind of policy.

As noted above, the Union has formidable the power regulatory field because of the common-internal market This process.

has lead significant law making provide regulatory

to very to a framework for the free of the factors of production. movement that law the main of public the Union. ensures source power EU regulation has beyond the confines of market gone narrow regulation to include elements of social and environmental regulation. Given the importance of the market the member and to states economic actors within them, unlikely significant we are to see a reduction in the Union’s regulatory capacity. In fact about concern

food safety, for example, lead less EU regulation.

may to more not

The focus improving the regulatory regimes and

now on ensuring the EC law transposed and enforced in the member states. There also important international dimension EU an to re-

gulation arising from demands for global regulation in certain

fields. Redistribution remains largely national responsibility a Europe. That said, the Union has had develop re—distributive to a

BRIGID LAFFAN

capacity facilitate the of market integration and to process to provide side in for change. Prior 1988, the payments return treaty to agricultural policy the main re—distributive policy in common was the Union. Since then has been augmented by the structural and

cohesion funds that channel finance the less developed member to and regions in the Union. There doubling of the states was a of EU finance going Europe’s regions between amount to poorer 1988-1992. This followed by further increases in the was next period 1999 and stabilisation of EU cohesion spending to 2006, to a the financial perspective Berlin following agreement on a new at

24-25 March. More money was accompanied new processes

for distributing EU finance. An expansion in re—distributive poli-

cies accompanied by number of distributive policies rewas a search and development, education and culture. The small size of

the EU budget places clear limit the capacity of the Union to a on greatly expand its distributive and re—distributive capacity. The

Berlin retains 1.27 of GDP EU fiagreement percent as a cap on

nances. The European Union 1992 expanded the ambi-

Treaty on

tions of the Union in number of directions, notably the common a

the foreign and security policy and co—opera-

currency, common tion in justice and home affairs. The single has been currency established accompanied by institution building the form and was

of the central bank and the stability and growth pact to govern

national budgetary policies. The of the single

management currenhas greatly increased the need for the member states to develop cy

understandings of economic developments both within

common the Euro and in the international monetary system. Supranazone tional influences likely increase and the of issues that are to range of common concern" to the member states likely to grow. are The debate has already moved fiscal policy and issues of unfair to competition. The activities of the Union in pillars and tax two three have in importance and will become central grown even more the of the Union. The in Kosovo has re—openedthe

to agenda war

debate about the Union’s international capacity and its need to develop enhanced capacity in relation European security. The an to of Amsterdam established ambitious in Treaty a very programme

INTEGRATION AND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

the of justice and home affairs, which strengthen the area may modest framework for collective action that exists. now

The Balance between the National and the

European

The EU system that works the basis of high level a system on a of decentralisation and delegation. with not a system a strong centre replete with large fiscal bureaucratic works or resources. on the basis of the enmeshing the national and the European an uneasy tension between integration and With the autonomy. establishment of the single the EU has in place the last currency, put

building brick of economic integration. Enlargement the

to east and south will eventually establish the geographical reach of the

system and two intergovernmental conferences will one or more settle the main institutional questions. The well be system may

entering period of consolidation following the dynamic of

a change since the mid-1980s. This should allow the relationship

between EU and national settle down. competence competence to The decision Amsterdam insert the protocol

at to on subsidiarity

and proportionality into format makes these principles

a treaty part of the constitution of the The protocol establishes system. how Article 3b the Treaty European Union should be on operationalised. The document beautifully ambiguous. copperfas-

tens subsidiarity as a legal principle but that does call into one not

question the conferred the European Community

powers on

Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice. The application of the principle also the provisions and objectives of the

must respect

Treaty particularly as regards the maintaining full of the acquis

communautaire and the institutional balance Protocol, articles 2-

3. Moreover, identifies subsidiariry principle that allows as a Community action within the limits of its be expanded powers to where circumstances require, and conversely, be restricted so to or discontinued where longer justified 3. Provi-

no Protocol

ded that these provisions the subsidiariry principle

are met, one that should all EU institutions in the carrying of their govern out tasks. The protocol mindful that the EU should only

was legislate

BRIGID LAFFAN

the and that Community should to extent necessary measures leave much for national decision possible. Moreover, as scope as care should be taken well established national arrangeto respect and the organisation and working of Member States legal ments article The debate about subsidiarity and its

systems. Protocol,

subsequent inclusion in the treaties reflects the fact that the Union

public policy and that be

now maturing as a arena care must taken that the Union’s reach does extend beyond its to ensure not

grasp.

The Balance between Large and Small

States

The constitutional order of the Union based the formal on of the 15 member That said, the member states

equality states.

differ size, economic wealth and capacity. To date, the EU has balance the needs of its large and small states are a re-

managed to

smooth Size does feature variable the latively manner. not as a

day day policy—making of the Union. Policy cleavages

to system would tend manifest themselves cleavages between the not to as and small. Small do, however, have collective interest large states a of voice and the rules of the The

in issues representation, game. that gives over-representation small states

current system one to of weighted in Council and MEPs in the European terms votes Parliament. The of enlargement with more prospect eastern many small has raised the question of small/ large state representastates tion, issue that resolved Amsterdam. In protocol an was not at a institutions the Amsterdam Treaty the outline of instituon to an tional there in that the large will lose second

bargain states a

Commissioner in for re—weighting of in the Council. return a votes This will be of the imponant issues be addressed at the one most to Conference. Apart from the question of

2000 Intergovernmental

formal representation in the institutions, smnll must be vistates about the of informal directoire of the large gilant emergence an in the Union. Large already have extensive bilastates states more teral with each other than they do with the small and contact states

INTEGRATION AND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

there has been growth of informal the second a Contact groups pillar. High-ranking the Union have also tended posts to go to the nationals of large in the last states year.

Conclusions

The Union has achieved deep economic integration without a

centralised political authority. has developed capacity

a to go-

this increasingly integrated economic without of

Vern space many the attributes associate with Collective EU we governance. governance had to be crafted in novel and experimental bea manner of the continuing salience of the member containers cause states as of national societies and polities. In general, the EU does not represent of bargaining between the national a process zero—sum and the European. The EU only succeed the in-

can mobilising

stitutions, actors and of the member and therefore resources states reaffirming them. In the EU, trade formal sovereignty states and control for representation, voice and influence. This should be

seen as a positive sum game, although for all and all not states social forces time. The prismatic of the Union at any one nature set to continue with segmented bargaining and problem in

solving

different policy Arising from EMU, the will have arenas. system to take domestic and less diplomatic character. The on a more trajectory of the Union polity difficult plot, the as a very to as politicisation of the EU novel and the emphasis

system on bringing

Europe closer its citizens relatively for to a recent concern Europe’s political leaders. could be argued that the Union could

be democratised in bits and pieces in line with the which the way Union has done things in the At the Union’s past. present, political fabric being fashioned incremental, contested and an patchy The unlike of pragmatic manner. process not a strategy and incremental market creation. However, the

disquiet a num-

ber of member states about the impact of the EU their national on democracies, in addition the growing stakes in

to integration may

force Europe’s political leaders be innovative in their to more

BRIGID LAFFAN

the political fabric of integration. So far they have

approach to re-

sisted with the roles of the game of national politics.

tampering

INTEGRATIONAND STATEHOOD IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

References

Laffan, B., O’DOnnell R. and Smith, M. 2000,

Europe’s Experi-

mental Union: Rethinking integration. London:

Routledge

Milward, A. S., Lynch, F.M.B., Romero, F Ranieri, R. and Soren- ., sen V. 1993 The Frontier National Sovereignty. London:

Routledge

Moravesik, A. 1998 The Choice Europe. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

for

versity Press

Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet A. 1998 European and

integration

Supranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press Wallace, H. 2000 "The Policy Pendulum, in Wallace, W. and Wallace, H., eds. PolicyMa/eing in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press

EU

The Architecture of

Institutions and Citizen

Participation

Hermann Schmitt‘

Introduction

Modern democracy representative democracy. This holds for the of democracy, that the political in the

prototype mass process national political holds all the for political entity arena. more a which large and complex the European Union. Some 300 as as million citizens called participate in all of local and are to sorts in national politics and in EU politics. The dif-

regional politics,

ferent tiers of this multi-tiered polity independent from are not another, and the national and the EU layer are particularly one intimately intertwined.

Direct citizen participation generally limited.

government and of the times, political decisions taken At most places most are of the people rather than by the people them-

by representatives

selves. Citizen participation in politics restricted but not to,

concentrated the of electing representatives. Poli-

upon process tical parties in indispensable in this process. are many ways Even leave aside possible irregularities, evaluations of the We democratic quality of the electoral from process may vary one election the Those evaluations be based upon two to next. can

l The author professor political science Mannheimer Zentrum für at Euro äische Sozialforschun Mannheim universit y P g at .

THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU INSTITUTIONS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND

criteria. One D0 the people who position turnout. are not a to take part the real thing i.e., policy making least in

at participate

elections of their representatives, and what does mean many do not The second criterion political agreement or, more technically, issue congruence between electors and elected. Representative democracy works well participate voters elections, and representatives decide would they had as voters chance A related question how issue a to. congruence brought about. Are the parties responsive followers of

voters preferences

or are they powerful molders of the world views of their voters. We will briefly address each of these questions turn.

Turnout

Turnout high in national parliament elections, with only a very modest downward trend the last half consiover century. derably lower in European Parliament elections, with dramatic a decline the last election Figure 1.

Figure Electoral Participation in Western Europe and in the E C/ E U

80 l ä 70

50 I 40

20 - firstaxirrzriaridatias EmpamPaIimn=ndeaias 10

0 1945-505160 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-2000 Samah., " "2," ‘ M ‘ J J. 15BFP=Pifl5m , ,

HERMANN SCHMITT

There of differences between national and are two aspects turnout European Parliament elections: level and trend. Level differences

mainly differential mobilisation and involvement. are due to stake national elections than in European elections, the more at

campaigning of political parties intense, the politicisation

more

of the public generally higher, and the public more

mass involved result Reif 8CSchmitt 1980. as a generally believed that level differences do relate not systematically attitudes about the EU. EU-critical attitudes not to are major factor the explanation of abstentionism in European a Parliament elections Schmitt 8CMannheimer 1990 and der

see van

Eijk 8CFranklin 1996; for View Blondel al. 1998. a contrary et People do abstain because they do with the Union not not agree and its policies, but because they uninterested and disenchanare ted. Rather than abstentionism, would EU-critical one expect

orientations anti-integrationist parties lists form and

to cause or to absorb the respective share as, in the Danish and the to vote e.g., French case. The formation of such EU-critical partisan forma-

tions take time, and be equally successful in may may not every Nevertheless, the general impression that abstenparty system. tions in European Parliament elections normally result of are not a EU-critical orientations. just level differences which become apparent the not above figure. There also trend differences: participation rates in are European Parliament elections decline faster than participation

in national first order elections. Why this not well rates so understood; changing effect patterns like concurrent context national first—order elections in different national settings be may composition effects that originate the rounds of one reason; two enlargement of the Union since 1979 be other. This in may an

needs further investigation.

any case While low best characterised ringing alarm clock turnout as a for the democratic quality of elections, deficient representation

immediately and substantially important. Low turnout not

more problematic those staying home be well in agreement per se — may with the functioning of the political and therefore system may see need participate. In the long however, deficient no to run,

THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

participation likely undermine effective representation.

seems to This the uestion address: Whether and what de we now to gree thisu already u the European Union.n 15apparent in

Effectiveness of Political Representation

The European Union combines distinct modes of two government

which based different of socio-political linkage:

are on two routes

intergovernmentalism and the confederal model of political

representation and party government and the federal model of political representation see Figures 2 and 3. The democratic quality of the EU political be process cannot adequately evaluated restrict attention just of the we our to one two competing models of in the European Union, the government federal the confederal. The for the electoral or same goes two involved, the European and the national. European Pararenas liament elections just and the important, elecare one, not most toral which analysis of the democratic quality of the event upon an EU political process has to be based.

HERMANN SCHMITI

Figure The intergovernmental model European political

representation

EuropeanCouncill Council of Ministers / National Government 1 National Government 15 National Parliament 1 National Parliament 15 ... National Parties National Parties ... National Electorate 1 National Electorate 15

Figure The federal model European political representation

European Government European Parliament European Political Parties European Electorate

THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU INSTITUTIONSAND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Previous research has established that the effectiveness of political representation in the EU does differ much either

not way Schmitt

8CThomassen 1999, chap. 9. Representation functions equally well badly via the European federal does via the national or as

inter-governmental channel of satisfactory

EU government. with regard to the grand directions of public policy. While party elites generally somewhat the left than their the are more to voters, between elites’ and voters’ ideological orientations congruence still considerable. Figure 4.

Figure Effectiveness representation regarding grand policy

directions: left-rig/at orientations

right O o

o I . O O .

A w x=.86

ä b 5 6 7 8 9 lO MEPsmeanpositions right

Source: European Representation Study 1994-7.

The political between and elites equally agreement voters party

profound regarding the principle of European unification though

party elites generally somewhat Euro-positive than their are more

HERMANN SCHMITT

Elites and voters of most parties meet in the Eurovoters are. positive angle. Only few find another the Euro-critical

a one corner.

Mass-elite found less satisfactory only when

agreement we

leave the grand political and take the thorny paths of

avenues specific EU policy No matter what EU policy domain

measures.

look at borders, single market, common currency We —open or — the effectiveness of political representation here found be

to deficient. Figure 6 displays the issue

common currency as an example. Most elites strongly favour of while their

party are

locate themselves middle-of-the-road. This be voters more may understood substantively sceptic and critical view.

as a more can however be that feel poorly informed and

many voters are therefore undecided about rather than opposing the European

Monetary Union.

Figure Eflfectiveness political representation regarding specific

E U policies: Tbe question

currency

flCWCOmfl10n

9-

8-

. 0.: §7 o å se.

° §6 °"0.0

.

§5- 0

o. .

. . ‘gr g3 °

;L r=.52

l l l l l l | | l

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 0 national NEPSmeanpositions newcommon

Source: European Representation Study 1994-7.

Political representation less effective in view of specific EU

more

policies and probably in view of specific policies in general while

to Work well regarding the grand policy directions like

seems —

THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU INSTITUTIONSAND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

left right, and anti-integration. Having said this,

or pro— or however, still know nothing about how this solid base of poli-

we

tical agreement between representatives and represented brought

about the elites that lead voters opinion, the the

or are voters

driving force

This only be adequately assessed with diachronic study

can a

design. Analysing voters’ and party elites’ political

average preferences with regard to European unfication 1979 and 1994,

we find initial evidence that the elites who behave

some party

responsively view of changing voter preferences Figure 6.

Somewhat in contrast to the findings of Essaiasons and Holmbergs Swedish study 1996 this to suggest that political

seems representation in Europe might not be such elite—driven

an process after all.

Figure Representation from above A simple causal model linking elites and voters views about European unification in I 994 and I 979

1 elite voters views views 1994 .51 1994

60 .76

elite voters views views 1979 1979

Source: European Election Studies 1979 and 1994.

Notes: N ofcases parties = 18. The partiesfor which elite and massdataare available for both 1979and 1994are:CVP B, SP B, PVVB, SDDK, V DK, FbmEFDK, CDU D, SPD D, PS F, UDF F, MSI/ANl, DC/PPII, CDA NL, PVDANL, VVD NL, ConservativeParty GB, LabourParty GB, andLiberalParty/LiberalDemocrats GB. The modelhas been estimatedwith EQS;goodnessof tit measuresand test statisticsare notreportedasthere was nointentiontomaximisethe fit betweenmodel and data.

HERMANN SCHMITI

Summary and Conclusions

Compared national politics, participation of EU citizens

to EU politics and declining. This should not be taken

poor as an indication of political disagreement between party elites and party

EU policies because abstention have, and repeatvoters on can are

edly found have, other than policy disagreement. Fac-

to sources tors conducive to high turnout levels

are:

high politicisation of the campaign, i.e. high saliency of issues.

This hard achieve in European Parliament election

to a as EU issues typical low salience issues in most places, and

are

there hardly disagreement between the major parties

any about them.

successful personalisation of issue/goal conflict. This again

hard to achieve for the time being, there transnational

as, no personalisation of political alternatives at the EU level. One

procedural that could change this degree

measure so some would be the direct election of the President of the European Commission in with the EP election.

concurrence the closeness of the electoral the likelihood of

race, e.

governmental change. This does presently not apply to

European Parliament elections, they do not result in

as now

formation. However, the investiture of government a new Commission by newly elected European Parliament could be

a

step in this direction. one

and attachments/ party loyalties. Quite numerous strong party generally, party attachments tend to decline. In this

perspective, declining in European and national elections

turnout rates

result of the socio-political

are a same processes.

technical like compulsory voting, Sunday voting and

measures easiness of the electoral generally, and the dis-

system more

1 order election day. These factors tend explain tance to to variance in turnout between countries.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Political representation found to be Well-functioning View of the grand directions of public policy, both generally and in View of European unification. found be ineffective in View of EU

to policies both European and in national elections. Thus

we conclude that:

national elections mechanism for generating - are as poor a voter-party agreement EU policies European Parliament

on as elections and European Parliament elections good

are are as a mechanism for issues national elections

common concern as are.

elections generally translate preferences about — seem to voter the grand directions of public policy, rather than those about specific policies, into elite attitudes and behaviours.

HERMANN SCHMITT

References

Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott and Palle Svensson 1998 People

and Parliament in the European Union. Participation, Democracy, and Legitimacy. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Esaiasson, Peter and Sören Holmberg 1996 Representation from

Ahove: Members Parliament and Representative Democracy in

Sweden. Aldershot: Dartmouth Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt 1980 "Nine national

second-order elections: A systematic framework for analysis of

European elections results; together with K. Reif, European

journal Political Research 8,1: 3-44 Schmitt, Hermann and Jacques Thomassen, eds. 1999 Political

Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford:

Oxford University Press 1999 Schmitt, Hermann and Renato Mannheimer 1991 "About Voting

and Non-Voting in the European Elections of June 1989 in European journal Political Research 19,1:31-54.

Van der Eijk, Cees, Franklin, Mark N., al. 1996 Choosing

et Europe The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press

Blaming the Messenger

Political Communications and Turnout EU

Elections

Pippa Norris‘

The erosion of evident in the June 1999 elections the

turnout to European Parliament has set widespread alarm bells ringing Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg further evidence that the

as public becoming disenchanted and disengaged with the European Union. The level of voting participation fell from almost two—thirds 63 % of the electorate the first direct elections in 1979 just under half 49.2 % of European citizens in June 1999,

to its historical nadir see Figure 1. The decline successive

over election particularly clear in the Netherlands and Portugal,

as well Austria, Finland and Sweden, which sharp drop

as saw a after their first founding European elections. There also stark

are national differences, in the elections 90 % of Belgian

most recent citizens voted compared with only 23 % of the

one quarter British electorate Table 1. As Franklin and his colleagues

see

have arguedz, the institutional of electoral laws provides

system much of the explanation for these persistent systemic differences,

notably the of compulsory voting in Belgium, Luxembourg

use

1The author professor atJohn. F. Kennedy School of Government

at Harvard University. 2 Mark Franklin, Cees der Eijk and Erik Oppenhuis. 1996. "The Institu-

van tional Context: Turnout. In Choosing Europe The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union, edited der Eijk and Mark

Cees van Franklin. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

and Italy, Sunday polling day Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Swe

den, and the majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system used in mainland Britain until the 1999 contests.

Figure Tumour EU Elections 1979-99

Turnout EU Electlons 1979-99 Austria Belgium Danmark EU16 OM DoM.nesshow i mn å ,—-£.——‘

30.0 Finland Franco Germany Graeca mo __

S701

’ W

gm

30.0 x

Ireland Italy Lux Moth

1o.n//

son

X

30.0 Portugal Spain Sweden UK 90.0

/

k M

F"/1

so 1980199519901996 1980190519901995 1980199519901995 1990199619991995 year year year year

Set in broader context, the decline in the EU turnout a even worrying because trends elsewhere. more proves contrary to Many that there has been general decline voter partiassume a cipation but in fact in established democracies levels of turnout have remained fairly stable during the last decades; 71 % of two

voting population participated elections these states in

age

PIPPA NORRIS

the 1990s, down only 3 % from the 197053. As well known,

despite similar socioeconomic and political developments

in postindustrial societies, there persistent cross-national disparities

are levels of electoral participation. Some countries like Switzerland, France and the Netherlands have experienced substantial longterm falls Figure 3. In American presidential elections, in

see

1996 less than half 47.2 % the voting popular ballot,

age cast a down from almost two-thirds 63.1 % in 1960. calculate

we

turnout 171 countries worldwide, in all national elecaverage tions from 1945 1998, Switzerland ranks 137‘, the US ranks

to 138"‘, and Mexico ranks 139‘.

igure Change in EU Turnout 1994-99

HolmaIldy lux 67,7 V0.7 52.9 603 52.7 60.0 71.2 440 7ÅB 885 35.7 35.5 59.1 Ål6 3b4 56.8 avo 00.0 50.4 30.1 47.0 45.2 70,1 50.5 70.5 use 20.9 40.4 u a au 23.0 49.2

I1994 -1999

But, within this the media campaigns be

context, can news or party blamed for the downward trend in European participation there were a systematic negative bias in the media headlines

— news

3IDEA. Voter Turnout from I945 to 1998. www.int-idea.se.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

highlighted corruption the Commission, bureaucratic

at over regulation in Brussels, and junkets for the European parliament

— would be surprising deserted the polling stations.

not voters

Table Turnout in European Elections, 1979-1999

1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 Chg 1994-99 Notes

Germany 65.7 56.8 62.4 60.0 45.2 -14.8

Source:http://europa.eu.int

T0 examine this issue the first section of this outlines the

paper theoretical framework the literature, the next considers the evidence for the association between attention to campaign

communications and in European elections in 1989, 1994 and

turnout 1999. The conclusion briefly summarizes the theory of virtuous

a circle explain the major findings and speculates about the im-

to

plications for participation in EU affairs.

PIPPA NORRIS

Figure Postweur M eurz Turnout Per Decade

Postwar Mean Turnout Per Decade

lwoting AgePopulationsource:IDEA antral: =_i;=i_t1.l___ ...As-JL F|I_|I_I£__. m" IeIg|Im_

—"/‘H.- S vu: l i ...g O g sun

:sn nano: Germany Greece mi ___l_¢_lI_I_d____ mn /—/."" "-.. S lsnH få ° 5 sun

zsn Ing .ligan Luxembourg llulco NGIMLIIIQ um: N s sn g--—.f‘.. A o å sm $ :sn Ncuzealam lol:|_d______‘ logga _§p_l_|;_____ IIIn M "‘---q. s sn _... O 5 s..

:sn suaen §uIIzuIam nä; UK pusnj mn" " w /~ 5 sn /""‘—--— cl 5 m O :sn

decade decade decade decade decade

Understanding Political Participation

Explanations of political participation focus four of fac-

on sets tors. The institutional perspective the importance of the stresses

legal including the level of political rights and civil liber-

context ties, the type of electoral the facilities for registration and system, voting, the expansion of the franchise, the frequency, level and

timing of elections, and the competitiveness of electoral politics4.

" SeeIvor Crewe. Electoral Participation. thePolls, edited In Democracy at

Austin Ranney and David Butler. Washington, DC: AEI Press; Arend

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

In of the thorough comparative studies, Jackman and

one most Miller examined participation democracies

voter in twenty-two and found that political institutions and electoral laws provided the

plausible explanation for Variations in turnout, most voter

including levels of electoral participation and proportionality, multi—partyism and compulsory voting5. Franklin, der Eijk and

van Oppenhuis that variations in participation in European elec-

argue tions be attributed in large differences in systemic fac-

can part to

notably the of compulsory voting, the proportionality of

tors, use the electoral and the closeness of European nation elec-

system, to tions". In the United States, well, the legal hurdle of registration

as requirements and the frequency of elections widely believed to

are depress American turnout7.

At individual—level, the cultural perspective based

on survey

analysis has emphasized the importance of individual like

resources, education, socioeconomic status and time, combined with

age, motivation, meaning the attitudes people bring to the electoral

like of efficacy, political interest and party identiprocess a sense fication. Almond and Verba stressed the importance of civic

values learnt through the early socialization processs.Cultural attitudes towards the political system substantially

vary across

European notably support for the regime and representative

states,

Lijphart. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma. American Political ScienceReview. 91: 1-14. 5Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller. 1995. Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies During the 1980s. Comparative Political Studies,27: 467- 92. Seealso Richard Katz. 1997.Democracy and Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6Mark Franklin, der Eijk and Erik Oppenhuis. 1996. The Institu-

Cess van tional Context: Turnout. In Choosing Europe TheEuropean Electorate and National Politics in the Face Union, edited by Cees der Eijk and Mark

van Franklin. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 7Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes New Haven: Yale University Press. 3Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

PIPPA NOHFHS

institutionsg. long series of studies, Verba has demonstrated

In a how various forms of participation make different demands of skills, time, that political participation best be

money or so can understood multidimensional phenomenon. That people

as a

who regularly donate campaigns, their

money to or contact representative, necessarily involved other dimensions

are not like party work, community activism. There different costs

or are and benefits associated with different of participation. The

types

main categories distinguished Verba and his colleagues

concern

voting, campaign work, communal activity, and specialists.

contact In addition few citizens active all dimensions, while

a are across

involved in some are none.

Lastly, the organizational perspective has stressed the role of

mobilizing agencies, referring the electoral functions of

to party and candidate organizations, networks like churches, volun-

group tary associations and trade unions, social networks of families, friends and colleagues, and the role of the media. Putnam

news has argued that the decline of dense networks of local associations

and community organizations has reduced social capital and

contributed towards long—term erosion of American turnout

a

the generation. Verba found that churches and among post-war

voluntary organizations provide networks of recruitment, that

so those drawn into the political through these associations

process develop the organizational and communication skills that facilitate further activity. In the United States, Aldrich and Wattenberg

9Pippa Norris. Ed. Critical Citizens: Global Supportfor Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ‘° SeeSidney Verba, and Norman Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. l See,for example, Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen. 1995. Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan. 12Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

suggest that the decline of party organizations, and their replacement by entrepreneurial candidates, has been critical to this

process.

The role of political communications Via parties and the

news media fall into this latter category of factors. Parties mobili-

act as zing agencies through direct communications with voters, including traditional grassroots activities such canvassing, leafleting

as

and contacting voters, well holding party meetings and

as as cam-

paign rallies, and using national advertising party political

or broadcasts. The media this function through providing

news serve information about parties, candidates and policies that help

can to

crystallize voting choices, and the partisan particular, has

press, long been thought to help reinforce party support. In these activities through positive both parties and the media can

messages news

and candidate electors, and serve to increase party support among

the propensity they negative

to turnout, or can convey messages

that function depress participation.

to

The literature divided about the effects of media activity. In the traditional ‘Columbia’ model, partisan-leaning and

newspapers

campaigns playing vital role in reinforcing

party were seen as a

and getting the "The that people read ahout support out vote: more

listened to the campaign the media, the interested or on mass more they hecame in the election and the strongly they to feel

more come ahout their candidate...Media exposure gets out the vote at the

same

time that solidifiespreferences. It crystallizes and reinforces

more than "H The Michigan model conceptualized attention

converts. to political communications somewhat differently, itself minor

as a form of activism, instead of independent factor capable of

an influencing This perspective became influential that

turnout. so developed into the mainstream View studies of political partici-

13John Aldrich. 1995. Why Parties Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Martin P. Wattcnberg. 1996. The Decline of/imerican Political Parties: 1952- 1994. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhree. Voting: A Study Opinion Formation in Presidential Campaign. Chicago: University

a of Chicago Press. Pp. 246-248.

PIPPA NORRIS

pation, which rarely treated the media important causal factor

as an

their models. A of studies has credited the

range more recent

media with boosting public participation.

In contrast, in recent years many popular commentators

com-

monly that the public has become disengaged through

suggest negative There issues here. One

messages. are two separate con-

the effects of the of negative "attack" ads politicicerns use or

where candidate campaigns criticize their opponents’ ans or party character record. In the United States, Ansolabehere and

or

Iyengar provide of the most convincing experimental evi-

some dence that the of negative attack television campaign

use or ads, meaning those designed criticize the has the

to opponent, capacity to turn off American voters at the ballot box. Negative

advertising drives people from the polls in large numbers...

away Negative advertising breeds distrust the electoral process and pessimism about the value individual voice. Yet

an own

15SeeAngus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. TheAmerican Voter. New York: John Wiley. P. 92. Seealso Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim. 1978. Participation ana Political Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Geraint Parry, George Moyser and Neil Day. 1992.Political Participation and Democracy in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ’ Brice E. Pinkleton, and Erica Weintraub Austin. 1998. Media and Participation: Breaking the Spiral of Disaffection. In Engaging the Public: How Government and the Media Invigorate American Democracy. Ed. Thomas

can

Johnson, Carol E. Hays and Scott P. Hays. New York: Rowan 8cLittlefield; Hugh Culbertson and Guido H. Stempel III. 1986. "How media and

use reliance affect knowledge level." Communication Research.13:579—602;Alexis

Tan. 1980. Mass media issue knowledge and political involvement.

use, Public Opinion Quarterly. 44: 241-48. 7 See,for example, Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1992. Dirty Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kathleen H. Jamieson. 1984. Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism Presidential Advertising. New York: Oxford University Press; Karen Johnson-Cartee and Gary A. Copeland. 1991. Negative Political Advertising: Coming Age. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 3 Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar. 1995. Going Negative: How Political Advertisments Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press. P. 112.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

difficult to know how far generalize from these findings

we can

broadly part because of the different institutional context more of advertising European campaigns. Commercial political ad-

vertising has late to most European countries. In like

come some, Austria, negative advertisements banned law. In others like

are the Netherlands, although ads allowed, few aired because

are are parties have limited financial And still others like

resources. Britain difficult the effects of five to ten minute

to compare a

political broadcast, shown channel, with the effects party once per of repetitive 30—second ads in the United States. Lacking

common

systematic comparative data negative ads,

on exposure to we can-

these claims further here. not pursue

The other claim relates practices origina-

concern to common ting in the media, which examine, such where

news we can as rou-

tine headlines emphasize political scandals, incompe-

government

and/or partisan conflict. For example, Patterson tence suggests that American turned off by the media’s routine empha-

voters are sis the game schema, characterized by horse journalism

on race who’s ahead, who’s behind and extensive of opinion

coverage

polls. He that changes in journalism in the 1960s produce

argues

shift towards game-immersed strengthening voters’ mis-

a news,

of the candidates and reducing their of involvement. trust sense For Cappella and Jamieson strategic frames for political acti-

news

cynical to politicians, and campaigns.

vate responses governance Yet others that strategic focus and horse polls func-

argue a race

tion positive by increasing the American public’s atten-

a way, tion issue information and political knowledge. Zhao and Beske

to

conclude that of opinion polls complimentary to issue

coverage

‘° Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha. 1995. Political Advertising in Western Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

2°Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. Spiral Cynicism: The Pressand the Public Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

21Thomas E. Patterson. 1993. Out ofOrder. New York: Vintage.

22Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. Spiral ofCynicism. The Pressand the Public Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 139.

PIPPA NORRIS

stimulating rather than displacing attention.

coverage, seems

equally plausible that what matters for electoral participation

what the polls the of their In

report, not extent coverage per se. Britain, for example, Heath and Taylor found that the closeness of

the monitored by reported opinion polls, of the best

race, as one predictors of turnout. Neck—and-neck increased the

contests incentive In addition, the effects of negative not

to vote. news are well established. In the British for example, large-scale

context, experiments in the 1997 election demonstrated that to

exposure negative television about the major parties had influence

news no

images propensity whereas positive did

on party or to vote, news have significant impact voterszs.

a on

Therefore need further understand the effects of

we to go to

political communications public participation. Since most of

on the research has been conducted within the of American

context campaigns, which atypical of established democracies,

are most

useful reexamine the evidence in broader of post-in-

to a range dustrial societies. This study focuses political participation in

on European elections, which allow explore the effects of

us to campaign communications the fifteen member states, control-

across ling for of the major cultural and the structural factors al-

some ready discussed. Political participation involves different

many

of activity, from contacting representatives to becoming

types ac-

tive in community organizations, political parties, interest

or

23Xinshu Zhao and Glen L. Beske. 1998. Horse-Race Polls and Audience Issue Learning." The Harvard International journal Press/Politics. 34: 13- 34; Philip Meyer and Deborah Potter. 1998. Pre-election Polls and Issue Knowledge in the 1996 U.S.Presidential Election. The Harvard International journal Press/Politics. 34:35—43. 23Denis McQuail. 1992. Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest. London: Sage. P. 17. 2‘ Anthony Heath and Bridget Taylor. 1999. Turnout and Registration. In Critical Elections: Voters and Parties in Long-term Perspective, Edited by Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris. London: Sage.

SeePippa Norris et al. 1999. On Message:Communicating the Campaign. London: Sage.Chapter

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

In this study focus comparing of

groups. we on voter turnout, one the least demanding forms of activity but also of

one the most universal. For people, casting the ballot provides their only

many

form of political expression. This also comparable

measure

established democracies, unlike involvement in parties across or interest that different things in different

groups may mean Very institutional settings.

Political Communications and Electoral Turnout

As noted earlier, the level of voting participation fell from almost two-thirds of the electorate the first direct elections

in 1979 to just under half of European citizens in June 1999. Can the

news media campaigns be blamed for the downward trend in

or party European participation Theories of Videomalaise that

suggest those who most exposed the media and/or

were to news party

should the cynical and disenchanted with messages prove most Europe. Yet the of campaign information

we compare sources for those who reported Voting in the 1994 European elections, contrary to the Videomalaise thesis, positive relationship evi-

a dent: those who something about the campaign

saw newspapers and television, who received election leaflet

or an or saw party advertising, likely to cast ballot Table 2. All the

were more a see zero-order correlations with the exception of being contacted by

party worker proved significant. In the between

a many cases gap

and proved modest but the of voters non-voters case newspaper readers the reached 10 percentage points.

gap

PIPPA NORRIS

Table 2. Political Communications and Voting Participation, 1994

% Who said campaign came to their Not Voted Voted Zero order Sig.

Source:EuropeanElectionStudy1994,Eurobarometer41.1N.13,095.

T0 whether this relationship held to multivariate analysis,

see up regression models in 1989, 1994 and 1999 predicting

was run voting using the standard structural, attitudinal and national-

turnout level controls. This includes education, and income the latter

age

for SES, which have most commonly been found to be as a proxy associated with turnout, along with political interest measured by propensity discuss politics. The results in Table 3 confirm that,

to

previous studies have found, and income proved as many age

predictors of turnout, along with political interest. The strong

generation particularly to stay home. In contrast younger prone the gender in has shrunk the become

gap turnout over years to insignificant while education measured restricted scale

on a proved inconsistent. National factors also proved important, with below-average reported in Britain, the Netherlands, Por-

turnout tugal and Ireland, already shown in official aggregate

a pattern figures Table As noted earlier, the legal and institutional

such the of compulsory voting, provides by far the

context, as use

convincing explanation for these national contrasts. After most social controls included, all the forms of political communi-

were

cation proved significant and positive, including of

use newspapers, television/ radio and campaign activity. The strength of these

party factors did these models, because of func-

vary across in part tionally equivalent but different of media attention, but

measures all pointed in the direction. The replication of these models

same in successive elections increases confidence in the reliability of

our the results.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

Table Predictors of Voting Participation, 1989-99

Voted the Si Votedin the Si Intentionto Vote Sig

European g European g theEuropean

Elections Elections Elections

1989EU10 1994EU10 1999EU15 STRUCTURAL Education -.04 .01 .07 Gender -.01 .01 .01 Age .21 " .24 .10 "‘ Income .04 " .05 .08 " ATTITUDINAL Politicalinterest/discuss .10 " .17 " 1 "" Left-RightIdeology -.02 .01 ‘" .06 " ATTENTIONT0 TVNewsscale .13 " .04 ‘ .07 "" Newspaperscale 1 "" .04 .07 "‘ PartyCommunications .07 "‘ .10 "" Notavailable NATION Belgium .13 .06 .09 Denmark -.04 -.11 " .05 Germany .02 -.08 "" -.12 "" Ireland .06 -.15 "" .03 Italy .11 .03 "‘ .09 " Luxembourg .08 " .05 " .03 Netherlands -.02 -.16 " -.07 "" Portugal -.05 -.13 .02 Spain .01 -.01 .03 UK -.10 " -.21 " -.11 " Austria -.06 Finland -.01 Sweden -.13 "" Constant .29 .17 3.01 R2 .16 .18 .15 Note:ThefiguresrepresentOLSstandardizedregressioncoefficientsbetas.Votingturnout the lastcolumnusesa 5-pointscalecombiningwhethertherespondentreportedvoting 1994EU electionsandtheirintentiontovote the1999EUelections,measuredMarch-May1999. Sources:EuropeanPost-ElectionSurvey,June-July1989,Eurobarometer31A;EuropeanElection Study1994Eurobarometer41.1.M13095;EurobarometerSpring51.0 1999.

We find evidence for the claim that those exposed

no most to news

during the campaign demobilized the experience.

coverage were

Yet interpretations of these findings remain interpretation.

open to

Does media attention to the campaign which sequentially prior

lead to turnout Or does general propensity lead

a to turnout to media attention because I want to cast vote, I seek

my out information about the parties and Elsewhere,

candidates in a

extended I that the plausible more treatment, argue most interpretation of this evidence that there virtuous circle

a

PIPPA NORRIS

where watching the activates existing predispositions and

news

tendencies lead people the news. prior to turn on

Table Evaluations of TV Campaign News by Turnout, 1989

agreementwithstatement... Voted R Sig %Mentioned Nptd

voe stands Europeanquestions 6 18 .16 "" showedmewheremyparty on make mindhowtovote 3 12 .14 helpedme upmy aboutthefutureof Europe 10 15 .07 ‘ helpedmethink differencesbetweenpartieson European 6 10 .07 brought out the

matters Commission 5 8 .07 "‘ toldmehowtheEuropean run relationshipbetweenmy countriesparties 5 9 .07 " told meaboutthe

andthose othercountries abouttheadvantages...ofbeing theEU 16 16 .01 didnttellme should abouttheEuropeanparliament 13 12 -.01 " didntshowmewhyI care confused 19 15 -.04 "" Ieflmefeelingrather boring 21 15 -.06 allseemedrather

‘Thinkingespeciallyhowthecampaignwascoveredontelevision,whichofthesestatements Note:Q wouldyousayyouagreewith‘

R ZeroOrderCorrelationbetweenTVuseandstateme

Source:EuropeanPost-ElectionSurvey,June-July1989,Eurobarometer31A.

be resolved here with cross—sectional data but These issues cannot

of the behind this look at to explore some reasons pattern we can

how people evaluated series of concerning television a statements

of the 1989 campaign. Table 4 shows that compared with coverage

those who did significantly more likely to not turnout, voters were

that TV showed them where their stood report coverage party on

Europe, helped make their mind how and highlighted up to vote,

differences. This the idea, which Paul Lazarsfeld party supports

argued fifty that the attentive the information years ago, use on

the help crystallize their voting choices. In contrast, nonnews to

feel that left them feeling voters were more prone to coverage

confused bored. or

26SeePippa Norris. Fall 2000. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in

Post-Industrial Societies.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

Conclusions and Implications

Why should consistently find positive link between electoral we a turnout and attention to the media There three possible news are

answers.

One interpretation that those who predisposed

are most to participate for whatever could well be interested

reason more

keeping with affairs in the the direction of up current news, so causation could be from attitudes of the one-way, to use news media. This View consistent with the uses and gratification

literature, which that of the media reflect suggests uses mass prior predispositions the audience: people who love football turn to the results, people who invest check the business and sports pages, people interested in politics read eds about and op government

public policy.

Another could be that the of watching answer process or reading about public affairs whatever increases inte-

for reason our

rest in, and knowledge about, and

government politics, thereby facilitating political participation. The watch read,

more we or this interpretation, the learn. News habits be caused more we can factors such leisure and schedumany as patterns broadcasting les: people catch the because after popular may news comes on a sit—com, because radio stations air headline between music or news clips, or because the household subscribes home delivery of to a newspaper. In this view, the direction of causality would again be

but this running from prior habits one—way, case news to our

subsequent political attitudes and knowledge.

Both these Views could logically make of the associations sense establish. One the other could be we or true. not possible to resolve the direction of causality from cross—sectional surveys taken point time. But plausible and convinat one seems more cing to assume a two way-interactive This conclusion process. arthat in the long-term, like the socialization in the gues process family workplace, there well be virtuous circle where or may a

"Jay G. Blumler and Elihu Katz. Eds. 1974. The Uses of Mass Communications: Current Perspectives Gratifications Research. Beverly Hills, CA: on Sage.

PIPPA NORRIS

the media and campaigns activate the active. news party serve to Those interested and knowledgeable most attention to most pay Learning about public affairs reduces the bar-

political news. more

further civic In this interpretation, the ratchet riers to engagement. of reinforcement thereby in direction that healthy for moves a

democratic participation.

the media has far less reinforce the In contrast, news power to of the disengaged, because, given the availabi-

disengagement easy

of the multiple alternatives available, and minimal political

lity now

interest, when presented with about politics and current news

affairs this habitually likely off,

group more to turn over, turn or surf another web the disengaged do catch the to page. news, little attention. And they do attention, they are likely to pay pay likely mistrust media of information. they are more to sources political inoculates against their

Repeatedly tuning out messages This theory provides plausible and coherent potential impact. a

interpretation of why the and broadcasters have a negapress may bias in of the EU and those who attention to tive coverage yet pay the media remain engaged than those who do not news more watch read. What here the characteristics of how or matters are sift, and in the media, rather than people sort use messages news

simply passively and uncritically absorbing the messages an over—simple stimulus—response model.

Claims of videomalaise methodologically flawed that are so best the Scottish verdict, at worse they are at unproven, to use or result often blaming the messenger for false. As a too we are ills of the body politic. This not just more deep—rooted matters, because need understand the real of civic disengagewe to causes advance knowledge, but also because the diament to our correct

has serious implications for public policy choices. Blaming gnosis

the deeply conservative strategy, blocking

messenger can prove a

effective institutional reforms.

generalize broadly from these results, they sug-

we can more that communications thereby reinforce the

gest campaign may

division between those who in and from public tune tune out affairs. Some people will have civic skills, social networks, more and interest find about in Brussels Luxembourg, to out events or

BLAMING THE MESSENGER

and their accordingly. The institutional also to cast vote context does important for electoral and devices like seem turnout, com-

pulsory voting and Sunday polling days raise levels of partici-

can pation. But the evidence here that of public suggests coverage affairs the traditional media should be blamed for news not broader inequalities in educational skills socio-economic or resources common throughout post-industrial societies. The erosion of turnout EU elections therefore best be

can explained

changes of other factors, such the institutional a range as context for voting, the role of mobilizing agencies such

as political

parties in activating the performance of the EU major support, on issues like unemployment and economic growth, and the rational

incentives ballot perceive major differento cast a voters cannot between political parties of the issues ces on many core facing Europe. There problems how the media are news covers Europe, in particular lack of stories about routine policy a most matters like regional aid jobs combined with or programmes, a systematic negative bias in the and television that newspaper coverage provided issues such the euro. Nevertheless often the on as news media blamed the rather than as messenger, confronting more

deep-rooted problems in how citizens with the European

connect Union.

28SeePippa Norris. Fall 2000. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post—Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

To Share Democratic

Between

Legitimacy

Different Political Levels

Hans Agné‘

though democracy about equally shared between Even power, democratic procedures have controlled than citizens, never more of the exercised in society. To understand demoparts power any thus the relation between the unit in which demo-

we study

cracy thought take place and other units where power exercracy to cised, democratically The question I would like to pose or not. the division of between the European union and concerns power its member-states. Given preference for high turnout in general a and its effect in democratic legitimacy: Which elections possible

power-division preferable I start making two assumptions:

the why there general interest the the first answers question a level of the second the question why citizens turnout; answers then by discussing how and democratic vote. I proceed turnout affected by power-division between less

legitimacy are more or

focusing the European union and its

democratic organisations, on

member-states.

The author doctor student Department of political science at at Stockholm university.

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICALLEVELS

Why are we interested citizens participation general elec-

tions A social scientist could be that in answer turnout general elections good indicator of the for the

a popular support politi-

cal system other politically relevant quality. That or some answer

fair enough for explaining the interest of social scientist. a How-

the in general elections interesting

ever, turnout only as an indicator of the popular for the support political system, and not itself important for the popular than outside support, no one social science need to bother about the political debate would

focus the real problem, that lack of

on a supposed popular

support for the political and time the system, not waste any on instrument for studying the problem, which the mere turnout. Thus, first explain the for our answer can not concern turnout general elections found in the political sphere, and have so we to put the question again. Why interested citizens particiare we

pation general elections

A second would be that democracy impossible citianswer zens don’t vote. Even though this probably could

answer explain

of the interest citizens

some common participation in general

elections, it’s sufficient. adopt representative elitist not you a or conception of democracy which I believe people do — most —v0ting citizens condition for democracy. What not a necessary a necessary condition for representative democracy the

possibility

for all citizens to vote free and fair elections. Of course one

could the voting—possibility be only formal, and

suspect to not real, there extremely low the elecan turnout, as European tions, that citizens prevented from to say: are voting some invisible of determining society. But such structure power a

marxist interpretation would require judgement, be

extra can’t accepted a priori, judgement which hasn’t been made the Swea dish debate. So the idea that

democracy impossible citizens

dont vote, can’t fully question why there answer our a general interest turnout general elections, long of as as some us are neither marxists participatory democrats. nor To understand the interest in in eleccommon turnout general tions I would third the former propose a answer, complementing

ones, saying that participation in general elections has

a common

HANS AGNE

interest because its assumed improve underpin the legitito or

of the In weberian understanding of legi-

macy political system. a

timacy 1991:6 that would citizen participating

Beetham mean: a

general election will extent than not participaa to a greater

believe in the justifiability of the political authority. the ting

citizens justification of the authority from democratic prinstems and belief that actual conditions sufficiently conforms to

ciples a

these principles, then in addition qualify the legitimacy as we can democratic The higher the the deeper and

legitimacy. turnout,

widespread becomes the conviction of the citizens that polimore

tical decision—making justified and democratically justified. The

are the the higher the expected level of democratic higher turnout,

legitimacy. That’s first assumption.

my There least for the view that participation a two reasons

general elections improves democratic legitimacy. First, participa-

in elections have informative and educational tion general can an

effect. The of choosing political and confirming

procedure a party

the choice with the ballot, while following the political debate, can work fast in political science and democratic theory, as a course

what democracy about, the obligations and rights of learning

its strengths and weaknesses. Given that the citizen

democracy, are

situated democratic culture and political order such informain a tion and deliberation expected increase the democratic legiare to of the its democratic justifiability according to the timacy system, citizens. Second, and View important, participation in to my more elections improves democratic legitimacy because can

general one

between democratic praxis and

reasonably assume a spill—over con-

viction. individual behaves like subject of the democratic an a

decision—making procedure, that he she makes political

or a choice and walks the ballot box, the democratic principles are to become deeply embedded in that This expected to more person.

would in deeper understanding for the majority prin-

turn create a and accordingly that minority has also the deciciple, a to accept

has voted against. Thus, participating in general elections

sion

yield democratic legitimacy the political order.

are expected to to

To the relation between in the European union

explore turnout

and its member-states and its supposed in democonsequences —

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS

cratic legitimacy need know what determines the

—we to voting

behaviour. Why do people vote Of I can’t this course answer

question fully and seriously. During the last days have

two we discussed different explanations, but taken

together as one single

model these explanations fare complex for theoreare too to use a tical analysis about the relation between democratic

legitimacy on

the national and the European level. What do then My solution to a well-known in political science: when reality complex too and don’t know how handle you to you turn to a ideal—type rational choice—model. Of the model should be understood course as

elaborated hypothesis and justified explanation.

an not a However, the interest of rational—choice analysis only theoretical, a not as the idea of citizen rationally calculating the political

a importance of voting non-voting underlying of or an assumption a large

number of in public debate My intention take arguments to these existing and influential further. arguments a step A rationalistic the question why do people answer to vote — would be that people because they political influence, vote want because they influence political the

want to decision-making or

of political decisi0n—making. According the rationa-

scope to same listic hypothesis people don when believe that

vote they voting

makes too little political difference, that is: when the of

cost voting

higher than its benefits, when for example voting takes too much time and compared the gains of voting in of energy to terms influence.

Before I explain the relation between different demogo on to cratic organisations sharing the citizens I the same want to sum up

explanative assumptions made far.

so

2In this find others pursued group we among many an argument chairman Bengt Göranssons, saying that low the European a turnout elections expected of the important questions of as one most any political election, whether the will posed or not government stay, never in the campaigns of the European elections due the

which to

constitutional limitations of the European parliament. the elections

were about something important the implies that more argument turnout would increase.

HANS AGNE

Diagram A hypothesis

Desire for Participation Democratic

political influence in elections legitimacy

What the diagram first: that the citizens decision to vote or says depends the citizens desire for political influence at not to vote on minimal individual effort, and second: that the voting-act results a

political legitimacy, which be specified democratic legiti-

can as because of its democratic principles and procedumacy source

res.

citizens because they political influence the turnout vote want general elections supposed increase when adding more comto and the organisation given that it’s the elected

petencies power to

body which controls the rather: that citizens benew powers, or lieve so. As there limited number of citizens and each a votes, becomes important when the organisation gains power, vote more and the motivation for voting thereby strengthened. This idea

be illustrated in diagram. can a

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICALLEVELS

Diagram One democratic organisation, A

Turnout elections of the organisation A

Power/competencies of

the organisation A

Note that have begun different organisa-

we not yet to compare tions. Both axis describe the unit, organisation A. We

same try to capture only what expected to happen in single democratic

one organisation when the and competencies of the organisa-

powers

tion expanded. And what happens that expected

are turnout to increase.

stopped the analysis by here would certainly conclude,

we we that the solution the problem of low in the elections of

to turnout the European parliament transfer the Parlia-

to more power to ment, either from the member-states from other political insti-

or tutions at the international level, including the institutions of the European union. That also recommendation for

a common reducing the democratic problems of the union. For example of

one the celebrities this field, Joseph Weiler, professor of

European law, has suggested that the European parliament should have

power to take financial decisions which today exerci-

—a power

HANS AGNE

sed in the member-states in order make the citizens in-

- to more terested what the Parliament doing Weiler 1999:355. the European parliament could decide about the of the citizens

money then the citizens would be interested vote, according

more to Weilers We will however take the analysis bit further

argument. a and check the conclusion stable.

In what could other organisation, call organisation

way some

differ from the first organisation A In this ideal-type diagram

the only thing that the inclination of the graph. So what

can Vary

could happen that organisation B has the following relation

an between and the of the organisation.

turnout power

Diagram One democratic organisation, which has citizens

more OR veto points than organisation A

more

Turnout elections of the organisation B

Power/competencies of

the organisation B

Or could think of organisation where the Variation in turn-

we an

smaller, this organisation C. out even as

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS

Diagram One democratic organisation, C, which has citizens

more AND veto points than organisation A

more

Turnout elections of the organisation C

Power/competencies of

the organisation

How could explain the differences between organisation A, B

We and C we want to stay the rational-choice perspective there are at least two explanations for such differences. The first explanation the size of the of citizens. The second

system, terms the number of points the decision-making procedure of the

veto organisation. I comment shortly each of them.

on

According rational—choice assumption the size of the

to our

system expected to have negative impact all other

are a on turnout,

things equal. The negative impact expected because

on turnout

increasing the number of citizens implies decreasing of

a amount political influence for each of them, and the incentive for Voting

thereby weakened. Note the "all other things equal assumption.

The system size often thought have positive impact

to a on system capacity, which could neutralise the negative impact of increa-

HANS AGNE

sing the number of citizens. All such realistic consequences very

excluded from this ideal—type diagram.

are The second explanation the differences turnout between to organisation A, B and C the difference in the number of veto

points in each organisation. The point decision-

veto a stage a making procedure where the decision be blocked. The number can of points between different organisations. For veto can vary

example, in monist democracy where antique Athens

a — pro-

bably the example the political forum could not

most extreme as

only legislate but also judge and directly their decisions

execute — there only point. All that needed for social act to one veto a become decision the collective moment and a say at one one place. This example could be contrasted with experiences from

international negotiations where the final has to be ratioutcome fied in national parliaments before the proposal becomes decia sion, that is: before the decision into in this example comes power; there point there national parliaments, are as many veto as are or there might be also constitutional and international even more, as courts. Now, there veto points in an organisation are many rather than few, there will be less decisions taken, all other things equal, least: the decision-making will take time and or at more reand thus be less efficient. The probability that certain sources a decision will be taken given time decreases, when the at a opportunities block the decision increases. As the number of to veto

points decreases decision-efficiency, the number of points

veto also expected decrease turnout general elections; as partiare to cipating the elections of efficient organisation intean more resting citizen who seeks maximise his her political influto to or than participation in the elections of inefficient organisaence, an tion. This holds for all kinds of points, but of the veto veto some points controlled by elected bodies the problem are not more

the veto point then act more independently.

severe, as can The European union has points than its membermore veto the number of points in the union between states, even veto vary

different policy The decision—making from

areas. process vary regulating the market, where there at least three veto common are points the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of mi- —

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS

nisters to decisions the of the European union, — on competence which takes ratification in the national parliaments. The in turnout the elections the European parliament should reach lower level to a because of the Veto-points, compared institutional to an set—up

with less veto-points.

From normative democratic perspective, the points of a veto

the European union problematic. By adding points

are veto to a

democratic decision—making procedure, the organisation gives more resistance to majority of citizens supporting political

a a change. Instead of treating all possible alternatives alike, decia

sion—making procedure with veto points favours

many status quo, which implies bias of conservative ideology violating the

a thus

idea of politically neutral decision—making procedure. This dea mocratic problem holds for all kinds of points. But the veto European union there further problems: 1 there only are two veto point which directly elected other having one the ones their legitimacy mainly from non-democratic sources; 2 the

formation of public opinion against and of the politics

support

pursued by the European parliament, hampered by linguistic,

organisational and maybe cultural constraints. That turnout

lower organisation C than organisation A because its higher number of veto-points, could thus be re-phrased saying that

turnout lower in organisation C than in organisation A because C less democratic than A.

Let’s turn to the comparison between in different now turnout democratic units.

3The relation complex between in the elections the Euroturnout to pean parliament and the internal points of the Council of Ministers. veto the Council of Ministers reaches decision, its number of points a veto could actually increase the influence of the Euro parliament, the as internal veto points weakens the Council of Ministers and thereby makes easier for the.Parliament to gain for its position bargain support a with the Council. the Council of Ministers however doesn’t reach a decision, the number of internal veto points will decrease the interest of the European parliament, cant influence the situation. as

HANS AGNE

Diagram Two democratic organisations, A and in the political system sharing the citizens/voters

same

Turnout e ctions of the organis ion A

Power ompetencies of

the orga isation B

and competence which added to organisation B taken from Premise: Every power organisation A.

This time have organisation A the vertical axis and organi-

we on sation B the horizontal axis. For the have also

on moment we

included simplification, premise that and

a a says: every power

which added organisation B taken from organi-

competence to

Will depart from this simplification. But for

sation A. Later on we the sake of lucidity I with simple model. It’s not much to

start a

about this diagram. have defined -in the premise the say As we —

of organisation B what taken from organisation A, the

power as graph should be inverted. The more power or competencies to or-

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS

ganisation B from organisation A, the lower expected turnout

organisation A.

Now take look diagram which includes the a at a turnout two democratic units in the political same system.

Diagram Two democratic organisations with the relevant same Characteristics, A:I and A:2

Turnout both A:1 and A:2

Power/competencies of the organisation A:1

Premise: Every power and competence which added to organisation A:1 taken from organisation A:2.

Given that the organisations alike relevant number are aspects — of citizens and number of points should veto —we expect a symmetrical trade off between the the democratic units. turnout two What gain in unit will lose in the other. Of you one you course we should be that the overall capacity probably aware system not the when competencies and taken from unit same power are one to the other in the political But for still time same system. some we stay with the ideal-type premise of the diagram.

HANS AGNE

We to the rather predictable comparison, between

now come

less democratic units that differs from each other in two more or aspects relevant for the level of turnout. Take for example

a comparison between the organisations A and which have

we pre-

viously identified, the provocative comparison between

or more

organisation A and C.

Diagram Two less democratic organisations, A and B. B

more or bas eit/Jer citizens than A veto points

more or more

Turnout both A and B

B

A

Power/competencies of

the organisation A

Premise: Every power and competence which added to organisation A taken from organisation B.

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENTPOLITICAL LEVELS

Diagram Two less democratic organisations, A and C. C

more or bas bot/a citizens than A and veto points

more more

Turnout both A and C

A

C

Power/competencies of

the organisation A

Premise: Every power and competence which added to organisation A taken from organisation C.

To make the situation obvious turn this diagram

even more we can around and place organisation C on the horizontal axis instead of organisation A, while keeping the relation between the

same two.

HANS AGNE

Diagram Two less democratic organisations, A and C. C

more or bas both citizens than A and veto points

more more

Turnout both and C

Power ompetencies of

the orga sation C

Premise: Every power and competence which added to organisation C taken from organisation A.

In this diagram easily that it’s irrational transfer

we can see to any

from A to want to maximise turnout in power or you general election. Yes, transferring and competencies from

power organisation A C B will yield higher turnout in C but

to or a or doing this will lose turnout in A than win in C B.

you more you or

As small central state like for example Sweden

a most resembling to A, and the large European union with several veto

points resembling C, have reached quite dif-

most to we now a ferent conclusion than the simple drawn by Weiler. His

more one point that increase of and of the Euro-

was an power competence

parliament would solve of the democratic shortcomings pean some of the union. At this rather that increasing the

moment we say

of the European parliament would the democratic power worsen

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICAL LEVELS

shortcomings of the union, though at the national level, long

as as the competencies and transferred the European parlia-

powers to

from national parliaments bodies controlled ment comes or these.

But this conclusion also premature. The premise saying that

— every power and competence added to organisation A taken

from organisation C for all expansions of and

— not true power

competencies the European parliament. It’s thus time

to problematize the premise and differ between policy where

areas we believe that the premise and policy where believe

true areas we

the premise be false. I shall give presumptive

to try to a answer to

this question.

What trying to identify situation where the

we are a power and competencies of democratic unit be expanded, with-

one can

negative effects the other democratic unit. We thus out any on look for situation with the following

a structure.

HANS AGNE

Diagram I Two less democratic organisations, A and C. C more or bas both citizens than A and veto points more more

Turnout both A and C

C L

Power/competencies of the organisation C

Premise: No and competence which added to organisation C taken from power organisation A.

Where find this T0 the of Robert Dahl this can we use term would be find in where the alienated, and structure areas power delegated, from the democratic units Dahl 1982:6, 47-53. not the isn’t democratically controlled, then be power at present can added another political level with negative effects turnout to no on and democratic legitimacy. I will take three popular examples of this kind of which commonly believed need another power, are to political level than the nation—state for its effective implementation.

The first example found security policy. According to a

popular realist thesis the European integration taken forward the necessity for nation-states they succeed to co—operate are to protecting their citizens from Put in another until the war. way: European integration, in the modern of this the sense term, secu-

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICALLEVELS

rity policy of the European nation—states disaster of inefficiwas a ency. During less than Germany and France fighted seventy years

against each other three So, the security policy

Wars. transferred the European level, that would decrease to not turnout national elections, this policy couldn’t be effectively pursued as on the national level anyway.

The problem here that all countries have had such bad not a efficiency security policy. Sweden hasn’t fought since a war 1809. You can accuse Sweden for having immoral security an policy during the second world and also for hiding its agenda War, after the But measured its goal its citizens war. to protect — from the policy has been efficient. might then be aggressors — difficult to convince Swede that his her really has lost the a or state

possibility to pursue an efficient security policy.

The second example found environmental policy. Pollu-

tion’s of air and easily be taken from nation water can one to

another; the holds for global heating. According simple

same to a Prisoners Dilemma logic that where individually — no state acts all states need for solving problem this could as to act a common — be serious problem for the nation—states and might thus

a require

international level for effective This probably an governance. true. One problem however, that environmental issues, though

important and requiring international co—operation, might need a

political level both above the European, and below. some cases, For example, to rise the problem—solving—capacity of environmen-

tal policy in Sweden, its citizens need with citizens to co—operate the Baltic Russia, Poland, Germany, England, US and states, China, but the with the European citizens not to same extent Greece and Spain.

The third example found economic policy. The globalisa-

tion of capital and factors of production often said limit for to

example the tax-capacity of the nation—states. capital,

persons and factors of production easily exit from certain jurisdiccan a tion, state will them higher than other, which theoretino tax any cally would yield race the bottom of taxation these a to on taxbases. As the free of capital, services and movement persons, commodities intensive inside the European union than more

HANS AGNE

outside, the union be feasible organisation for retaking seems to a of the lost mobile bases. This should not some power to tax tax affect the national elections, long the tax—power turnout as as couldn’t be exercised nationally This time the problem anyway. that such hard for the member—states to agree matters seem very Even there today social democrats in thirteen of fifteen on. member—state which by ideogovernment, governments are not

logy opposed public tax—capacity, the radical decision

to most up the code of conduct, taken by the Council of Ministers till now late 1997; and that far less radical than the tax—competencies

of mobile tax-bases which are discussing now. we S0, the conclusion from this three examples security, envi- — ronmental and economic policy that there competencies — are and which could be transferred the European union, power to or competencies which has already been transferred, without decrea-

sing the national elections, the powers are not conturnout as trolled by the national parliaments But have also anyway. we observed problems in each example, implying that the short-

comings of democratic legitimacy in the European union will not

be satisfactorily solved by following the political implication of

this analysis. Finally then, simple the initial question

my very answer to — about when it’s better divide two levels, or worse to a system measured of democratic legitimacy that divi-

against a norm — a

sion better when the public that policies be effectively purcan sued level but all the other. And this criterion on one not at on fulfilled, should keep decision-making the level not we power on with lowest possible number of citizens and Veto points, we maximise democratic legitimacy. To improve turnout it’s want to also directly elected bodies that should have decisionof course when competencies transferred higher level. making power are to a

TO SHARE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLITICALLEVELS

Refe ren ces Beetham, David 1991 The Legitimation Power. Houndmills:

Macmillan Education LTD Dahl, Robert A. 1982 Dilemmas Plumlist Democracy. New

Haven: Yale University Press Weiler, Joseph 1999 Tbe Constitution Europe.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

3 .

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Demokratins räckvidd. Dokumentation från ett seminarium SOU 1998:55 En god affär i Motala. Journalisternas avslöjanden och läsarnas etik SOU 1998:63 Att rösta med händerna. Om stormöten, folkomröstningar och direktdemokrati i Schweiz SOU 1998:85 Gör barn till medborgare Om barn och demokrati under 1900-talet SOU 1998:97 Det unga medborgarskapet. Dokumentation från ett seminarium SOU 1998:101 Lekmannastyre i experternas tid. Dokumentation från ett seminarium SOU 1998:102 Demokrati på europeisk nivå SOU 1998:124 Läsarna och demokratin. Ett brev till det läsande Sverige SOU 1998:134 Lokala Demokratiexperiment. Exempel och analyser SOU 1998:155 10. På Marginalen. En intervjubok från Socialtjänstutredningen SOU 1998:161

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27. Olydiga medborgare SOU1999:101 28. Demokratins förgörare SOU 1999:10 29. Civilsamhället som demokratins arena. Några

kritiska reflektioner SOU 1999:112 30. Demokrati på remiss SOU 1999:144 31. Vad hände med Sveriges ekonomi efter 1970

SOU 1999:150 32. Citizen Participation in European Politics

Den parlamentariskt sammansatta Demokratiutredningen analyserar den svenska folkstyrelsens förutsättningar inför 2000-talet. Det sker i ljuset av bl.a. globaliseringen, Eumedlemskapet, förändringarna i medielandskapet, den nya IT-tekniken, förnyelsearbetet inom offentlig förvaltning, folkrörelsernas förändringar och det sjunkande Valdeltagandet. Vid sekelskiftet ska utredningen presentera en sammanvägd analys etti slutbetänkande.

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Democracy within EU the light of the 1999 EUP-elections

Member of Cabinet Britta Lejon, Ministry of Justice Why some People vote and Others do not

Professor Cees van deer Eijk, Universiteit van Amsterdam European Parliament Elections. Institutions. Attitudes and Participation

Professor Richard Sinnot, University College Dublin Integration and Statehood the European Union. The distribution of Powers Between the EU and the Member States

Professor Brigid Laffan, University college Dublin The architecture of EUInstitutions and Citizen Participation

Professor Hermann Schmitt, MZEs,Universit5t a Mannheim v

Blaming the Messenger Political Communications and Tornout

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